L 

x  n 


NOT  A  PERIODICAL 

POLITICAL 
SCIENCE 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 

SOCIAL  SCIENCES 


VOL.  VII  SEPTEMBER,  1918  No.  3 


BOARD  OF  EDITORS 

ERNEST  L.  BOGART  JOHN  A.  FAIRLJE 

LAURENCE  M.  LARSON 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

UNDEK  THE  AUSPICES  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

URBANA,  ILLINOIS 


COPYRIGHT,  1918 
BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


The  American  Municipal  Executive 


RUSSELL  McCULLOCH  STORY,  PH.D. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  IN  AMERICAN  CITIES 9 

CHAPTEE  II 

THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY   ....  16 

ENGLISH  ANTECEDENTS 16 

IN  COLONIAL  TIMES 21 

SINCE  COLONIAL  TIMES 23 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  MAYORAL  CONSTITUTION  TODAY 37 

QUALIFICATIONS 37 

NOMINATION  AND  ELECTION 44 

REMOVAL  FROM  OFFICE 52 

THE  TERM  OF  OFFICE  ..." 61 

THE  FILLING  OF  VACANCIES 63 

SALARIES  AND  BOND 67 

INDUCTION  INTO  OFFICE 70 

MISCELLANEOUS  FEATURES 71 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION 73 

GENERAL  AUTHORITY 74 

POWER  OF  APPOINTMENT 78 

POWER  OF  REMOVAL 87 

POWER  OF  SUSPENSION .92 

POWER  OF  INVESTIGATION     ........  94 

REPORTS  AND  CONFERENCES 98 

ON  BOARDS  AND  COMMISSIONS 99 

POWER  OF  APPROVAL 100 

PUBLIC  SAFETY 102 

FINANCE  ADMINISTRATION    . 105 

JUDICIAL  ADMINISTRATION 106 

MISCELLANEOUS  POWERS 108 

GENERAL  ESTIMATE 110 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION 114 

THE  MAYOR  AND  THE  COUNCIL     .  .     *        .        .        .        .        .  114 

GENERAL  STATUS   .        .        .        ....        .        .        .  115 

LEGAL  POWERS 119 

ENACTMENT  OF  LEGISLATION        .        .        .        .  '      .        .  128 

APPROVAL  AND  VETO      .        .        .        .        ,        .  131 


EXTRA-LEGAL  INFLUENCE      .        .        ....        .        .  139 

STATE  LEGISLATION       .        .        .        ...        .        .        .  144 

CHAPTEE  VI 

THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS .        .        .  149 

CHAPTEB  VII 

THE  PERSONALITY  OP  THE  MAYOR       .    "    *• 163 

CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER 181 

CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONERSHIP        .        .        .  182 

QUALIFICATIONS 183 

How  CHOSEN 184 

REMOVAL  FROM  OFFICE 186 

TERM  OF  OFFICE 187 

THE  FILLING  OF  VACANCIES 187 

SALARIES 189 

MISCELLANEOUS  FEATURES 190 

THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  AND  ADMINISTRATION        .        .        .  191 

THE  STRONGER  MAYOR  TYPE 191 

THE  "STRONG"  MAYOR  vs.  THE  ORDINARY  MAYOR       .        .  193 

As    COMMISSIONER 194 

THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  AND  LEGISLATION      ....  195 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CITY  MANAGER 199 

THE  MAYORALTY 199 

THE  CITY  MANAGERSHIP 204 

THE  MANAGER  AND  ADMINISTRATION 210 

THE  MANAGER  AND  LEGISLATION 218 

CONCLUSIONS  221 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  EXECUTIVE  OFFICE  IN  AMERICAN  CITIES 

For  half  a  century  popular  interest  in  city  government  in  this 
country  has  centered  in  the  person  and  office  of  the  municipal 
executive.  Both  in  matters  of  policy  and  of  administration  he 
has  commanded  confidence  to  a  far  greater  degree  than  has  the 
organ  of  legislation,  the  council.  The  result  has  been  the  rapid 
decline  of  the  latter  and  a  corresponding  growth  in  the  power 
and  position  of  the  executive.  Not  even  the  newer  forms  of 
municipal  organization  have  successfully  stemmed  the  drift  to- 
ward executive  domination.  Mayors,  commissioners,  and  man- 
agers continue  to  attract  the  public  interest  in  their  plans  and 
activities  while  councils  and  commissions  are  passively  tolerated 
as  necessary  but  unworthy  of  sustained  attention. 

The  weakness  of  municipal  government  in  this  country  has 
long  been  bound  up  with  the  condition  of  the  municipal  council, 
tho  obviously  not  with  that  alone.  The  weakness  of  the  legis- 
lative organ  as  an  object  of  citizen  interest  has  seemed  to  be 
fundamental.  Whether  due  to  bicameral  organization,  to  the 
council's  lack  of  power,  to  legislative  interference,  to  the  ward 
system,  to  the  long  ballot,  to  the  executive  veto,  to  traditions  of 
a  corrupt  and  inefficient  past,  or  to  these  and  other  reasons  in 
combination,  the  condition  is  one  that  apparently  is  of  more  vital 
concern  and  is  much  more  difficult  to  solve  than  is  any  deficiency 
in  administration.  The  American  city  seemingly  has  not  devoted 
to  this  situation  the  attention  it  deserves.  Neither  home  rule, 
commission  government,  manager  government,  the  short  ballot, 
the  abolition  of  wards,  nor  any  of  the  many  other  reforms  of 
recent  years  have  revived  the  municipal  council  to  its  alleged 
rightful  place  in  the  mind  of  the  citizen  or  in  the  conduct  of 
public  affairs.  The  executive  has  resisted  all  the  forces  which 
would  normally  have  operated  to  restore  the  council  to  its  prop- 

9 


10  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [206 

er  power  and  prestige,  and  to  subordinate  administration  to  its 
supervision  and  control. 

The  drift  toward  executive  domination  has  been  noted  in  many 
fields  of  government  in  recent  years.  Presidential  authority  in 
our  national  system  increasingly  forces  Congress  to  do  its  will, 
and  executive  usurpation  is  a  frequent  subject  of  protest  on  the 
floors  of  the  national  legislature.  The  growing  authority  of  the 
British  cabinet  over  the  house  of  commons  and  the  apparent  ina- 
bility of  the  latter  to  maintain  the  substance  of  the  parliament- 
ary system  points  to  the  triumph  of  the  executive  where  the  legis- 
lative organs  have  been  touted  as  omnipotent.  The  breakdown  of 
control  by  the  council  is  apparent  in  Chicago  where  council  gov- 
ernment has  made  its  last  stand  in  the  larger  American  cities. 
Meetings  of  commissions  in  commission  governed  cities  are  not 
objects  of  widespread  public  interest ;  indeed,  the  very  opposite  is 
notoriously  the  case.  The  city  manager  threatens  to  swallow  up 
the  commission  or  council  which  selects  him,  and  the  meetings 
which  hear  his  reports  and  approve  his  recommendations  do  not 
call  forth  those  discussions  of  public  policy  or  those  criticisms  of 
public  administration  which  reflect  a  vigorous  and  healthy  legisla- 
tive life.  Whether  one  prefers  it  or  not,  the  expanding  activities 
of  modern  government  have  reduced  municipal  councils  no  less 
than  national  and  state  legislative  organs  to  a  condition  of  de- 
pendence upon  the  executive.  The  predominance  of  the  latter 
in  American  city  government  is  the  outstanding  fact  of  munici- 
pal organization  and  operation. 

Despite  the  multiplied  demonstrations  of  the  incapacity  of 
modern  organs  of  legislation  to  deal  with  the  problems  of  modern 
government,  orthodox  opinion  continues  to  cling  to  the  notion 
that  the  council  should  be  the  controlling  factor  in  municipal 
life.  The  fact  that  it  is  not  dominant  and  probably  will  never 
again  be  in  control  has  not  been  fully  appreciated.  What  is  to 
take  its  place  is  being  determined  by  processes  not  subject  to  the 
logic  of  theorists  who  worship  the  old  order.  Rather,  there  is 
being  worked  out  a  popular  forum  which  wisely  or  unwisely  as- 
sumes the  responsibility  of  making  decisions  on  questions  of  pub- 
lic policy  and  which  directly  controls  the  executive  to  whom  it 
commits  administrative  affairs.  Councils  and  other  legislative 
bodies  may  retain  the  shadow  of  authority,  may  still  fill  in  the 
details  where  the  public  at  large  has  not  voiced  its  will,  may  even 


207]  THE    EXECUTIVE    OFFICE    IN    AMERICAN    CITIES  11 

select  the  administrative  expert,  but  the  responsibility  of  both 
council  and  executive  is  immediately  to  the  people  and  every 
wise  executive  recognizes  this  fact. 

If,  then,  there  is  being  evolved  some  new  form  for  the  expres- 
sion of  democracy  in  which  the  people  and  the  administrative 
agencies  are  to  constitute  the  most  important  factors  and  the 
legislative  organs  are  to  be  a  less  consequential  feature  than  in 
past  municipal  history,  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  take  stock  of 
the  executive  office  in  American  municipalities  today.  The  pub- 
lic can  intelligently  determine  its  course  only  as  it  is  familiar 
with  the  situation  now  existing  in  administration.  Too  long  the 
processes  of  development -have  gone  on  without  an  adequate  an- 
alysis of  this  situation,  with  the  result  that  extravagant  claims 
have  been  made  for  this  or  that  type  of  executive  organization 
and  for  one  or  another  method  of  supervising  administrative 
agencies.  It  is  in  the  hope  of  supplying  in  part  such  a  survey  of 
the  office  of  the  municipal  executive  that  this  study  is  offered  to 
a  public  already  aroused  to  progressive  activity  in  municipal 
affairs. 

There  are  over  two  thousand  American  cities  in  which  the 
municipal  executive  is  called  by  the  title  of  mayor ;  in  approxi- 
mately four  hundred  others  he  is  known  as  president  or  mayor- 
commissioner  or  as  commissioner;  and  in  less  than  one  hundred 
municipalities  he  is  styled  the  city  manager.  The  mayoralty  ob- 
tains in  all  but  half  a  dozen  of  the  larger  and  more  important  cit- 
ies. It  is  the  oldest  of  the  three  offices  and  until  the  opening  of 
the  twentieth  century  was  found  in  practically  all  American  cit- 
ies. The  history  of  the  mayor-commissionership  and  of  the  com- 
missionership  lies  wholly  within  the  present  century  and  that  of 
the  managership  within  the  last  decade.  These  facts  impart  sig- 
nificance to  the  figures  indicating  the  extent  to  which  the  newer 
types  of  organization  have  been  adopted.  The  favor  with  which 
they  have  been  greeted  demonstrates  the  dissatisfaction  with  the 
old  order  and  the  active  character  of  the  search  for  a  municipal 
constitution  adapted  to  the  twentieth  century  city.  Such  a  con- 
stitution must  recognize  two  facts,  viz.,  the  dominating  position 
of  the  executive  organ,  and  the  immediate  supervisory  authority 
of  the  municipal  electorate  in  administration.  The  outlook  for 
a  restored  council  is  not  promising  and  to  those  who  long  for 
such  a  revival  must  appear  positively  discouraging.  At  best  it 


12  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [208 

will  but  share  in  the  important  decisions  of  public  policy,  the 
executive  and  the  electors  playing  the  influential  and  decisive 
parts.  It  may  develop  into  a  sort  of  electoral  body  to  choose  the 
municipal  executive;  but  as  in  school  administration  the  execu- 
tive, when  chosen,  will  be  actually  responsible  to  the  people  and 
will  largely  dictate  the  council's  decisions. 

The  actual  and  the  relative  importance  of  the  executive  office 
increases  with  the  concentration  of  population  in  urban  centers. 
The  heads  of  municipal  administration  often  preside  over  popu- 
lations aggregating  hundreds  of  thousands  and  in  some  cases 
millions.  Three  cities  in  this  country  rank  higher  in  population 
than  do  twenty-five  of  the  states.  Twenty-five  cities  have  a  high- 
er population  than  do  two  of  the  states.  Nine  cities  exceed  and 
eleven  states  fall  below  the  half  million  mark.  The  office  of 
municipal  executive  is  therefore  frequently  a  commanding  one 
and  vies  in  dignity  and  salary,  tho  not  in  authority,  with  the 
governorship. 

The  spread  and  development  of  local  autonomy  undoubtedly 
contributes  to  the  importance  of  municipal  office  holding,  and  in 
this  accretion  of  strength  the  executive  shares.  "While  it  may  be 
truly  urged  that  the  relative  importance  of  municipal  chief  mag- 
istrates does  not  now  appear  to  be  much  greater  in  the  home  rule 
states  than  in  others,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  greater  cities 
are  almost  all  located  in  the  states  where  municipal  home  rule 
does  not  obtain.  One  can  hardly  conceive  of  home  rule  for  New 
York  City,  Philadelphia,  or  Chicago  without  an  accompanying 
increase  in  the  power  and  influence  of  the  executive  authority. 
The  electorate,  however,  will  absorb  the  major  portions  of  the 
new  strength  conferred  by  a  thoro-going  regime  of  local  self- 
government.  The  so-called  revival  of  the  council  is  more  appar- 
ent than  real. 

Among  recent  developments  which  indicate  a  growing  impor- 
tance for  the  office  under  review  there  should  be  noted  the  appear- 
ance of  an  executive  consciousness  on  the  part  of  the  incumbents. 
This  is  shown  in  the  formation  of  leagues,  associations,  and  simi- 
lar organizations  for  the  study  of  municipal  problems.  Many  of 
these  organizations  are  the  offspring  of  earlier  associations  of  the 
mayors.  Their  prominent  and  active  members  are  principally 
executives.  National  and  sectional  conferences  of  mayors  have 
been  held,  one  for  the  consideration  of  public  utility  problems, 


v209]  THE    EXECUTIVE    OFFICE    IN    AMERICAN    CITIES  13 

the  others  dealing  prominently  with  the  question  of  national  pre- 
paredness. The  city  managers  have  a  national  organization  and 
hold  annual  conferences.  The  immediate  results  of  these  devel- 
opments are  not  of  such  momentous  importance,  but  the  recog- 
nition of  a  common  interest  in  municipal  and  other  problems  of 
the  day  and  the  effort  to  approach  them  semi-professionally  in  a 
spirit  of  mutual  helpfulness  are  highly  significant  of  the  place 
of  the  municipal  executive  in  American  life. 

The  mayoralty  is  the  most  common  and  the  most  important 
type  of  municipal  executive  organs.  The  mayor  represents  the 
municipality  in  its  dealings  and  relations  as  a  corporate  entity. 
On  behalf  of  the  city  he  welcomes  its  distinguished  visitors  and 
extends  greetings  to  conventions  and  assemblies  which  gather 
within  its  bounds.  He  delivers  memorial  and  other  addresses  on 
occasion,  opens  local  festivals  and  pitches  the  first  ball  of  the 
baseball  season.  The  mayor  is  marked  for  responsibility.  The 
office  is  immune  from  many  of  the  weaknesses  which  appear  in 
every  executive  unit  made  up  of  more  than  one  person. 

Legally  it  usually  lacks  that  basis  in  fundamental  law  which  is 
supplied  the  chief  executive  offices  in  state  and  nation ;  its  exist- 
ence depends  upon  the  will  of  the  state  legislatures  and  its 
constitution  and  powers  are  defined  in  statute  law,  municipal 
charters,  and  council  ordinances.  On  the  other  hand  the  term 
mayor  is  well  worked  into  the  political  conceptions  of  the  Amer- 
ican public  and  even  where  changes  of  a  radical  nature  are  taking 
place  in  municipal  executive  organization,  the  title  often  remains 
to  indicate  the  one  who  represents  the  unity,  dignity,  and  author- 
ity of  the  city. 

The  movement  toward  mayor  government  which  was  so  con- 
spicuous twenty-five  years  ago  has  subsided  during  recent  years. 
This  movement  had  its  origin  and  basis  in  the  stress  which  mod- 
ern municipal  problems  placed  upon  the  administrative  organi- 
zation of  the  earlier  council  system.  For  the  handling  of  these 
problems  there  was  necessary  the  directive  force  of  some  single 
agent,  together  with  the  greater  freedom  of  action  and  ease  of 
control  which  administrative  unity  made  possible.  The  develop- 
ment of  the  mayoralty  followed,  but  it  proved  to  be  neither  uni- 
form nor  adequate. 

The  forces  which  produced  the  mayor  system  are  more  potent 
today  than  ever  before.  They  have,  however,  taken  more  varied 


14  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [210 

methods  of  attaining  the  desired  administrative  goal.  Thus  it  is 
that  commission  government  and  manager  government  have  come 
into  being,  and  are  successfully  contesting  with  the  mayor  sys- 
tem for  the  public  favor.  Both  of  these  newer  forms  have  made 
spectacular  growth  and  both  have  achieved  remarkable  results. 
In  the  commission  system  the  mayoralty  remains,  tho  largely 
shorn  of  its  powers.  In  the  manager  form  the  mayor  usually 
disappears,  tho  in  some  eases  remaining  to  perform  the  distinc- 
tively political  as  differentiated  from  the  business  and  adminis- 
trative functions  of  the  executive. 

The  evolution  of  the  commission  plan  is  proceeding  steadily 
and  its  application  in  larger  cities  will  produce  features  and  re- 
sults not  now  foreseen.  In  its  impact  upon  mayor  government 
it  has  undoubtedly  stimulated  and  purified  the  latter  and  has, 
perhaps,  contributed  to  its  permanence  and  'Stability.  At  the 
same  time  it  has  experienced  a  vigorous  reaction  in  the  strength- 
ening of  the  mayoralty,  in  the  demand  for  greater  centraliza- 
tion of  administrative  authority  and  responsibility  and  for  the 
separation  of  legislative  and  executive  functions,  in  the  increas- 
ing need  for  expert  administrators,  and  in  the  appearance  of  the 
manager  plan.  It  is  significant  also  that  in  the  commission  form 
the  mayor-commissioner  has  a  more  favorable  position  than  did 
the  mayor  of  a  century  ago.  All  the  factors  which  have  aided  in 
creating  the  mayor  of  today  are  either  present  to  enhance  that 
position  in  commission  government  or  are  likely  to  appear  as  the 
commission  plan  undergoes  the  test  of  metropolitan  conditions. 

In  the  manager  plan  the  attempt  to  restore  the  municipal 
council  and  the  emphasis  upon  administration  by  experts  are 
features  that  constitute  a  sharp  challenge  to  both  the  mayor  and 
the  commission  systems.  The  executive  is  apparently  subordi- 
nated to  the  council.  Nevertheless,  the  history  of  government  in 
democracies  evidences  a  tendency  toward  executive  leadership. 
Indeed,  in  our  modern  life  with  its  large  governmental  constit- 
uencies and  its  complex  and  highly  technical  problems  it  is 
doubtful  if  any  adequate  form  of  municipal  organization  can  be 
devised  which  will  assure  efficiency  and  at  the  same  time  deny 
executive  leadership.  There  are  those  who  believe  that  the  city 
manager,  tho  nominally  elected  by  the  council,  will  in  fact  be- 
come the  dominating  factor  in  the  regime  of  which  he  is  a  part, 
and  that  the  council  will  sink  into  practical  subordination.  The 


211]  THE    EXECUTIVE    OFFICE    IN    AMERICAN    CITIES  15 

manager  plan,  on  the  other  hand,  is  held  to  make  possible  a  vig- 
orous and  responsible  council  operating  in  conjunction  with  a 
trained  and  wide-awake  executive,  chosen  because  of  his  fitness, 
and  clothed  with  ample  authority  to  control  and  direct  the  ad- 
ministrative forces  of  the  city.  One  may  gauge  the  importance 
attached  to  the  coming  of  the  manager  form  of  municipal  organi- 
zation by  the  universal  interest  in  its  development  and  achieve- 
ments. It  is  also  significant  that  this  form  has  supplanted  the 
mayor  plan  in  the  "model  charter"  prepared  and  presented  by 
a  committee  of  the  National  Municipal  League  in  1915. 

With  the  exception  of  the  managership  the  municipal  executive 
office  is  largely  devoid  of  standards  indicating  the  fitness  of  the 
holder  for  the  performance  of  his  duties.  The  mayoralty  and 
the  mayor-commissionership  alike  are  open  to  the  good,  bad,  and 
the  indifferent,  and  in  almost  all  cases  to  the  untrained  and  to 
the  politically  ambitious.  The  establishment  of  high  standards 
and  traditions  in  the  municipal  service  generally  depends  in  no 
small  degree  upon  their  establishment  first  in  the  office  of  the 
chief  executive.  The  prompt  achievement  of  the  latter  task  is 
one  of  the  problems  before  those  who  would  retain  the  one  or  the 
other  of  the  above  forms  of  organization. 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  type  or  position  of  the  munic- 
ipal executive  office  will  ever  become  uniform  thruout  the  coun- 
try. There  is  already  considerable  diversification  in  organization 
and  practice  with  respect  to  the  office,  and  this  is  true  of  each 
of  the  three  principal  systems.  It  is  probable  that  this  diversi- 
fication will  continue,  especially  as  the  principle  of  home  rule 
for  cities  comes  to  fuller  definition  and  acceptance  and  permits 
of  experiments  designed  to  meet  the  political  conceptions  and 
conditions  of  the  communities  undertaking  them.  The  progress 
that  has  been  made  as  a  result  of  such  experiments  has  nowhere 
been  more  conspicuous  than  in  the  recent  history  of  the  munic- 
ipal executive.  Not  a  little  of  the  strength  and  virility  of  the 
commission  and  manager  plans  is  due  to  the  freedom  and  ease 
with  which  cities  have  adapted  them  and  developed  them  thru 
local  self-government.  The  experiences  of  the  past  and  the  ex- 
periments of  today  may  confidently  be  expected  to  stimulate  and 
hasten  the  evolution  of  more  perfect  organs  for  executing  the 
public  will  and  administering  the  public  business. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE 
MAYORALTY 

The  term  "mayor"  is  an  ancient  one.  Originally  it  comes  from 
the  Latin  "magnus,"  being  the  comparative  of  that  adjective, 
but  having  the  form  ' '  mayor. ' '  It  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
applied  to  the  domain  of  city  government  by  the  Romans,  tho  an 
officer  called  the  "prefect"  seemed  to  have  exercised  functions 
much  similar  to  those  we  commonly  associate  with  the  office  of 
mayor.  The  term  gradually  acquired  political  significance  in 
the  kingdom  of  the  Merovingian  Franks.  The  chief  officer  of  the 
royal  household  was  the  major  domus  or  mayor  of  the  palace. 
In  the  degeneracy  of  the  Merovingian  rulers  came  the  opportuni- 
ty of  the  mayors  —  they  became  the  chief  officers  of  state  and 
finally  usurped  the  royal  title  itself. 

English  Antecedents 

The  use  of  the  term  mayor  became  general  wherever  the 
,Frankish  influence  was  felt.  Today  forms  of  the  word  are  found 
in  Germany,  Portugal,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  some  of  the 
British  Dominions.  In  Germany  the  "meier"  exercises  functions 
similar  to  a  bailiff,  tho  as  a  steward  he  may  be  a  purely  private 
functionary.  In  Portugal  the  "maior"  or  "mayor"  and  in 
France  the  "maire"  are  titles  to  which  are  attached  a  distinct 
political  significance.  It  is  in  England  that  the  immediate  ante- 
cedents of  the  American  mayor  are  to  be  found.  Its  beginnings 
there  are  not  fully  known,  being  wrapt  in  the  obscurity  that 
hides  much  of  the  origin  of  things  in  England.  It  is  known  that 
the  office  existed  de  facto  before  it  was  recognized  de  jure  in  the 
municipal  charters.  It  is  generally  accepted  by  the  authorities 
that  there  was  ho  mayor  in  London  prior  to  1189,  that  there  was 
a  mayor  by  1193,  and  that  the  title  was  a  Norman  importation. 
Norman  influence  in  London  was  very  strong  and  there  was  a 

16 


213]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  17 

tendency  to  copy  French  titles.  The  use  of  the  term  "mayor" 
to  designate  the  chief  officer  in  cities  had  been  extant  in  northern 
France  some  years  before  1189.  The  application  of  the  title  to 
the  portreeve,  bailiff,  or  head  officer  of  English  cities  and  bor- 
oughs certainly  began  under  the  Normans. 

By  1216  some  of  the  most  advanced  among  the  English  towns 
had  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  charter  right  to  elect  their  mayors. 
This  early  emergence  of  the  mayoralty  gave  it  strength  during 
the  following  centuries  when  the  organization  of  English  munic- 
ipal government  was  being  definitely  shaped,  tho  the  perma- 
nency of  the  title  does  not  seem  to  have  been  assured  until  at 
least  the  late  thirteenth  or  early  fourteenth  century.  While 
Edward  I,  in  organizing  his  parliament,  seems  to  have  recognized 
the  boroughs,  he  made  the  sheriff  and  not  the  mayor  the  return- 
ing officer,  thus  indicating  that  no  borough  constitution  of  an  in- 
dependent character  or  fixed  type  had  as  yet  come  into  existence. 

The  standard  form  of  organization  in  municipalities  was  one 
of  the  products  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  and  was 
incomplete  until  the  realization  of  the  legal  personality  of  the 
municipal  corporation.  By  the  close  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
however,  the  organization  of  municipal  government  had  taken 
permanent  shape  and  the  mayor  was  the  chief  magistrate.  He 
was  one  of  the  close  corporation  which  the  charter  either  created 
or  which  custom  had  come  to  recognize,  following  some  early 
and  successful  usurpation,  as  having  the  right  to  exercise  char- 
ter powers.  The  general  powers  of  these  corporations  differed 
according  to  the  respective  charter  terms  and  local  practice.  But 
the  form  of  English  municipal  government  became  fixed  and  re- 
mained practically  unchanged  until  long  after  the  transplanting 
of  English  stock  and  ideas  to  the  shores  of  the  New  World. 

In  this  early  period  of  municipal  history  the  obligation  of 
office  holding  was  not  unknown,  and  the  custom  of  compelling  the 
one  chosen  as  mayor  to  serve  in  that  capacity  was  well  estab- 
lished. In  the  Cinque  Ports  and  probably  elsewhere  a  refusal 
was  punished  by  the  demolition  of  the  home  of  the  delinquent. 
In  the  case  of  London  and  other  chartered  cities  the  election  of 
the  mayor  was  an  annual  affair,  tho  the  incumbent  was  often  re- 
tained in  office,  and  was  sometimes  reflected  for  many  terms. 
The  mayor  was  "presented"  to  the  king  in  the  procedure  pre- 
scribed by  the  charters,  and  this  was  done  following  each  elec- 


18  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [214 

tion;  and  upon  such  presentation,  the  mayor-elect  vowed  his 
loyalty  to  the  ruler. 

In  his  political  capacity  the  mayor  was  from  the  first  an  officer 
of  no  small  consequence.  The  mayor  of  London  was  named  as 
one  of  the  committee  who  were  to  enforce,  if  necessary,  the  Mag- 
na  Charta  against  John.  The  Londoners  are  quoted  as  announc- 
ing that  ''come  what  may,  they  should  have  no  king  but  their 
mayor. ' '  The  mayor  undoubtedly  brot  considerable  standing  and 
prestige  to  the  office,  for  he  was  one  of  the  city's  barons  or  chief 
men.  London's  first  mayor  was  a  leader  in  the  efforts  to  secure 
charter  privileges.  Of  the  details  of  his  power  wre  have  little 
exact  knowledge,  but  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  exer- 
cised considerable  control  in  the  government  and  administration. 
In  the  oath  taken  by  the  common  councilor  he  agrees  not  to 
leave  the  council  without  the  mayor's  permission.  The  mayor  as 
chief  of  the  aldermen  presided  at  assize,  pleas,  and  hustings.  In 
the  communal  oath  of  1193,  as  in  that  of  the  London  freeman  of 
today,  one  of  the  vows  taken  is  that  of  ' '  obedience  to  the  mayor, ' ' 
a  phrase  which  probably  meant  more  in  that  day  than  in  this. 
One  of  the  titles  by  which  the  corporation  of  London  was  known 
in  the  late  thirteenth  century  was  "The  Mayor  and  the  Com- 
monalty of  London." 

The  developments  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries 
made  the  mayor  the  most  prominent  official  in  municipal  life. 
The  early  charters  of  the  fourteenth  century  often  made  pro- 
vision for  the  election  of  the  mayor  by  the  burgesses ;  but  during 
the  fifteenth  century  there  was  a  marked  contraction  of  the  elec- 
torate, and  the  mayor  usually  came  to  be  chosen  by  the  council, 
consisting  of  the  aldermen  and  the  common  councilors.  In  ad- 
ministrative and  in  legislative  matters  affecting  the  city  he  occu- 
pied a  position  of  authority,  one  that  is  still  reflected  in  the  sev- 
enteenth and  eighteenth  centuries.  In  the  dealings  of  the  munic- 
ipality with  the  king  and  with  the  outside  world  in  general  the 
mayor,  as  the  head  of  the  corporation,  stood  foremost.  Of  course 
London  was  somewhat  in  advance  of  the  other  cities  and  her  in- 
fluence was  widely  felt  in  the  organization  and  development  of 
the  municipal  constitution  both  in  its  chartered  and  its  customary 
forms. 

The  history  of  the  mayoralty  from  1600  to  the  American  Revo- 
lution, at  which  time  the  direct  influence  of  English  local  insti- 


215]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  19 

tutions  in  American  life  may  be  deemed  to  have  ceased,  is  not 
easy  to  trace.  At  the  opening  of  the  Tudor  regime  there  were 
between  one  hundred  and  two  hundred  chartered  towns  and 
boroughs  organized  on  the  basis  of  the  typical  municipal  consti- 
tutions of  mayor,  aldermen,  and  common  councilors,  tho  there 
were  numerous  variations  in  detail.  The  tendency  toward  oli- 
garchic control  by  this  governing  group  was  a  feature  of  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  The  body  of  mayor,  alder- 
men, and  common  councilors  became  an  ever  narrowing  one  and 
the  drift  to  the  "close  corporation"  was  steady.  In  the  later 
seventeenth  century  the  policy  of  the  Stuarts  was  openly  antag- 
onistic to  the  continued  existence  of  the  old  town  charters,  and 
they  were  forfeited  and  surrendered  in  large  numbers  under 
pressure  from  the  crown.  Even  London  sank  so  low  as  to  be- 
come a  victim  of  this  movement  and  the  slight  opposition  to  the 
forfeiture  of  its  charter  shows  the  depth  to  which  the  spirit  of 
local  self-government  had  fallen  in  England.  Royal  interfer- 
ence and  direction  and  local  oligarchies  became  dominant  factors 
in  municipal  life.  The  mayoralty  suffered  no  little  impairment 
of  its  former  position  of  leadership,  tho  remaining  as  an  impor- 
tant factor  in  municipal  life. 

There  was  a  recovery  in  municipal  government  after  the  fall 
of  the  Stuarts  but  the  recovery  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  been 
in  the  direction  of  constructive  reform.  There  is  rather  a  trans- 
fer of  the  control  over  municipal  life  from  the  crown  to  the 
landed  aristocracy.  There  were  no  important  developments  in 
the  municipal  constitution  except  as  the  process  of  petrification 
may  be  deemed  important.  Of  new  life  there  was  a  plenty  dur- 
ing the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  but  in  municipal 
government  it  was  unable  to  break  thru  the  old  shell  until  1835. 
Therefore,  from  the  standpoint  of  municipal  constitution,  the 
period  is  properly  considered  to  be  one  of  stagnation,  if  not  one 
of  positive  decline.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  mayoralty,  as 
will  be  pointed  out  later,  it  was  also  one  of  decline,  a  tendency 
which  culminated  when  the  mayoralty  lost  out  almost  entirely 
in  the  reforms  initiated  under  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act 
of  1835,  an  act  which  established  council  government  in  English 
cities. 

It  was  during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  that 
the  municipal  institutions  of  the  English  were  transferred  in 


20  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [216 

spirit,  in  nomenclature,  and  in  form  to  the  shores  of  America. 
It  is  important,  therefore,  that  the  English  mayoralty  of  those 
centuries  be  more  carefully  examined  with  a  view  to  ascertaining 
how  far  it  served  as  a  model  for  the  municipal  executive  in  the 
American  colonies.  Both  the  title  and  the  position  of  the  mayor 
in  the  English  municipal  corporation  were  matters  determined 
by  the  borough  charter.  This  instrument  conferred  upon  the 
executive  considerable  tho  somewhat  indefinite  powers  extending 
to  every  feature  of  municipal  borough  life.  In  legislation  he 
presided  over  all  assemblies  of  the  corporation.  In  judicial  mat- 
ters he  was  the  chief  magistrate  and  clothed  with  all  the  powers 
of  a  justice  of  the  peace,  an  office  which  was  then  more  important 
than  it  is  in  America  today.  He  also  presided  at  the  borough 
quarter  sessions,  and  held  whatever  courts  the  borough  main- 
tained, either  in  the  capacity  of  sole  judge  or  jointly  with  the 
recorder.  His  judicial  duties  included  service  as  coroner  for 
the  borough  and  a  number  of  quasi-judicial  functions  such  as 
those  of  escheator,  or  keeper  of  the  borough  gaol.  The  executive 
and  administrative  authority  of  the  mayor  reveals  the  chief 
source  of  his  power,  notwithstanding  the  wide  judicial  author- 
ity of  a  local  nature  which  he  possessed.  His  appointive  power 
was  extensive,  sometimes  including  all  but  the  few  offices  speci- 
fied in  the  charter.  He  was  empowered  to  regulate  trade,  ad- 
minister public  property,  manage  cooperative  and  quasi-public 
enterprises,  and  to  enforce  the  laws.  In  this  latter  capacity  he 
rose  to  a  commanding  place  in  municipal  life.  The  mayor  was 
the  ' '  lord  of  the  town ; "  he  was  ' '  almost  omnipotent ; ' '  the  honor 
and  supreme  authority  of  the  seventeenth  century  city  "subsis- 
ted in  his  person;"  he  enjoyed  the  "first  voice  in  all  elections 
and  other  things  that  concern (ed)  the  town."  Despite  the  steady 
decline  in  the  mayoralty  in  England  during  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury due  to  the  slow  development  of  new  forces  within  the  cities, 
a  great  part  of  his  authority  survived  until  the  reform  legislation 
of  1835. 

With  respect  to  their  methods  of  choosing  the  head  of  the  cor- 
poration, or  mayor,  English  municipal  corporations,  during  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  may  be  divided  into  three 
main  groups.  By  far  the  largest  proportion  —  from  two-thirds 
to  three-fourths  —  were  close  corporations  and  the  mayor  was 
elected  by  the  members  of  the  corporation  from  among  their  own 


217]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OP  THE  MAYORALTY  21 

number.  The  second  group  comprised  those  in  which  there  was 
a  restricted  electoral  power  conferred  upon  the  freemen  or  bur- 
gesses, the  members  of  the  corporation  retaining  a  strong  control 
either  thru  power  of  nomination  or  thru  exclusive  eligibility  to 
the  mayoralty.  In  the  third  group  there  was  a  real  approach 
to  municipal  democracy,  the  freemen  electing  the  councilors  and 
participating  in  general  assembly  in  the  nomination  of  the  mayor 
or  chief  officer  of  the  corporation ;  but  the  final  choice  of  the  latter 
was  usually  left  to  some  smaller  body,  such  as  the  council. 

The  English  custom  in  respect  to  mayoral  salaries  was  not 
materially  different  then  from  what  it  is  today.  There  were,  it 
is  true,  certain  nominal  allowances  and  perquisites.  ' '  But  it  may 
safely  be  assumed  that  even  the  largest  of  these  allowances  never 
did  more  than  cover  the  out-of-pocket  expences  of  the  holder  of 
the  office,  and  seldom  sufficed  to  meet  the  innumerable  charges 
.  .  ."  ''The  Headship  of  the  Corporation,  whatever  its  nom- 
inal emoluments,  was  in  fact,  in  1689  as  in  1835,  always  an 
honorary  office  of  considerable  personal  labour,  rewarded  only 
by  the  prestige,  power  and  social  consideration  universally  con- 
ceded to  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  the  Borough."  And  there  are 
cases  on  record  in  which  the  boroughs  adopted  during  this  peri- 
od the  principle  of  requiring  free  service  of  their  officers,  the 
mayor  among  others. 

In  Colonial  Times 

When  one  turns  from  the  position  of  the  mayoralty  in  the 
mother  country  to  consider  the  place  which  it  held  in  the  English 
colonies  in  America,  a  contrast  is  at  once  apparent.  The  repro- 
duction here  of  the  close  corporation,  the  custom  of  annual  selec- 
tion, and  even  of  the  studied  attempt  to  copy  after  the  English 
model  in  the  establishment  of  the  mayoralty  did  not  suffice  to 
prevent  a  marked  differentiation.  The  strength  of  the  office  dn 
England,  whether  due  to  charter  custom,  or  the  personal  stand- 
ing of  the  mayor  or  to  all  three  in  combination,  was  to  no  small 
degree  lost  in  the  atmosphere  of  a  new  country,  owing  to  the 
leveling  conditions  of  pioneer  life,  and  to  the  tendency  of  trans- 
plantings  generally  to  manifest  new  characteristics  and  to  fol- 
low new  lines  of  development.  The  effort  to  reproduce  the  Eng- 
lish mayor  was  partly  a  conscious  one,  for  in  the  Elizabeth,  New 
Jersey,  charter  it  was  provided  that  the  mayor  should  have 


22  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [218 

charge  of  the  borough  "in  as  full  and  ample  manner  as  is  usual 
and  customary  for  other  mayors  to  have  in  like  corporations  in 
our  realm  of  England."  The  gradual  introduction  of  English 
' '  methods  of  government ' '  was  one  of  the  prudent  achievements 
of  Colonel  Nicolls  according  to  William  Smith,  who  made  this 
comment  in  connection  with  the  incorporation  of  New  York  un- 
der the  care  of  the  mayor,  five  aldermen,  and  a  sheriff.  No  doubt 
the  colonists  imagined  that  the  English  mayor  was  being  repro- 
duced in  the  colonies.  The  colonial  mayors,  it  is  true,  often  re- 
ceived considerable  prestige  thru  their  appointment  by  the  pro- 
vincial governors,  as  in  New  York.  They  thus  represented  the 
general  government  of  the  colony  in  local  affairs.  The  mayors 
were  frequently  reappointed,  some  serving  for  ten  years.  In  this 
way  they  were  able  at  times  to  gain  no  small  amount  of  personal 
influence.  But  in  general  the  powers  of  the  corporation  were  ab- 
sorbed by  the  municipal  council.  The  colonial  mayor  was  rela- 
tively insignificant  in  both  legislation  and  administration  as  com- 
pared with  his  English  fellow.  He  was  in  a  real  sense  the  servant 
of  the  council. 

If  we  view  the  position  of  the  American  mayor  during  the 
period  prior  to  1796  from  the  purely  legal  point  of  view  we  find 
that  the  standing  of  the  office  more  nearly  approached  uniform- 
ity during  its  early  history  than  it  has  at  any  time  since.  Its 
development  has  followed  very  diverse  lines  in  different  cities 
and  general  uniformity  in  legal  status  is  now  beyond  realization, 
even  tho  it  were  desirable.  But  in  the  colonies  the  mayors  were 
all  subordinate  to  their  respective  municipal  legislatures.  Tho 
the  detail  varies  slightly  the  general  picture  presented  is  always 
the  same.  Even  the  judicial  powers  which  were  employed  to 
raise  the  mayor  to  such  prominence  in  English  boroughs  were 
allowed  to  lie  dormant  in  the  colonies  and  today  are  of  little  con- 
sequence. 

The  position  of  the  American  mayor  before  1796  may  be  sum- 
marized as  follows: 

(1)  The  title  was  employed  by  municipal  corporations  in  New 
York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  Maryland  and  Delaware ;  altho  it  was  first  pro- 
vided for  in  Maine,  yet,  except  for  Boston's  appropriation  of  the 
title  after  the  Revolutionary  war,  it  had  not  been  in  vogue  in 
New  England  before  this  date.  The  title  of  the  office  which  in 


219]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  23 

New  England  corresponded  to  the  mayoralty  was  "moderator." 

(2)  The  charter  position  of  the  mayor  was  not  strong.     He 
had  few  powers  other  than  minor  ones.     He  was  legally  a  part 
of  the  council  and  often  subordinate  to  the  governor,  and  en- 
joyed, therefore,  no  large  independence. 

(3)  He  was  an  officer  of  some  prestige  socially  and  politically, 
depending  largely  on  his  personality. 

(4)  There  was  a  marked  absence  on  the  part  of  the  mayoralty 
of  discretionary  activity  in  matters  of  police,  sanitation,  and 
morals.     In  this  respect  there  is  a  striking  contrast  with  the 
English  mayor  of  contemporary  years. 

(5)  Owing  to  frontier  conditions  and  the  leveling  influences 
under  which  the  mayoralty  was  set  up  in  this  country  the  office 
lacked  much  of  the  strength  which  custom  and  precedent  gave  to 
it  in  England. 

(6)  The  failure  of  the  office  to  develop  importance  prior  to  the 
adoption  of  the  federal  constitution  may  be  traced  to  the  absence 
of  appointive  power,  the  want  of  a  complex  municipal  life,  the 
active  participation  of  the  municipal  councils  in  borough  admin- 
istration, and  the  failure  of  the  mayors  to  exercise  fully  judicial 
powers  which  they  already  possessed.    In  this  respect  the  early 
American  mayor  signally  failed  to  follow  the  course  marked  out 
by  the  mayors  of  English  boroughs. 

Since  Colonial  Times 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  periodize  the  history  and  develop- 
ment of  the  mayoralty  in  the  United  States  since  the  close  of  the 
colonial  era.  The  development  of  the  office  has  not  been  in  any 
sense  uniform  and  any  effort  to  generalize  must  recognize  nu- 
merous exceptions.  This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  it  will  be 
well  to  emphasize  certain  dates  which  have  some  general  accept- 
ance or  special  significance  in  the  history  of  the  mayoralty  and 
describe  the  conditions  then  obtaining,  with  such  reference  to 
the  intervening  years  as  the  history  of  the  office  may  seem  to 
justify.  The  years  selected  for  this  purpose  are  1796,  1823, 
1870,  1900,  and  the  present  time. 

The  year  1796  is  significant  both  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
American  municipal  constitution  and  of  the  mayoralty  as  a  part 
thereof.  Both  had  been  relatively  unimportant  in  a  population 
of  which  less  than  four  per  centum  lived  in  incorporated  cities 


24  THE   AMERICAN   MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [220 

and  boroughs.  The  years  which  had  so  much  meaning  in  the 
early  history  of  the  country  stood  for  little  in  municipal  history. 
With  the  year  1796  it  is  different.  It  has  real  interest  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  mayoralty  for  it  betokens  the  play  of  new 
forces  and  new  ideas,  and  it  introduces  the  years  of  development 
and  growth  in  the  position  of  the  mayor. 

Many  writers  have  called  attention  to  the  influence  of  the  fed- 
eral principles  of  government  in  our  municipal  organization.  It 
was  but  nine  years  after  the  framing  of  the  federal  constitution 
and  but  seven  years  after  it  went  into  effect  that  the  evidences  of 
this  impact  became  discernible.  Municipal  government  was  in  a 
formative  and  primitive  stage  of  its  development  in  this  country. 
It  therefore  yielded  quickly  to  the  pressure  of  the  ideas  found  in 
the  new  federal  organization.  The  predominance  of  these  ideas 
in  the  Baltimore  charter  of  1796  was  overwhelming.  In  the  case 
of  the  mayoralty  its  development  may  properly  be  said  to  date 
from  this  charter.  Provision  was  made  for  the  choice  of  a  mayor 
thru  an  electoral  college  chosen  by  popular  vote ;  the  mayor  was 
given  a  veto  which  was  of  substantial  character,  a  three-fourths 
vote  of  the  municipal  council  being  necessary  to  override  it;  a 
limited  power  of  appointment,  responsibility  in  law  enforcement, 
supervisory  authority  in  municipal  finance,  and  the  duty  of  mak- 
ing recommendations  to  the  council  were  bestowed  upon  him;  he 
was  to  receive  an  annual  salary.  A  more  striking  triumph  of 
the  ideas  which  created  the  national  executive  can  hardly  be  con- 
ceived. 

This  victory  proved  to  be  too  complete  to  be  permanent.  It 
was  to  be  a  century  distant  before  the  real  position  of  the  munic- 
ipal executive  was  to  approximate  relatively  that  of  the  federal 
executive.  The  Baltimore  charter  was  a  prophecy  —  not  the  ful- 
filment. It  was  a  thing  born  out  of  due  season.  Some  one  has 
observed  that  the  institutions  which  change  most  slowly,  which 
possess  the  most  vitality,  are  the  institutions  of  local  govern- 
ments. It  is  an  observation  which  holds  true  in  American  munic- 
ipal history.  The  council  was  too  firmly  rooted  in  the  public 
esteem  and  in  the  municipal  constitution,  the  conditions  de- 
manding change  were  too  feeble  to  force  a  general  and  immediate 
acceptance  of  the  theories  of  the  federal  constitution  as  appli- 
cable to  organization  in  municipalities.  Every  step  in  the  ulti- 


221]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  25 

mate  victory  of  the  federal  analogy  was  won  only  by  a  long 
and  painful  process  of  development.  And  when  the  federal 
principles  finally  triumphed  in  municipal  life  generally,  when 
it  had  created  the  federal  plan  with  its  strong  executive,  it  was 
heralded  to  the  world  as  a  conspicuous  failure.  Stress  and  cir- 
cumstance had  been  creating  other  "plans."  Intelligent  care 
and  scientific  investigation  are  modifying  all  plans. 

The  year  1796,  however,  marks  an  important  point  in  munic- 
ipal history.  The  Baltimore  charter,  tho  premature,  signifies 
the  emergence  of  the  mayoralty  into  independence  and  impor- 
tance. And  the  development  of  the  mayoralty  from  this  date 
constitutes  one  of  the  main  features  of  the  evolution  of  Ameri- 
can municipal  life  and  organization.  The  Baltimore  mayoralty 
of  1796,  with  some  few,  tho  not  unimportant,  modifications,  is  the 
mayoralty  now  to  be  found  in  most  American  cities.  It  is  one 
of  the  few  contributions  of  our  municipal  democracy  to  the  the- 
ory and  practice  of  our  municipal  organization  and  differentiates 
the  American  municipal  executive  from  others  in  foreign  lands. 

In  the  course  of  the  struggle  of  the  federal  ideas  for  recogni- 
tion and  supremacy  in  the  municipal  field,  the  year  1823  is  sig- 
nificant because  of  the  contribution  which  was  made  in  that  year 
and  the  years  immediately  following  it  to  the  conception  of  the 
municipal  executive.  It  is  not  possible  to  separate  the  develop- 
ment of  institutions  from  those  personalities  in  which  they  find 
expression.  If  the  Baltimore  charter  of  1796  was  a  prophecy  of 
the  mayor  of  a  century  later,  Josiah  Quincy  was  the  later  nine- 
teenth century  mayoralty  incarnate.  He  became  the  chief  mag- 
istrate of  the  recently  chartered  city  of  Boston  in  1823.  Under 
the  charter  of  1822  the  office  of  mayor  had  supplanted  that  of 
moderator.  Yet  the  position  was  not  an  imposing  and  a  com- 
manding one.  The  importance  of  executive  leadership  was  not 
expressly  recognized.  Popular  election  alone  appears  as  an  im- 
portant element  in  strengthening  the  mayoralty,  tho  Boston  was 
not  the  first  to  introduce  the  popularly  chosen  municipal  execu- 
tive. But  popular  election  plus  the  personality  and  vigor  of  Mr. 
Quincy  produced  a  demonstration  of  the  mayoralty  and  its  pos- 
sibilities that  has  left  its  mark  to  the  present  day.  Moreover  Mr. 
Quincy  consciously  cultivated  the  intelligence,  confidence,  and 
appreciation  of  the  municipal  electorate  in  the  work  which  he 


26  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [222 

was  doing.  He  not  only  set  the  standards  of  the  office  for  many 
years  in  advance,  but  he  left  in  the  mind  of  the  municipal  citizen 
a  definite  conception  of  a  new  type  of  municipal  executive. 

The  contribution  of  Mr.  Quincy  was  not  the  work  of  a  man 
lustful  for  power  in  order  that  he  might  aggrandize  himself,  or 
further  partisan  interests.  The  strength  which  he  brought  to 
the  office  and  the  interpretation  which  he  gave  to  its  place  and 
function  in  municipal  organization  were  imparted  with  a  full 
appreciation  of  what  he  was  doing.  In  describing  the  events  of 
his  first  inauguration  as  mayor  Mr.  Quincy  says  of  himself  ' '  The 
Mayor,  in  his  inaugural  address  .  .  .  deduced  the  spirit  of 
the  city  charter  from  its  language  and  the  exigencies  which  led 
to  its  adoption,  and  explained  his  views  of  the  powers  and  duties 
of  the  office  of  Mayor,  and  the  principles  by  which  he  should  en- 
deavor to  execute  and  fulfil  them. ' '  He  then  outlined  the  defects 
in  the  old  town  organization  and  especially  those  of  division  of 
executive  power,  lessened  responsibility,  want  of  relationship  in 
the  work  of  the  former  branches  of  the  executive.  The  remedy 
was  provided  for  "in  the  powers  of  the  Mayor,"  which  he  con- 
ceived to  be  "requisite"  for  the  efficient  exercise  and  fulfilment 
of  the  duties  imposed  upon  the  municipal  executive.  The  pur- 
pose which  moved  him  during  his  mayoralty  is  clearly  expressed 
in  his  own  words  thus:  "To  postpone,  and  if  possible,  to  pre- 
vent the  occurrence  of  such  a  state  of  indifference  to  the  essential 
qualities  of  the  executive  [as  he  was  described  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs]  .  .  .  the  Mayor  elect  deemed  it  his  chief  offi- 
cial duty  to  produce  and  fix  in  the  minds  of  all  the  influential 
classes  of  citizens  a  strong  conviction  of  the  advantage  of  having 
an  active  and  willingly  responsible  executive,  by  an  actual  ex- 
perience of  the  benefits  of  such  an  administration  of  their  affairs ; 
and  also  of  their  right  and  duty  of  holding  the  mayor  respon- 
sible, in  character  and  office,  for  the  state  and  the  police  and 
finances  of  the  city. ' '  To  bring  the  responsibility  of  the  executive 
officer  into  distinct  relief  before  the  citizens,  was  accordingly  a 
leading  principle,  by  which  he  endeavored  to  regulate  his  con- 
duct in  that  office.  This  purpose  he  avowed,  and  never  ceased  to 
enforce  by  precept  and  example,  during  his  administration  of 
nearly  six  years. 

No  student  of  municipal  history  who  has  perused  the  career  of 
Mr.  Quincy,  either  as  recorded  by  himself  or  by  others,  or  who 


223]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  27 

has  studied  his  messages  and  addresses  to  his  fellow  officers  and 
citizens  in  Boston  can  reasonably  question  but  that  he  approx- 
imated the  ideals  of  the  mayoralty  as  he  saw  them.  He  did  not 
escape  scathing  criticism  of  either  his  views  or  his  acts.  "The 
Mayor  assumes  too  much  himself.  He  places  himself  at  the  head 
of  all  committees.  He  prepares  all  reports.  He  permits  nothing 
to  be  done  but  by  his  agency.  He  does  not  sit  solemn  and  digni- 
fied in  his  chair,  and  leave  general  superintendence  to  others ;  but 
he  is  everywhere,  and  about  everything,  —  in  the  street ;  at  the 
docks ;  among  the  common  sewers ;  —  no  place  but  what  is  vexed 
by  his  presence."  In  these  words  Mr.  Quincy  quotes  the  com- 
plaints of  his  adversaries.  To  a  man  with  his  convictions  and 
firmness  of  purpose  they  must  have  been  the  assurance  that  he 
was  in  some  measure  achieving  his  purpose. 

It  is  not  easy  to  realize  the  full  influence  of  such  a  mayoral 
career  as  that  conceived  and  worked  out  by  Mr.  Quincy.  The 
tracing  of  this  influence  in  Boston  is  not  so  difficult,  but  else- 
where the  problem  is  a  much  harder  one.  Nevertheless  one  may 
not  doubt  the  fact  that  the  effect  of  the  demonstration  which  had 
been  thus  consciously  staged  in  Boston  was  an  important  factor 
in  the  future  development  of  the  office.  There  was  no  little  cor- 
respondence between  officials  in  the  principal  cities  of  the  day, 
for  example,  between  Boston  and  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and 
Charleston,  South  Carolina,  respectively.  The  achievements  of 
this  administration  in  Boston  were  known  elsewhere.  It  is  not 
possible  to  say  to  what  extent  mayors  elsewhere  were  inspired  to 
larger  efforts  and  more  vigorous  service  by  reason  of  Mr.  Quin- 
cy's  example.  Even  less  is  it  possible  to  say  to  what  extent  the 
latter 's  methods  had  laid  hold  upon  the  ordinary  municipal  «citi- 
zen,  or  those  who  had  to  do  with  the  drawing  up  of  municipal 
charters  in  the  years  following.  There  was  a  reaction  from 
mayor  government  even  in  Boston  following  Mr.  Quincy 's  re- 
tirement, yet  no  succeeding  mayor  failed  to  feel  his  influence. 
An  influence  of  this  sort  is  no  less  real  because  it  is  hard  to 
measure.  Such  conceptions  as  his  do  not  permeate  the  public 
consciousness  nor  command  general  acceptance  all  at  once.  But 
that  there  is  a  real  connection  between  a  Quincy  and  a  mayoral 
type  such  as  we  are  familiar  with  today  cannot  be  seriously  ques- 
tioned. By  seizing  upon  the  opportunity  to  show  the  possibilities 
of  an  office  that  was  passing  thru  a  formative  period  Mr. 


28  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [224 

Quincy  proved  himself  to  be  one  of  those  creative  spirits  who 
from  time  to  time  leave  their  impress  upon  even  the  institutions 
with  which  they  come  in  contact. 

The  acceptance  of  the  elective  mayoralty  in  Boston  in  1822, 
tho  not  the  first  instance  of  the  elective  principle  being  ap- 
plied to  this  office,  is  also  significant  because  it  foreshadows  the 
triumph  of  the  executive  over  the  bonds  which  had  heretofore 
been  the  guarantee  of  council  predominance.  The  overthrow 
of  the  latter  did  not  come  all  at  once,  but  it  has  steadily  declined 
in  influence  and  power  from  that  day  to  this.  Popular  election 
of  the  mayor  spread  rapidly  and  with  popular  election  came  in- 
dependence. From  being  the  servant  of  the  council  the  mayor 
was  suddenly  confronted  with  the  opportunity  of  becoming  its 
master.  The  course  of  municipal  development,  the  inability  of 
the  councils  to  adjust  themselves  to  the  rapidly  shifting  condi- 
tions of  the  following  century,  the  like  futility  and  ineffective- 
ness of  legislative  interference,  coupled,  as  it  was,  with  waste  and 
spoils,  the  greater  ease  with  which  the  mayor  could  be  brot 
to  feel  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  and  with  which  responsibil- 
ity could  be  fixed  upon  him,  all  these  factors  and  others  combined 
to  give  the  executive  its  opportunity.  Mr.  Quincy  seized  upon 
this  opportunity  with  more  zeal  and  with  larger  comprehension 
than  did  most  of  his  successors.  But  that  the  latter,  too,  did  not 
fail  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  between  1822  and  the  present 
time  the  mayoralty  has  received  no  serious  setback  in  its  move- 
ment toward  the  most  commanding  position  in  the  mayor  and 
council  plan  of  government. 

The  importance  of  the  triumph  of  popular  election  can  hardly 
be  overestimated.  It  is  an  indication  of  the  serious  and  honest 
effort  that  was  being  made  to  apply  the  principle  of  the  separa- 
tion of  powers  to  municipal  government  and  organization.  It 
was  a  development  that  has  changed  the  character  of  American 
municipal  institutions.  The  theory  of  the  separation  of  powers 
is  impracticable.  It  works  out  in  the  establishment  of  some 
extra-legal  mastery,  or  as  in  the  case  of  city  government,  the  tri- 
umph of  one  of  the  divisions  of  power  set  up.  It  was  inevitable 
in  the  municipal  field,  where  the  work  of  government  is  so  largely 
administrative  in  its  character,  that,  once  the  principle  of  separa- 
tion of  powers  was  recognized,  the  mastery  should  gravitate 
toward  the  administrative  organ  or  head  of  municipal  govern- 


225]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  29 

ment.  Popular  election  gave  to  the  mayor  the  strategic  position. 
Mr.  Quincy  made  the  most  of  it.  He  always  made  it  a  point  to 
inform  the  electors  with  regard  to  his  policies  and  plans.  He 
perceived  very  clearly  that  with  the  support  of  the  electors  be- 
hind him  he  could  readily  dominate  the  council.  His  success  has 
perhaps  never  been  excelled ;  but  his  methods,  and  others  which 
he  was  not  able  to  employ  under  the  less  favorable  conditions 
then  obtaining  in  law  and  custom,  have  been  assiduously  utilized 
by  many  a  mayor  in  succeeding  years.  Had  popular  election  of 
the  mayor  never  come,  the  council  might  have  been  saved,  but 
with  popular  election  once  established  the  supremacy  of  the 
council  in  the  field  of  municipal  government  was  ultimately 
doomed.  The  same  forces  are  at  work  in  varying  degree  in  state 
and  nation,  tending  to  exalt  the  administrative  arm  of  the  gov- 
ernment and  to  depress  the  legislative;  and  the  steady  increase 
of  the  presidency  and  the  governorship  at  the  expense  of  the  con- 
gress and  the  state  assemblies  respectively,  and  in  spite  of  a  re- 
sistance fortified  by  the  provisions  of  written  constitutions,  shows 
how  logical  and  irresponsible  was  the  growth  of  the  mayoralty. 

If  the  establishment  of  popular  election  for  the  mayoralty  was 
not  a  direct  blow  at  the  power  of  the  council,  the  bestowal  of  the 
veto  upon  the  mayor  must  be  accepted  as  the  beginning  of  the 
positive  movement  against  the  position  and  integrity  of  the  legis- 
lative branch  of  the  municipal  government.  This  development 
in  the  mayoralty  appeared  in  the  New  York  charter  of  the  year 
1830,  and  in  the  words  of  Mr.  Greenlaw  constitutes  the  "first 
marked  encroachment  on  the  powers  of  the  council. ' '  Moreover 
this  veto  was  an  absolute  one  —  the  signature  of  the  mayor  was 
necessary  to  the  enactment  and  validity  of  ordinances.  The  ab- 
solute veto  gave  way  to  the  qualified  veto  in  the  course  of  its 
development,  and  this  in  turn  to  the  selective  veto  when  appro- 
priation bills  were  concerned ;  but  the  net  result  was  the  develop- 
ment of  a  most  important  power  of  the  municipal  executive  in 
legislation,  a  power  which  in  New  York  state  has  been  extended 
to  include  local  and  special  legislation  affecting  municipalities. 

The  time  when  the  mayoralty  generally  was  vested  with  a  legal 
control  over  administration  is  not  easy  to  determine.  The  ten- 
dency in  that  direction  antedates  the  year  1850,  but  it  is  between 
1850  and  1860  that  some  of  the  more  important  and  permanent 
steps  are  taken.  Out  of  twelve  representative  cities  five  of  them 


30  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [226 

made  some  progress  toward  vesting  the  mayor  with  varying  meas- 
ures of  authority  over  appointments,  and  four  of  them  vested  in 
him  either  complete  or  partial  supervisory  powers  over  adminis- 
tration. Feeble  powers  of  removal  appear  in  three  of  them, 
while  the  vague  responsibility  of  being  "chief  executive"  is  im- 
posed in  five.  In  the  charters  issued  in  the  smaller  cities  between 
1850  and  1870  the  mayor's  administrative  control  is  quite  notice- 
able. In  Illinois,  for  example,  the  charters  of  Macomb,  Jackson- 
ville, and  several  other  cities  confer  upon  the  mayor  the  power  of 
appointing  the  school  board,  a  power  not  given  under  the  general 
municipal  act  of  1872  and  bestowed  today  in  only  a  few  of  the 
larger  cities.  Altho  the  following  decade  appears  to  have 
been  a  period  of  relatively  little  change,  with  reaction  showing 
itself  here  and  there,  as  in  Pittsburgh  (where  the  veto  power 
was  temporarily  lost  in  1867),  yet  there  was  no  important  set- 
back in  the  development  of  the  mayoralty.  The  year  1850  there- 
fore marks  the  point  when  the  mayoral  office  ' '  finds  itself, "  so  to 
speak,  and  it  is  definitely  recognized  in  law  as  the  principal  re- 
pository of  administrative  authority  and  responsibility.  It  must 
be  said,  however,  that  the  definite  coordination  of  the  mayor's 
powers  and  responsibilities  was  not  seriously  attempted  during 
this  period. 

Roughly  speaking  the  significance  of  the  year  1870  lies  in  the 
fact  that  counciliar  supremacy  and  legislative  interference  had 
both  been  tried  and  found  wanting  by  this  time.  Corruption 
and  self-seeking  were  the  usual  product  of  the  former  and  were 
coupled  with  gross  inefficiency.  Confusion  and  irresponsibility 
followed  the  train  of  legislative  efforts  to  remedy  the  situation  in 
municipal  government.  The  preliminary  tryouts  of  the  mayor- 
alty had  been  made.  Frequently  the  results  had  been  favorable. 
From  this  year,  therefore,  there  is  noticeable  a  distinct  accelera- 
tion in  the  trend  toward  mayor  government.  The  mayor  became 
the  "hostage"  for  the  good  government  of  the  city,  even  before 
authority  commensurate  with  this  responsibility  was  committed 
to  him.  But  this  was  not  long  the  case.  Within  the  next  thirty 
years  the  mayor  system,  with  comparatively  few  exceptions,  be- 
came the  rule  in  those  parts  of  the  country  where  municipal  gov- 
ernment was  a  problem  of  consequence.  The  steps  which  were 
taken  to  effect  this  predominance  of  the  municipal  executive  were 
the  extension  of  the  mayor 's  power  of  appointment  and  removal, 


227]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  31 

a  point  upon  which  there  was  remarkable  agreement  among  the 
charter  makers  of  the  period,  the  lengthening  of  the  mayor's 
term  of  appointment  to  office,  the  express  announcement  in  many 
charters  of  the  mayor's  liability  for  the  good  government  of  the 
city,  and  the  expansion  of  the  mayor's  power  in  municipal  legis- 
lation and  finance  thru  the  bestowal  of  positive  rights  and 
duties  and  the  strengthening  of  his  veto. 

The  development  of  the  mayoral  office  to  its  position  of  respon- 
sible leadership  is  largely  the  fruit  of  the  last  half  century. 
"The  mayor  system,"  "mayor  government,"  and  like  expres- 
sions by  which  we  characterize  the  predominance  of  the  executive 
in  the  majority  of  American  municipalities,  represent  compara- 
tively recent  efforts  to  describe  the  result  produced  by  the  evolu- 
tion of  organization  in  cities  operating  under  the  ' '  federal ' '  prin- 
ciples. This  result  was  so  nearly  achieved  in  1900  that  it  had 
called  forth  general  recognition  and  no  little  treatment.  More- 
over, with  few  exceptions,  it  was  a  result  that  was  accepted  in 
large  measure  in  all  parts  of  the  Union.  It  had  no  serious  rival 
systems  with  which  to  contend.  True  the  council  was  still  pow- 
erful in  many  cities.  In  states  like  Illinois,  the  general  munic- 
ipal law  did  not  admit  the  supremacy  of  the  executive  in  munic- 
ipal affairs,  but  in  practice  he  was  very  much  more  powerful 
than  the  legislative  acts  alone  would  indicate.  The  place  of  the 
office  in  the  municipal  regime  appeared  secure  and  in  many 
places  complete.  Its  supremacy  was  now  rooted  deeply  in  the 
past,  and  there  were  advocates,  not  a  few,  who  urged  continued 
exaltation  of  the  office  as  the  most  promising  hope  for  good  city 
government  in  the  United  States.  The  hopes  of  reformers  were 
centered  upon  it  and  the  enlargement  of  its  influence  and  power. 
The  judicial  functions  of  the  office  alone  had  declined  in  impor- 
tance, except  in  some  parts  of  the  south  and  in  Indiana. 

Everywhere,  practically,  the  mayor's  power  to  mold  the  rest 
of  the  administrative  service,  so  far  as  it  was  under  the  control 
of  the  local  government,  was  recognized,  tho  to  a  much  greater 
degree  in  some  cities  than  in  others.  Sometimes  his  powers  of 
appointment  and  removal  were  complete,  but  the  practice  was 
more  general  of  requiring  the  consent  of  the  council,  or  of  one 
house  thereof,  to  appointments,  and  often  removals  by  the  mayor 
might  be  overruled  by  the  council.  The  tendency  was  strongly 
in  the  direction  of  making  the  authority  of  the  mayor  independ- 


32  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [228 

ent  of  any  interference  on  the  part  of  the  council  in  administra- 
tive appointments  and  removals.  In  cities  where  this  authority 
was  already  complete  a  statement  of  reasons  or  a  report  to  the 
council  of  the  grounds  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  remove 
officials  was  sometimes  provided  as  the  sole  check  upon  arbitrary 
action.  Mr.  Greenlaw  concluded  in  1899  that  in  no  other  point 
were  the  city  charters  so  generally  in  agreement  as  in  the  depend- 
ence of  administrative  officers  upon  the  mayor. 

The  relation  of  the  mayor  to  municipal  legislation  was  ex- 
pressed in  an  almost  universal  recognition  of  the  veto  power  in 
its  qualified  form  and  in  a  wide  acceptance  of  the  selective  veto. 
The  veto,  indeed,  was  in  the  process  of  a  vigorous  and  healthy 
development  and  was  being  strengthened  in  matters  of  finance, 
including  appropriations  and  indebtedness,  and  franchise  grants. 
The  mayor  sat  in  the  council  as  presiding  officer,  and  he  was 
usually  clothed  with  authority  to  cast  the  deciding  vote  in  case 
of  a  tie  and  at  times  in  other  matters.  In  Chicago  the  mayor 
had  wrested  from  the  council  the  acknowledged  right  to  appoint 
the  committees  of  the  latter,  a  victory  for  the  executive  that  was 
won  by  Carter  H.  Harrison,  Sr.,  as  a  result  of  a  hard  struggle. 
In  New  York  City  the  influence  of  the  mayor  did  not  cease  when 
his  term  of  office  was  ended,  but  he  was  given  a  seat  and  voice, 
tho  no  vote,  in  the  council  meetings  as  long  as  he  was  a  resi- 
dent of  the  city. 

Only  a  few  years  more  were  required  before  the  application 
of  the  federal  principles  brot  forth  the  plan  of  municipal 
organization,  in  which  the  mayor  became  the  prototype  within 
the  municipality  of  the  president  in  our  national  government 
with  the  administrative  service  grouped  into  great  departments 
headed  by  his  appointees.  In  municipal  charters  and  general 
laws  the  mayor  was  made  responsible  for  the  government  of  the 
city,  for  the  honesty,  efficiency,  and  economy  of  administration, 
the  character  of  its  laws  and  the  good  order,  peace,  and  safety  of 
the  community.  The  attempt  to  find  pure  city  government  and 
successful  administration  by  the  concentration  of  great  powers 
and  even  greater  responsibility  in  the  person  of  one  man,  in  the 
opinion  of  Mr.  Greenlaw,  was  "almost  pathetic."  "There  is," 
says  Mr.  Brand  Whitlock,  the  ex-mayor  of  Toledo,  Ohio,  "a 
strange,  almost  inexplicable  belief  in  the  almost  supernatural 


229]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  33 

powers  of  a  Mayor."  Says  Mr.  Whitlock,  "I  have  been  waited 
on  by  committees  —  of  aged  men  —  demanding  that  I  stop  at 
once  those  lovers  who  sought  the  public  parks  on  moonlit  nights 
in  June,  I  have  been  roused  from  bed  at  two  o  'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing with  a  demand  that  a  team  of  horses  in  a  barn  four  miles  on 
the  other  side  of  town  be  fed ;  innumerable  ladies  have  appealed 
to  me  to  compel  their  husbands  to  show  them  more  affectionate 
attention,  others  have  asked  me  to  prohibit  their  neighbors  from 
talking  about  them.  One  Jewish  resident  was  so  devout  that  he 
emigrated  to  Jerusalem,  and  his  family  insisted  that  I  recall  him ; 
a  Christian  missionary  asked  me  to  detail  policemen  to  assist  him 
in  converting  the  Jews  to  his  creed;  and  pathetic  mothers  were 
ever  imploring  me  to  order  the  release  of  their  sons  and  husbands 
from  prisons  and  penitentiaries,  over  which  I  had  no  possible 
jurisdiction."  To  one  sorrowful  suppliant  the  mayor  was  "the 
father  of  all."  Moreover,  "this  exaggerated  notion  of  the  may- 
oral power  was  not  confined  to  those  citizens  of  the  foreign 
quarters;  it  was  shared  by  many  of  the  native  Americans,  who 
held  the  mayor  responsible  for  all  the  vices  of  the  community." 
Mr.  Whitlock  wrote,  of  course,  a  decade  or  more  later  than  Mr. 
Greenlaw  and  others  who  were  describing  the  mayor  system  of 
the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  yet  his  words  fairly  describe 
the  popular  opinion  of  the  degree  of  responsibility  which  had 
been  heaped  upon  the  municipal  executive  during  the  closing 
years  of  that  period,  and  indicate  how  impossible  it  was  for  the 
mayor  to  approximate  in  performance  the  conceptions  more  or 
less  generally  held  regarding  his  position,  powers,  and  functions. 
Nor  did  the  more  intelligent  escape  this  conception  of  the  mayor- 
alty. The  ' '  Conferences  for  Good  City  Government ' '  gave  large 
space  on  their  programs  and  in  their  published  ' '  Proceedings ' '  to 
rehearsals  of  the  campaigns  for  the  mayoralty  in  various  cities ; 
the  progress  forward  or  backward  was  to  no  small  degree  meas- 
ured by  the  success  of  reform  or  independent  mayors :  the  mayor 
was  to  make  up  for  the  sins  of  the  past,  he  was  the  prophet  whose 
coming  was  the  promise  of  better  things,  and  as  executive  he 
appeared  the  sole  hope  and  refuge  of  a  people  who  despaired  of 
attaining  good  city  government.  The  mayor  was  to  be  the 
savior  of  a  municipal  citizenship  that  had  not  yet  perceived  that 
its  only  salvation  could  come  thru  its  own  exertions,  that  in 


34  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [230 

truth  was  almost  convinced  of  its  own  incapacity  for  self-help. 
The  measure  of  responsibility  heaped  upon  the  mayor  had  far 
surpassed  the  means  at  his  command  for  meeting  the  multi- 
tudinous demands  and  obligations  that  pressed  upon  him.  In- 
deed, the  means  for  meeting  the  responsibilities  placed  upon  him 
were  not  fully  bestowed  upon  the  mayor,  even  when  the  measure 
of  his  authority  appeared  to  be  the  greatest. 

By  the  close  of  the  century  the  federal  principles  of  govern- 
ment as  conceived  and  worked  out  in  the  American  national  gov- 
ernment had  wrought  an  almost  complete  change  in  the  organ- 
ization of  American  cities.  Some  things  yet  remained  to  be  done 
if  a  true  copy  of  the  federal  system  was  to  be  realized  in  munic- 
ipal government,  but,  barring  a  revolutionary  upheaval  in  think- 
ing and  in  tendencies,  the  complete  application  and  acceptance 
of  these  principles  did  not  appear  to  be  far  distant.  Moreover, 
most  men  were  hoping  that  this  time  might  come  speedily.  Only 
here  and  there  arose  rare  and  scattered  voices  of  protest  and 
pleas  for  the  revival  and  restoration  of  council  government.  The 
tide  toward  mayor  government  and  the  exaltation  of  the  execu- 
tive seemed  to  be  sweeping  ahead  irresistibly.  The  mayoralty 
seemed  destined  to  become  the  center  of  that  centralization  in 
our  municipal  democracies  toward  which  De  Tocqueville  asserted 
all  democratic  governments  were  tending. 

How  altered  is  the  situation  today !  At  the  very  moment  of  its 
triumph  the  mayor  plan  was  successfully  challenged.  Now  near- 
ly a  half  thousand  vigorous  and  aggressive  municipalities  en- 
thusiastically proclaim  that  they  have  found  something  better, 
and  in  these  the  mayor  is  either  largely  shorn  of  his  power,  or 
dispensed  with  altogether.  Every  year  adds  some  scores  to  the 
number  of  cities  which  relegate  to  the  past  the  federal  analogy 
as  developed  in  the  field  of  municipal  government.  To  take  its 
place  the  commission  plan  and  the  city  manager  plan  have  ap- 
peared. They  have  not  won  recognition  without  a  struggle,  but 
they  have  won  it.  The  old  order  is  changing  rapidly. 

Nevertheless  the  mayor  plan  will  not  disappear.  In  the  course 
of  the  contest  for  public  favor  it  is  being  stimulated  and  purified. 
Many  of  the  more  important  achievements  of  the  past  fifteen 
years  stand  to  the  credit  of  cities  governed  under  a  mayoral 
regime.  In  these  accomplishments  the  leadership  of  the  mayors 


231]         THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MAYORALTY  35 

has  been  conspicuous.  Education  in  local  problems  has  very 
often  been  the  product  of  a  mayor's  leadership  and  vision.  The 
organization  of  mayors'  associations  in  many  states  testifies  to  a 
desire  and  determination  to  furnish  constituencies  with  intelli- 
gent political  leadership.  The  most  active  members  of  state  and 
national  organizations  for  municipal  betterment  are  frequently 
mayors  of  cities.  The  mayoralty  has  undoubtedly  held  its  own 
in  the  great  cities  of  the  country,  and  the  total  number  of  cities 
under  mayor  government  is  probably  not  very  many  less  than  it 
was  at  the  beginning  of  the  century.  Moreover,  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  there  has  been  a  continued  development  of  the 
power  and  position  of  the  mayor,  and  that  its  predominance  in 
the  system  based  upon  the  federal  analogy  is  more  firmly  estab- 
lished than  ever  before.  The  desire  to  supplement  popular  con- 
trol and  clearly  defined  responsibility  with  efficiency  has  caused 
the  further  strengthening  of  the  executive,  and  the  success  of 
rival  schemes  of  municipal  organization  has  hastened  and  ac- 
centuated this  development. 

Despite  this  apparent  position  and  continued  growth  of  the 
mayoralty,  it  must  be  observed  that  it  is  no  longer  the  most  strik- 
ing feature  of  municipal  life  and  organization.  Tho  by  no 
means  inconspicuous,  recent  surveys  of  municipal  tendencies 
have  often  omitted  to  mention  it,  an  oversight  which  would  have 
been  inconceivable  little  more  than  a  decade  ago.  It  is  more  dif- 
ficult to  watch  a  three-ringed  performance  and  the  tendency  is 
to  watch  most  intently  the  latest  development.  It  is  true,  too, 
that  having  set  up  an  organ  of  government  that  was  both  power- 
ful and  responsible  the  attention  of  reformers  was  turned  toward 
other  problems  of  municipal  life  and  government,  especially  that 
of  securing  efficiency  in  the  public  service.  To  the  solution  of 
this  problem  both  the  commission  and  the  city  manager  plans 
have  rendered  signal  help.  These  plans  have  been  the  offspring 
of  the  movement  for  efficiency.  The  evolution  of  mayor  govern- 
ment gradually  prepared  the  electorate  for  that  concentration  of 
authority  which  efficient  administration  demands.  The  splendid 
successes  of  the  newer  forms  of  government  have  not  sprung  full- 
grown  from  the  fertile  womb  of  disaster;  they  are  rather  the 
product  of  earlier  struggles,  the  end  of  which  was  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  democracy  and  efficiency  in  American  city  government.  It 


36  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [232 

now  appears  that  mayor  government,  commission  government, 
and  city  manager  government  are  to  participate  in  achieving 
that  end.  For  today  each  of  these  forms  is  potentially  and 
actively  full  of  promise  that  the  end  will  be  realized.  The  mu- 
nicipal citizen  who  is  still  in  the  prime  of  life  has  a  reasonable 
expectancy  of  living  to  see  good  government  become  the  normal 
thing  in  American  cities,  whether  their  executives  are  mayors, 
mayor-commissioners,  or  city  managers. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  MAYORAL  CONSTITUTION  TODAY 

A  survey  of  the  mayoral  constitution  as  one  finds  it  today  does 
not  reveal  striking  dissimilarities  with  the  constitution  of  the 
office  fifteen  or  twenty  years  ago,  at  least  not  in  the  municipal- 
ities retaining  the  mayor  and  council  plan.  Marked  changes 
have  occurred  in  the  constitution  of  the  office  in  commission  and 
city  manager  governed  cities,  but  these  will  be  considered  in  the 
chapters  devoted  to  the  executive  under  these  two  types.1 

Qualifications 

The  qualifications  for  the  mayoralty  are  properly  considered 
from  two  standpoints,  the  legal  ones  imposed  by  statute  upon  the 
holder  of  the  office,  and  the  practical  requirements  imposed  by 
the  exigencies  of  practical  politics.  The  legal  group  of  qualifica- 
tions varies  widely  in  its  details,  but  there  is  great  similarity, 
amounting  almost  to  uniformity,  in  the  principles  applied.  In  the 
political  group  the  qualifications  are  almost  everywhere  the  same, 
and,  on  the  whole,  have  operated  to  produce  a  mayoral  type  some- 
what different  from  the  other  leading  executive  types  of  Amer- 
ican officialdom.  The  legal  group  of  qualifications  has  exercised 
an  almost  negligible  influence  in  determining  the  kind  of  men 
who  occupy  the  office.  The  influence  of  political  forces  and  re- 
quirements has  been  potent  and  constant  and  therefore  most 
effective. 

In  the  legal  group  of  qualifications  three  are  almost  universal- 
ly required,  viz.,  local  residence,  United  States  citizenship,  and 
suffrage  right.  In  many  of  the  larger  urban  communities  age 
and  property  qualifications  are  added.  The  requirement  of 
local  residence  has  no  important  exceptions  in  this  country.  In 

i  An  excellent  short  review  of  the  constitution  of  the  office  is  presented  in 
the  second  chapter  of  Mr.  Bayles'  monograph  published  in  1895.  The  chap- 
ter title  is  "Present  Constitution  of  the  Office." 

37 


38  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [234 

states  where  cities  operate  under  general  statutes,  as  in  Illinois 
and  Indiana,  the  general  municipal  act  usually  imposes  the  resi- 
dence requirement.2  In  other  cases  the  requirement  is  a  feature 
of  the  special  charter  under  which  the  municipal  corporation  is 
operating.  Thus  the  charters  of  Boston,  Philadelphia,  Roches- 
ter, Baltimore,  Detroit,  St.  Louis,  Denver,  Kansas  City,  San 
Francisco,  and  many  other  cities  specifically  require  local  resi- 
dence. The  New  York  City  charter  of  1901  did  not  specify 
residence  in  the  city  as  a  requirement,  but  the  proposed  charter 
of  1909  inserted  such  a  qualification  for  the  office  of  mayor.  The 
specification  of  the  requirement  has,  of  course,  been  unnecessary 
in  those  cases  in  which  it  has  been  omitted,  political  availability 
heretofore  imposing  the  residence  requirement  where  the  law  has 
refrained. 

The  length  of  the  residence  required  varies  considerably.  In 
the  city  of  Rochester  but  five  months  suffice  to  satisfy  the  legal 
requirement.  In  many  cities  it  is  but  one  year,  especially  in  the 
smaller  cities  and  those  operating  under  general  state  law  in 
Texas.  In  Mississippi  it  is  two  years.  In  Louisville,  Ky.,  the 
period  of  residence  must  have  been  three  years.  In  Kansas  City, 
Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  and  St.  Louis  the  residence  demanded 
of  the  mayor  prior  to  his  election  is  five  years. 

The  purpose  of  the  residence  qualification  is  not  expressly  in- 
dicated in  the  charters  and  statutes  which  give  it  force.  The 
theory  underlying  it  has  a  twofold  basis,  viz.,  local  residents  are 
most  familiar  with  local  conditions  and  every  locality  has  resi- 
dents capable  of  filling  the  office  satisfactorily.  The  flavor  of 
local  patriotism  has  not  confined  its  influence  to  our  representa- 
tive bodies  alone  but  has  heretofore  been  equally  potent  in  the 
effect  it  has  had  upon  executives  in  municipalities.  No  doubt  it 
has  been  entirely  unnecessary  in  the  past  to  incorporate  a  resi- 
dence requirement  in  the  charter  or  general  law.  Proposals  that 
residence  within  the  state  suffice,  or  that  there  be  no  residence 
requirement  whatever  have  scarcely  received  a  respectful  hear- 
ing at  the  hands  of  charter  conventions  and  state  legislators,  and 
indeed,  of  municipal  citizens  and  electors  themselves.  A  non- 
resident, until  within  the  present  renaissance,  would  rarely  if 

2  Note  for  example,  the  provisions  of  the  Municipal  Laws  of  Illinois, 
Art.  2,  Sec.  21:  "The  chief  executive  officer  of  a  city  shall  be  a  mayor, 
who  shall  .  .  .  reside  within  the  city  limits  .  .  ." 


235]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  39 

ever  have  had  any  opportunity  of  even  coming  before  the  elec- 
tors as  a  candidate.  Partisan  politics  as  developed  in  American 
cities  have  amply  guaranteed  local  residence.  Moreover,  there 
appears  to  be  no  breakdown  in  this  requirement  with  respect  to 
the  mayoralty.  While  experts  may  be  sought  for  among  non- 
residents this  enlightened  tendency  has  not  been  manifest  in  the 
search  for  mayors.  The  force  of  custom,  the  weight  of  inertia, 
and  the  elective  character  of  the  mayoralty  are  large  factors  in 
the  maintenance  of  the  residence  qualification. 

If  the  residence  qualification  has  any  justification  it  seems  rea- 
sonable that  the  practice  in  some  cities  of  requiring  a  residence 
of  from  three  to  five  years  is  to  be  commended.  Whatever  force 
the  residence  qualification  may  have  appears  to  be  lost  under  the 
five  month  requirement  of  Rochester.  In  smaller  cities  three 
years  would  suffice,  while  in  the  metropolitan  centers  five  years 
does  not  appear  to  be  unreasonable  if  familiarity  with  local  con- 
ditions is  to  be  presumed  on  the  part  of  the  holder  of  the  office. 
The  thirty  to  sixty  day  residence  qualification  serves  no  purpose 
except  to  make  sure  that  the  mayor  is  a  qualified  elector  at  the 
time  of  the  election. 

The  requirement  of  citizenship  is  imposed  upon  mayors  in 
most  municipalities,  tho  not  always  in  specific  terms.  In  St. 
Louis,  Baltimore,  Kansas  City,  and  many  other  cities  there  is  an 
express  provision  establishing  citizenship  as  a  qualification  for 
the  office  of  mayor.  The  general  municipal  act  of  the  state  of 
Illinois  fixes  a  like  requirement  for  mayors  in  all  cities  of  the 
state.  In  Philadelphia  and  Pittsburgh  state  citizenship  is  required. 
In  Cleveland,  New  York,  Portland,  and  a  few  other  cities  citi- 
zenship is  not  made  a  qualification  either  directly  or  indirectly 
in  the  municipal  charter.3  Indirectly  citizenship  is  required  by 
the  provision  that  the  mayor  shall  be  a  qualified  elector  of  the 
city  or  state,  a  method  which  is  effective  inasmuch  as  all  but  ten 
of  the  states  provide  that  electors  shall  be  bona  fide  citizens  of  the 
United  States.4  In  some  of  these  ten  states  the  charter  provi- 

s  Not  even  the  qualification  of  being  an  elector  is  specified,  probably 
owing  in  part  to  the  fact  that  practically  speaking  such  specification  is 
unnecessary. 

4  Beard,  0.  A.,  American  Government  and  Politics  (new  and  revised  edi- 
tion of  1914),  pp.  454,  455.  These  states  are  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Indiana, 
Kansas,  Michigan,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  Oregon,  South  Dakota,  and  Texas. 


40  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [236 

sions  of  the  municipal  constitution  supplement  the  state  electoral 
code  by  specifying  citizenship  as  a  qualification  for  the  office.5 

In  some  of  the  cities  referred  to  in  the  foregoing  discussion 
the  qualifications  for  both  citizenship  and  electorship  are  speci- 
fied. If  there  is  practical  value  in  specifying  either,  the  twofold 
requirement  is  not  wholly  superfluous,  inasmuch  as  the  bases  of 
the  two  qualifications  are  by  no  means  the  same  and  citizenship 
is  not  always  a  prerequisite  to  the  suffrage.  On  the  other  hand 
there  are  in  all  our  cities  vast  numbers  of  citizens  who  are  not 
qualified  electors,  and  the  requirement  of  citizenship  alone  might 
in  some  cases  admit  to  the  office  those  who  were  not  privileged  to 
vote.  The  first  program  of  the  National  Municipal  League  sug- 
gested only  that  a  candidate  be  a  qualified  elector.6 

In  general  it  may  be  said  that  the  tendency  in  the  states  has 
been  to  make  citizenship  a  condition  upon  which  suffrage  rests. 
It  is  improbable  that  this  tendency  will  be  relaxed ;  certainly  we 
will  not  soon  witness  the  extension  of  the  suffrage  to  larger  num- 
bers of  those  who  are  not  citizens.  In  the  case  of  male  citizens 
twenty-one  years  of  age  and  upward  the  suffrage  may  usually 
be  presumed,  but  this  has  not  been  true  of  female  citizens,  es- 
pecially in  those  states  in  which  the  process  of  urbanization  has 
proceeded  furthest.  The  requirement  that  a  mayor  be  a  qualified 
elector  presumes  therefore  in  most  cases  that  he  is  a  citizen  of  the 
state  or  of  the  United  States.  Many  important  cities  specify  the 
requirement  of  suffrage  right  and  this  qualification  is  likely  to 
maintain  its  place  in  the  charters  of  the  future.  The  city  of  Bos- 
ton even  limits  the  eligibility  list  to  the  "male  qualified  registered 
voter."  The  new  city  charter  of  St.  Louis  on  the  contrary  omits 
the  requirement  that  the  mayor  be  an  elector.  No  marked  trend 
toward  or  away  from  this  qualification  is  discernable  in  the  mu- 
nicipal history  of  the  past  two  decades. 

In  addition  to  the  requirements  noted  above  as  qualifications 
for  the  mayoral  office  there  are  some  others  which  are  less  gen- 
Five  of  the  great  metropolitan  districts  lie  wholly  or  in  part  within  these 
states,  viz.,  St.  Louis  and  Kansas  City  in  Missouri,  Detroit  in  Michigan, 
Indianapolis  in  Indiana,  and  Portland  in  Oregon. 

5  This  is  true  in  all  but  one  of  the  metropolitan  centers  lying  in  the  states 
named  in  the  preceding  note.     Cf.  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  7,  Sec.  2 ;  Kansas 
City,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  2;  Detroit,  Charter,  Sec.  89. 

6  National  Municipal  League  ' '  Program, ' '  Art.  3,  Sec.  1. 


237]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  41 

erally  recognized,  but  which  are  still  of  considerable  importance. 
The  age  qualification  of  twenty-one  years,  is,  of  course,  quite 
commonly  recognized  either  directly  or  indirectly  and  may  as  a 
rule  be  assumed.  It  is  rarely  if  ever,  expressly  inserted  in  the 
municipal  charter,  or  in  the  general  laws  of  the  state.  The  pro- 
vision specifying  that  the  candidate  must  be  a  qualified  voter 
indirectly  fixes  a  minimum  age  limit.  The  charters  of  the  larger 
cities,  however,  quite  commonly  fix  a  higher  age,  some  of  them  in 
express  terms,  others  indirectly.  The  charters  of  Philadelphia, 
Baltimore,  Kansas  City,  Pittsburgh,  Charleston,  and  the  general 
law  of  the  state  of  Montana  prescribe  that  the  mayor  must  be 
twenty-five  years  of  age.  The  new  charter  of  the  city  of  St. 
Louis  follows  the  former  St.  Louis  and  New  Orleans  charters  in 
fixing  the  minimum  age  at  thirty  years.  The  charter  of  San 
Francisco  indirectly  specifies  the  age  qualification  as  twenty-six 
years  by  requiring  that  the  mayor  has  been  an  elector  of  the  city 
and  county  for  five  years. 

The  property  owning  and  tax  paying  qualifications,  while  not 
generally  imposed,  still  maintain  their  places  in  some  of  the  im- 
portant cities  of  the  land.  In  Baltimore  the  mayor  must  for  two 
years  have  paid  taxes  on  property  in  the  city  to  the  value  of  two 
thousand  dollars.  In  Kansas  City  the  mayor  must  have  paid 
city  and  county  taxes  for  two  years  just  preceding  his  election 
to  the  office.  The  charter  of  Seattle  provides  that  the  mayor 
must  have  been  a  tax  payer  of  the  city  for  at  least  four  years 
preceding  his  election  to  the  office.  The  general  municipal  act 
of  Montana  lays  down  the  qualification  for  all  mayors  within  the 
state  that  they  shall  be  tax  paying  freeholders  within  the  limits 
of  the  city  in  which  they  hold  office.  The  recently  adopted  St. 
Louis  charter  provides  that  the  mayor  shall  have  been  an  "as- 
sessed tax  payer  of  the  city  for  two  years."  Writing  twenty 
years  ago  Mr.  Bayles  thought  the  imposition  of  property  holding 
qualification  was  "very  rare,"  and  concludes  that  the  value  of 
such  a  requirement  is  not  apparent,  inasmuch  as  "in  practice  it 
need  never  disqualify  a  candidate."  There  seems  to  be  no  ten- 
dency, however,  to  omit  this  qualification  in  cities  where  it  has 
heretofore  existed.  Failure  to  require  property  ownership  and 
tax  paying  has  not  demonstrably  lowered  the  character  of  those 
holding  the  municipal  executive  office  in  cities  which  do  not  re- 
quire them.  On  the  other  hand  these  qualifications  have  not 


42  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [238 

given  evidence  of  their  power  to  elevate  the  standards  of  the  of- 
fice in  those  cities  which  retain  them. 

Quite  rarely  the  provision  is  to  be  found  in  the  charters  that 
the  mayor  is  not  to  hold  any  other  official  position  during  his 
term.  The  new  Cleveland  charter  provides  that  the  mayor  ' '  shall 
not  hold  any  other  public  office  or  employment,  except  that  of 
notary  public  or  member  of  the  state  militia. ' '  The  provisions  of 
the  general  municipal  act  of  the  state  of  Illinois  and  of  the 
Kochester  charter  prevent  the  mayor  from  holding  more  than  one 
municipal  office  during  the  term  for  which  he  may  be  elected. 
The  old  St.  Louis  charter  prohibited  the  mayor  from  holding  any 
state  or  federal  office  while  mayor.  By  judicial  decision  a  num- 
ber of  offices  have  been  held  in  certain  states  to  be  incompatible 
with  the  office  of  mayor.7  In  general,  however,  the  question  of 
the  mayor  holding  two  or  more  offices  is  one  that  takes  care  of 
itself.  Tradition  in  the  American  municipal  democracy  is  in  ac- 
cord with  the  general  sentiment  of  the  nation  regarding  any  ef- 
fort on  the  part  of  one  individual  to  secure  an  undue  share  either 
of  honor  or  more  particularly  of  emoluments.  The  number  of 
those  who  are  willing  and  anxious  to  serve  the  public  is  too  great 
to  permit  their  votes  or  influence  to  be  ignored  by  prospective 
candidates. 

In  any  extensive  survey  of  the  mayoral  office  one  finds  numer- 
ous special  qualifications.  In  New  York  City  the  mayor  may  not 
be  one  who  is  a  pensioner  of  the  city.  In  Pennsylvania  cities 
holders  of  the  office  may  not  succeed  themselves.  The  charter  of 
the  city  of  Detroit  prescribes  that  the  mayor  be  able  to  read  and 
write  the  English  language  "intelligibly,"  and  authorizes  the 
council  to  declare  void  the  election  of  any  person  not  so  quali- 
fied. A  number  of  cities  prohibit  the  mayor  from  having  any 
interest  whatever  either  as  principal  or  surety  in  city  contracts. 
Defaulters  to  municipal  corporations,  and  those  who  have  been 
convicted  of  malfeasance  in  office,  bribery,  or  other  corrupt  prac- 
tice or  crime  are  declared  to  be  ineligible  in  Illinois  and  in  St. 
Louis  respectively.  The  Baltimore  charter  declares  that  the 
mayor  shall  be  a  person  "of  known  integrity,  experience  and 
sound  judgment." 

Despite  the  imposing  array  of  legal  qualifications  which  are 
demanded  of  those  who  would  fill  the  office  of  mayor,  it  may  be 

7  Bayles '  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United  States,  p.  21. 


239]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  43 

confidently  asserted  that  few  of  them  serve  to  bar  from  office 
those  who  are  eligible  from  a  political  or  partisan  standpoint. 
Occasionally,  it  is  true,  the  existence  of  these  legal  qualifications 
may  serve  a  purpose.  The  spectacle  of  San  Francisco  casting 
more  than  thirty  thousand  votes  in  1915  for  a  mayoral  candidate 
who  had  served  a  term  in  prison  for  being  associated  with  a  for- 
mer era  of  corruption  in  the  government  of  the  city  would  have 
been  prevented  by  the  presence  of  legal  qualifications  which 
would  have  nullified  such  candidacy  had  it  been  successful. 
American  municipal  democracy  will  not,  however,  secure  the 
more  desirable  type  of  mayors  through  the  imposition  of  mere 
legal  qualifications.  The  real  standards  and  qualifications  which 
those  who  aspire  to  be  mayors  must  meet  are  those  which  exist  in 
the  political  consciousness  of  the  municipal  electorates.  From 
the  standpoint  of  practical  politics  the  extra-legal  qualifications, 
constituting  the  " availability"  and  "acceptability"  of  mayoral 
candidates,  are  of  vastly  greater  importance. 

Mayoral  candidates  are  usually  party  men  and  even  when  this 
is  not  the  case  as  sometimes  happens  in  the  reform  and  fusion 
movements  which  characterize  American  municipal  political 
strife,  they  must  be  men  either  of  known  or  potential  strength 
with  the  electors.  The  qualities  that  give  men  such  strength  vary 
considerably  with  the  time  and  the  city.  Political  activity  prior 
to  the  period  of  candidacy  and  office  holding  has  been  an  un- 
questioned asset  in  the  great  majority  of  cases.  Experience  in 
public  office,  especially  if  the  record  of  service  be  generally  ac- 
ceptable, is  an  advantage  not  lightly  despised.  A  "safe"  candi- 
date is  always  acceptable  to  large  numbers  of  the  electorate. 
Inasmuch  as  a  successful  candidate  for  mayor  tends  to  become  a 
power  in  the  party  organization  the  leaders  in  established  party 
circles  must  be  satisfied  with  a  prospective  candidate.  To  this 
end  recognition  won  in  party  endeavor  and  leadership  estab- 
lished by  successful  party  work  is  desirable.  An  attractive  per- 
sonality, a  known  sympathy  with  many  classes  in  the  commun- 
ity, a  reputation  for  being  public  spirited,  power  as  a  "mixer" 
and  as  a  writer  or  speaker,  an  absence  of  puritanical  tendencies 
in  the  enforcement  of  law,  and  a  capacity  for  overlooking  or  for 
dealing  mildly  with  the  petty  delinquencies  of  humanity,  secret 
or  open  acknowledgment  of  the  powerful  private  interests  that 
deal  directly  with  the  municipal  government,  a  declared  regard 


44  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [240 

for  the  safety  and  liberties  of  the  individual  and  an  avowed  de- 
termination to  curb  vice  and  crime,  ability  to  manage,  bluff,  or 
bulldoze  municipal  councils,  a  habit  of  thinking  and  willing  for 
oneself  and  a  sort  of  courage  that  dares  to  counter  private  and 
party  bosses  or  even  the  public  opinion  —  all  these  qualities  in 
varied  measure  go  to  make  up  the  mayoral  type  of  the  American 
municipality.  Social  distinction,  wealth,  expert  trai»ing  for  the 
work  of  the  municipal  executive,  and  advanced  educational  at- 
tainments have  not  been  conspicuous  as  characteristics  demanded 
of  the  American  mayor.  Yet  the  extra-legal  qualifications  which 
he  must  satisfy  have  been  quite  exacting,  the  extent  to  which  one 
group  of  characteristics  or  another  must  predominate  depending 
upon  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  campaign,  the  qualities 
of  the  opposition  candidate,  and  the  temper  of  the  electorate. 

It  should  be  further  observed  that  such  legal  qualifications  as 
those  of  residence,  reasonable  maturity,  citizenship,  and  suffrage 
right  are  so  powerfully  enforced  by  the  purely  political  exigen- 
cies of  American  public  life  and  by  that  intensity  of  local  pride 
and  self-sufficiency  as  to  render  their  inclusion  in  charter  pro- 
visions and  general  municipal  acts  almost  superfluous.  On  the 
contrary  extra-legal  conditions  have  been  fostered  consciously 
by  the  professional  politician  class  partly  for  its  own  benefit,  and 
partly  to  check  opposing  partisans,  and  partly  from  a  sincere 
belief  that  these  conditions  are  eminently  desirable.  In  general 
they  have  harmonized  with  the  more  common  legal  qualifications 
imposed  upon  mayors  and  have  rendered  such  qualifications 
largely  unnecessary. 

Nomination  and  Election 

With  the  exception  of  the  city  manager  the  chief  magistrates 
of  American  cities  are  elected  by  popular  vote.  This  method  of 
choice  renders  necessary  the  development  of  adequate  systems 
of  nomination.  In  the  course  of  American  municipal  history 
there  have  been  five  distinct  methods  of  placing  in  nomination 
candidates  for  the  mayoral  office.  These  methods  are  as  follows : 

1.  Self -announcement  by  the  candidate  or  an  informal  cau- 
cus of  his  friends. 

2.  Nomination  by  a  municipal  party  caucus  or  primary. 

3.  Nomination  by  a  delegate  convention  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives of  a  city  party  or  at  least  of  its  organized  units. 


241]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  45 

4.  Nomination  by  petition  or  nominations  papers  signed  by 
a  proportion  of  the  qualified  voters. 

5.  Nomination  by  direct  primary. 

There  have  been  other  methods  used  especially  when  the  power 
of  choosing  the  mayor  was  vested  in  the  hands  of  the  governor  as 
in  colonial  times  or  in  the  council  as  in  the  early  national  period 
and  in  Tennessee  down  until  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century.8 
But,  as  Mr.  Edward  Stanwood  remarks  in  his  History  of  the 
Presidency,  from  the  meager  materials  at  hand,  it  is  not  easy  to 
reconstruct  the  political  machinery  in  use  during  the  first  thirty 
years  under  the  Constitution.  Nor  must  it  be  supposed  that, 
where  many  communities  were  developing  political  institutions 
without  much  help  from  one  another,  because  not  in  close  inter- 
course, any  general  statement  regarding  their  practice  is  true  at 
all.9  Of  the  methods  named,  however,  the  first  three  have  largely 
passed  out  of  use,  the  second  alone  being  still  employed  in  some 
of  the  smaller  cities  in  states  where  the  general  laws  have  not 
standardized  the  practice  regarding  nominations  and  elections 
thruout  the  state.  In  the  case  of  the  third  method  or  nomination 
by  delegate  convention,  it  appears  that  until  1913,  state  law  still 
permitted  its  use  in  cities  of  the  third  class  in  the  state  of  Utah, 
but  the  same  law  permitted  also  the  nomination  of  candidates  by 
the  use  of  nomination  papers.10 

It  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  relative  predominance  be- 
longs to  nomination  by  petition  or  to  nomination  by  direct  pri- 
mary, the  two  methods  which  are  most  common  today.  In  gen- 
eral it  may  be  observed  that  they  have  an  almost  equal  hold  upon 
the  municipalities,  tho  the  direct  primary  method  appears  to 
find  favor  in  the  larger  cities.  The  practices  with  respect  to 
nominations  vary  so  widely  in  details  that  it  is  only  with  respect 
to  the  more  general  principles  followed  that  it  is  possible  to  make 
note  in  this  discussion. 

Nomination  by  petition  involves  the  filing  of  a  request  that  the 
name  of  the  candidate  for  the  mayoral  office  shall  be  printed 

8C/.  Bayles'  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United  States,  p.  21.  This  is 
not  the  case  today  in  important  cities  such  as  Memphis  and  Nashville,  the 
latter  now  operating  under  the  commission  form  of  government. 

»  Stanwood,  Edward,  A  History  of  the  Presidency,  p.  170. 

10  The  earlier  systems  of  nomination  overlap  so  in  their  use  that  a  gen- 
eral statement  as  to  the  probable  predominance  at  any  given  time  of  any 
one  of  them  must  be  accepted  cautiously. 


46  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [242 

upon  the  official  ballot.  This  petition  must  be  signed  by  a  cer- 
tain number  or  proportion  of  the  qualified  electors  of  the  munic- 
ipality and  must  be  accompanied  by  the  addresses  of  the  signers 
and  the  attestation,  usually  a  sworn  statement,  of  the  one  who 
secured  the  signatures  certifying  that  they  are  valid  and  are  be- 
lieved to  be  in  conformity  with  the  election  laws.  This  petition 
is  filed  with  the  election  authorities,  its  validity  investigated  by 
them,  and  if  satisfactory,  certified  by  them  and  the  nomination 
placed  upon  the  ballot.  To  these  general  features  there  are  add- 
ed many  others,  the  details  exhibiting  some  variation  in  almost 
every  important  locality.  Thus  there  are  opportunities  pro- 
vided for  candidates  withdrawing  their  names,  for  signers  with- 
drawing their  signatures,  and  for  the  filling  of  vacancies  in  nomi- 
nations. In  some  places  there  are  requirements  that  candidates 
must  accept  in  writing  the  nominations  made.11  In  Boston  the 
signers  must  be  registered  as  well  as  qualified  voters. 

Certain  important  questions  appear  in  connection  with  the 
method  of  nomination  by  petition.  The  first  of  these  has  to  do 
with  the  number  of  nominating  signatures  that  is  to  be  required. 
In  Boston  the  number  is  three  thousand  registered  voters.  There 
has  been  at  least  one  serious  effort  to  have  the  figure  reduced  to 
one  thousand.  Apparently  this  effort  was  sponsored  by  the  Dem- 
ocratic machine  tho  its  purpose  in  doing  so  is  not  clear.  Party 
organizations  find  their  opportunity  in  the  surmounting  of  ob- 
stacles which  serve  to  deter  less  united  and  perhaps  less  actively 
interested  citizens.  In  fact  political  organizations  have  filled  a 
real  place  in  American  political  life  by  caring  for  just  such  tasks 
and  thereby  relieving  the  voter  of  the  burden,  and  too  often,  in 
his  thot,  of  his  responsibility.  The  Boston  charter  at  first  re- 
quired five  thousand  valid  signatures  in  order  that  a  few  very 
good  men  might  have  a  chance  to  get  their  names  on  the  ballot. 
But  in  practice  the  requirement  of  this  number  of  signatures 
was  expensive,  some  of  the  petition  gatherers  charging  as  high 
as  twenty  cents  per  name;  while  to  provide  against  signatures 
being  rejected  there  must  always  be  secured  a  large  surplus  to 
insure  acceptance  of  the  petition.12  The  success  of  the  large 

11  Cf.    Cleveland,    Charter,    Sec.    7.     Failure    to    file   the   acceptance    as 
required  causes  the  name  of  the  candidate  to  be  omitted  from  the  ballot. 

12  Cf.  a  note  in  the  National  Municipal  Beview  for  April,  1914,  p.  376, 
by  H.  S.  Gilbertson.     Mr.  Gilbertson  cites  the  Boston  Globe  as  authority 


243]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  47 

petition  in  securing  for  Boston  a  higher  type  of  municipal  exec- 
utive has  not  been  conspicuously  noticeable.  It  is  true,  however, 
that  the  issues  in  the  Boston  mayoralty  elections  have  been  ren- 
dered more  clear  cut.13 

The  adoption  of  the  English  system  of  nomination  upon  the 
petition  of  a  comparatively  small  number  of  names,  or  some 
other  equally  simple  process  has  been  suggested  as  a  possible 
way  out  of  the  rather  intricate  methods  now  in  use.  If  practical 
in  American  political  life  such  a  step  would  be  highly  desirable 
but  one  may  well  question  whether  a  system  which  is  character- 
ized by  ease  of  nomination,  inexpensiveness  of  operation,  sim- 
plicity of  procedure  would  not  come  to  grief  in  American  munic- 
ipalities because  of  the  absence  of  the  stabilizing  forces  which 
characterize  English  and  European  municipal  electorates.  The 
presence  of  a  highly  educated  governing  class,  the  long  estab- 
lished social  and  political  traditions  of  the  communities,  the 
willingness  of  men  of  means  and  standing  to  spend  and  be  spent 
in  the  public  service — these  factors  are  not  conspicuous  in  Amer- 
ican municipal  democracies.  Rather  spoils,  rotation  in  office, 
large  salaries,  vast  legal  power,  the  conception  that  almost  every 
citizen  is  capable  of  filling  responsible  positions  in  the  public 
service,  and  the  immensely  valuable  franchises  and  concessions 
of  municipalities  have  hindered  the  development  of  the  restraints 
which  more  simple  methods  require.  The  transition  to  some  less 
complex  method  of  making  nominations  is  one  that  is  probably 
now  under  way.  With  the  collapse  of  the  convention  system  the 
work  of  experimentation  has  been  undertaken  on  a  large  scale 
and  if  the  present  activity  continues  some  method  approximating 

for  the  statement  regarding  the  expensive  character  of  nomination  pro- 
cedure. The  Boston  Advertiser  is  also  referred  to  as  pointing  out  that  the 
situation  thus  created  is  unfair  to  the  poor  man  who  wants  to  fight  the 
machine  but  has  no  wealthy  backers.  The  charge  that  the  system  encour- 
ages perjury  and  fraud  is  also  made  though  no  evidence  to  that  effect  is 
produced.  One  may  not  accept  these  statements  unreservedly;  the  mayor- 
alty in  Boston  has  been  continually  in  the  hands  of  those  not  aligned  with 
the  well  meaning  and  well-to-do  reform  element  of  the  Back  Bay. 

!3  See  the  discussion  of  the  workings  of  the  Boston  plan  and  the  need  of 
simplification  by  Dr.  W.  B.  Munro  in  The  Government  of  American  Cities, 
pp.  136-139.  Dr.  Munro  concludes  that  the  Boston  system  of  requiring  3000 
names  has  served  "the  cause  of  independence  in  municipal  politics  better 
than  any  of  the  nominating  systems  which  preceded  it  .  .  ." 


48  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [244 

a  solution  of  the  problem  of  placing  candidates  in  nomination 
may  reasonably  be  expected  to  be  worked  out.  The  city  of  St. 
Paul  has  developed  a  method  of  "presentation  for  nomination" 
at  the  direct  primary  which  requires  but  fifty  genuine  qualified 
signatures.14  These  must  be  presented  in  the  form  of  individual 
certificates  attested  and  acknowledged  before  a  notary  public. 
Altho  this  rather  simple  method  precedes  a  primary  election,  ex- 
perience may  demonstrate  that  it  is  applicable  on  a  broader  scale. 
The  practice  which  is  current  in  Los  Angeles  of  requiring  the 
payment  of  a  fee  at  the  time  the  nomination  petition  is  filed  may 
prove  to  be  of  permanent  value  in  connection  with  the  method 
of  nomination  by  petition.  In  the  charter  which  was  proposed 
for  Seattle  in  1914,  the  filing  fee  was  fixed  at  one  per  centum  of 
the  annual  salary. 

Nomination  by  petition  has  tended  to  gain  in  favor  if  one  may 
judge  from  some  of  the  more  important  recent  charters.  The 
charter  revisions  in  Boston,  1909,  Detroit,  1914,  Columbus,  1914, 
Cleveland,  1913,  Cincinnati,  1914,  Minneapolis,  1913,  and  Seat- 
tle, 1914,  besides  those  in  many  smaller  cities,  all  provided  for 
nominations  by  petition.  Moreover  there  was  noticeable  advance 
toward  simplifying  the  procedure.  Thus  in  the  Minneapolis 
proposals  nominations  could  be  made  on  the  petition  of  one  hun- 
dred qualified  voters,  in  Detroit  of  five  hundred  voters  in  case  of 
the  mayoralty,  in  Columbus  of  two  per  centum  of  the  registered 
voters.  Not  all  of  these  charters  were  accepted  but  in  no  case 
does  rejection  seem  to  have  turned  on  the  provisions  for  nomi- 
nating candidates. 

One  of  the  most  widely  used  methods  of  making  nominations 
today  is  the  direct  primary  or  election  to  nomination  under 
official  supervision  and  upon  an  official  ballot.  The  strength  of 
political  organizations  has  determined  that  it  shall  be  the  closed 
or  party  primary.15  For  this  reason,  in  part,  it  has  failed  to 
achieve  all  that  was  expected  of  it  and  that  was  prophesied  for 

i*St.  Paul,  Charter,  Chap.  II,  Sec.  12.  Further  details  of  the  sys- 
tem are  contained  in  the  Sections  Nos.  11  to  19  inclusive. 

is  A  summary  description  of  the  direct  primary  in  its  various  phases  and 
forms  is  found  in  Beard,  C.  A.,  American  Government  and  Politics,  pp.  691- 
699.  A  discussion  of  the  subject  will  be  found  in  Munro,  W.  B.,  The  Gov- 
ernment of  American  Cities,  pp.  125-136.  A  more  complete  account  of 


method  and  its  development  will  be  found  in  Merriam,  C.  E.,  Primary  Elec- 
tions.    There  has  been  development,  however,  since  this  work  was  published. 


245]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  49 

it  in  the  direction  of  encouraging  independence  in  nominations. 
It  was  designed  to  supplant  the  convention  system  whose  abuses 
so  frequently  scandalized  municipal  as  well  as  state  politics.  Yet 
it  has  to  no  small  degree  come  under  the  control  of  the  very 
forces  from  which  it  was  hoped  it  would  free  the  voter.  It  has 
proven  costly  and  has  placed  heavy  burdens  upon  the  electorate. 
In  the  opinion  of  many  it  has  prolonged  the  period  of  domination 
of  state  politics  in  municipal  affairs.  There  has  been  a  deter- 
mined movement,  however,  toward  the  non-partisan  primary  in 
municipal  nominations,  especially  in  commission  governed  cities, 
the  result  of  which  is  to  render  somewhat  more  difficult  the  task 
of  the  professional  politician  to  retain  his  leadership  and  control, 
but  the  advantages  of  organization  and  party  backing  are  too 
great  to  be  denied  even  in  the  non-partisan  primary.  As  for  the 
open  primary  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  it  has  a  future  in  the 
United  States.16 

The  dominating  position  of  the  executive  in  American  cities 
today  finds  its  fundamental  basis  in  popular  election.  The  price 
of  leadership  and  supremacy  in  municipal  democracy  as  in  our 
state  and  national  governments  is  the  maintenance  of  close  and 
immediate  contact  with  the  electorate.  The  mayor,  to  a  larger 
degree  than  any  other  officer  in  city  government,  is  the  spokes- 
man for  the  municipality,  the  mouthpiece  of  the  voters.  In  New 
York,  Chicago,  Boston,  Los  Angeles,  and  many  other  cities,  only 
those  who  register  may  take  part  in  the  elections.  In  most  cities, 
however,  the  elections  may  be  participated  in  by  the  qualified 
voters.  Thus  out  of  thirty  representative  cities  twenty  of  them 
provide  in  their  charters  for  election  at  the  hands  of  the  ' '  quali- 
fied voters. ' '  The  San  Francisco  charter  and  the  "Wisconsin  gen- 
eral municipal  act  specify  election  "by  the  people."  The  pro- 
visions in  Keene,  Maine,  call  for  election  by  the  "legal  voters." 
These  various  provisions  have,  in  practice,  about  the  same  signifi- 
cance in  that  they  refer  to  those  who,  under  the  laws  of  the  state, 
are  qualified  to  vote.  In  an  increasing  number  of  states,  of 
course,  this  includes  women. 

Mayoral  elections,  in  common  with  the  usual  American  prac- 
tice, are  decided  by  the  plurality  of  votes.    Many  charters  spec- 
if Nebraska  tried  the  open  primary  and  reverted  to  the  closed  primary. 
Wisconsin   still  retains  the   open   primary   together   with   the   non-partisan 
primary  in  an  optional  form. 


50  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [246 

ify  that  a  plurality  shall  determine  elections.17  Others  assume 
plurality  elections  in  accordance  with  the  general  practice  in  the 
state  under  state  law.  In  general,  however,  plurality  elections 
are  recognized  by  students  of  municipal  government  and  life  as 
undesirable.  In  Salem,  Mass.,  in  1909,  a  mayor  was  elected  by 
twenty-four  per  centum  of  the  votes,  so  divided  was  the  opposi- 
tion. These  divisions  are  not  infrequently  the  product  of  careful 
political  scheming  and  are  planned  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  major- 
ity with  regard  to  a  particular  candidate.  One  of  the  recognized 
merits  of  the  non-partisan  primary  is  that  it  insures  majority 
elections.  The  same  argument  is  advanced  in  behalf  of  the 
majority-preferential  ballot.  The  majority  and  plurality  prin- 
ciples are  both  utilized  in  the  charter  of  Toledo,  Ohio.  The 
preferential  ballot  is  employed  in  municipal  elections  and  a  ma- 
jority of  first  choice  votes  elects,  but  if  no  candidate  has  a  major- 
ity of  first  choice  votes,  then  a  plurality  of  first  and  second  choice 
determines  the  outcome. 

Non-partisan  elections  for  municipal  officers  including  the 
mayor  imply  the  absence  of  partisan  designations  from  the  bal- 
lots voted.  The  city  of  Boston  is  conspicuous  among  the  mayor 
governed  cities  in  this  respect,  tho  it  is  not  uncommon  among 
commission  governed  cities.18  There  are  many  municipalities, 
however,  especially  among  the  smaller  cities,  that  do  not  permit 
the  state  and  national  party  organizations  to  dominate  local 
political  life.  In  their  place,  however,  there  appear  local  party 
organizations,  often  very  similar  to  the  state  and  national  branch- 
es in  their  purposes  and  aims.  Aspiring  leaders  do  not  hesitate 
to  use  their  power  in  the  local  organizations  to  further  their  am- 
bitions in  larger  fields  of  political  endeavor.  In  New  York,  Phil- 
adelphia, and  Chicago,  partisan  elections  obtain,  tho  in  both 
New  York  and  Philadelphia  fusion  and  other  independent  tick- 
ets have  always  commanded  strong  support  and  have  frequently 
been  victorious  at  the  polls.  The  problem  of  divorcing  local  and 
state  political  activity  must  be  successfully  solved  if  the  interests 
of  the  city  are  to  be  happily  served,  but  the  solution  becomes 

i?  Cf.  the  charters  of  Hartford,  Conn.,  Chap.  II,  See.  13 ;  New  Britain, 
Conn.,  Sec.  10;  St.  Paul,  Minn.,  Sec.  25,  which  reads,  "In  all  municipal 
elections  a  plurality  of  votes  shall  constitute  an  election. ' '  Also  charter 
of  Grand  Forks,  N.  D.,  See.  114. 

is  See  Amended  Charter,  1909,  Sees.  45,  46.  See  also  Cleveland,  Char- 
ter, See.  8. 


247]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  51 

increasingly  difficult  to  achieve  as  American  cities  grow  in  popu- 
lation and  consequently  in  political  importance.  State  and 
national  parties  must  retain  a  considerable  vitality  in  the  thot 
and  attachment  of  the  municipal  voter  if  they  are  to  succeed  in 
the  larger  political  field.  Even  in  Boston,  with  its  non-partisan 
elections,  the  Democratic  organization  had  not  failed  to  keep  its 
hand  on  the  city  hall  and  the  mayoralty. 

Occasionally  an  election  for  mayor  may  result  in  a  tie  vote. 
Two  methods  are  provided  for  deciding  the  election  in  such  a 
case.  The  more  common  method  appears  to  be  that  of  casting  the 
lot.19  In  other  cases  the  city  council  elects  the  mayor,  a  "more 
honest  way. "  20  In  Cleveland  preferential  voting  obtains,  and  a 
tie  is  decided  in  favor  of  the  candidate  having  the  largest  number 
of  first  choice  votes.21  This  review  of  the  methods  of  choosing 
mayors  indicates  some  dissatisfaction  with  plurality  elections  tho 
these  still  prevail  in  most  municipalities.  The  introduction  of 
assured  majority  elections  thru  the  preferential  ballot  or  the 
system  of  non-partisan  nominations  reveals  a  determination  to 
have  the  mayoral  office  represent  as  large  a  proportion  of  the 
people  as  possible.  It  is  somewhat  early  to  estimate  finally  the 
effect  of  substitution  of  nomination  by  petition  and  by  the  direct 
primary  for  the  convention  system  upon  the  character  and  type 
of  municipal  executive  produced;  on  the  one  hand  there  have 
not  been  the  momentous  transformations  which  were  prophesied, 
and  on  the  other  hand  there  seems  to  be  no  good  reason  for  re- 
turning to  the  convention  as  an  organ  for  making  nominations. 
The  enlargement  of  the  municipal  electorate  by  the  inclusion  of 
women  appears  to  be  eminently  justifiable  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  mayoralty,  tho  the  immediate  influence  is  difficult  to  ana- 
lyze and  estimate.22  There  is  apparent  a  widespread  desire  to 

is  Thus  the  charter  of  St.  Paul,  Sec.  25,  provides  that  ' '  the  election 
shall  be  determined  by  the  casting  of  lots  in  the  presence  of  the  coun- 
cil .  .  . "  So  also  the  city  election  law  in  Illinois,  Art.  5,  Sec.  11. 

20  As  in  Pittsburgh  and  Philadelphia.     In  the  former  the  vote  must  be 
viva  voce. 

21  Charter,  Sec.  8.     See  also  Toledo,  Charter,  Sec.  23.     The  lot  is  also 
utilized  in  the  case  of  Toledo  and  Cleveland,  in  case  the  tie  persists  thru 
the  first,  second,  and  third  choices  in  the  number  of  votes  cast  for  the  re- 
spective candidates. 

22  See  an  interesting  article  in  the  National  Municipal  Review  for  July, 
1915,  entitled,  "Are  Women  a  Force  for  Good  Government?"  by  Edith 
Abbott. 


52  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [248 

simplify  the  processes  of  choosing  the  mayor  and  this  promises 
well  in  a  day  when  the  electors  are  in  a  mood  to  consider  experi- 
ments. There  appears  to  be  no  desire  to  make  the  office  less  de- 
pendent upon  the  popular  support  which  has  contributed  so 
largely  to  making  it  what  it  is.  Rather,  the  tendencies  toward 
simplification  aim  to  increase  this  dependence  and  responsibility 
to  the  electorate  and  to  improve  the  position  of  the  mayor  as 
regards  his  relation  to  the  other  organs  of  government.  The 
three  principal  objects  to  be  kept  in  view  in  future  development 
are  ease  of  nominations,  reasonable  expenditures  in  behalf  of 
candidacies,  and  majority  elections. 

Removal  from  Office 

Mayors  may  be  removed  from  office,  (1)  by  action  of  the  munic- 
ipal council,  (2)  by  judicial  proceedings  before  a  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction,  (3)  by  a  state  officer,  the  governor,  or  (4) 
by  recall  elections.  In  his  survey  of  the  mayoral  constitution  in 
1895  Mr.  Bayles  noted  briefly  that  the  first  three  of  these  proc- 
esses were  then  provided  for  either  in  municipal  charters  or 
under  the  general  laws  of  the  state.23  The  fourth  process,  that 
of  the  recall,  has  developed  since  that  time,  and  bids  fair  to  be- 
come the  most  generally  employed  of  the  four. 

The  power  of  the  council  to  remove  the  mayor  has  been  held  to 
be  a  common  law  power  vested  in  municipal  corporations.  It 
arises  out  of  the  recognized  right  of  corporate  bodies,  public  and 
private,  to  select  their  own  officials  and  to  hold  them  responsible 
for  the  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the  corporation.  In  the  states 
of  New  York,  Tennessee,  "West  Virginia,  and  New  Jersey,  this 
power  has  been  recognized  as  one  which  may  properly  be  exer- 
cised by  the  representative  body  or  council  of  the  corporation. 
Dr.  John  F.  Dillon  in  his  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Munici- 
pal Corporations  ventures  the  opinion,  in  the  absence  of  judicial 
settlement  on  the  question,  that  the  municipal  council  in  the 
United  States  possesses  the  authority  to  remove,  for  cause,  the 
corporate  officers  of  the  municipality  whether  elected  or  not.2* 

23 Bayles'  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United  States,  p.  23.  There  is  no 
serious  effort  to  classify  the  processes  in  Mr.  Bayles'  brief  discussion.  The 
topic  is  one  that  has  not  received  large  attention  from  those  who  have  dis- 
cussed the  mayoralty,  yet  in  recent  years  its  importance  has  been  revealed 
on  more  than  one  occasion. 

24  The  New  York  decision  is  cited  in  Bayles '  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the 


249]  THE   MAYORAL   CONSTITUTION  TODAY  53 

This  may  of  course  be  modified  in  municipalities  in  which 
the  charter  confers  or  limits  the  power  of  removal  in  ex- 
press terms. 

The  charters  of  many  cities,  however,  expressly  provide  for 
the  removal  of  the  mayor  by  the  council.  Thus  the  recently 
adopted  charter  of  the  city  of  St.  Louis  authorizes  the  board  of 
aldermen  to  remove  the  mayor  for  crime,  misdemeanor  in  office, 
grave  misconduct  showing  unfitness  for  public  duty,  or  for  per- 
manent disability.  So  also  do  the  charters  of  Kansas  City  and 
Seattle. 

The  procedure  for  carrying  out  removal  by  the  council  varies 
from  city  to  city.  The  St.  Louis  charter  indicates  the  principal 
steps.  The  charges  must  be  specific  and  must  be  presented  in 
writing.  Accompanying  them  a  notice  is  required  which  states 
the  time  and  place  of  a  hearing.  The  mayor  shall  either  be  served 
with  the  charges  or  the  notice  of  these  shall  be  published  three 
times  in  a  daily  newspaper.  The  charter  provides  for  the  public 
character  of  the  hearing  and  grants  the  mayor  the  right  to  appear 
and  defend  himself,  either  in  person  or  by  counsel,  and  confers 
upon  him  the  privilege  of  the  process  of  the  board  of  aldermen  to 
compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses  in  his  behalf.  The  vote  on 
the  proposal  to  remove  the  mayor  is  to  be  taken  by  yeas  and  nays 
and  made  a  matter  of  record.  Three-fourths  of  all  the  members 
of  the  board  must  vote  for  removal  to  effect  such  action.  In 
Seattle  the  vote  to  remove  takes  effect  if  two-thirds  of  the  council 
support  it.  In  Minneapolis  a  bare  majority  suffices  to  effect  re- 
moval. In  some  of  the  states  provision  is  made  by  general  law 
for  the  removal  of  the  mayor  by  the  council.  For  example,  in 
Wisconsin,  the  General  Charter  law  authorizes  the  council  to  re- 
move the  mayor  upon  the  preferment  of  charges  against  him 
and  a  hearing  upon  the  same,  the  mayor  having  an  opportunity 
United  States,  p.  26,  footnote  2.  The  entire  subject  is  treated  from  its 
legal  point  of  view  in  Dillon,  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Municipal  Cor- 
porations, Vol.  II,  Chap.  XII,  especially  Sees.  460-465,  475-477,  484,  485. 
The  citations  to  cases  and  a  summary  view  of  them  in  the  states  other  than 
New  York  are  to  be  found  in  Dillon,  Vol.  II,  pp.  782,  783,  footnotes  3  and 
1  respectively.  In  the  state  of  Michigan  it  has  been  held  that  a  city  council 
derives  its  powers  from  express  legislative  enactment  and  has  no  inherent 
power  to  remove  for  cause  a  statutory  officer  appointed  by  the  mayor  for  a 
fixed  term,  but  this  would  not  seem  seriously  to  impair  the  more  generally 
accepted  view  that  the  authority  inheres  with  respect  to  corporate  officers. 


54  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [250 

to  be  heard  in  his  defense.  A  vote  by  three-fourths  of  the  coun- 
cil is  necessary  to  effect  removal.  In  the  general  law  of  Michigan 
governing  fourth  class  cities  the  provisions  are  similar  except 
that  a  two-thirds  vote  of  all  the  aldermen  elect  is  specified. 

The  second  method  available  for  the  removal  of  the  mayor  in- 
volves judicial  process  before  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction. 
Of  course  the  safeguards  which  have  been  thrown  about  removal 
by  the  council  have  tended  to  give  that  method  the  appearance  of 
a  judicial  proceeding.25  The  word  "impeachment"  is  used  in 
the  charter  of  Seattle  thus  implying  the  organization  of  the  coun- 
cil as  a  court  of  impeachment.  But  procedure  in  cases  of  this 
kind  is  very  similar  to  that  which  obtains  in  the  cities  where  the 
terms  "impeachments"  and  "court  of  Impeachment"  are  not 
employed.  The  council  really  acts  as  the  representative  body  of 
the  corporation  rather  than  as  a  court. 

The  courts  which  are  vested  with  the  power  to  remove  the  in- 
cumbents of  the  mayoral  office  are  not  the  same  in  the  various 
states.  In  Illinois  the  circuit  courts,  or  the  municipal  and  city 
courts  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  may  receive  and  try  an  indict- 
ment of  a  mayor  for  "neglect,  oppression,  malconduct  or  mal- 
feasance in  the  discharge  of  the  duties"  of  his  office  and  upon 
conviction  the  defendant  shall  be  fined  not  more  than  $1000  and 
be  removed  from  office.  In  Indiana  prosecution  may  be  by  affi- 
davit instead  of  indictment.26  In  Scranton,  Pennsylvania,  and 
other  cities  of  that  commonwealth  the  court  of  common  pleas  of 
the  proper  county  has  jurisdiction  and  acts  as  a  court  of  im- 
peachment, the  charges  being  preferred  by  not  less  than  twenty 
freeholders  of  the  city.  The  court  then  appoints  a  committee  of 
five  to  make  investigation  of  the  charges.  This  committee  has 
power  to  take  and  compel  testimony,  and  to  examine  books.  It 
makes  a  written  report  to  the  court  and  the  latter  transmits  it 
to  the  select  council,  which  then  sits  as  a  court  of  impeachment. 
A  judge  of  the  court  of  common  pleas  presides  and  is  empowered 
with  the  authority  of  a  court.  If  the  court  of  impeachment  finds 
the  officer  guilty  of  the  charges  presented  the  court  of  common 

25  Thus  the  power  to  summon  witnesses,  compel  testimony,  etc.,  the  require- 
ments respecting  notice  and  hearing,  and  the  provisions  that  the  proceedings 
shall  be  a  matter  of  record  all  savor  strongly  of  a  judicial  nature. 

26  Cf.   Indianapolis,    Charter,    Sec.   240.     This   section   is   a  part   of   the 
general  municipal  laws  of  the  state. 


251]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  55 

pleas  is  directed  to  enter  judgment  and  to  declare  the  office 
vacant.27  The  charter  of  the  city  of  Norfolk,  Va.,  provides  for 
the  removal  of  the  mayor  by  the  corporation  court  of  the  city, 
the  motion  for  removal  being  instituted  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of 
the  city  council  and  being  prosecuted  before  the  court  by  the 
council.  The  charter  of  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  substitutes  the  appel- 
late division  of  the  supreme  court  and  requires  a  three-fourths 
vote  of  the  council  to  institute  proceedings. 

Numerous  examples  might  be  cited  to  show  the  liability  of  the 
mayor  both  to  judicial  process  and  to  impeachment  proceedings. 
One  of  the  more  recent  cases  is  that  of  Mayor  James  Rolph,  Jr., 
of  San  Francisco,  who  was  charged  with  contempt  in  the  superior 
court  on  August  6,  1916.  The  charge  was  not  sustained  by  the 
court  as  indicated  in  its  decision  reported  in  the  Municipal  Rec- 
ord of  Aug.  26.  The  controversy  arose  over  the  operation  of  cer- 
tain cars  owned  by  the  municipal  railways  over  the  tracks  of  the 
United  Railways,  a  private  corporation.  An  earlier  decision  had 
enjoined  the  city  from  operating  its  cars  over  the  tracks  on  lower 
Market  street  and  had  thereby  seriously  impaired  the  efficiency 
of  the  municipal  lines  and  had  put  them  face  to  face  with  a  pos- 
sible loss  in  revenue  of  almost  $150,000  per  year.  The  mayor 
had  refused  to  obey  the  injunction.  Mayor  Bell  of  Indianapolis 
was  recently  charged  with  complicity  in  election  frauds  in  the 
conduct  of  an  election  within  the  city.  He  was  acquitted  by  a 
jury ;  but  the  contrast  between  the  position  of  the  governor  of  the 
state  and  that  of  the  mayor  of  the  chief  municipality  within  the 
state  was  rendered  quite  clear  as  far  as  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ordinary  courts  of  law  are  concerned. 

One  of  the  most  conspicuous  cases  in  recent  years  is  that  of 
Don  Roberts,  mayor  of  Terre  Haute,  Indiana.  He  was  accused 
of  fraud  in  connection  with  elections  in  the  fall  of  1914,  and  was 
tried  and  found  guilty.  During  the  course  of  the  judicial  pro- 
ceedings in  which  he  was  involved  he  used  all  the  power  of  his 
office  to  coerce  witnesses  and  otherwise  influence  the  course  of 
matters  before  the  court.  For  example  he  promptly  dismissed 
from  office  those  who  pleaded  guilty  or  who  threatened  to  do  so. 

27.4  Digest  of  the  Laws  and  Ordinances  of  the  City  of  Scranton  (1907), 
pp.  261,  262.  It  is  difficult  to  see  what  further  obstacles  could  have  been 
put  in  the  path  of  those  who  might  be  bent  upon  effecting  the  removal  of 
a  municipal  officer. 


56  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [252 

He  threw  every  possible  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  investigation. 
Even  when  convicted  he  insisted  on  the  retention  of  his  office 
and  was  impeached  by  the  city  council  before  removal  was  ef- 
fected. 

The  power  of  the  courts  to  review  the  decisions  of  the  councils 
sitting  as  courts  of  impeachment  and  of  lower  courts  which  are 
authorized  to  make  removals  is  comparatively  limited.  Usually 
appeals  may  not  be  taken  upon  issues  of  fact,  but  upon  questions 
involving  the  jurisdiction  of  the  removing  power,  or  the  legality 
of  the  cause  assigned  for  removal.28  The  charter  of  Norfolk, 
Va.,  however,  expressly  reserves  to  the  accused  the  right  of  ap- 
peal to  the  supreme  court  of  appeals. 

The  practice  of  authorizing  a  state  officer  such  as  the  governor 
to  remove  a  mayor  is  current  only  in  the  states  of  New  York  and 
Ohio.  It  was  recommended  also  by  the  National  Municipal 
League  in  its  Municipal  Program,  but  beyond  this  it  has  received 
no  important  consideration  at  the  hand  of  states  or  municipali- 
ties. In  the  New  York  charter  the  governor  is  authorized  to 
direct  the  attorney  general  to  conduct  the  inquiry  respecting  the 
mayor  and  pending  the  investigation  he  may  suspend  the  mayor 
for  a  period  not  to  exceed  thirty  days.  This  feature  of  the  New 
York  charter  dates  back  to  an  act  of  1882,  and  has  evidently 
impressed  itself  favorably  upon  succeeding  charter  commissions, 
for  not  only  was  it  incorporated  into  the  present  charter,  but 
it  was  also  retained  in  the  charter  proposed  in  1909,  and  was 
expanded  to  include  such  other  executive  officers  as  the  president 
of  the  council,  the  comptroller,  and  the  borough  presidents. 

In  Ohio  a  provision  was  enacted  in  1913  by  the  assembly  of 
that  state  in  obedience  to  a  mandatory  provision  adopted  in  an 
amendment  to  the  state  constitution  in  1912.  The  charges  are 
filed  in  the  form  of  a  petition  for  removal  and  must  be  signed 
by  twenty  per  centum  of  the  qualified  electors  as  determined  by 
the  vote  at  the  preceding  general  election.  The  charges  are  de- 
posited with  the  judge  of  the  court  of  common  pleas  of  the  county 
and  the  defendant  is  to  be  served  with  a  copy  thereof  either  by 
the  court  or  by  the  direction  of  the  governor  at  least  ten  days 
before  the  hearing  thereon.  The  hearing  is  to  be  had  within 
thirty  days  and  the  proceedings  are  to  be  public.  The  decision 
is  to  be  made  public  with  the  reasons  therefor  and  is  to  be  filed 

zs  Dillon,  Municipal  Corporations,  Vol.  II,  p.  815.     (Fifth  Edition.) 


253]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  57 

for  record  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state.  In  the  case  of 
the  decision  by  the  governor,  the  decision  is  final,  but  in  the  case 
of  a  decision  by  the  court  of  common  pleas  there  is  an  appeal 
reserved  to  the  court  of  appeals.  In  1915  complaints  were  made 
to  Governor  Willis  against  Mayor  Keller  of  Columbus.  The 
governor  issued  a  formal  statement  announcing  his  refusal  to 
take  any  action  and  stating  that  he  would  take  a  similar  attitude 
with  regard  to  the  mayors  of  other  cities  concerning  whom  ob- 
jections had  been  raised.  The  position  taken  by  the  executive 
of  the  state  was  that  only  dangers  of  a  positive  nature,  such  as 
pillage,  disorder,  and  the  like,  would  justify  the  exercise  of  the 
authority  conferred  upon  him.  He  justified  his  action  by  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  the  right  and  the  responsibility  of  mu- 
nicipalities to  govern  themselves.  Moreover  the  remedy  of  judi- 
cial process  was  pointed  out  as  available  and  the  inference  is  that 
this  method  is  more  desirable  except  in  rare  cases.  Such  an  in- 
terpretation of  his  authority  by  one  governor  does  not,  of  course, 
bind  his  successors  to  do  likewise.  It  establishes,  however,  a 
sound  precedent  and  one  that  should  have  a  wholesome  influence 
in  the  municipal  life  of  the  state  by  discouraging  the  tendency 
of  dissatisfied  portions  of  municipal  electorates  to  run  to  the 
state  for  relief  from  undesirable  conditions  instead  of  working 
out  their  own  salvation.  As  an  aid  to  the  latter  the  removal  of  a 
mayor  by  the  governor  has  little  to  offer  and  constitutes  in  the 
hand  of  a  willing  state  executive  a  real  menace  to  municipal  self- 
reliance. 

The  recall  as  a  method  for  getting  rid  of  municipal  officers,  in- 
cluding mayors,  whose  continued  occupancy  of  public  office  is 
open  to  serious  objections  has  met  with  widespread  favor  among 
municipalities  in  every  part  of  the  country  and  under  each  of 
the  principal  forms  of  municipal  government.  While  it  is  often 
associated  with  the  commission  form,  probably  because  it  has 
usually  been  incorporated  as  a  feature  of  the  commission  plan, 
yet  its  origin  and  earlier  development  were  under  the  mayor  sys- 
tem, and  it  has  since  been  made  a  feature  of  the  mayor  and  coun- 
cil plan  in  numerous  cities  and  in  a  number  of  the  states.  The 
value  of  the  recall  appears  to  lie  rather  in  the  possibility  of  its 
use  than  in  the  likelihood  that  it  will  be  used,  tho  it  has  been 
used  effectively  many  times.  There  is  no  question  but  that  it 


58  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [254 

has  been  an  effective  means  of  encouraging  a  sense  of  responsi- 
bility on  the  part  of  municipal  executives  as  well  as  other  holders 
of  positions  of  public  trust  and  responsibility. 

There  are  two  principal  forms  in  which  the  recall  has  been 
adopted  in  cities:  first,  the  original  form  as  it  appeared  in  Los 
Angeles,  and  as  it  exists  with  but  minor  modifications  in  most  of 
the  cities  which  have  adopted  it ;  and  second,  the  Boston  form  of 
the  recall  as  expressed  in  the  revised  charter  of  1909. 

The  recall  as  developed  in  Los  Angeles  provides  for  the  recall 
of  both  elective  and  appointive  officers  in  the  municipal  service, 
including,  of  course,  the  mayor.  The  election  to  recall  the  mayor 
is  held  upon  petition  of  twenty  per  centum  of  the  entire  vote 
cast  for  all  candidates  for  the  office  at  the  preceding  mayoral  elec- 
tion. Such  petition  is  addressed  to  the  municipal  council  and  filed 
with  the  city  clerk,  and  contains  a  brief  statement  of  the  reasons 
for  which  removal  is  sought.  The  petition  may  not,  however,  be 
filed  earlier  than  three  months  after  the  incumbent  has  entered 
upon  his  term  of  office.  The  statement  of  reasons  given  with  the 
petition  is  not  subject  to  review  but  the  petitions  are  subject  to 
the  examination  and  require  certification  at  the  hands  of  the  city 
clerk.  In  case  they  prove  to  be  deficient,  it  is  permissible  to 
amend  them.  The  sufficiency  of  the  petition  is  in  no  case  sub- 
ject to  review  by  the  council.  The  latter  body,  under  the  man- 
datory provisions  of  the  charter,  is  required  to  call  a  special  elec- 
tion upon  its  receipt  of  a  recall  petition,  properly  certified.  The 
charter  specifies  that  the  election  must  be*  held  not  less  than  fifty 
nor  more  than  sixty  days  after  the  date  of  certification,  except 
that  the  recall  election  may  be  combined  with  any  other  general 
or  special  municipal  election  that  may  be  held  within  the  sixty 
day  period.29 

The  ballot  for  the  recall  of  mayors  in  Los  Angeles  contains  the 
following  question:  "Shall  (inserting  name  of  officer  sought  to 
be  removed)  be  removed  from  the  office  of  mayor  by  the  recall?" 
Opposite  the  question  appear  the  words  "yes"  and  "no"  with 
voting  squares.  There  also  appear  upon  the  ballot  the  names  of 
those  who  have  been  nominated  as  candidates  for  the  office  in 

29  See  the  provisions  of  the  charter  of  Los  Angeles,  Sec.  198.  For  the 
provisions  regarding  the  form,  mode  of  signing,  filing,  examination,  and  cer- 
tification of  petitions  see  the  selections  dealing  with  the  initiative  petitions, 
Sees.  198a  and  198b. 


255]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  59 

case  the  incumbent  is  recalled.  These  nominations  are  made  by 
petition,  except  that  the  name  of  the  incumbent  is  placed  upon 
the  ballot  as  a  candidate  unless  he  resigns  his  office  or  declines 
to  be  a  candidate.  If  a  majority  of  the  electors  voting  on  the 
question  vote  "yes,"  the  officer  is  removed  from  office  upon  the 
declaration  of  the  returns  by  the  council,  and  the  candidate  re- 
ceiving the  highest  number  of  votes  for  the  office  is  elected  to 
succeed  him.  The  incumbent  may  be  recalled  and  reflected  at 
the  same  election  and  under  such  circumstances  continues  in 
office  for  the  balance  of  the  term  for  which  he  was  first  chosen. 
If  another  candidate  is  elected  he  serves  for  the  same  period. 
The  recall  of  a  mayor  or  his  resignation  in  face  of  a  recall  bars 
him  from  being  appointed  to  office  for  a  period  of  two  years.30 

Such  is  the  recall  as  applied  to  the  mayoralty  in  Los  Angeles. 
The  provisions  in  the  charters  of  San  Francisco,  Seattle,  St. 
Louis,  and  Cleveland  are  strikingly  similar  to  those  in  Los  An- 
geles. San  Francisco  provides  for  a  petition  signed  by  thirty 
per  centum  of  the  entire  vote  cast  at  the  preceding  mayoral  elec- 
tion and  requires  that  the  election  be  held  within  forty  days. 
Seattle  requires  the  signature  of  twenty-five  per  centum  and 
makes  the  election  mandatory  within  forty  days.  St.  Louis  re- 
quires twenty  per  centum  of  the  registered  vote  at  the  time  of 
the  preceding  mayoral  election  with  the  further  requirement  that 
twenty  per  centum  of  the  registered  voters  in  each  of  at  least  two- 
thirds  of  the  wards  of  the  city  must  be  secured  and  the  date  for 
the  election  is  fixed  at  not  more  than  ninety  days  from  the  time 
the  board  of  election  commissioners  has  mailed  notice  of  the  suf- 
ficiency of  the  petition  to  the  incumbent  whose  removal  is  sought. 
In  St.  Louis  the  death  or  resignation  of  the  incumbent  at  any 
stage  of  the  proceedings  stops  the  election.  In  Cleveland  a  peti- 
tion for  the  recall  of  the  mayor  must  be  signed  by  not  less  than 
fifteen  thousand  electors  and  the  sixty  day  time  limit  for  the 
holding  of  the  election  obtains.  In  all  the  above  cities  except 
San  Francisco  amended  or  supplementary  petitions  may  be  filed 
if  the  first  one  appears  insufficient. 

The  recall  provided  for  in  the  Boston  Charter  is  different  from 
that  which  prevails  elsewhere  in  that  every  mayor  must  face  the 
possibility  of  a  recall  thru  a  provision  which  automatically 

30  Charter  of  the  city  of  Los  Angeles,  Sees.  198q,  198r,  198s,  198t.  The 
provision  regarding  the  method  of  nomination  is  found  in  Sec.  198u. 


60  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [256 

places  the  question  ' '  Shall  the  mayor  be  recalled  ? ' '  upon  the  bal- 
lot at  the  end  of  the  second  year  of  his  four  year  term.  The 
regular  November  election  is  used  for  the  purpose  of  testing  the 
opinion  of  the  electors  upon  this  question.  If  fifty  per  centum 
of  the  registered  vote  of  the  city  is  cast  "yes"  then  the  mayor 
must  stand  for  a  reelection  at  a  recall  election  following  in  De- 
cember. In  practice  the  Boston  plan  has  never  proven  effective 
enough  to  recall  a  mayor,  despite  a  hard  fight  put  up  against 
Mayor  Fitzgerald  in  1911.  The  total  vote  for  the  recall  was 
approximately  only  one-third  of  the  registered  vote,  though  it 
constituted  a  majority  of  the  vote  cast  on  the  recall  proposition.31 
The  results  which  have  been  obtained  with  the  Boston  recall  have 
apparently  not  appealed  to  municipal  charter  makers  elsewhere 
for  it  has  had  no  vogue  outside  the  city  of  its  origin.  The  the- 
oretical values  which  attach  to  the  Boston  recall  are,  however, 
worthy  of  consideration.  The  mayor  is  assured  that  he  will  have 
a  long  enough  period  in  which  to  inaugurate  his  policies  and 
make  the  preliminary  tests  thereof.  If  he  is  not  recalled  his 
continuance  in  office  and  the  further  development  of  his  plan 
cannot  be  menaced  or  interrupted  by  the  machinations  of  his 
enemies,  either  personal  or  political.  The  insertion  of  the  recall 
proposition  upon  the  ballot  automatically  obviates  the  effort  to 
secure  signatures  for  the  recall  petition,  prevents  the  intimida- 
tion of  those  who  would  like  to  sign  such  a  petition  and  minimizes 
the  rancor  and  bitterness  which  the  application  of  the  recall  in- 
evitably invites.  Opposite  tendencies  must  also  be  reckoned 
with.  The  successive  efforts  to  put  the  recall  into  operation  hav- 
ing failed,  apathy  toward  such  efforts  even  when  most  desirable 
is  likely  to  result.  The  failure  of  a  majority  of  those  voting  on 
the  proposition  to  make  their  wrill  effective  because  the  inertia  of 
a  body  of  inactive  citizens  as  large  in  number  as  their  active 
opponents  has  been  thrown  in  the  scales  against  them  is  most 
discouraging.  Practically  speaking  the  Boston  recall,  like  that 
obtaining  in  the  commission  governed  cities  of  Illinois,  becomes 
effective  only  when  something  akin  to  a  political  revolution 
against  the  existing  authorities  occurs.  The  comment  of  the 
Kansas  City  Star  in  1911  was,  "The  Boston  election  proves 

si  The  figures  may  be  obtained  by  consulting  the  National  Municipal  Be- 
view,  Vol.  I,  pp.  127,  128. 


257]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  61 

.  .  .  that  the  public  official  who  makes  good  need  not  fear 
the  recall,  even  if  he  offends  the  politicians  and  the  men  who 
want  to  use  his  office  for  personal  gain.  He  can  trust  the  people 
when  he  knows  the  people  can  trust  him."  This  comment  tells 
but  half  the  story  regarding  the  operation  of  the  Boston  recall. 
The  other  half  is  that  the  public  official  known  as  the  mayor  of 
Boston  does  not  need  to  fear  the  recall  even  under  exceptional 
failure  to  measure  up  to  his  responsibilities. 

It  would  probably  be  unfair,  however,  to  indicate  that  the 
presence  of  the  recall  in  Boston  has  accomplished  nothing  in  the 
way  of  restraint.  Doubtless  the  incumbent  breathes  somewhat 
more  easily  when  the  usual  announcement  is  made  that  no  recall 
has  been  ordered,  for  there  is  the  rare  possibility  that  it  might  be. 
This  possibility,  while  not  a  matter  of  immediate  concern  to  the 
holder  of  the  mayoralty  is  nevertheless  one  that  is  ever  present 
and  politicians  as  astute  as  those  in  control  of  Boston  politics  are 
reputed  to  be,  would  not  altogether  overlook  its  presence.  Were 
the  proportion  necessary  to  carry,  lowered  to  a  majority  of  the 
total  vote  cast  either  at  the  election  or  on  the  proposal  to  recall 
the  Boston  plan  would  become  an  effective  weapon  with  which  to 
secure  responsible  and  decent  city  government  —  at  least  so  far 
as  the  recall  can  ever  become  such  a  weapon. 

The  Term  of  Office 

The  mayor's  term  of  office  has  tended  to  become  longer  as  the 
amount  of  power  entrusted  to  him  has  increased.  There  are  nota- 
ble examples  in  which  this  has  been  true.  The  six  largest  cities 
in  the  country  have  adopted  the  four  year  term.32  There  are  also 
many  lesser  municipalities  operating  under  the  mayor  system 
which  have  adopted  the  four  year  term.33  In  one  the  term  is  five 
years.34  But  the  most  favored  term  appears  to  be  two  years, 
except  in  New  England  where  some  cities  still  retain  what  was 
formerly  customary,  a  one  year  term.  Thus  out  of  thirty  cities 
selected  so  as  to  represent  the  country  geographically  fifteen  of 
them  elect  their  mayors  for  two  years.  The  general  municipal 

32  New  York,  Chicago,  Philadelphia,  St.  Louis,  Boston,  and  Baltimore. 

ss  These  are  widely  scattered.  For  example,  Los  Angeles,  Calif. ;  Co- 
lumbus, Ohio,  and  Charleston,  S.  C. 

34  Jersey  City,  New  Jersey.  Munro,  Government  of  American  Cities,  p. 
214. 


62  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [258 

acts  of  a  number  of  the  states  such  as  Illinois,  Indiana,  Wiscon- 
sin, and  Nebraska  specify  a  term  of  two  years.35 

Once  the  longer  term  has  been  adopted  there  appears  to  be  no 
disposition  to  return  to  the  earlier  practice  of  short  terms.38  In 
general,  the  longer  term  has  given  satisfaction,  though  it  has  not 
achieved  all  that  its  advocates  hoped  and  prophesied  that  it 
would.  It  was  hoped  that  the  longer  term  would  serve  to  in- 
crease the  importance  of  the  office  to  such  an  extent  that  the  elec- 
tors would  be  stimulated  to  see  that  better  men  were  chosen  to 
fill  it.  Yet  it  is  hard  to  affirm  that  any  such  result  has  been 
achieved.  The  memory  of  the  election  of  Van  Wyck  in  New 
York  is  fresh  as  an  instance  of  the  failure  of  the  newly  created 
four  year  term  to  do  just  this  thing.  The  lengthened  term  has 
probably  justified  itself  in  that  it  has  made  it  possible  for  the 
mayor  to  be  more  of  an  administrator  and  less  of  an  active  poli- 
tician, it  has  given  the  holder  of  the  mayoralty  a  better  chance  to 
demonstrate  his  policies  and  manifest  his  abilities,  and  it  has 
tended  to  allay  somewhat  the  pressure  of  frequent  municipal 
campaigns.  On  the  whole,  too,  it  has  prevented  the  frequent  dis- 
ruption of  the  municipal  service  thru  changes  in  the  office  of 
chief  executive  and  has  therefore  resulted  in  more  uniform  and 
perhaps  better  service.  There  is  a  sense,  too,  in  which  length  of 
service  tends  to  produce  improved  service.  Official  life  and  the 
constant,  tho  often  feeble  sense  of  responsibility  which  is  ever 
present  tends  to  attract  so  conspicuous  an  officer  as  the  mayor 
toward  higher  levels  of  thot  and  conduct.  Respect  for  de- 
cency and  the  public  interest  is  sometimes  acquired  thru  long 
years  of  service  in  positions  of  eminence  and  trust.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  two  year  and  the  four  year  term  consists  partly 
in  that  this  factor  is  allowed  opportunity  to  get  in  its  work,  and 
in  the  case  of  longer  service  the  force  of  the  acquired  point  of 

35  An  exception  to  the  rule  that  one  year  terms  are  more  common  in  New 
England  is  Montana  in  which  state  there  is  a  constitutional  provision  against 
the  term  exceeding  two  years  and  where  the  legislature  under  general  law 
has  provided  for  a  one  year  term.  Laws  of  Montana,  Sec.  4748.  (Political 
Code.)  Also  Constitution,  Art.  16,  Sec.  6. 

3«  The  charter  of  New  York  City  has  undergone  one  change  from  the  four 
to  the  two  year  term,  but  the  latter  has  since  been  altered  to  provide  for  the 
longer  period. 


259]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  63 

view  may  lead  to  a  practical  break  with  former  practices  and  as- 
sociates.37 

The  number  of  terms  that  a  mayor  may  serve  is  not  deter- 
mined by  any  general  tradition.  In  practice  reelections  are 
quite  common,  tho  the  number  of  single  terms  is  sufficiently  large 
to  indicate  that  second  terms  do  not  follow  as  a  matter  of  course. 
The  incumbent  generally  has  the  advantage  of  a  well  organized 
group  that  is  immediately  interested  in  his  reelection.  In  small- 
er cities  opposition  parties  often  go  begging  for  candidates. 
Especially  is  this  true  where  the  salaries  attached  to  the  office 
are  not  attractive  in  themselves,  and  where  no  vital  question  of 
local  public  policy  has  arisen  to  stir  up  an  active  contest.  In 
Pennsylvania  and  Indiana  reelection  is  prohibited,  at  least  for 
successive  terms,  but  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  wide  approval 
of  this  practice.  It  should  be  said,  however,  that  the  persistence 
of  the  single  term  notion  is  but  an  evidence  of  the  strength  which 
still  characterizes  the  popular  fear  of  executive  power  or  tyranny 
in  local  administration.  The  development  of  longer  terms  for 
the  mayoralty  will  command  wider  support  in  proportion  as  the 
methods  for  effective  control  over  executive  action  by  public  opin- 
ion are  perfected.  The  advantages  of  the  longer  term  are  pretty 
well  appreciated  in  cities  of  size  and  importance.  It  is  in  these 
that  opportunity  for  trying  out  policies  and  time  for  acquiring 
skill  and  mastery  in  administrative  work  are  most  imperative. 
The  prospect  for  the  future  favors  the  longer  term  and  this,  in 
turn,  promises  increased  effectiveness  and  responsibility  on  the 
part  of  the  municipal  executive. 

The  Filling  of  Vacancies 

The  subject  of  vacancies  involves  a  consideration  of  what  con- 
stitutes a  vacancy  and  what  are  the  methods  by  which  it  is  filled. 

37  The  career  of  Carter  H.  Harrison,  Jr.,  former  mayor  of  Chicago,  illus- 
trates this  tendency.  During  his  six  terms  as  mayor  of  Chicago  he  alienated 
one  by  one  the  forces  which  had  been  mainly  instrumental  in  enabling  him 
to  acquire  public  office.  At  the  same  time  he  failed  to  acquire  the  positive 
attitude  toward  reform  which  would  bring  him  new  strength.  His  elimina- 
tion from  active  candidacy  in  the  primaries  of  his  own  party  by  a  decisive 
majority  in  favor  of  his  opponent  witnessed  to  his  isolation,  too  good  for  a 
host  of  former  supporters,  not  good  enough  for  the  many  who  desired  more 
than  negative  virtues. 


64  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [260 

Vacancies  in  the  office  of  mayor  are  of  two  kinds  and  they  are 
usually  treated  differently.  The  first  kind  is  the  temporary 
vacancies.  They  are  those  which  are  caused  by  the  mayor's  ab- 
sence from  the  city  temporarily,  by  his  being  incapacitated  for 
his  duties  thru  illness  or  accident  of  a  temporary  nature,  or  by 
his  suspension  from  his  office  during  the  course  of  an  investiga- 
tion. The  permanent  vacancies  are  those  which  occur  by  reason 
of  the  death  or  permanent  disability  of  the  incumbent,  his  resig- 
nation, his  removal  from  office  thru  some  one  of  the  methods 
already  described,  or,  in  very  many  cities,  by  his  change  of  resi- 
dence from  the  city  in  which  he  holds  office  to  some  locality  out- 
side its  limits. 

Temporary  vacancies  are  commonly  filled  by  the  president  or 
chairman  of  the  council  in  cities  where  the  mayor  does  not  pre- 
side over  that  body.  Thus  in  Madison  and  other  first  class  cities 
in  Wisconsin,  in  Rochester,  St.  Louis,  and  many  other  cities  this 
practice  is  provided  for  in  the  municipal  charter,  or  in  the  gen- 
eral law  of  the  state.  In  the  case  of  St.  Louis  and  Baltimore  the 
presiding  officer  of  the  board  of  aldermen  must  meet  the  same 
qualifications  as  the  mayor,  a  precaution  which  does  not  seem  to 
obtain  in  all  cases.38  There  are  exceptions  to  the  practice  of  per- 
mitting the  council  to  fill  temporary  vacancies  in  the  mayoral 
office.  In  Indianapolis  and  other  Indiana  cities  which  have  the 
office  of  controller  the  latter  or  the  city  clerk  acts  as  mayor  in 
case  the  chief  executive  is  unable  to  fulfil  his  duties.  The  Cleve- 
land charter  provides  for  the  temporary  performance  of  the  may- 
oral functions  by  the  director  of  the  department  of  law. 

Permanent  vacancies  are  not,  as  a  rule,  provided  for  in  the 
same  way  as  temporary  ones.  In  a  few  cases  no  provision  is  made 
for  the  popular  election  of  a  new  incumbent,  but  as  a  general 
thing  the  practice  is  to  choose  a  successor  at  a  special  election, 

ss  See  charters  as  follows:  St.  Louis,  Art.  4,  Sec.  3;  Baltimore,  Sec.  214. 
The  president  of  the  second  branch  of  the  council  succeeds  to  the  mayor- 
alty in  case  of  the  absence  or  incapacity  of  the  mayor.  The  charter  of 
Seattle  illustrates  the  failure  to  require  the  same  qualifications  of  the  tem- 
porary successor  as  are  required  of  the  mayor  himself.  The  Seattle  charter 
imposes  a  tax  paying  qualification  upon  the  mayor,  but  no  such  qualification 
is  imposed  upon  the  members  of  the  city  council,  the  president  of  which  is 
chosen  from  among  its  membership  and  may  succeed  to  the  mayoralty  and 
all  its  powers.  See  Art.  4,  Sec.  2,  Subdiv.  D,  and  Sec.  6,  First;  Art.  5,  Sees. 
1  and  11. 


261]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  65 

unless  the  former  mayor 's  term  is  about  to  expire.  For  example, 
in  Minneapolis  a  vacancy  in  the  mayoral  office  is  to  be  filled  by 
special  election  within  twenty  days  after  the  vacancy  occurs.39 
In  Illinois  the  general  municipal  act  provides  for  the  holding  of 
an  election  if  the  vacancy  occurs  one  year  or  more  before  the  end 
of  the  term.  If  less  than  a  year  of  the  term  remains  the  council 
is  authorized  to  elect  one  of  its  members  to  act  as  mayor.  Prac- 
tically the  same  provisions  obtain  in  Pennsylvania  cities,  in  Los 
Angeles,  and  in  the  municipalities  of  Wisconsin  and  some  other 
states.  In  such  cases  the  council  is  often  authorized  to  make  ap- 
pointment to  fill  the  vacancy  temporarily.  Where  possible  elec- 
tions to  fill  vacancies  are  made  to  coincide  with  the  regular  elec- 
tions; but  as  in  Minneapolis  and  in  Norfolk,  Virginia,  limits 
within  which  the  elections  must  be  held  are  not  uncommon. 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  sometimes  the  practice  to  fill  a  vacancy 
in  the  mayoral  office  by  authorizing  the  council  to  elect  for  the 
unexpired  term.  Thus  in  San  Francisco  the  council  is  author- 
ized to  fill  the  vacancy  by  election,  the  incumbent  to  serve  until 
the  next  general  municipal  election.  There  is  no  limitation  as 
to  who  may  be  elected  except  the  qualifications  imposed  upon 
incumbents  selected  in  the  ordinary  way. 

In  cities  in  which  the  mayor  does  not  preside  over  the  council, 
the  usual  custom  is  that  the  president  of  that  body,  or  of  one  of 
its  branches  in  case  there  is  more  than  one,  shall  succeed  to  the 
office  of  mayor  in  the  event  of  a  vacancy.  The  charter  usually 
covers  this  contingency  and  provides  also  that  the  requirements 
and  qualifications  which  are  demanded  of  the  mayor  must  also 
be  satisfied  by  his  successor.  In  many  cities  in  which  these  con- 
ditions obtain  the  president  of  the  council  is  elected  by  popular 
vote.  Baltimore,  New  York,  Rochester,  and  Seattle  fill  perma- 
nent vacancies  in  this  manner.  The  new  St.  Louis  charter,  how- 
ever, provides  for  the  succession  of  the  president  of  the  board 
of  aldermen  only  temporarily,  tho  the  president  is  elected  at 
large  as  in  the  other  cities  mentioned. 

Still  another  practice  is  to  have  the  succession  fall  upon  some 
officer  of  the  city  government  outside  of  the  council.  Thus  in 
the  cities  of  Indiana  the  controller  succeeds,  except  in  cities  which 

39  Charter,  Chap.  II,  Sec.  2.  Exception  is  made  so  as  to  permit  merging 
this  special  election  with  a  general  election  if  the  latter  occurs  not  less  than 
ten  or  more  than  sixty  days  from  date  of  the  vacancy. 


66  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [262 

have  no  such  officer,  in  which  cases  the  councils  elect.  In  the 
comparatively  recent  charter  of  Cleveland  a  similar  method  of 
filling  a  vacancy  was  adopted,  the  order  of  succession  being  elab- 
orated rather  fully,  and  the  mantle  of  the  chief  executive  falling 
in  turn  upon  the  heads  of  departments  appointed  by  the  mayor.40 
This  feature  of  the  Cleveland  charter  is  unique  in  that  it  is  pos- 
sible to  have  a  mayor  whose  selection  for  public  office  has  not 
been  submitted  to  popular  vote,  a  contingency  that  is  guarded 
against  in  almost  all  charters  that  do  not  entrust  the  choice  of  a 
successor  to  the  council.  There  seems  to  be  no  good  reason,  how- 
ever, for  preferring  council  to  mayoral  selection  of  one  to  whose 
lot  it  falls  to  carry  out  the  policies  approved  at  the  time  the 
mayor  was  elected. 

There  seems  to  be  no  tendency  toward  uniform  methods  in  the 
selection  of  those  who  succeed  to  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor. 
Variation  in  practice  may  be  explained,  perhaps,  by  the  fact  that 
in  this  country  the  electorate  is  content  to  take  a  chance  on  what 
it  will  get  in  the  event  of  a  vacancy  in  executive  office.  Only 
thus  can  one  explain  the  nonchalance  with  which  the  nomination 
and  election  of  weak  candidates  for  the  vice-presidency  and  for 
the  lieutenant  governorships  are  countenanced  in  national  and 
state  politics.  In  fact  the  question  of  succession  to  the  mayoralty 
was  not  one  of  great  moment  in  the  earlier  history  of  the  office 
and  the  methods  of  filling  vacancies  have  been  largely  the  inher- 
itance from  times  when  the  importance  of  the  position  was  not 
as  great  as  it  has  become  today.  The  proper  and  most  desirable 
method  of  handling  vacancies  is  one  that  has  not  yet  been  found. 
There  are  more  or  less  serious  objections  to  each  of  the  methods 
now  in  vogue.  Election  by  councils  which  have  tended  to  be- 
come less  influential  and  less  able  appears  to  be  rather  anomalous 
when  the  growing  power  and  position  of  the  mayor  is  considered. 
Popular  election  imposes  an  added  burden  of  expense  upon  the 
municipality  which  the  financial  circumstances  of  most  Ameri- 
can cities  can  ill  support.  The  succession  of  administrative  offi- 
cials who  have  been  appointed  by  the  mayor  appears  to  be  a  step 
in  the  direction  of  recognizing  the  increased  prominence  of  the 

4°  Cleveland,  Charter,  Sec.  74.  The  order  of  succession  is  as  follows : 
Director  of  law,  director  of  public  service,  director  of  public  welfare,  direc- 
tor of  public  safety,  director  of  finance,  and  director  of  public  utilities. 
There  is  little  likelihood  that  Cleveland  will  soon  be  without  a  mayor. 


THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  67 

office  and  the  authority  of  its  holder.  The  succession  of  the  pres- 
ident of  the  council  gives  no  adequate  assurance  of  satisfaction 
and  serves  only  to  vacate  another  rather  important  office,  leaving 
it  to  be  filled  usually  by  the  council.  It  is  not  certain  that  the 
election  of  vice-mayors  would  meet  the  situation  in  view  of  state 
and  national  experience.  On  the  whole  the  Cleveland  plan  ap- 
pears to  point  the  way  in  the  right  direction,  especially  where  the 
method  exists  in  conjunction  with  efficient  methods  for  insuring 
executive  responsibility  thru  adequate  process  of  removal,  such 
as  impeachment,  judicial  action,  or  the  recall.  As  these  pro- 
cesses exist  today  they  do  not  give  entire  satisfaction.  Their 
development  as  agencies  for  securing  better  controlled  executives 
in  mayor  governed  cities,  or  the  substitution  for  them  of  some 
better  means,  is  highly  desirable. 

The  successor  of  the  mayor  inherits  all  of  his  powers  in  the 
case  of  a  permanent  vacancy,  but  in  the  event  of  temporary  va- 
cancies it  is  not  uncommon  to  restrict  the  authority  of  the  tem- 
porary incumbent.  In  New  York  City  the  president  of  the  board 
of  aldermen  when  temporarily  acting  as  mayor  during  the  sick- 
ness or  absence  of  the  mayor  is  forbidden  to  exercise  the  appoin- 
tive and  removal  powers  within  thirty  days,  or  to  sign,  approve, 
or  disapprove  resolutions  or  ordinances  within  nine  days.  The 
Seattle  charter,  on  the  other  hand,  expressly  clothes  the  acting 
mayor  with  all  the  powers  of  the  mayor  even  during  temporary 
vacancies  while  other  charters  appear  to  assume  that  he  shall 
enjoy  full  authority. 

Salaries  and  Bond 

The  mayors  of  practically  all  communities  of  size  and  impor- 
tance now  receive  a  salary.  Not  so  many  years  ago  the  office  of 
mayor  was  a  fee  office  and  the  transition  to  the  fixed  salary  has 
become  the  rule  only  within  the  past  quarter  century.  In  cities 
where  the  judicial  functions  of  the  mayor  are  still  a  matter  of 
some  consequence  the  fees  are  still  collected,  tho  in  case  a  salary 
is  paid  these  fees  are  usually  turned  over  to  the  city.  In  some 
communities  mayors  still  serve  with  little  or  no  pay  and  in  many 
states  they  are  dependent  upon  the  will  of  the  council  for  the 
amount  they  receive.41  The  practice  which  obtains  in  the  larger 
cities  and  in  an  increasing  degree  in  the  smaller  cities  is  to  fix 

4i  This  is  the  practice  in  states  which  create  municipal  corporations  tinder 
general  law,  at  least  with  regard  to  the  classes  of  smaller  cities.  Compare 


68  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [264 

the  mayor 's  salary  in  the  municipal  charter.  This  is  usually  the 
custom  in  those  states  in  which  cities  may  draft  their  own  char- 
ters under  municipal  home  rule  privileges,  while  it  is  notable 
that  in  charter  enactments  for  great  cities  the  salaries  are  always 
specified.42  It  does  not  appear,  however,  that  there  is  any  stan- 
dardization in  the  remuneration  paid.  With  larger  responsibili- 
ties and  greater  power  the  salary  of  the  mayor  of  New  York  City 
is  three  thousand  dollars  less  than  that  paid  the  mayor  of  Chi- 
cago and  but  twenty-five  hundred  dollars  more  than  that  paid  by 
Dayton,  Ohio,  to  its  city  manager.43  With  less  than  one-fourth 
the  population  of  Minneapolis,  Minn.,  Evansville,  Indiana,  pays 
its  mayor  twice  the  salary  paid  in  the  former.  Similar  instances 
might  be  multiplied  to  witness  to  the  absence  of  uniform  stan- 
dards in  calculating  the  value  of  the  mayoral  services  of  the  re- 
ward to  be  offered  for  them. 

There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  whether  salaries 
should  be  declared  in  the  charters  or  left  to  be  determined  by 
the  municipal  council.  The  municipal  league  program  endorsed 
the  latter  plan 44  and  safeguarded  the  executive  by  providing 
that  the  salary  should  not  be  changed  during  the  term  of  an  in- 
cumbent so  as  to  operate  either  against  him  or  in  his  favor.  This 
proposal  followed  in  the  main  the  practice  which  already  obtained 

for  example,  the  situation  in  Illinois.  Cities  under  ten  thousand  commonly 
pay  their  mayors  from  $300  to  $600.  Mendota  gained  some  notoriety  in 
1915  by  the  generous  act  of  its  council  in  raising  the  mayor's  compensation 
from  an  average  of  sixteen  cents  per  day  to  an  average  of  a  little  less  than 
one  dollar  per  day  or  three  hundred  dollars  per  year. 

42  The  mayor  of  New  York  City  is  paid  $15,000 ;  the  mayor  of  Chicago, 
$18,000;  the  city  manager  of  Dayton,  $12,500;  other  cities  pay  as  follows: 
Boston,  $10,000;  Minneapolis,  $2,000;  San  Francisco,  $6,000;  Philadelphia, 
$12,000;  Evansville,  Ind.,  $4,000;  Utica,  N.  Y.,  $1,600.     The  list  might  be 
increased  indefinitely.     Some  of  these  amounts  are  fixed  by  charter;  others 
by  ordinance.     The  charter  of  Madison,  Wis.,  provides  that  the  mayor  shall 
receive  no  salary.     Cf.  Sec.  26. 

43  In  general  it  may  be  noted  that  the  tendency  appears  to  be  to  pay 
fairly  good  salaries  in  those  cities  which  are  most  alive  to  the  need  for 
capable  administration  and  which  have  put  forth  some  effort  to  secure  it. 
This,  however,  hardly  explains  the  fact  that  Chicago  pays  its  mayor  the 
largest  salary  received  by  any  municipal  executive  in  the  country.     The  good 
salaries  which  are  paid  to  commissioners  and  city  managers  are,  however,  in 
line  with  the  development  noted. 

44  Art.  3,  Sec.  8. 


t 

265]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  69 

in  many  of  the  general  municipal  acts  of  the  states.  As  far  as 
the  amount  of  the  salaries  paid  is  concerned  there  seems  to  be 
little  in  actual  practice  to  indicate  that  one  method  has  any  ad- 
vantage over  the  other.  Charters  and  councils  alike  are  now 
generous,  now  parsimonious.  Local  conditions  and  standards 
seemed  to  have  played  a  prevailing  part  in  determining  the  sal- 
aries paid,  tho  doubtless  the  present  tendency  to  pay  more  liber- 
ally is  having  a  country-wide  influence.  Authorities  agree  that 
salaries  in  American  cities  compare  favorably  with  those  in  the 
cities  of  the  principal  European  countries,  especially  France  and 
England,  in  neither  of  which  do  the  mayors  receive  substantial 
remuneration. 

American  experience  seems  to  demonstrate  one  thing  with  re- 
spect to  salaries.  It  is  better  to  pay  good  salaries,  or  no  salaries, 
than  to  pay  low  ones.  However  low  they  may  be  they  attract  the 
professional  politician,  the  individual  who  is  in  politics  for  a 
living.  In  smaller  communities  good  mayors  will  be  found  who 
will  serve  without  salary  whereas  the  same  man  could  not  be  at- 
tracted by  a  small  remuneration.  On  the  other  hand  where  the 
office  demands  the  entire  attention  of  the  incumbent  or  any  large 
part  of  his  time  and  thot  it  is  wiser  to  offer  a  salary  commen- 
surate with  the  responsibilities  imposed.  It  will  prove  cheaper 
in  the  long  run,  a  statement  that  is  abundantly  demonstrated 
from  the  experience  of  commission  governed  cities. 

Many  cities  and  some  states  thru  their  general  laws  require 
the  mayor  to  give  bond  for  the  proper  fulfilment  of  his  duties. 
The  amount  of  the  bond  is  sometimes  fixed  in  the  state  law,  45 
sometimes  determined  by  the  municipal  council.46  The  premiums 
are  as  a  rule  paid  from  the  municipal  treasury.  In  a  number 
of  cities  no  provision  is  made  for  a  bond  from  a  mayor,  but  he  is 
charged  with  careful  oversight  of  the  bonds  given  by  other  mem- 
bers of  the  municipal  staff.47 

45  The  general  law  in  Illinois  provides  that  in  no  case  shall  the  bond  be 
less  than  $3,000. 

4«  This  is  the  more  general  practice.  See  the  charter  of  Cleveland,  Sec. 
190,  and  of  St.  Louis,  Art.  8,  Sec.  4. 

47  Cf.  Los  Angeles,  Charter,  Art.  5,  Sees.  62,  64.  Under  Sec.  63  it  is 
possible  the  council  might  compel  the  mayor  to  give  bond,  tho  Sec.  64 
renders  such  an  effort  of  doubtful  validity.  No  bond  is  specified  in  Kansas 
City. 


70  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [266 

Induction  into  Office 

The  process  by  which  the  mayor  is  inducted  into  office  con- 
stitutes a  ceremony  which  is  usually  regarded  with  little  atten- 
tion. In  general  it  consists  of  the  administration  of  an  oath  by 
some  competent  or  authorized  officer  in  the  state  or  municipal 
service.  In  Boston  the  oath  is  administered  by  the  justice  of  the 
supreme  judicial  circuit  or  by  a  judge  or  justice  from  some  other 
court  of  record.  The  administration  of  the  oath  takes  place  be- 
fore the  municipal  council  and  a  certification  of  the  act  is  entered 
upon  the  journal.  The  custom  provided  for  in  Kansas  City  dif- 
fers from  the  above  in  that  the  oath  is  administered  by  the  city 
clerk  or  other  municipal  officer,  in  the  presence  of  the  common 
council  and  citizens  who  may  desire  to  attend.  The  oath  to  be 
taken  is  the  same  as  that  required  of  common  councilors.  In  New 
York  and  Cleveland  the  practice  is  similar  to  that  of  Boston, 
except  that  the  oath  must  be  subscribed  to  and  filed  in  the  office 
of  the  city  clerk.  In  Philadelphia  the  record  of  the  oath  having 
been  taken  must  be  filed  with  the  controller. 

The  content  of  the  oath  or  affirmation  appears  to  differ  among 
municipalities.  The  New  York  charters  require  that  the  mayor 
take  and  subscribe  to  the  declaration  ' '  faithfully  to  perform  the 
duties  of  his  office. ' '  The  following  declaration  is  used  in  many 
cities:  "I  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm  as  the  case  may  be)  that 
I  will  support  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  State  of ,  and  that  I  will  faithfully 

discharge  the  duties  of  the  office  of  Mayor  according  to  the  best 
of  my  ability. "  48  A  recent  variation  from  this  form  is  that  re- 
quired by  the  St.  Louis  charter  which  specifies  a  declaration  in- 
cluding the  following  items :  (1)  The  mayor  has  all  of  the  quali- 
fications for  the  office  named  in  the  charter ;  (2)  he  is  not  subject 
to  any  of  the  disqualifications  for  the  office;  (3)  in  addition  to 
the  United  States  Constitution  and  that  of  Missouri  he  will  sup- 
port the  St.  Louis  charter  and  ordinances;  (4)  he  will  be  influ- 
enced in  the  appointment,  promotion,  demotion,  suspension,  or 
discharge  of  officers  or  employees  by  the  consideration  of  fitness 
only;  (5)  he  will  not  expend  or  authorize  the  expenditure  of 

48  Los  Angeles,  Charter,  Art.  2,  See.  10.  See  also  the  municipal  laws  of 
Illinois  for  the  same  statement. 


267]  THE    MAYORAL    CONSTITUTION   TODAY  71 

money  otherwise  than  for  adequate  consideration  and  efficient 
service  to  the  city.49 

While  the  constitutional  oath  appears  to  be  the  general  prac- 
tice, supplemented  here  and  there  by  special  provisions  inserted 
by  charter  makers,  it  has  not  been  unknown  for  councils  to  be 
authorized  to  demand  an  additional  oath,  or  for  no  oath  what- 
ever to  be  necessary.50  On  the  other  hand  many  charters  specify 
that  failure  to  take  the  oath  of  office  works  forfeiture  of  the  title 
which  the  mayor  elect  may  have  to  it. 

Miscellaneous  Features 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  constituent  features  of  the  may- 
oral office  there  are  miscellaneous  items  which  are  more  or  less 
common  and  which  are  properly  noted  at  this  point.  In  all  cities 
of  size  or  importance  it  is  customary  for  the  mayor  to  have  sec- 
retarial assistance  of  a  private  and  confidential  character  pro- 
vided for  him.  The  extent  of  this  assistance  varies  according  to 
the  size  of  the  city  and  the  conditions  which  obtain.  In  San 
Francisco  the  mayor  appoints  a  stenographer,  an  usher,  and  a 
private  secretary  to  aid  him  in  caring  for  his  duties.  The  mayor 
of  St.  Louis  under  the  old  charter  was  given  an  office  force  of 
five :  a  secretary,  an  assistant  secretary,  a  stenographer,  a  page, 
and  a  janitor,51  and  over  them  his  power  was  complete.  But  no 
provision  for  a  staff  as  formidable  in  numbers  was  made  in  the 
charter  adopted  in  1914.  In  fact  the  matter  appears  to  have 
been  left  to  the  determination  of  the  municipal  council.  Char- 
ters, indeed,  quite  frequently  omit  to  mention  this  custom.  Often 
they  declare  that  the  mayor  shall  have  his  office  in  the  city  hall ; 
and  in  Indiana  the  mayor  is  expected  to  devote  regular  periods 
of  the  day  to  office  hours. 

Moreover  the  mayor  may  frequently  call  to  his  assistance  those 
who  are  specially  qualified  to  render  aid,  either  in  the  capacity 
of  citizen  groups  with  advisory  functions  or  as  in  the  case  of  St. 
Louis  a  certified  public  accountant  to  help  him  maintain  the 
annual  audit  of  the  financial  affairs  of  the  city,  a  duty  imposed 
upon  him  by  charter.  The  creation  of  "the  mayor's  eye"  in 

49  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  8,  Sec.  3. 

so  Bayles,  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United  States,  pp.  25,  26,  with  cita- 
tions, especially  those  in  the  first  and  last  paragraphs, 
si  The  salary  budget  of  the  five  was  $5,220  per  year. 


72  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [268 

New  York  witnesses  to  the  tendency  to  augment  the  organization 
of  the  mayoral  office  so  as  to  enable  the  holder  to  perform  his 
duties  more  effectively.52 

The  mayoral  constitution  today  gives  evidence  of  some  devel- 
opment when  compared  with  what  it  was  in  the  last  decade  in 
the  nineteenth  century.  While  there  have  been  few  changes  in 
the  legal  requirements  imposed  upon  candidates,  the  extra-legal 
qualifications  demanded  have  been  appreciably  elevated  owing  to 
the  increasing  alertness  and  intelligence  of  influential  and  pub- 
lic spirited  citizen  groups.  Nomination  by  petition  or  by  direct 
primary  have  practically  displaced  the  delegate  convention,  tho 
the  influence  of  organized  political  parties  has  not  been  greatly 
weakened.  Some  gain  has  been  achieved  thru  non-partisan  elec- 
tions, but  it  is  a  gain  that  is  maintained  by  eternal  vigilance.53 
On  the  whole  there  has  been  progress  in  the  direction  of  ease  of 
nomination  and  the  establishment  of  a  direct  and  immediate 
bond  between  the  mayor  and  the  electorate.  In  part  this  is  due 
to  the  application  of  the  recall  to  the  office  as  a  means  of  sup- 
plementing the  processes  of  removal  which  were  available  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century  ago.  Other  methods  of  removal  do  not  appear 
to  have  increased  in  importance  or  effectiveness.  The  movement 
for  longer  terms  has  continued  unabated  and  two  and  four  year 
terms  are  the  most  common  today,  with  the  four  year  term  gain- 
ing in  popularity.  Coincident  with  this  has  been  the  disposition  to 
increase  salaries  until  today  the  American  mayor  is  well  in  the 
lead  of  his  contemporaries  in  other  countries.  On  the  other  hand 
there  is  an  impressive  want  of  standardization,  many  cities  re- 
maining parsimonious,  others  paying  more  than  the  circumstan- 
ces seem  to  require.  In  general  the  constitution  of  the  office  exhib- 
its no  such  radical  changes  as  characterized  its  progress  in  the 
latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  changes  that  have 
been  observed  have  rather  seemed  to  popularize  and  strengthen 
the  office  and  to  accentuate  its  tendency  to  displace  the  council 
as  the  most  effective  organ  in  municipal  democracy.  These 
changes  further  witness  to  the  demand  for  responsible  and  re- 
sponsive organs  of  government  in  American  cities. 

52  This  institution  is  discussed  more  fully  in  a  later  chapter. 

53  The  Municipal  League  of  Seattle  in  the  spring  campaign  of  1916  re- 
fused its  endorsement  to  Socialist  candidates  for  municipal  office  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  running  on  a  party  ticket  and  thus  violating  the 
spirit  of  the  non-partisan  elections  act. 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION 

' '  An  administration  which  should  neither  court  the  few,  nor  stand  in  awe 
of  the  many,  which  should  identify  itself  exclusively  with  the  rights  of  the 
eity,  maintaining  them  not  merely  with  the  zeal  of  official  station,  but  with 
the  pertinacious  spirit  of  private  interest;  which  in  executing  the  laws, 
should  hunt  vice  in  its  recesses,  turn  light  upon  the  darkness  of  its  haunts, 
and  wrest  the  poisonous  cup  from  the  hand  of  the  unlicensed  pander;  which 
should  dare  to  resist  private  cupidity,  seeking  to  corrupt ;  personal  influence, 
striving  to  sway;  party  rancor,  slandering  to  intimidate;  .  .  .  "1 

In  American  cities  the  mayor  is  the  head  of  the  administration, 
a  position  which  he  holds  by  reason  of  charter  or  statutory  pro- 
visions. It  is  a  responsibility  that  is  the  product  of  his  compara- 
tive successes  and  the  occasion  of  his  most  lamentable  failures. 
It  was  clearly  defined  by  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  but 
has  not  ceased  to  develop  since  that  time,  except  in  those  cities 
now  quite  numerous  in  which  the  mayor  plan  has  been  sup- 
planted by  other  forms  of  government.  Thru  the  relation  which 
exists  between  the  mayor  and  administration  municipal  govern- 
ment has  become  more  sensitive  and  more  responsive  to  the  pub- 
lic will.  If,  as  one  prominent  observer  of  American  government 
says,  the  cities  of  the  United  States  are  today  better  governed 
than  are  the  states  of  the  Union,  the  explanation  must  be  sought 
in  their  administration.2  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  de- 
scribe the  nature  and  extent  of  the  mayor's  responsibility  in  ad- 
ministration, to  define  the  powers  he  enjoys  and  the  methods  by 
which  they  are  exercised,  and  to  note  the  forces  which  continue 
to  augment  the  importance  of  the  mayor  as  an  administrative 
officer. 

1  This  excerpt  is  taken  from  Josiah  Quincy's  farewell  address  as  mayor 
of  Boston.     See  his  Municipal  History,  pp.  261,  262. 

2  An  assertion  made  by  Mr.  Elihu  Koot  to  the  N.  Y.  Constitutional  Con- 
vention in  1915. 

73 


74  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [270 

General  Authority 

The  nature  of  the  relation  which  the  mayor  bears  to  admin- 
istration may  be  either  advisory,  supervisory,  or  active  and  man- 
agerial. Quite  commonly,  indeed,  the  actual  practice  of  incum- 
bents of  the  office  will  exhibit  all  of  these  characteristics.  In  the 
case  of  one  department  the  relations  maintained  between  the 
mayor  and  the  head  of  the  department  are  chiefly  advisory.  The 
supervision  is  casual  or  perfunctory.  Active  interference  is  not 
dreamed  of.  In  the  case  of  another  department  the  supervisory 
relation  of  the  mayor  is  constantly  felt.  In  still  other  cases  the 
interference  of  the  mayor  in  the  direction,  plans,  and  operation 
of  municipal  departments  is  so  constant  as  to  make  his  relation 
an  active  one  and  his  counsel  become  orders  rather  than  advice. 
The  advisory  position  of  the  mayor  is  illustrated  by  the  career 
of  Mayor  Blankenburg  of  Philadelphia.  When  he  appointed 
each  of  his  directors  he  said  to  them:  "You  have  absolute  con- 
trol of  your  department.  The  responsibility  must  be  yours. 
Come  and  consult  me  whenever  you  wish,  but  for  results  I  look 
to  you. ' ' 3  Mayor  Mitchel  of  New  York  expressed  this  con- 
ception of  the  relation  of  the  mayoralty  to  administration  chiefs 
in  somewhat  different  terms  as  follows :  ' '  The  theory  of  the  re- 
lation of  the  mayoralty  to  these  departments  in  the  past  has  been 
this :  That  the  mayor  should  appoint  the  head  of  the  department 
and  send  him  out  to  make  good,  send  him  out  to  administer;  if 
he  got  into  trouble  then  try  to  help  him  out ;  if  he  got  into  too 
serious  trouble  or  failed  to  make  good  or  did  something  calling 
for  such  action,  then  remove  him  and  appoint  a  successor.  That 
theory  has  been  due  very  largely  to  the  enormous  amount  of  time 
which  the  mayor  must  devote  to  other  duties  of  his  office,  to  his 
participation  in  the  work  of  ...  various  boards  and  com- 
missions, to  the  time  he  must  devote  to  interviews  in  his  office. ' '  * 

Municipal  charters  define  the  mayor's  responsibility  for  su- 
pervision in  the  broadest  terms.  In  Baltimore  it  is  provided  that 

s  Quoted  from  an  article  entitled  "What  ia  the  City?"  by  Mr.  Blanken- 
burg and  published  in  the  Independent,  Vol.  LXXXV,  pp.  84,  85  (January 
17,  1916). 

* ' '  The  Office  of  Mayor, ' '  by  John  Purroy  Mitchel,  mayor  of  the  city  of 
New  York,  published  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Political  Science 
in  the  City  of  New  York,  Vol.  V,  pp.  479-494.  (April,  1915.)  See  p.  491 
for  the  quotation. 


271]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  .  75 

the  mayor  has  "general  supervision  over  subordinate  officers." 
These  provisions  are  typical  of  very  many  other  charters.  A 
variation  is  found  in  the  charter  of  Tacoma  which  provides  that 
the  mayor  has  supervision  of  ' '  departments,  officers  and  employ- 
ees" and  which  charges  him  to  "vigilantly  observe  the  official 
conduct  of  all  public  officers. ' ' 5  The  degree  with  which  this 
duty  is  complied  with  depends  very  largely  upon  the  local  tradi- 
tions of  the  office  in  the  case  of  ordinary  men,  and  upon  the  force 
and  personality  of  men  of  unusual  talent  and  determined  pur- 
pose. Local  conditions  also  determine  the  degree  of  supervision 
which  is  exercised.  Quite  frequently  it  is  active  and  intelligent 
with  respect  to  departments  in  which  matters  of  immediate  polit- 
ical or  community  interest  are  being  dealt  with,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  may  be  quite  indifferent  with  regard  to  departments  and 
officers  further  removed  from  the  public  eye.  In  larger  cities 
it  is  small  wonder  that  the  supervisory  duties  of  the  mayor  are 
not  performed  with  equal  effectiveness  thruout  the  entire  organ- 
ization of  government.  The  means  which  have  been  placed  at 
his  disposal  have  made  it  impossible  in  most  cases  to  comply 
with  the  provisions  of  the  charter  in  a  literal  and  active  sense. 
In  some  places  the  deficiencies  have  been  more  keenly  appreci- 
ated than  in  others  and  the  means  supplied.  But  in  view  of  the 
characteristic  American  belief  in  the  all  sufficiency  of  mere  dec- 
laration of  desire  in  law  the  majority  of  the  cities  are  still  with- 
out those  agencies  which  enable  a  mayor  to  become  a  real  super- 
visor in  administration.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  in  practice 
his  advisory  relationship  is  more  commonly  in  evidence.  The  the- 
ory of  his  supervision  as  expressed  in  charters  implies  an  omni- 
science and  a  capacity  for  being  in  several  places  at  the  same 
time  that  taxes  the  strength  and  ability  of  the  most  gifted  in- 
cumbents of  the  office.  Adequate  personal  supervision  becomes 
impossible  except  in  spots  or  at  odd  seasons.  Effective  man- 
agerial machinery  is  largely  wanting,  and  perfunctory  oversight 
or  casual  review  is  the  inevitable  result. 

Nevertheless  the  mayor's  part  in  administration  is  sometimes 
more  than  advisory  or  supervisory  in  its  character.  Occasions 
arise  which  appear  to  demand  his  participation  in  it.  At  other 

s  Tacoma,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  51.  The  San  Francisco  charter  states 
that  the  mayor  shall  "vigilantly  observe"  the  official  conduct  of  all  public 
officers.  Art.  4,  Chap.  I,  Sec.  2. 


76  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [272 

times  he  participates  whether  the  occasion  seems  to  warrant  his 
action  or  not.6  Such  activity  is  more  likely  to  occur  in  connec- 
tion with  police  administration.  Charters  very  often  lay  upon 
the  mayor  the  express  duty  to  see  that  proper  measures  are  taken 
to  preserve  peace  and  order,7  or  by  investing  in  him  complete 
power  of  removal  from  office,  make  possible  his  interference  in 
all  parts  of  the  administration  if  he  is  so  minded.  It  is  note- 
worthy that  one  of  the  most  successful  mayors  in  recent  years 
believed  in  this  direct  participation.  Said  Mayor  Mitchel  of 
New  York  City,  ".  .  .  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  the  mayor 
ought  to  be  more  than  merely  the  head  of  the  city  government 
sitting  in  the  City  Hall  ready  to  receive  the  public,  appointing 
the  heads  of  the  departments  and  sending  them  out  to  make 
good  independently,  or  to  fail  independently;  that  he  ought  to 
be  really  the  business  manager  of  the  city  of  New  York,  that  he 
ought  to  have  the  close  contact  that  would  enable  him  to  become 
an  effective  business  manager.  There  are  problems  of  pure  ad- 
ministration in  the  departments  that  ought  to  come  back  to  the 
mayor  for  settlement.  There  are  problems  of  policy  in  the  de- 
partments that  ought  to  come  back  to  him  for  settlement. ' ' 8 

One  can,  without  strain,  imagine  the  spirit  of  Josiah  Quincy, 
to  whom  active  participation  in  administration  was  of  the  es- 
sence of  his  oath  of  office,  rejoicing  in  the  utterance  of  doctrine 
like  the  foregoing.  It  is  a  doctrine  that  becomes  increasingly 
difficult  of  application  as  the  city  grows  in  size  and  as  the  prob- 
lems of  government  become  more  numerous,  complex,  and  techni- 
cal. The  mayor  of  the  smaller  community  quite  commonly  takes 
an  active  part ;  for  the  mayor  of  millions  the  possibility  of  inter- 
ference is  limited,  unless  special  instruments  are  provided  for 
that  purpose. 

The  extent  of  the  administrative  authority  of  the  mayor  is, 
indeed,  almost  as  great  as  that  conferred  upon  the  city  itself. 
It  would  be  incorrect,  however,  to  say  that  he  exhausts  this  au- 
thority even  where  he  is  most  powerful.  On  the  other  hand  there 

o  The  mayor  of  Aurora,  111.,  attained  something  more  than  local  fame  in 
1916  by  taking  charge  of  some  of  the  municipal  departments  and  announc- 
ing that  he  was  ' '  king. ' ' 

7  Note  for  example  the  charter  of  San  Francisco,  Art.  4,  Chap.  I,  Sec.  2. 

&  Proceedings  of  tJie  Academy  of  Political  Science  in  the  City  of  New 
York,  Vol.  V,  p.  492.  (April  1,  1915,  p.  14.) 


273]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  77 

are  few  lines  of  municipal  activity  that  do  not  feel  his  power  and 
influence,  either  directly  or  thru  his  appointees.  General  grants 
of  authority  are  everywhere  the  rule,  tho  usually  supplemented 
and  defined  by  specific  enumerations.  The  definition  of  those 
powers  is  of  course  far  from  being  uniform  thruout  the  country, 
tho  certain  powers  are  generally  recognized  in  some  form  or 
other.  Of  these  the  most  far-reaching  is  that  of  appointing  the 
heads  of  administrative  departments,  and,  in  many  cases,  mem- 
bers of  municipal  boards  and  commissions  and  minor  officials. 
Complementary  to  this  power  is  that  of  removal,  assuring  the 
mayor  of  the  continuance  of  harmony  and  cooperation  in  his 
official  family.  In  almost  all  cases  he  is  empowered  to  call  meet- 
ings of  the  most  important  officials,  and  in  some  cases  this  is 
made  a  duty.  He  enjoys  the  privilege  of  investigating  all  official 
acts,  records  etc.,  and  with  this  is  associated  the  power  to  require 
regular  and  special  reports.  By  some  charters  the  mayor  is 
made  a  member  ex  officio  of  appointive  boards,  tho  not  always 
with  the  right  to  vote.  The  mayor  may  institute  and  maintain 
suits  in  behalf  of  the  city  against  delinquent  officials.  He  may, 
in  most  cities,  reinforce  the  ordinary  police  by  calling  upon  the 
governor  for  the  aid  of  the  militia.  In  the  administration  of 
justice  he  is  not  so  important  as  he  once  was;  but  he  is  still  in 
many  cities  clothed  with  the  authority  of  a  justice  of  the  peace, 
an  authority  that  is  exercised  with  varying  degrees  of  activity. 
He  may  remit  fines  and  penalties  imposed  for  violation  of  munic- 
ipal ordinances. 

The  actual  importance  of  the  mayor's  power  in  the  field  of 
administration  is  of  course  affected  also  by  his  relation  to  the 
council.  The  favor  of  the  latter  body  is  rarely  disassociated 
from  his  policies,  and  is  secured  by  dealing  gently  with  this  con- 
stituent and  by  generous  distribution  of  the  patronage  of  his 
office,  a  situation  which  most  municipal  executives  accept  as 
unblushingly  as  has  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  his 
dealings  with  Congress.  Finally  the  position  of  the  mayor  in 
local  politics  has  a  direct  bearing  upon  his  administrative  influ- 
ence and  authority.  If  he  is  but  the  figurehead  for  the  real  and 
dominating  personality  in  local  politics,  if  he  serves  simply  as 
the  decoy  to  attract  the  electors  or  to  receive  their  wrath,  if  it  is 
his  part  to  dream  and  prattle  over  impracticable  schemes  of 
municipal  development  while  the  real  political  leaders  direct  the 


78  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [274 

performance  of  the  work  at  hand,  his  position  as  head  of  the  ad- 
ministration becomes  a  source  of  danger  to  the  public  interest.9 

Power  of  Appointment 

A  consideration  of  the  powers  enumerated,  one  by  one,  and  in 
further  detail,  will  aid  in  gaining  a  clear  appreciation  of  their 
significance.  The  power  of  appointing  other  officers  in  the  mu- 
nicipal service  is  not  only  the  most  important  but  it  is  generally 
the  most  highly  developed.  Where  it  has  gone  furthest  in  its 
evolution  the  administrative  chiefs  stand  in  the  relation  of  cabi- 
net members  grouped  about  the  mayor.  The  principle  followed 
is  similar  to  that  of  presidential  government  as  differentiated 
from  ministerial  government.  The  recognition  of  this  cabinet 
form  of  organization  has  gone  much  further  in  American  cities 
than  it  has  in  the  state  governments,  and  the  term  "mayor's 
cabinet"  is  frequently  used  in  describing  the  relationship  which 
is  established  by  reason  of  his  appointing  power  and  the  conse- 
quent responsibility  to  him  of  the  departmental  heads.10  The  de- 
velopment of  the  appointing  power  has  not,  however,  been  uni- 

9  Such  was  the  situation  in  the  case  of  Philadelphia  from  1907  to  1912. 
The  mayor's  "principal  interest  in  municipal  affairs  was  in  a  series  of  mag- 
nificent dreams,  which  he  called  comprehensive  plans,"  for  a  splendid  art 
gallery;  a  huge  "convention  hall"  with  a  stadium  and  aviation  field;  the 
moving  of  the  Sehuylkill  river,  which  bisects  the  city;  the  laying  out  of 
boulevards  and  diagonal  thorofares;    and  the  creation  of  a  great  system 
of  wharves,  warehouses,  and  industrial  establishments.     Not  one  of  these 
grandiose  plans  ever  got  beyond  the  paper  stage;    but  while  the  mayor 
mooned  and  dreamed  over  them  the  political  leaders  who  had  put  him  in 
office  and  named  the  subordinates  whose  commissions  he  signed  were  busy 
with   practical   things.      From    "Philadelphia's    Strabismus,"    by    George 
W.  Norris,  The  Outlook,  Vol.  CXI,  pp.  1049,  1050  (December  29,  1915).  On 
the  whole  this  picture  is  not   overdrawn,   tho   Mr.  Norris  was  a  member 
of  the  Blankenburg  administration  which  succeeded  the  one  described.    The 
danger  to  the  public  interest  in  this  case  arose  from  the  activities  of  two 
contractors  who  were  then  and  are  now  the  real  political  leaders  in  Phila- 
delphia's administration  and  whose  activity  in  exploiting  the  municipality 
has  become  notorious. 

10  The  report  of  one  of  the  National  Municipal  League  committees  at 
the  meeting  held  in  Los  Angeles  in  1912  advises  that  in  every  large  city 
the  mayor  ought  to  have  cabinet  officers  to  advise  him  and  applies  to  the 
group  described  by  the  term  "the  mayor's  cabinet."     From  a  reprint  of 
the  report  published  in  the  Cleveland  Municipal  Bulletin,  p.  16,  September, 
1912 


275]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  79 

form  in  American  cities,  and  the  variations  which  obtain  are 
sufficiently  diverse  to  warrant  description  and  comparison.  Es- 
pecially is  this  the  case  with  regard  to  the  restrictions  which  in 
the  majority  of  cases  are  imposed  upon  its  exercise. 

In  many  cities  the  mayor's  power  of  appointment  is  discre- 
tionary. He  is  unrestrained  by  the  legal  necessity  of  securing 
confirmation  of  his  appointments.  The  entire  responsibility  for 
the  character  of  the  administrative  personnel,  at  least  in  the 
higher  offices,  is  upon  him.  He  becomes  in  fact  as  well  as  in 
theory  the  center  of  the  municipality's  executive  services.  This 
situation  obtains  most  conspicuously  in  New  York  City  and  in 
Cleveland  and  represents  the  extreme  concentration  of  executive 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  mayor.  In  another  and  larger  group 
of  cities  the  mayor's  power  of  appointment  is  restricted  by  the 
necessity  of  having  its  exercise  confirmed.  This  confirmation  in 
most  cases  must  come  from  the  city  council,  or,  in  bicameral 
councils,  from  the  board  of  aldermen.  A  most  important  excep- 
tion is  the  city  of  Boston,  where  the  appointments  must  be  con- 
firmed by  the  Massachusetts  Civil  Service  Commission,  a  state 
authority. 

The  extent  of  the  mayor's  appointing  power  is  determined  by 
three  sorts  of  provisions.  The  first  vests  in  him  the  appointment 
of  department  heads  and  all  other  charter  officers,  boards  and 
commissions,  etc.,  not  elective  by  the  people,  and  other  munici- 
pal employees  as  they  may  be  provided  for  by  ordinance.  The 
second  recognizes  the  authority  of  the  mayor  in  the  appointment 
of  departmental  chiefs,  but  grants  to  the  latter  the  power  of 
appointing  their  own  subordinates.  The  third  restricts  the  ap- 
parently wide  sweep  of  the  power  of  appointment  by  erecting 
a  civil  service  commission  the  function  of  which  is  to  examine 
and  test  the  fitness  of  applicants  and  to  select  qualified  individ- 
uals. The  appointments  to  subordinate  positions  in  the  service 
must  then  be  made  from  eligible  lists  supplied  by  the  commission. 
The  three  types  of  provisions  cited  above  will  be  discussed  in 
turn. 

Los  Angeles  is  typical  of  those  cities  in  which  the  appointment 
of  all  officers  for  whose  selection  the  charter  does  not  make  spe- 
cific provision  is  vested  in  the  mayor.  The  exceptions  specified 
are  not  numerous,  but  include  such  officials  as  the  superintendent 
of  the  city  schools  who  is  appointed  by  an  elective  board  of  edu- 


80  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  .    [276 

cation.  The  appointments,  however,  are  subject  to  confirmation 
by  the  majority  of  the  council.11  In  voting,  the  council  members 
must  record  their  votes,  publicly  given  on  roll  call.  Broader 
powers  of  appointment  are  conferred  upon  the  mayors  of  New 
York  and  of  St.  Louis.  "He  shall  appoint  ...  all  non- 
elective  officers  and  all  employees"  excepting  those  whose  selec- 
tion is  expressly  provided  for  in  other  ways  by  the  charter.  In 
these  cases  the  consent  of  the  council  is  not  required.  Similar 
provisions  appeared  in  the  charter  proposed  in  the  report  of  the 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  charter  commission  of  1913. 12  Except  where 
the  confirmation  of  appointments  by  the  council  is  retained,  the 
power  vested  in  the  mayor  under  these  provisions  represents  a 
tremendous  concentration  of  authority  in  the  hands  of  a  single 
individual. 

The  second  type  of  provisions  is  illustrated  in  the  case  of  the 
Cleveland  charter.  The  mayor  is  vested  with  the  power  to  ap- 
point directors  of  all  the  administrative  departments,  and  the 
officers  and  members  of  commissions  not  included  within  the  reg- 
ular departments.  The  directors  of  the  departments  appoint  the 
commissioners  in  charge  of  each  of  the  divisions  in  the  depart- 
ment; and  the  commissioners  in  turn,  with  the  approval  of  the 
director,  appoint  all  officers  and  employees  in  the  division.  Most 
of  these  positions  belong  to  the  classified  service  and  the  appoint- 
ing authority  is  restricted  to  the  eligible  list  presented  by  the 
civil  service  commission  to  the  city,  but  the  appointing  power 
of  the  mayor  is  unrestricted  inasmuch  as  it  lies  wholly  in  the 
unclassified  service.13  The  provisions  proposed  for  the  city  of 
Toledo,  Ohio,  by  the  charter  commission  of  1914,  were  very  simi- 
lar to  these  in  the  Cleveland  case,  but  excepted  all  heads  of  divi- 
sions and  all  ordinary  unskilled  labor  from  the  classified  service, 
thus  increasing  the  authority  of  the  directors  and  division  heads 
respectively.  These  provisions  undoubtedly  recognize  a  tendency 

11  Cf.   Scranton,  Pa.,  Digest  of  Laws  and  Ordinances,  p.   23 ;    Seattle, 
Charter,  Art.  5,  Sec.  4. 

12  Sec.  10.     Note  also  the  charter  of  San  Francisco,  Sec.  4 ;  The  Munic- 
ipal League  program,  Art.  4,  Sec.  1. 

is  Charter,  Sees.  71,  77,  80,  83,  129,  131,  134.  It  will  be  observed  that  the 
directors  of  departments  have  some  discretion  in  appointments  as  provided 
for  in  Sec.  131  (1),  (c)  and  (f),  relating  respectively  to  the  selection  of 
advisory  boards  and  certain  heads  of  divisions. 


277]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  81 

which  is  present  under  the  first  set  of  provisions,  viz.,  for  the 
mayor  to  entrust  the  selection  of  deputies  and  subordinates  to 
his  department  heads,  or  to  rely  upon  them  for  recommendations 
as  to  who  should  be  appointed. 

A  third  sort  of  provision  found  in  charters  and  of  importance 
in  determining  the  appointive  power  of  the  mayor  is  that  which 
relates  to  the  selection  from  minor  officers  and  employees  by  the 
merit  system.  These  provisions  are  usually  found  in  cities  that 
have  charters  embodying  the  second  sort,  and  in  almost  all  mod- 
ern charters  whether  drawn  by  states  or  cities  the  merit  prin- 
ciple finds  recognition.  The  customary  practice  is  to  divide 
the  entire  civil  service  into  two  groups,  one  the  unclassified  list 
and  the  other  the  classified  list  of  officers.  In  the  unclassified 
list  are  placed  the  elective,  departmental,  and  other  important 
places,  the  list  being  generally  specified  in  the  charter  itself.14 
The  effect  of  the  application  of  the  merit  principle  is  to  restrict 
the  exercise  of  the  appointive  power  within  the  bounds  of  proved 
fitness  for  the  place.  The  appointing  authority  is  assisted  in  the 
intelligent  performance  of  its  duty,  a  duty  that  is  by  no  means 
a  simple  undertaking,  but  inasmuch  as  the  assistance  must  be 
accepted  the  restriction  is  real  and  to  some  degree  effective.  It 
should  be  observed,  however,  that  these  restrictions  are  often 
only  partially  able  to  exert  their  influence  and  that  sometimes 
the  restraint  exerted  is  more  apparent  than  real.  This  is  partic- 

i*  The  following  list  from  the  recently  adopted  St.  Louis  charter  illus- 
trates the  offices  in  the  unclassified  service: 

"  (a)  all  officers  elected  by  the  people; 

"  (b)  all  heads  of  departments,  offices  and  divisions; 

' '  (c)  the  members  of  all  boards  appointed  by  the  mayor,  or  serving  with- 
out compensation,  however  appointed; 

"  (d)  one  secretary,  deputy  or  assistant  and  one  stenographer  for  each 
officer  or  board  in  the  unclassified  service,  who  are  or  may  be  provided  by 
ordinance  with  such  subordinates; 

"(e)  all  officers  of  the  board  of  aldermen; 

' '  (f )  surgeons,  physicians  or  other  experts  serving  in  a  consulting  or 
other  capacity  without  compensation. 

"(g)  In  addition  to  the  above,  on  unanimous  vote  of  the  board  (of 
Public  Efficiency),  there  may  be  included  in  the  unclassified  service  such 
other  offices  or  positions  requiring  exceptional  scientific,  mechanical,  pro- 
fessional or  educational  qualifications  as  may  be  ordered  by  rule  of  the 
Board." 

See  Charter,  Art.  18,  See.  3. 


82  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [278 

ularly  true  where  the  power  of  appointing  and  removing  the 
members  of  the  civil  service  commission  is  vested  in  the  mayor.15 
The  temptation  which  political  pressure  brings  to  the  municipal 
executive  proves  beyond  the  power  of  many  to  resist.  This  fact 
accounts  for  the  tendency  to  except  the  civil  service  commission- 
ers from  the  removal  power  of  the  mayor,  even  tho  appointed  by 
him,  or  to  make  their  removal  possible  only  upon  adequate  cause 
being  established.  In  New  York  State  the  municipal  commis- 
sions are  subject  to  a  supervisory  authority  vested  in  the  state 
civil  service  board,  an  authority  which  in  1914-1915  was  exer- 
cised by  an  investigation  of  the  New  York  City  commission.16 
The  conviction  is  deepening  that  the  permanent  administrative 
service  of  the  cities  should  be  placed  beyond  the  reach  of  the  local 
appointing  authorities.  Various  suggestions  have  been  advanced 
to  achieve  this  end  by  relieving  the  mayor  and  his  staff  of  the 
power  to  use  the  patronage  as  a  reward  for  party  service.  Among 
these  are  the  appointment  of  the  local  civil  service  board  by  the 
governor  and  the  selection  of  local  commissioners  by  the  merit 
system  under  the  auspices  of  the  state  commission.17 

Opinion  is  divided  as  to  the  advisability  of  putting  practi- 
cally the  whole  of  the  administrative  service,  including  depart- 
ment heads,  into  the  classified  service.  So  eminent  a  student  of 
municipal  government  as  William  Dudley  Foulke,  for  five  years 
president  of  the  National  Municipal  League,  affirms  that  civil 

is  As  for  example,  in  Chicago  under  Mayor  Thompson.  Cf.  The  New 
Republic,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  36-38,  for  article  on  "The  Fall  of  a  Mayor."  The 
civil  service  commission  was  made  the  pliant  tool  in  the  demoralization  of 
the  municipal  service,  and  conservative  friends  of  good  administration  have 
been  led  to  protest  against  the  obvious  and  flagrant  attempts  to  intrench 
the  adherents  of  a  political  machine  in  the  municipal  civil  service.  Within 
four  months  Mr.  Thompson  had  made  9,163  temporary  appointments  "the 
spoils  men's  method"  of  evading  civil  service  restraint. 

is  The  investigation  and  its  results  is  described  fully  in  the  National 
Municipal  Review,  VoL  V,  No.  1  (January,  1916),  pp.  47-55.  Although 
the  investigation  assumed  the  nature  of  a  persecution,  and  failed  to  estab- 
lish a  serious  case  against  the  New  York  City  commission,  its  work  will 
probably  aid  in  correcting  practices  which  have  been  tolerated,  both  in  city 
and  state.  The  Mitchel  administration  was  vitally  interested  in  the  in- 
vestigation inasmuch  as  in  New  York  City  the  mayor  may  appoint  and 
remove  civil  service  commissioners  at  pleasure. 

IT  In  Massachusetts  the  state  commission  exercises  a  direct  control  over 
the  work  of  the  city  commissions. 


279]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  83 

service  "rules  could  be  well  applied"  to  department  heads.18  On 
the  other  hand  there  is  the  view  that  "there  is  no  objection  to  the 
higher  positions  being  filled  with  party  men. ' ' 19  The  point  of 
view  of  an  experienced  and  responsible  administrator  is  well 
expressed  by  Mayor  Mitchel  of  New  York,  who  selected  his  staff 
of  assistants  solely  on  the  basis  of  training  and  fitness,  from 
within  party  lines  if  possible,  from  without  them  if  necessary.20 
Under  the  conditions  which  obtain  in  the  political  life  of  most 
American  cities  at  the  present  time  the  introduction  of  the  non- 

is  Presidential  address  before  the  National  Municipal  League  in  1915. 
Published  in  the  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol.  V,  No.  1  (January,  1916), 
p.  15. 

!9  Quoted  from  an  address  by  Augustus  Lynch  Mason  before  the  Eco- 
nomic Club  of  Indianapolis,  delivered  January  25,  1915.  Published  in 
pamphlet  form.  The  quotation  is  taken  from  p.  18. 

20  Mr.  Mitchel  said :  ' '  The  theory  of  selection  upon  which  the  fusion 
[which  nominated  and  elected  him  as  mayor]  .  .  .  was  predicated,  was 
that  appointments  to  the  headship  of  ...  departments  should  be  based 
solely  upon  qualification,  training  and  fitness  to  discharge  the  duties  of  the 
office,  and  without  regard  to  political  service  rendered.  .  .  There  had 
been  a  number  of  political  parties  contributory  to  the  fusion  movement. 
Each  of  these  parties  felt  that,  subject,  of  course,  to  the  prime  requirement 
of  competency  and  efficiency,  it  ought  to  receive  recognition  in  these  ap- 
pointments. My  point  of  view  toward  the  selection  of  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments was  that,  first  of  all,  I  had  to  find  men  qualified;  that  if  qualified 
and  trained  men  could  be  found  within  the  lines  of  these  political  parties 
contributory  to  fusion,  I  should  be  glad  to  find  them,  to  select  them,  and  to 
appoint  them.  But  if  I  could  not  find  them  within  the  lines  of  those  parties 
within  a  reasonable  length  of  time,  or  if  I  could  find  better  qualified  men 
outside  the  organizations  of  these  parties,  I  felt  that  it  was  my  duty  to 
select  those  men." 

Mr.  Mitchel  selected  some  organization  men  for  positions  on  his  staff; 
a  great  many  were  not  party  men.  The  position  in  which  he  was  placed 
would,  however,  have  proved  the  undoing  of  a  man  less  resolute.  He  thus 
described  the  temptation  to  which  he  was  subjected :  ' '  The  pressure,  the 
perfectly  natural  pressure,  that  comes  from  each  one  of  the  parties  is  great. 
You  are  urged  that  this  particular  applicant  recommended  by  the  party  is 
quite  as  good  as  any  other  you  may  find  elsewhere.  He  may,  in  fact,  have 
some  excellent  qualifications.  Perhaps  the  balance  is  almost  even  between 
him  and  the  other  man;  and  yet  that  other  man  may  have  some  particular 
qualification  or  some  particular  experience,  that  recommends  him  more 
strongly;  and  when  the  selection  is  made,  then  the  party  that  recommended 
the  other  feels  aggrieved,  because  it  says,  'After  all,  he  was  pretty  nearly 
as  good.'  '  See  Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Political  Science  in  the 
City  of  New  York,  Vol.  V,  No.  3  (April,  1915),  pp.  2,  3. 


84  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [280 

partisan  expert  would  be  inopportune.  Municipal  electorates 
will  have  to  be  brought  to  the  point  of  supporting  such  a  policy 
thru  gradual  education  and  as  the  result  of  experiments  made 
in  the  more  progressive  and  enlightened  centers.  The  respon- 
sible executive,  appointing  his  principal  assistants  only  from  the 
best  qualified  of  his  party  associates  is  the  intermediate  stage 
which  municipal  administration  has  now  generally  reached  in 
its  evolution  and  it  is  a  step  far  in  advance  of  conditions  a  half 
century  ago.  It  constitutes  the  justification  of  continued  en- 
deavor toward  the  goal  set  by  Mr.  Foulke.  When  that  goal  is 
reached  the  appointive  power  of  the  mayor  will  be  less  significant 
than  it  now  is,  but  until  then  it  will  continue  to  be  of  the  utmost 
importance,  despite  the  restrictions  in  the  filling  of  subordinate 
positions. 

Perhaps  the  most  promising  development  of  recent  years  in 
the  direction  of  restricting  the  appointing  of  the  mayor  as  re- 
gards department  heads  and  other  major  officials  is  the  use  to 
which  the  Massachusetts  State  Civil  Service  Commission  has 
been  put  in  the  effort  to  secure  expert  administrative  chiefs  for 
Boston.  Upon  the  commission  is  imposed  the  duty  of  passing 
upon  the  appointments  made  by  the  mayor.  The  charter  pro- 
vides that  the  latter  shall  appoint  all  heads  of  departments  and 
members  of  municipal  boards.  The  confirmation  of  the  council 
is  not  required.  It  is  specified,  however,  that  the  appointees 
shall  be  recognized  experts  in  the  work  that  shall  devolve  upon 
them,  or  that  they  shall  be  specially  fitted  for  the  performance  of 
their  duties  by  reason  of  their  education,  training,  or  experience. 
To  secure  this  expert  service  the  mayor  is  required  to  present 
certificates  giving  in  writing  his  opinion  of  the  appointee.  These 
certificates  are  in  one  or  two  forms  as  follows: 

"I  appoint  (name  of  appointee)  to  the  position  (name  of  of- 
fice) and  I  certify  that  in  my  opinion  he  is  a  person  specially 
fitted  by  education,  training  or  experience  to  perform  the  duties 
of  the  said  office  and  that  I  make  the  appointment  solely  in  the 
interest  of  the  city. ' '  The  certificate  is  to  be  signed  by  the  mayor 
and  filed  with  the  city  clerk.21  The  latter  forwards  a  certified 

21  The  mayor  has  the  option  of  which  certificate  he  will  use.  The  inclu- 
sion of  the  second  form  as  one  which  might  be  used  indicates  some  diver- 
gence of  opinion  among  the  framers  of  the  charter  as  to  whether  the  head 
of  a  department  or  the  member  of  a  board  need  always  be  a  "recognized 


281]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  85 

copy  of  the  certificate  to  the  state  civil  service  commission.  The 
commission  inquires  into  the  appointee's  qualifications,  and  if 
satisfied  as  to  the  character  of  the  appointee's  qualifications  it 
becomes  its  duty  to  file  a  certificate  similar  to  that  of  the  mayor's 
in  the  office  of  the  city  clerk.  When  this  is  done  the  appoint- 
ment becomes  operative,  subject  to  the  usual  provisions  govern- 
ing the  induction  of  appointees  into  office.  If,  however,  the  com- 
mission is  not  satisfied  as  to  the  qualifications  of  the  mayor's 
appointee,  it  may  void  the  appointment  by  failing  to  file  a  certi- 
ficate within  thirty  days  of  the  time  when  it  received  notification 
from  the  city  clerk.  The  operation  of  the  foregoing  provision  in 
Boston  has  commanded  the  attention  of  students  of  municipal 
organization  thruout  the  country.  The  city  has  been  spared  many 
poor  appointments  thru  the  failure  of  the  commission  to  approve 
the  certificates  submitted  by  the  mayor,  and  doubtless  executives 
have  been  deterred  from  submitting  some  names  for  which  there 
was  obviously  no  hope  of  approval.  The  plan  has  been  suggest- 
ed for  adoption  in  Cincinnati  and  in  a  somewhat  modified  form 
in  Indianapolis.  Doubtless  it  is  a  step  in  the  direction  of  state 
control  and  for  that  reason  fails  to  attract  the  support  of  ardent 
believers  in  municipal  home  rule.  Experience  in  Boston  leads 
one  to  surmise  that  the  mayors  of  that  municipality  take  some 
long  chances,  and  in  an  effort  to  pay  off  political  debts  submit 
names  for  which  they  must  realize  there  is  little  hope  of  approv- 
al.22 

A  choice  between  the  three  principal  methods  of  exercising  the 

expert."  As  a  matter  of  experience  the  forms  have  meant  but  little,  ap- 
parently, to  the  mayors  who  have  filled  them  in  and  signed  their  names.  In 
his  book,  The  Government  of  American  Cities,  p.  231,  Professor  W.  B. 
Munro  points  out  that  from  the  very  first  the  mayor  of  Boston  has  attempted 
to  appoint  those  who  ' '  under  the  broadest  interpretation  of  the  terms ' ' 
could  not  be  considered  qualified.  The  commission  which  investigates  the 
appointments  has  failed  to  approve  a  very  large  percentage  of  them.  In 
explaining  the  reasons  which  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  plan  Mr.  Munro 
says:  "The  Boston  plan  rests  upon  the  conviction  that  aldermanic  con- 
firmation as  a  check  upon  the  mayor  is  an  open  farce,  if  nothing  worse; 
that  the  average  mayor  cannot  be  trusted  to  appoint  competent  heads  of 
departments  if  he  has  sole  responsibility  in  the  matter;  and  that  the  system 
of  competitive  civil-service  examinations  does  not  procure,  for  department 
headships,  men  of  adequate  administrative  capacity  or  political  vision." 

22  The  reports  of  the  Boston  Finance  Commission  contain  many  illustra- 
tions of  this  practice.     Cf.  especially  Vol.  V,  pp.  18-20;  Vol.  IX,  pp.  17-20. 


86  THE  AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [282 

appointive  power  of  the  mayor  should  be  made  with  due  regard 
to  conditions  obtaining  in  respective  cities.  On  the  whole  the  ex- 
perience of  Boston  does  not  appear  to  have  secured  a  higher 
grade  of  public  officials  than  have  been  secured  in  cities  like 
Cleveland  and  New  York  where  the  appointing  power  of  the 
mayor  is  comparatively  free  from  all  except  the  more  formal 
restrictions.  The  record  of  the  Boston  plan  indicates  that  it 
will  serve  to  check  the  improper  use  of  the  appointing  power  in 
the  hands  of  a  man  who  is  willing  to  prostitute  his  office  by  plac- 
ing in  positions  of  authority  and  responsibility  men  who  are  in- 
capable, untrained,  and  unscrupulous.  It  will  not  assure  the 
appointment  of  highly  desirable  chiefs.  It  fixes  a  minimum 
standard  below  which  appointees  must  not  go,  but  it  does  little 
to  raise  that  minimum, —  the  power  of  the  commission  is  inade- 
quate for  that  purpose.  The  maximum  qualifications  in  public 
servants  cannot  be  established  by  any  cut  and  dried  charter  de- 
vice. It  is  the  product  of  citizen  interest,  activity,  and  support. 
Cleveland  has  enjoyed  a  long  period  of  honest  and  relatively 
efficient  government  and  will  not  tolerate  anything  else.  Politi- 
cal conditions  in  Boston  are  less  favorable  than  in  many  other 
cities.  The  persons  who  could  be  expected  to  back  such  efforts 
quite  often  live  in  adjoining  cities  and  do  not  participate  in  the 
municipal  politics  of  Boston,  and  among  those  who  reside  in  the 
city  there  is  wanting  the  degree  of  cooperation  between  different 
social  groups  that  is  necessary  to  success.  The  Boston  plan  is 
not  one  that  commends  itself  to  those  cities  willing  to  undertake 
their  own  redemption  without  the  interference  of  state  authori- 
ties. It  does  not  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  that  clear 
and  definite  responsibility  in  administration  which  is  so  desirable, 
especially  when  the  appointive  authority  of  the  city  is  elected  by 
one  great  party,  while  the  state  civil  service  board  may  be  ap- 
pointed by  a  governor  elected  by  the  opposite  party.  Of  the 
three  methods,  that  of  confirmation  by  the  council  seems  to  be 
the  least  desirable,  tho  still  the  most  prevalent,  especially  in 
cities  operating  under  general  state  laws  and  in  the  smaller  urban 
communities. 

There  are  further  restrictions  upon  the  appointive  power 
which  do  not  at  first  appear.  Commonly  the  terms  of  the  mem- 
bers of  boards  and  commissions  and  sometimes  of  officers  created 
by  law  or  charter  do  not  all  expire  with  an  outgoing  administra- 


283]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  87 

tion.  It  is  thus  possible  for  the  dead  hand  of  one  administra- 
tion to  be  powerfully  felt  in  a  succeeding  one.23  An  interesting 
restraint  is  found  in  the  Los  Angeles  charter  which  permits  the 
recall  of  appointive  officers.  In  the  qualifications  which  are  fixed 
for  the  incumbents  of  many  offices  there  are  also  restrictions 
which  operate  with  greater  or  less  degree  of  effectiveness.  More- 
over there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  exercise  of  the  appointing 
power  is  more  and  more  being  subjected  to  close  and  searching 
scrutiny  by  organized  groups  of  the  electorate  and  public  spirit- 
ed agencies.  Public  opinion  as  well  as  political  and  partisan 
considerations  also  tend  to  narrow  down  the  field  of  the  appoint- 
ing power. 

Power  of  Removal 

In  close  connection  with  the  power  of  appointment  is  that  of 
removal.  In  fact  the  latter,  with  certain  limitations,  almost  sup- 
plements the  power  of  appointment  and  gives  to  the  latter  much 
of  its  significance.  It  makes  it  possible  for  the  mayor  to  enforce 
the  responsibility  to  him  which  the  power  of  appointment  is 
presumed  to  create.  In  general  the  removal  power  is  exercised 
in  one  of  three  ways:  (1)  at  will,  (2)  for  cause  only,  (3)  with 
the  consent  of  the  council,  or  other  confirming  authority. 

Removal  of  incumbents  from  office  at  the  discretion  of  the 
mayor  is  the  goal  toward  which  the  development  of  this  power 
has  been  tending.  Thus  Baltimore  permits  the  removal  of  an 
appointee  in  this  manner  during  the  first  six  months  of  his  serv- 
ice, but  restricts  the  exercise  of  the  removal  power  following 
that  date.  Superior,  Wis.,  authorizes  the  mayor  to  remove  watch- 
men, policemen,  and  firemen  at  will.  The  city  of  New  York 
vests  in  the  mayor  complete  power  to  remove  heads  of  depart- 
ments at  any  time.24  In  Toledo,  Ohio,  the  removal  power  is 
practically  discretional  with  regard  to  all  public  officers  except 
members  of  the  civil  service  commission  or  of  the  commission  of 

23  Thus  in  the  charter  adopted  by  Toledo  in  1915  the  terms  of  some  of 
the  officers  appointed  by  the  mayor  are  five  years.  For  example,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Commission  of  Publicity  and  Efficiency  (Sec.  181),  and  of  the 
City  Plan  Commission  (Sec.  189). 

2*  In  New  York  City  the  members  of  the  Board  of  Education  and  of  the 
Aqueduct  Commission  and  trustees  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York 
and  of  the  Bellevue  hospital  and  the  judicial  officers  of  the  city  are  excepted 
from  the  removal  power  of  the  mayor. 


88  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [284 

publicity  and  efficiency,  but  laconically  adds:  "A  removal  by 
the  mayor  shall  be  final. ' '  The  Boston  charter  confers  this  power 
of  complete  removal  upon  the  mayor  only  with  regard  to  the 
employees  of  his  office,  who  are  excepted  from  the  civil  service 
rules  and  denied  all  protection.25 

Eemoval  by  the  mayor  for  cause  only  is  the  practice  most  gen- 
erally recognized  in  charters  of  late  years.  The  mayor's  author- 
ity is  variously  affected  by  these  efforts  to  avoid  giving  him 
arbitrary  power.  In  Boston  the  method  of  removal  for  depart- 
ment heads  and  board  members,  except  in  the  case  of  election 
commissioners,  school  committeemen,  etc.,  is  for  the  mayor  to  file 
a  written  statement  of  the  removal  setting  forth  in  detail  "the 
specific  reasons"  which  prompted  him  to  the  act.  A  copy  of  the 
statement  is  delivered  to  the  person  removed  from  office.  If  the 
latter  so  desires  he  may  file  with  the  clerk  a  written  statement  in 
reply.  This  reply  does  not,  however,  have  any  other  value  than 
that  of  bringing  the  mayor's  action  into  publicity.  It  does  not 
affect  the  action  taken  by  him  unless  he  himself  so  determines. 
There  is  little  difference  between  this  situation  and  that  which 
exists  in  Toledo.  In  the  Boston  case  the  filing  of  the  reasons  is 
mandatory;  in  Toledo  it  is  necessary  only  upon  the  demand  of 
the  party  removed.  In  both  cases  the  action  of  the  mayor  is 
final.  The  Boston  type  of  removal  is  the  most  powerful  now 
employed  under  the  restriction  that  causes  may  be  assigned. 
Very  inadequate  reasons  may  be  given,  so  that  the  power  is  after 
all  restrained  principally  by  the  degree  of  publicity  which  is 
likely  to  follow  its  exercise.26 

25  Amended  City  Charter,  Sec.  15.     The  paragraph  is  unique  among  char- 
ter provisions  and  reads: 

"The  civil  service  law  shall  not  apply  to  the  appointment  of  the  mayor's 
secretaries,  nor  of  the  stenographers,  clerks,  telephone  operators  and  mes- 
sengers connected  with  his  office,  and  the  mayor  may  remove  such  ap- 
pointees without  a  hearing  and  without  making  a  statement  of  the  cause 
for  their  removal."  Cf.  San  Francisco,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Chap.  I,  Sec.  1. 

26  Amended  City  Charter,  Sec.  14.     One  mayor  of  Boston  has  used  the 
power  of  removal  rather  vigorously.     In  March,  1914,  Mayor  Curley  ousted 
sixty-three  employees  from  the  department  of  public  works,  justifying  the 
act  by  announcing  the  saving  of  approximately  $76,000  per  annum  to  the 
city,  that  sum  representing  the  total  of  their  salaries.     In  1914  also  the 
entire  board  of  appeals  was  removed.     The  only  other  case  under  the  pres- 
ent charter  was  the  removal  of  the  fire  commissioner  in  1912.     The  same 
party  has,  however,  been  in  control  since  the  amended  charter  was  adopted. 


285]  THE  MAYOR   4.ND  ADMINISTRATION  89 

The  recently  adopted  St.  Louis  charter  indicates  a  slightly 
more  conservative  development.  The  mayor  may  remove  all 
non-elective  officers  and  all  employees;  "but  shall  not  remove 
from  any  office,  department  or  division  head  appointed  by  him, 
except  for  cause. ' '  Another  provision  in  the  charter  follows  the 
Toledo  plan,  and  enables  the  employees  of  the  city  other  than 
those  excepted  above  to  require  a  statement  of  the  reasons  for 
discharge  to  be  filed  with  the  efficiency  board  of  the  municipality. 
The  charter  does  not  specify  the  nature  of  the  causes  or  the  man- 
ner of  their  presentation,  and  in  its  practical  operation  there 
appears  to  be  but  a  shade  of  difference  between  the  St.  Louis 
provisions  and  those  obtaining  in  Boston.  The  St.  Louis  pro- 
visions, indeed,  expressly  authorize  the  appointing  officer  to  ' '  sus- 
pend or  discharge  or  reduce  in  rank  or  compensation  any  officer 
or  employee  under  him,  with  or  without  cause,"  cases  specified 
in  the  charter  alone  excepted.27  These  instances,  however,  rep- 
resent a  very  weak  survival  of  the  requirement  that  removals 
may  be  for  cause  only. 

Earlier  practice  is  indicated  by  the  general  municipal  law  of 
Illinois  and  the  general  charter  statute  for  Indiana  cities.  In 
these  states  any  officer  appointed  by  the  mayor  may  be  removed 
by  him,  but  the  reasons  for  the  action  must  be  reported  to  the 
city  council  and  in  Indiana  to  the  person  removed.28  The  Illinois 
statute  empowers  the  mayor  to  act  whenever  the  interests  of  the 
city  demand  it,  but  protect  an  officer  against  removal  from  office 
a  second  time  for  the  same  offense.  The  reasons  must  be  filed 
with  the  council  within  ten  days.  If  this  is  not  done  or  if  the 
council  by  a  two-thirds  vote  disapproves  of  the  removal,  the  offi- 
cer is  restored  to  his  position.  It  is  easy  to  see,  however,  that 
many  cases  might  arise  in  which  the  opposition  of  the  mayor's 
action  could  not  command  the  necessary  two-thirds  majority  and 
the  action  of  the  executive  would  stand  with  or  without  satisfac- 
tory reasons.  Of  all  the  requirements  that  provide  for  removal 
for  cause  only  those  similar  to  the  provisions  of  the  Baltimore 
charter  guarantee  that  the  cause  will  have  something  of  reality 

27  In  classified  service,  removals,  etc.,  on  account  of  religious  or  political 
opinions  or  affiliations  are  prohibited.    Art.  18,  Sec.  12. 

28  General  Municipal  Laws  of  Illinois,  Art.  2,  Sec.  27.     It  is  interesting 
to  observe  that  in  the  Chicago  charter  convention  of  1904  this  feature  of 
the  removal  power  of  the  mayor  was  retained  intact. 


90  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [286 

in  them.  After  the  appointee  has  held  office  for  six  months  of 
his  term  he  may  be  removed  only  for  cause  and  after  a  hearing 
upon  the  case. 

The  third  method  of  exercising  the  removal  power  is  with  the 
consent  of  the  council  or  other  confirming  power.  The  situation 
in  Los  Angeles  is  typical.  There  the  charter  provides  that  with 
regard  to  appointed  officers  the  appointing  power  shall  have  the 
power  of  removal  in  all  cases,  but  "where  confirmation  is  re- 
quired, the  assent  of  the  confirming  body  shall  be  requisite  for 
removal."  The  action  of  the  council  or  other  assenting  body  is 
to  be  taken  by  an  open  ballot  or  call  of  the  roll  and  the  respective 
votes  made  a  matter  of  record.  The  number  of  cities  which  re- 
quire procedure  of  this  kind  in  effecting  removals  is  compara- 
tively small  and  is  diminishing.  None  of  the  later  charters  pro- 
posed or  adopted  include  this  method,  although  it  was  quite  the 
usual  method  when  the  power  of  removal  was  first  being  vested 
in  the  mayor.29 

There  are  other  methods  of  removing  officers  extant,  but  the 
number  of  cities  in  which  they  apply  are  limited.  One  of  the 
methods  denies  to  the  mayor  the  power  to  remove  but  enables 
him  to  prosecute  charges  before  the  council  or  other  competent 
authority.30  In  some  cities  the  subordinate  officers  may  be  re- 
moved from  office  by  the  recall  and  are  ineligible  for  reappoint- 
ment  if  recalled.  In  still  others  the  council  alone  may  remove, 
but  in  these  cases  it  still  retains  the  power  of  appointment.31 
The  last  method  to  be  mentioned  is  that  of  vesting  the  power  to 

2»  Other  cities  which  still  retain  this  method  are  Waltham,  Mass.,  Charter, 
See.  30;  Detroit,  Mich.,  Charter,  See.  162,  but  this  requires  a  majority  vote 
only;  Worcester,  Mass.,  and  Newton,  Mass.,  kept  this  method  until  1903  and 
1910  respectively;  cf.  also  charters  of  Providence,  E.  I.,  Sec.  9,  Clause  9; 
Pawtucket,  E.  I.,  Sec.  7,  Clause  7,  requiring  two-thirds  and  three-fifths 
votes  respectively  to  remove;  and  for  Butte,  Mont.,  the  Political  Code  of 
Montana,  Sec.  4781. 

so  See  Kentucky  General  Act  for  the  Government  of  Second-class  Cities, 
Sec.  184.  The  mayor,  however,  may  dismiss  officers  who  are  found  to  have 
been  interested  in  contracts  with  the  city  without  the  consent  of  the  alder- 
men. The  ordinary  method  of  reaching  this  practice  of  municipal  officers 
being  interested  in  public  contracts  is  to  declare  that  such  contracts  are 
void. 

si  Milwaukee,  Charter,  Chap.  XIX,  Sec.  7;  Minneapolis,  Charter,  Chap. 
II,  Sec.  1;  cities  of  the  fourth  class  in  the  state  of  Michigan,  General  Act 
of  Incorporation,  Sec.  103. 


287]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  91 

remove  in  the  mayor,  but  authorizing  an  appeal  from  his  action 
to  the  local  courts,  the  decision  of  the  latter  to  be  final.32  This 
list  may  not  be  exhaustive,  but  it  is  at  least  indicative  of  the  vari- 
ety of  the  processes  that  still  obtain  in  the  exercise  of  the  power 
of  removal.  The  centralization  of  administrative  authority  in 
the  mayoral  office  is  by  no  means  so  complete  as  the  survey  of 
the  more  important  cities  would  lead  one  to  think.  In  scanning 
the  numerous  methods  by  which  the  removal  power  is  called  into 
play  one  sees  the  weak  mayoralty  of  a  century  ago  side  by  side 
with  the  most  highly  developed  and  powerful  executive  of  the 
twentieth  century. 

As  has  been  noted,  removal  power  is  intended  to  enable  a 
mayor  to  bring  the  rest  of  his  administration  into  harmony  with 
his  own  policy,  or  to  curb  maladministration.  But  many  times 
it  proves  difficult  to  bring  the  power  into  play.  The  mayor  often 
hesitates  to  offend  powerful  groups  or  interests  that  may  be  in- 
terested in  the  misconduct  of  an  officer.  The  existence  of  the 
power  of  removal,  however,  enables  the  public  to  fasten  responsi- 
bility upon  the  mayor  and  in  that  respect  its  development  has 
been  eminently  justified.  There  are  of  course  instances  of  its 
gross  abuse.  It  was  most  notoriously  employed  in  Terre  Haute, 
Indiana,  during  the  election  fraud  cases  in  1915.  The  mayor 
announced  that  those  city  employees  who  pleaded  to  the  indict- 
ments for  election  fraud  returned  in  the  federal  court  would  be 
dismissed  from  the  service.  The  mayor  himself  being  under  in- 
dictment at  the  time  and  later  being  found  guilty  of  charges 
which  revealed  him  as  the  leader  in  the  fraudulent  practices 
charged,  the  threat  to  remove  could  be  interpreted  only  as  an  at- 
tempt to  coerce  his  fellow  defendants  into  a  more  vigorous  de- 
fense. There  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  power  to  remove  is  one 
that  is  frequently  employed  to  bulldose  employees  of  the  city  into 
subservience  that  is  far  from  the  kind  of  harmony  which  the 
power  was  intended  to  promote.  Despite  this  situation  one  can- 
not seriously  question  that  the  power  has  produced  the  results 
which  were  expected  of  it  and  has  been  a  potent  element  in  mayor 
government.  The  cause  of  good  government  appears  to  be  best 
served  where  the  power  of  removal  is  complete  or  nearly  so,  at 
least  with  regard  to  heads  of  departments  and  other  important 

32  Cf.  Norfolk,  Va.,  Charter,  Sec.  11.  The  mayor  must  specify  his  reasons 
to  the  party  removed. 


92  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [288 

functionaries  not  included  within  the  permanent  civil  service  of 
the  municipality.  The  best  guarantee  for  its  proper  exercise  is 
the  publicity  which  must  inevitably  attend  its  application  to  im- 
portant offices. 

Power  of  Suspension 

Closely  allied  with  the  power  of  removal  is  that  of  suspension. 
Frequently  it  is  not  mentioned  in  the  municipal  charters,33  but 
often  it  is  conferred  in  connection  with  the  power  to  appoint  and 
the  power  to  remove.34  In  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  the  mayor 
may  suspend  any  city  official.  If  the  action  is  sustained  by  the 
aldermen,  the  officer  is  removed  from  office.35  In  Superior,  Wis- 
consin, the  mayor  may  suspend  and  reinstate  any  employees  in 
the  police  and  fire  departments,  and  may  suspend  other  officials 
against  whom  charges  have  been  preferred  until  the  latter  have 
been  disposed  of.  In  some  cities  —  those  of  Indiana  for  exam- 
ple—  the  reason  for  the  suspension  must  be  sent  to  the  city 
council.  The  party  suspended  must  be  notified  of  the  action, 
but  the  decision  of  the  mayor  seems  to  be  final.  In  all  of  the 
foregoing  cases  the  power  of  suspension  is  expressly  conferred 
but  its  use  and  application  to  individual  cases  lie  within  execu- 
tive discretion.  In  San  Francisco  the  exercise  of  this  power  be- 
comes a  duty  and  the  authority  conferred  upon  the  mayor  is 
couched  in  mandatory  terms.36  In  general  the  power  to  suspend 
depends  upon  its  being  explicitly  bestowed,  but  in  case  the  ap- 
pointive P9wer  of  the  mayor  is  complete  and  exclusive  and  the 
terms  of  appointive  officials  are  not  fixed,  as  in  New  York  or 
Cleveland,  the  power  to  suspend  becomes  a  part  of  the  measure 
of  executive  discretion  vested  in  the  mayor.87 

There  has  been  a  disposition  in  a  number  of  cities  to  extend 

33  For  example  the  charters  of  Boston  and  Baltimore. 

s*  Cf.  the  charter  of  Indianapolis,  Sec.  80 ;  of  Superior,  Wis.,  Sec.  22. 

35  Vide  description  of  the  Newport  plan  by  E.  E.  Chadwiek  in  the  Pro- 
ceedings of  the  Providence  Conference  on  Good  City  Government,  p.  172 
(1907). 

3« Charter,  Art.  4,  Chap.  I,  Sec.  2.  The  language  is  as  follows:  "When 
any  official  defalcation  or  wilful  neglect  of  duty  or  official  misconduct  shall 
come  to  his  (the  mayor's)  knowledge,  he  shall  suspend  the  delinquent  officer 
or  person  from  office  pending  an  official  investigation." 

37  This  feature  of  the  power  of  suspension  is  discussed  from  the  stand- 
point of  administrative  law  in  Bayles'  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United 
States,  pp.  55,  56. 


289]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  93 

the  mayor's  power  of  suspension  to  elective  officers  as  well  as 
to  subordinate  appointive  officials.  It  was  retained  in  the  new 
charter  of  St.  Louis  and  is  found  in  the  charter  of  San  Francisco. 
The  former  charter  of  St.  Louis  permitted  the  mayor  to  suspend 
elective  officers  for  cause.  He  must  then  file  charges  with  the 
register  and  convene  the  council  for  the  purpose  of  stating  his 
ground  of  action.  The  approval  of  the  council  removed  the  in- 
cumbent from  his  position.  Failure  to  approve  operated  to  re- 
instate the  one  suspended.  The  provisions  in  the  new  charter 
are  very  similar.  A  three-fourths  vote  of  the  board  of  aldermen 
is  necessary  to  sustain  the  charges  and  fix  the  time  and 
the  place  of  the  hearing.  A  rather  formal  trial  ensues.  The 
members  of  the  board  must  record  their  vote  by  the  yeas  and 
nays  and  their  action  is  certified  to  the  mayor.  If  the  suspension 
is  not  sustained  the  immediate  reinstatement  of  the  defendant 
is  mandatory.  The  provisions  in  the  case  of  San  Francisco  are 
practically  identical  with  the  foregoing.  In  both  cities  the  mayor 
enjoys  the  power  of  appointing  some  person  to  perform  the 
duties  of  the  office  vacated  by  the  suspension. 

In  general  the  power  of  suspension  with  regard  to  an  elective 
office  is  vested  either  in  some  state  authority  or  it  is  vested  in 
the  council.38  When  vested  in  the  mayor  it  signifies  a  develop- 
ment of  the  doctrine  of  centralization  in  administrative  power 
and  responsibility  that  is  cumbersome  and  on  the  whole  undesira- 
ble. It  has  none  of  the  advantages  that  are  to  be  gained  by  the 
adoption  of  the  short  ballot  and  the  concurrent  recognition  of 
the  mayor 's  power  of  appointment  and  removal.  Nevertheless  it 
may  be  accepted  as  an  evidence  of  a  tendency  to  exalt  the  posi- 
tion of  the  mayoralty  in  administration,  even  at  the  expense  of 
the  elective  principle. 

The  power  of  suspension  can  hardly  be  viewed  except  in  rela- 
tion to  the  power  of  removal.  In  the  case  of  appointive  officers 
in  the  administration  it  is  often  used  but  chiefly  as  a  preliminary 
to  the  more  vigorous  discipline  of  complete  removal,  not  with  a 
view  of  chastening  the  individual  affected.  Occasionally  a  re- 
instatement occurs  but  it  is  not  the  rule. 

The  powers  of  appointment,  removal,  and  suspension  have  been 
the  center  of  prolonged  controversy,  and  the  discussion  over  them 

ss  See  the  charter  of  the  city  of  Los  Angeles,  Art.  2,  Sec.  9. 


94  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [290 

is  worthy  of  brief  consideration.  The  municipal  charter  of  the 
National  Municipal  League  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  mayor 
the  power  of  appointing  practically  all  subordinates.39  The 
wisdom  of  this  feature  of  the  charter  was  questioned  by  some  of 
the  conference  which  adopted  it,  and  has  been  questioned  since 
that  time  on  the  ground  that  this  power  over  department  heads 
is  sufficient.  It  also  has  been  urged  that  any  further  extension 
of  his  control  has  a  demoralizing  effect  on  the  municipal  service, 
while  the  moral  effect  of  responsibility  on  the  part  of  subordi- 
nates to  department  heads  ' '  is  great  and  should  not  be  sacrificed 
except  for  very  cogent  reasons. ' '  In  the  address  by  former  Gov- 
ernor W.  E.  Kussell  of  Massachusetts,  he  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  power  of  the  mayor  to  appoint  should  be  limited,  but 
his  power  to  remove,  complete.40  Municipal  practice  has  tended 
to  invest  the  mayor  with  complete  authority  over  department 
chiefs  and  to  create  a  subordinate  service  that  is  chosen  under 
the  merit  system  and  responsible  to  department  heads. 

Power  of  Investigation 

One  of  the  most  universally  recognized  powers  which  the  may- 
or possesses  is  that  of  investigating  all  branches  of  the  adminis- 
tration and  the  conduct  of  departmental  and  subordinate  officials. 
Upon  no  other  feature  is  there  such  unanimity  in  municipal 
charters,  unless  it  is  upon  the  provision  that  he  shall  be  the  chief 
executive  officer  of  the  city.  By  far  the  most  generally  employed 
phraseology  for  conferring  this  power  is  that  which  declares 
that  the  mayor  "shall  have  the  power  at  any  time  to  examine 
any  books  or  records  of  any  employee  of  the  city."  These 
words  or  their  equivalent  are  found  in  scores  of  municipal  char- 
ters and  in  many  general  charter  statutes.41  Slight  variations 

39  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  Art.  4,  Sec.  1.     The  provisions  were  that 
the  mayor  should  appoint  all  heads  of  departments  except  the  controller; 
also  subject  to  civil  service  regulations  the  subordinate  administrative  offi- 
cers and  employees  except  that  laborers  were  to  be  appointed  and  removed 
by  the  heads  of  departments.     In  New  York  City  the  direct  and  indirect 
appointing  power  of  the  mayor  affects  approximately  seventy  thousand  per- 
sons, drawing  salaries  totaling  more  than  sixty-five  and  one-half  millions  of 
dollars.     Cf.  Short  Ballot  BuMetin,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  7  (February,  1916),  p.  7. 

40  Quoted  in  Keinsch,  Readings  in  State  Government,  pp.  8,  9. 

*i  Cf.  the  General  Law  relating  to  the  Incorporation  of  Cities  of  the 
Fourth  Class  in  Michigan,  Sec.  50;  The  Cities  and  Villages  Act  of  Illinois, 


291]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  95 

occur:  the  word  "inspect"  is  used  in  place  of  the  word  "exam- 
ine ; ' '  the  words  ' '  papers ' '  and  ' '  manner  of  doing  business ' '  are 
added  now  and  then;  the  phrase  "without  notice"  appears  occa- 
sionally; now  and  then  the  employment  of  experts  for  the  in- 
vestigation is  authorized;  and  in  some  cases  "departments"  are 
specified  as  coming  within  the  power  of  investigation.42  Indeed 
these  provisions  have  been  common  in  charters  since  the  emer- 
gence of  the  mayoralty  into  more  than  merely  nominal  leader- 
ship. Taken  by  themselves,  however,  they  have  provided  for 
little  more  than  nominal  powers  of  investigation  and  to  assume 
that  the  authority  is  or  has  been  diligently  or  intelligently  exer- 
cised appears  to  be  very  largely  unwarranted.  Occasionally,  as 
in  the  case  of  Josiah  Quincy,  a  mayor  has  taken  this  power  seri- 
ously, but  its  vigorous  exercise  is  not  popular  among  municipal 
employees ;  it  demands  a  large  measure  of  tact  on  the  part  of  the 
executive;  it  lays  heavy  tribute  upon  the  mayor's  time  and  en- 
ergy ;  and  finally  it  presumes  a  training  and  a  knowledge  of  what 
constitutes  "legal  and  proper"  methods  of  doing  business,  keep- 
ing records  and  accounts  that  many  mayors  do  not  have.  In  this 
matter  of  inspection,  too,  local  tradition  has  had  no  little  to  do 
with  actual  practice,  and  very  frequently  the  sudden  introduc- 
tion of  adequate  inspection  or  examination  has  been  regarded  as 
casting  unwarranted  suspicion  upon  the  official  concerned,  or  as 
evidencing  an  unjustifiable  and  prying  concern  on  the  part  of 
the  mayor.  Doubtless,  too,  there  have  been  cases  in  which 
mayors  did  not  care  to  employ  this  authority,  vaguely  realizing 
that  it  might  not  cast  credit  upon  the  record  of  their  own  admin- 
istration. 

It  should  be  observed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  mayor  has 
actually  enjoyed  no  such  sweep  of  authority  as  the  general  lan- 
guage employed  would  seem  to  indicate.  To  remedy  this  situa- 
tion and  to  render  the  mayor  capable  of  conducting  investiga- 
tions efficiently  the  National  Municipal  League  program  advised 
that  the  mayor  be  empowered  to  compel  the  attendance  and  tes- 
timony of  witnesses  in  connection  with  his  investigations.  Some 

Art.  2,  See.  31;  Baltimore,  Charter,  Sec.  21;  Tacoma,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec. 
51;  Rochester,  Charter,  Sec.  49. 

42  Baltimore  specifies  ' '  departments,  sub-departments,  municipal  board, 
officer,  assistant,  clerk,  subordinate  or  employee."  Sec.  21.  The  Illinois 
act  specified  any  "agent"  of  the  city. 


96  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [292 

of  the  more  recent  charters  recognize  this  suggestion.  The  char- 
ter of  Cleveland,  for  example,  provides  that  "the  mayor  may, 
without  notice,  cause  the  affairs  of  any  department  or  the  con- 
duct of  any  officer  or  employee  to  be  examined.  Any  person  or 
persons  appointed  by  the  mayor  to  examine  the  affairs  of  any 
department  or  the  conduct  of  any  officer  or  employee,  shall  have 
the  same  power  to  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  the 
production  of  witnesses'  papers  and  other  evidence  and  to  cause 
witnesses  to  be  punished  for  contempt,  as  is  conferred  upon  the 
council  or  a  committee  thereof  by  this  charter."  Substantially 
the  same  provisions  are  found  in  the  Toledo  and  St.  Louis  char- 
ters. There  is  also  created  in  the  case  of  Toledo,  a  commission  of 
publicity  and  efficiency  whose  functions  are:  (1)  to  investigate 
any  and  all  departments  and  offices;  (2)  to  make  semi-annual 
reports  of  its  conclusions  to  the  mayor  and  to  other  municipal 
authorities;  (3)  to  recommend  improved  methods  to  the  council; 
(4)  to  publish  or  to  furnish  to  any  person  at  its  discretion  any 
reports,  recommendations,  or  information  it  may  have  concerning 
affairs;  (5)  to  investigate  and  publish  information  concerning 
the  improvement  and  development  of  municipal  administration 
elsewhere;  (6)  to  publish  all  municipal  records  and  reports;  and 
(7)  to  collect  information  for  and  to  advise  with  all  offices  and 
departments.  This  commission  not  only  furnishes  the  mayor 
with  the  means  of  conducting  an  investigation,  but  maintains 
such  an  investigation  constantly  and  by  the  publicity  secured 
stimulates  his  constant  interest  and  activity  along  the  same  lines. 
A  somewhat  similar  provision  is  found  in  Cleveland  in  the 
bureau  of  information  and  efficiency,  but  its  powers  are  less 
apparent. 

Two  very  interesting  developments  in  the  direction  of  vitaliz- 
ing the  mayor's  power  of  investigation  have  appeared  in  New 
York  and  Boston  respectively.  In  New  York  the  mayor  is  made 
responsible  for  the  administration,  an  obligation  that  involves 
the  oversight  of  some  twenty-nine  departments  and  nearly  sev- 
enty thousand  employees.  The  interests  cared  for  by  these  de- 
partments are  vast  and  important  and  involve  an  annual  ex- 
penditure running  up  into  hundreds  of  millions.  Obviously  the 
mayor  needs  some  efficient  agency  for  exerting  his  power  of 
investigation.  "The  Mayor's  Eye"  has  been  created  for  this 


293]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  97 

purpose,  a  commissioner  of  accounts  employing  almost  one  hun- 
dred skilled  persons  who  ' '  day  in  and  day  out ' '  furnish  the  chief 
executive  with  information  that  enables  him  to  keep  in  touch 
with  all  branches  of  the  administration.  It  has  proven  a  most 
effective  instrument  for  aiding  the  mayor  in  his  efforts  to  secure 
good  government.43 

The  Boston  charter  creates  a  finance  committee  whose  duty  it 
is  ' '  from  time  to  time  to  investigate  any  and  all  matters  relating 
to  appropriations,  loans,  expenditures,  accounts,  and  methods  of 
administration  affecting  the  city  of  Boston  or  the  county  of  Suf- 
folk, or  any  department  thereof,  that  may  appear  to  the  com- 
mission to  need  investigation,  and  to  report  ...  to  the 
mayor,  the  city  council,  the  governor  or  the  general  court. ' '  An 
annual  report  to  the  state  legislature  is  required.  It  is  also  pro- 
vided that  "whenever  any  payroll,  bill  or  other  claim  against  the 
city  is  presented  to  the  mayor  ...  he  shall,  if  the  same 
seems  to  him  to  be  of  doubtful  validity,  excessive  in  amount,  or 
otherwise  contrary  to  the  city's  interest,  refer  it  to  the  finance 
commission,  which  shall  immediately  investigate  the  facts  and 
report  thereon  .  .  ."  The  commission  is  made  independent 
of  voluntary  appropriations  by  the  municipal  council  and  is 
authorized  to  incur  such  expenses  "as  it  may  deem  necessary" 
and  the  city  is  made  liable  for  the  payment  of  these  expenses  to 
an  amount  not  exceeding  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  upon 
requisition  by  the  commission.  The  city  is  obliged  to  make  an 
annual  appropriation  of  twenty-five  thousand  dollars  for  investi- 
gations, besides  the  salary  of  the  chairman  of  the  commission. 
The  commission  is  clothed  with  authority  adequate  to  enable  it 
to  do  its  work  effectively.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  Boston 
plan  provides  the  mayor  with  an  effective  agent  for  carrying  on 
such  investigations  as  he  may  care  to  inaugurate;  it  further 
makes  sure  that  investigation  will  proceed  whether  the  mayor 
initiates  it  or  not.  These  two  features  are  highly  desirable  and 
will  doubtless  find  place  in  many  future  charters.  But  the 
finance  commission  is  appointed  by  the  governor  and  is  a  state  as 
well  as  a  municipal  agency.  It  is  hardly  to  be  anticipated  that 
municipal  charter  commissions  will  incorporate  these  latter  pro- 
visions into  the  charter  drafts  which  they  submit.  The  Toledo 

«  See  pamphlet,  The  Mayor's  Eye,  pp.  3-5. 


98  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [294 

plan  appears  much  more  likely  to  commend  itself,  strengthened, 
perhaps,  by  the  acceptable  features  which  the  Boston  charter 
offers. 

The  mayor's  power  of  investigation  is  frequently  enlarged  by 
the  council  thru  ordinances  empowering  him  to  act  along 
specific  lines.  One  has  but  to  turn  the  pages  of  the  numerous 
volumes  of  compiled  ordinances  which  are  accumulating  so  rap- 
idly today  to  discover  that  the  council  is  defining  with  great 
detail  the  inspectional  duties  of  the  mayor.  Every  new  regula- 
tory ordinance  provides  for  records  to  be  kept,  conditions  of  one 
or  many  sorts  to  be  maintained  in  stores,  shops,  industrial 
establishments,  etc.,  and  the  mayor's  office  is  charged  with  the 
investigation  of  such  records  and  conditions.  This  tendency  is 
especially  marked  in  smaller  cities  where  the  departmental  estab- 
lishment is  not  highly  organized,  or  where  the  council  still  re- 
mains a  very  powerful  organ  of  government ;  4*  but  it  is  far  from 
absent  in  the  more  important  municipalities.45 

Reports  and  Conferences 

An  important  element  of  the  mayor's  administrative  authority 
is  his  powers  of  calling  meetings  of  department  heads,  members 
of  boards,  commissions,  and  bureaus,  and  the  allied  power  of  call- 
ing for  reports  from  them  either  at  regular  intervals  or  at  his 
pleasure.  These  powers  are  frequently  conferred  in  express 
terms  in  the  municipal  charters,  while  in  cases  in  which  ap- 
pointees hold  office  at  the  pleasure  of  the  mayor  the  latter  has 
ample  authority  to  make  such  demands.  The  phraseology  in 
which  these  powers  are  bestowed  varies  greatly.  The  Cleveland 
charter  provides  for  annual  reports  from  the  directors  of  depart- 
ments to  the  mayor  and  for  the  furnishing  to  the  mayor  "at  any 
time"  such  information  as  he  may  desire.  The  Baltimore  char- 
ter employs  somewhat  happier  phraseology.  An  annual  conf er- 

**  See  for  example,  the  Principal  Ordinances  of  Superior,  Wis.,  pp.  187, 
188,  197. 

is  The  Eevised  Code  of  St.  Louis  furnishes  many  examples.  In  larger 
as  well  as  smaller  cities  mayors  make  personal  tours  of  inspection  from  time 
to  time.  It  may  be  observed  that  the  increasing  accessibility  of  municipal 
ordinances  opens  up  a  wide  field  for  study  in  municipal  legislation.  In  some 
of  the  more  important  branches  of  it  such  as  franchise  legislation  the  trails 
through  the  wilderness  have  been  blazed,  but  the  larger  part  of  this  field 
has  received  little  attention  beyond  spasmodic  attempts  at  local  codification. 


295]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  99 

ence  is  mandatory,  but  the  mayor  may  summon  heads  of  depart- 
ments "to  a  conference  on  municipal  matters  .  .  .  oftener, 
if  he  thinks  the  public  interests  will  be  promoted  thereby."  Re- 
ports either  oral  or  written,  as  the  mayor  may  prefer,  are  to  be 
made  once  every  month.  The  St.  Louis  charter  enables  the 
mayor  to  require  any  department,  board,  or  officer  to  "make 
reports  to  him,"  besides  requiring  annual  reports  and  the  fur- 
nishing of  information  ' '  at  any  time. ' '  An  example  of  the  exer- 
cise of  the  mayor's  power  of  calling  for  information  is  given  by 
Mayor  Mitchel  in  a  discussion  of  the  office  of  mayor.  Prior  to 
his  administration,  department  heads  had  been  submitting 
budget  estimates  to  the  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment. 
Upon  his  accession  department  heads  were  instructed  to  submit 
their  estimates  to  the  mayor,  enabling  the  latter  to  review  them 
and  to  present  to  the  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment  an 
executive  budget.  The  result  was  that  the  amount  asked  for  in 
the  budget  represented  a  decrease  from  the  actual  appropria- 
tions of  the  year  before.46  In  this  case  the  exercise  of  the  mayor's 
authority  secured  not  only  economical  estimates  of  departmental 
needs,  but  it  made  possible  the  inauguration  of  a  desirable  fea- 
ture in  municipal  budget  making.  The  mayor  system  has  con- 
siderable to  learn  regarding  the  value  of  frequent  meetings  of 
heads  of  departments  with  the  executive,  a  value  which  is  being 
demonstrated  in  cities  under  commission  and  manager  governed 
systems.  It  is  equally  true  that  the  power  to  call  for  informa- 
tion and  reports  may  be  made  the  means  of  securing  more  re- 
sponsible and  enlightened  administration. 

On  Boards  and  Commissions 

In  some  cities  the  position  of  the  mayor  in  administration  is 
enhanced  by  his  being  made  ex  officio  a  member  of  local  boards 
and  commissions,  or  in  case  membership  is  denied  him,  being 
privileged  to  attend  and  take  part  in  board  meetings.  In  San 
Francisco,  for  example,  he  is  a  member  of  the  board  of  library 
trustees  and  is  privileged  to  attend  the  meetings  of  any  other 
boards  and  to  offer  suggestions  during  their  proceedings.  Cleve- 
land makes  the  mayor  president  of  the  board  of  control  and  of 
the  sinking  fund  commission;  and  Cleveland  and  Toledo  make 

48  Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Political  Science  in  the  City  of  New 
York,  Vol.  V,  No.  3  (April,  1915),  p.  8. 


100  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [296 

him  president  of  the  board  of  revision  and  assessments.  In  New 
York  City  the  mayor  sits  as  chairman  of  the  boards  and  commis- 
sions of  which  he  is  a  member,  viz.,  the  board  of  estimate  and 
apportionment,  the  sinking  fund  commission,  the  banking  com- 
mission, the  armory  board,  and  the  board  of  city  record.47  St. 
Louis  and  Rochester,  New  York,  follow  the  practice  of  making 
the  mayor  a  member  of  the  board  of  estimate  and  apportion- 
ment,48 and  Baltimore  places  the  mayor  on  the  board  of  esti- 
mates. The  latter  city  also  makes  the  mayor  a  member  of  the 
board  of  charities  and  corrections,  of  the  art  commission,  and  of 
the  board  of  review  and  assessment.  Occasionally,  as  in  some 
Illinois  cities  which  retain  their  special  charters  issued  before  the 
constitution  of  1870  was  adopted,  the  mayor  is  a  member  of  the 
board  of  education. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  policy  of  making  the  mayor  a 
member  of  municipal  boards  and  commissions  may  easily  be  car- 
ried to  the  point  where  it  imposes  an  unnecessary  burden  upon 
him.  Except  in  the  case  of  boards  whose  function  it  is  to  unify 
and  direct  the  work  of  important  branches  of  administration  or 
to  coordinate  the  efforts  of  various  administrative  districts,  such 
as  the  boroughs  of  New  York  City,  or  to  prepare  the  budget  and 
apportion  the  distribution  of  the  annual  revenue,  there  seems  to 
be  little  gained  by  making  the  mayor  a  member  of  a  board  that 
could  not  be  gained  by  giving  him  adequate  powers  of  appoint- 
ment and  removal,  supervision,  and  control.  The  later  charters, 
in  so  far  as  any  tendency  may  be  said  to  exist,  appear  to  recog- 
nize this  fact,  and  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  any  disposition 
to  extend  the  practice. 

Power  of  Approval 

Perhaps  the  power  which  lays  the  heaviest  demand  upon  the 
time  of  the  mayor  is  that  of  approval.  At  his  discretion  literally 
hundreds  of  measures  and  acts  that  feature  the  conduct  of  ad- 
ministration are  subject  to  his  approval.  A  complete  enumera- 
tion of  these  would  serve  no  good  purpose,  but  the  following 

47  See  article  by  Mayor  Mitehel  in  Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Polit- 
ical Science  in  the  City  of  New  York,  Vol.  V,  No.  3  (April,  1915) ,  pp.  4,  7. 

48  Charter,  Art.  16,  Sec.  1.     One  of  the  criticisms  made  of  the  St.  Louis 
charter  before  and  after  its  adoption  was  that  it  did  not  make  the  mayor 
powerful  enough.    Eochester,  Charter,  Sec.  61. 


297]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  101 

classification  of  matters  subject  to  the  mayor's  approval  indi- 
cates the  range  within  which  cities  confer  the  power  of  approval : 

1.  Blanket  provisions  that  the  mayor  may  approve  all  matters 
requiring  approval  for  which  the  charter  has  failed  to  provide 
some  other  method. 

2.  The  bonds  of  city  officers  and  bidders  and  contractors  for 
city  work,  and  of  those  holding  licenses  and  permits. 

3.  The  settlement  of  disputes  as  to  jurisdiction  between  offi- 
cers or  branches  of  the  administration. 

4.  The  institution  of  suits  at  law  on  behalf  of  the  city. 

5.  The  appointments  made  by  the  controller  and  other  officers 
of  the  administration. 

6.  The  assignment  of  rooms  and  offices  to  the  departments,  or 
renting  of  additional  space  for  administrative  purposes. 

7.  The  inauguration  or  extension  of  special  administrative 
undertakings  such  as  investigations. 

8.  The  adjustment  and  settlement  of  claims  against  the  city. 

9.  The    rules    and   regulations   of   municipal    departments, 
boards,  and  commissions. 

10.  Multitudinous  and  varied  matters  upon  which  the  ap- 
proval of  the  mayor  is  required  by  city  ordinances.  Market 
leases,  settlements  made  by  street  commissioners,  deposits  of  city 
funds,  the  release  of  mortgages,  water  rates,  and  the  like. 

It  is  worthy  of  observation  that  in  more  recent  charters  the 
amount  of  this  work  requiring  the  approval  of  the  mayor  has 
decreased,  at  least  so  far  as  incorporation  of  the  requirements  in 
the  charters  themselves  is  concerned.  At  the  same  time  the 
power  itself  remains  practically  intact  through  the  larger  and 
more  immediate  control  which  the  mayor  has  gained  over  the 
administrative  service  by  the  elimination  of  the  council  as  a 
factor  in  appointments  and  the  development  of  a  complete  power 
of  removal.  Exceptions  to  this  tendency  may  be  noted  in  iso- 
lated paragraphs  in  such  charters  as  those  of  Cleveland  and 
Toledo.  For  some  of  the  exceptions  there  appear  to  be  reasons, 
especially  in  the  expenditure  of  public  funds.  Thus  in  Toledo, 
contracts  which  involve  the  expenditure  of  five  hundred  dollars 
or  more  may  not  be  entered  into  unless  approved  by  the  mayor 
and  the  head  of  the  department  interested. 


102  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [298 

Public  Safety 

In  the  administration  of  departments  which  involve  the  public 
safety  the  mayor  usually  enjoys  exceedingly  broad  powers  and 
the  charters  freely  specify  that  the  position  of  the  mayor  is  one 
of  supremacy  in  this  particular.  In  the  Cleveland  charter,  for 
example,  the  director  of  public  safety  who  is  the  executive  head 
of  the  police  and  fire  divisions  is  specifically  "under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  mayor."  In  the  San  Francisco  charter  it  is  pro- 
vided that  the  mayor  "may  use  and  command  the  police  force." 
The  Los  Angeles  mayoralty  is  not  as  imposing  in  its  authority 
as  that  of  many  other  cities,  but  a  charter  amendment  of  1911 
gives  the  chief  of  police  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  police 
force  "subject  only  to  the  orders  of  the  mayor."  In  cities  like 
Boston,  Baltimore,  and  St.  Louis,  where  the  police  are  under  the 
control  of  commissioners  responsible  to  state  authority,  the 
mayor's  powers  are  limited  except  in  cases  of  extreme  danger. 
In  the  smaller  fourth  class  cities  of  Michigan,  and  in  other  cases, 
the  control  of  the  local  police  is  vested  in  the  council.49  The 
mayor  is  frequently  clothed  with  the  powers  of  a  sheriff  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  law  and  suppressing  disorder.  It  is  obvious 
where  the  chief  of  police  or  the  police  commissioner  hold  office 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  mayor  that  the  latter 's  authority  is  both 
immediate  and  effective,  even  though  special  provisions  are  not 
incorporated  in  the  charter  to  that  end.50 

The  relation  of  the  mayor  to  the  fire  department  is  not  by  any 
means  uniform  thruout  the  country.  In  general  the  prac- 
tices fall  into  one  of  two  groups,  those  in  which  it  is  on  the  same 
basis  as  the  police  department,  and  those  in  which  there  is  a 
distinct  differentiation.  Cleveland  and  Seattle  furnish  very 
good  examples  of  the  first  group,  tho  widely  differing  from  each 
other.  In  the  former  the  chief  of  the  division  of  fire  is  respon- 
sible to  the  mayor  as  well  as  to  the  director  of  public  safety,  and 
the  mayor  enjoys  the  sole  power  of  suspension  prior  to  a  hearing 

49  Michigan,  laws  relating  to  the  incorporation  of  cities. 

so  The  administrations  of  Mayors  Whitlock  in  Toledo  and  Gaynor  in 
New  York  indicate  the  influence  of  the  mayor  in  police  affairs;  even  in  a 
city  like  Chicago  with  the  council  occupying  a  strong  position,  the  mayor  is 
the  dominating  figure  in  police  administration.  The  Newburgh  Survey,  pp. 
43,  44,  found  that  the  discipline  of  the  police  department  was  largely  in  the 
hands  of  the  mayor  and  the  chief  of  police. 


299]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  103 

by  the  civil  service  commission.  The  determination  of  the  pol- 
icies of  the  department  are  subject  to  the  will  of  the  mayor 
thru  his  effective  control  over  the  director  of  public  safety. 
The  mayor  of  Seattle  appoints  the  chief  of  the  fire  department 
from  those  who  have  qualified  under  the  civil  service  rules.  The 
mayor  is  charged  with  the  prescription  of  rules  for  the  depart- 
ment, and  may  remove  the  head  of  the  department  in  accord- 
ance with  the  rules  of  the  civil  service  code.  The  Kansas  City 
charter  gives  to  the  mayor  the  appointment  of  the  board  of  fire 
and  water  commissioners.  To  this  board  is  given  the  authority 
to  appoint  the  fire  chief  and  to  organize  the  water  supply  system 
as  well  as  the  fire  fighting  system.  The  board  consists  of  three 
members,  one  retiring  each  year,  a  fact  which  materially  lessens 
the  effectiveness  of  the  mayor's  control,  tho  he  is  ex  officio  a 
member  of  the  board  and  may,  therefore,  exert  a  great  personal 
influence.  New  York  City  offers  the  best  example  of  a  city  in 
which  the  mayor  may  dominate  completely  if  he  so  desires;  he 
may  remove  the  head  of  the  department  of  fire  commissioners, 
at  pleasure.  An  interesting  variation  is  found  in  Los  Angeles 
where  the  mayor  is  by  charter  made  a  member  ex  officio  and  pres- 
ident of  the  board  of  fire  commisioners,  there  being  two  other 
electors  appointed  by  him  subject  to  the  confirmation  of  the  coun- 
cil. The  chief  engineer  or  fire  chief,  is  however,  appointed  by 
the  mayor  and  expressly  subject  to  being  removed  by  the  latter. 
San  Francisco  takes  great  pains  to  establish  a  non-partisan  board 
of  fire  commissioners,  by  providing  that  not  more  than  two  out 
of  a  membership  of  four  may  be  of  the  same  political  party. 
The  mayor,  however,  may  attend  the  meetings  and  take  part  in 
the  board's  deliberations,  tho  without  a  vote. 

The  twentieth  century  has  witnessed  an  increasing  tendency 
to  vest  in  the  mayor  an  authority  over  public  safety  commen- 
surate with  the  responsibility  imposed.  In  states  like  Illinois, 
where  the  elected  chief  of  police  or  city  marshal  was  found 
frequently  thirty  or  forty  years  ago,  the  almost  universal  prac- 
tice today  is  appointment  by  the  mayor,  subject  to  confirmation 
by  the  council.  Elsewhere  the  tendency  has  been  to  free  the 
police  force  from  political  influence  through  the  adoption  of  civil 
service  reform  measures,  but  to  retain  the  mayor's  control  over 
the  head  of  the  department  and  to  give  the  mayor  either  inde- 
pendent, supervisory,  or  concurrent  police  authority.  With  re- 


104  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [300 

spect  to  the  fire  department  differing  tendencies  are  noticeable 
and  the  place  of  the  mayor  is  certainly  not  so  clear  and  com- 
manding as  is  his  position  in  police  administration.  The  dis- 
position indicated  in  the  Cleveland,  Toledo,  and  St.  Louis  char- 
ters, the  amendments  to  the  Los  Angeles  charter  in  1911,  and 
the  practice  that  obtains  in  New  York  and  Boston  reveal  a 
decided  trend  toward  concentration  of  power  in  the  mayoral 
office;  on  the  other  hand  the  system  of  board  control  has  been 
retained  in  important  centers  such  as  Baltimore,  Kansas  City, 
and  San  Francisco,  the  mayor  enjoying  at  best  a  somewhat  lim- 
ited authority.51 

Normally  it  may  be  said  that  the  mayor's  power  in  respect  to 
the  conduct  of  departments  such  as  police,  fire,  and  health,  is 
not  conspicuously  exercised.  The  major  part  of  the  task  is  com- 
mitted to  the  heads  of  the  departments,  or  directors  or  boards 
entrusted  with  the  immediate  performance  of  the  work.  There 
are  many  occasions,  however,  when  the  mayor  takes  an  active 
part  in  the  formation  of  the  plans  and  policies  of  these  depart- 
ments and  in  supplying  the  energy  and  vigor  with  which  they 
are  put  into  execution.52  The  problems  connected  with  the  public 
safety  offer  large  opportunity  for  gross  abuse  of  the  vast  powers 
conferred.  Not  a  few  municipal  executives  have  either  proven 
incapable  of  dealing  with  these  problems,  or  have  permitted  the 
agencies  which  were  intended  to  protect  the  public  to  be  con- 
verted into  instruments  for  personal  or  partisan  advantage,  par- 
ticularly in  the  field  of  police  administration.  The  best  that  can 
be  said  for  the  mayor's  relation  to  these  agencies  is  that  condi- 
tions have  materially  improved,  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  cour- 
ageous mayors  like  Jones,  "Whitlock,  Johnson,  Gaynor,  Mitchel, 
and  others,  and  the  tendency  to  call  into  directorship  men  of 
vision  and  training.  On  the  other  hand,  the  mayoralty  has  un- 
doubtedly failed  to  furnish  the  consistent,  enlightened,  pro- 
gressive, and  efficient  leadership  that  the  measure  of  its  authority 
has  in  many  places  demanded  of  it. 

6i  In  Minneapolis  the  mayor  has  powers  concurrent  with  those  exercised 
by  the  chief  of  police. 

52  See  for  a  recent  example,  the  account  of  Mayor  Mitchel 's  handling  of 
the  police  problem  in  the  National  Municipal  Review,  Vol.  V,  No.  1  (Jan- 
uary, 1916),  pp.  30,  31. 


301]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  105 

i 

Finance  Administration 

The  special  powers  of  the  mayor  in  the  field  of  finance  admin- 
istration call  for  a  more  individualized  consideration  than  their 
previous  mention  in  association  with  other  powers  indicates.  It 
is  in  this  field  that  many  conspicuous  developments  in  mayoral 
authority  have  taken  place  during  the  last  two  decades.  In  New 
York  and  St.  Louis  the  mayor  is  a  member  of  the  board  of  esti- 
mate and  apportionment  and  participates  in  the  work  of  financial 
direction  and  control  entrusted  to  that  body.  In  New  York  City 
he  is  also  a  member  of  the  sinking  fund  commission,  and  in  that 
capacity  acts  as  one  of  the  trustees  of  all  the  sinking  funds  of  the 
city  and  helps  to  determine  the  interest  rate  on  public  bond 
issues.  As  chairman  of  the  banking  commission  the  mayor  shares 
the  responsibility  of  selecting  the  depositories  of  city  funds ;  by 
creating  an  executive  budget  he  has  assumed  an  immediate  con- 
trol over  the  finances  of  the  various  municipal  departments.53  In 
Cleveland  and  Toledo  the  mayor  prepares  the  annual  budget,  in 
performance  of  which  duty  he  is  obliged  to  know  the  conditions 
obtaining  in  each  department,  and  to  pass  upon  numerous  ques- 
tions of  departmental  finance  and  administration.  Within  cer- 
tain limitations  the  mayor  of  Boston  is  not  only  authorized  to 
prepare  the  annual  budget,  but  may  approve  the  transfer  of 
appropriations  from  one  fund  to  another.  The  importance  to 
Boston  of  the  mayor's  financial  powers  is  revealed  in  the  report 
of  the  Boston  finance  commission  on  the  administration  of  Mayor 
Fitzgerald  in  1912.  The  mayor  is  held  responsible  for  extrava- 
gance in  payrolls,  his  neglect  of  the  fire  department,  his  tendency 
to  permit  increases  of  appropriations  and  his  approval  of  prop- 
ositions which  would  have  wiped  out  the  margin  of  the  city's  bor- 
rowing power ;  on  the  other  hand  it  was  noted  that  he  had  given 
more  funds  to  the  permanent  improvement  projects,  had  checked 
the  increase  in  the  municipal  debt,  and  had  bettered  the  condi- 
tions under  which  contracts  were  awarded. 

In  many  cities,  of  course,  it  is  still  true  that  the  power  of  the 
mayor  in  finance  administration  is  comparatively  limited.  The 
usual  power  to  inspect  books  and  accounts  obtains,  but  the  real 

ss  Charter,  Sec.  204;  also  Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Political  Sci- 
ence, etc.,  Vol.  V,  No.  3  (April,  1915),  p.  9. 


106  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [302 

authority  in  finance  administration  still  vests  in  the  council.54 
Yet  even  in  council  governed  Chicago  the  mayor  appoints  the 
city  comptroller ;  in  Kansas  City  the  mayor  is  one  of  a  committee 
of  three  to  select  the  depositories  of  city  funds ;  in  Baltimore  the 
mayor  must  approve  the  appointees  of  the  elective  controller  and 
is  a  member  of  the  board  of  estimates  and  of  the  advisory  depart- 
ment of  review  and  assessment.  In  Seattle  he  is  merely  a  mem- 
ber of  the  auditing  committee.  On  the  whole  it  appears  that  his 
power  in  financial  administration  is  increasing,  a  conclusion 
which  is  borne  out  by  a  survey  of  the  recommendations  of  prac- 
tically all  the  recent  charter  commissions. 

Judicial  Administration 

The  survey  of  the  relation  of  the  mayor  to  administration 
would  not  be  complete  without  some  consideration  of  his  position 
in  the  work  of  meting  out  justice.  Formerly  the  mayor  actually 
possessed  considerable  judicial  authority,  traces  of  which  are  still 
abundant.55  It  has  been  very  generally  held  that  this  judicial 
power  of  the  mayor  is  tending  to  disappear,  and  there  is  much 
to  confirm  this  opinion.  Later  municipal  charters  do  not  recog- 
nize former  practice  in  this  particular  and  generally  omit  pro- 
visions which  confer  such  power  upon  the  executive.56  In  some 
cases,  however,  this  loss  of  judicial  authority  is  more  apparent 
than  real,  for,  as  in  Ohio,  the  law  of  the  state  may  do  what  the 
charter  makers  have  refused  to  do.  In  Ohio  the  judicial  author- 
ity of  the  mayor  was  actually  increased  by  legislative  enactment 
of  April  28,  1913.  The  mayor  was  given  jurisdiction  in  coun- 
ties over  such  subjects  as  food  adulteration,  the  protection  of 
children,  the  enforcement  of  liquor  laws,  the  laws  governing  food 

54  For  example  in  Los  Angeles,  Chicago,  and  the  cities  of  Illinois,  Kansas 
City,  and  Seattle. 

ss  A  rather  detailed  description  of  the  judicial  authority  of  the  mayor 
will  be  found  in  Fairlie,  Municipal  Administration,  Chap.  XIX,  p.  421. 
Cf.  also  Bayles'  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United  States,  Chap.  V.  In 
brief  the  mayor  was  a  justice  of  the  peace,  possessed  of  some  civil  and 
criminal  jurisdiction,  and  held  court.  In  1895  Mr.  Bayles  prophesied  that 
his  judicial  authority  would  in  the  future  either  be  ignored  or  expressly 
withdrawn  (p.  74).  Earlier  practice  is  illustrated  in  the  code  of  N.  C., 
See.  2934. 

se  Cf.  the  charters  of  St.  Louis,  Los  Angeles,  Cleveland,  the  proposed  Cin- 
cinnati charter,  those  of  Kansas  City,  Seattle,  and  many  more. 


303]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  107 

stuffs,  sanitation  in  dairies,  bakeries,  and  restaurants,  and  the  in- 
spection of  weights  and  measures.  In  the  charters  of  New  York 
and  Baltimore  the  mayor  still  is  vested  with  the  power  of  a 
magistrate  and  a  justice  of  the  peace  respectively.57  The  Mis- 
souri legislature  confers  upon  the  mayor  the  power  of  the  county 
courts  with  respect  to  specified  matters.  State  law  in  Minnesota 
makes  the  mayor  one  of  a  group  of  three  who  are  authorized  to 
prepare  the  list  of  those  who  are  to  act  as  jurors  in  the  municipal 
courts.  The  power  and  duty  of  holding  court  regularly  still 
exists  in  Indiana  and  some  southern  states ;  and  to  be  married  by 
the  mayor  is  still  regarded  by  some  seekers  after  marital  bliss  as 
the  most  desirable  method  of  solemnizing  the  marriage  contract. 
On  the  whole,  however,  the  position  of  the  mayor  as  a  judicial 
officer  appears  to  be  declining,  owing  largely,  perhaps,  to  the 
development  in  the  cities  of  other  and  better  agencies  for  the 
administration  of  justice,  and  to  the  pressure  of  other  matters 
upon  the  mayor 's  time  and  strength. 

Of  much  more  immediate  consequence  is  the  mayor 's  authority 
to  modify  the  results  of  judicial  findings  through  the  remission 
of  fines  and  penalties  and  the  release  of  persons  imprisoned  for 
violation  of  municipal  ordinances.  Thus  in  New  York  and  Illi- 
nois the  mayor  may  suspend  sentences,  release  prisoners,  remit 
fines,  etc. ;  the  same  under  restriction  is  true  in  Kansas  City  and 
many  other  places.58  The  power  is  often  abused,  especially  when 
administrations  are  under  pressure  to  "enforce  sumptuary  and 
liquor  laws."  Great  display  is  made -of  the  searching  out  of  vio- 
lators; their  prosecution,  conviction,  and  the  penalties  imposed 
are  heralded  to  the  public.  The  wrath  of  the  public,  aroused  to 

57  New  York,  Charter,  Sec.  116;  Baltimore,  Charter,  See.  21.  The  New 
York  provision  is  laconic:  "The  Mayor  is  a  magistrate."  For  Ohio  see 
Act  of  April  28,  1913. 

ss  Cf.  New  York,  Charter,  See.  707,  Par.  3.  The  mayor  enjoys  this  power 
by  reason  of  being  a  magistrate.  In  Illinois  the  mayor  is  expected  to  report 
to  the  council  the  release  of  prisoners.  See  Municipal  Laws  of  Illinois, 
Art.  2,  Sec.  29.  The  Chicago  charter  convention  of  1904  proposed  to  con- 
tinue vesting  this  authority  in  the  mayor  and  incorporated  a  provision  to 
that  effect  in  the  instrument  it  drew  up.  The  mayor  of  St.  Louis  is  by 
ordinance  given  the  power  to  remit  fines,  penalties,  etc.  In  Kansas  City  the 
word  ' '  Forfeitures ' '  is  added  to  the  list  enumerating  the  penalties  to  which 
the  mayor's  power  of  remission  extends.  In  Madison,  Wis.,  (Charter,  Chap. 
XII,  Sec.  21)  the  mayor  may  grant  pardons,  commutations,  etc. 


108  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [304 

demand  such  actions,  is  appeased,  and  the  mayor  may  safely  slip 
around  to  the  scene  of  the  recent  prosecution  and  enter  his  order 
of  remission  in  behalf  of  those  convicted.  Notwithstanding  the 
temptation  to  pervert  this  power  in  order  to  curry  political  favor 
there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  warrant  the  claim  that  its  abuse 
is  the  normal  condition.  In  the  first  place  the  power  itself  has 
disappeared  from  many  charters ;  in  the  second  place  the  mayors 
of  larger  cities  seldom  interfere  personally,  preferring  to  act 
upon  the  recommendation  of  subordinate  investigators  or  boards 
created  to  look  into  applications  for  clemency;  and  finally  the 
more  liberal  interpretation  of  sumptuary  legislation  in  large 
cities  has  tended  to  limit  the  occasion  for  the  abuses  to  the  smaller 
municipalities. 

Miscellaneous  Powers 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  powers  of  the  mayor  there  is  a 
large  group  of  miscellaneous  powers  conferred  upon  him  either 
in  state  statutes,  city  charters,  or  municipal  ordinances.  These 
powers  include  the  prescription  of  parade  routes,  granting  con- 
sent to  place  building  material  in  the  street,  the  inspection  of 
pawn  brokers'  registers,  the  designation  of  local  holidays,  the 
authorizing  of  municipal  officers  to  appear  before  state  legisla- 
tures, the  sending  of  indigent  sick  to  hospitals  at  public  expense, 
the  deportation  of  resident  insane,  contracting  for  the  care  of 
foundlings,  the  direction  of  the  employment  of  the  workhouse 
prisoners,  the  issuance  of  death  certificates,  the  abatement  of 
nuisances,  the  arrest  of  lawbreakers,  and  the  muzzling  of  dogs; 
and  the  more  important  powers  of  revoking  licenses,  directing 
a  secret  service,  mediating  strikes,  and  so  on.  The  number  of 
these  powers  which  lie  in  the  discretion  of  the  mayor  for  their 
exercise  is  very  great.  They  relate  to  every  branch  of  municipal 
life  and  service.  There  are  literally  a  thousand  and  one  duties 
imposed  upon  the  mayor  and  calling  for  the  exercise  of  his  au- 
thority. One  marvels  at  the  detail  with  which  this  vast  multitude 
of  powers  has  been  set  forth;  at  the  folly  which  believes  that 
good  government  and  efficiency  are  to  be  found  in  the  direction 
of  one  man  power ;  at  the  comparative  success  which  many  may- 
ors have  achieved  in  the  wise  exercise  of  the  varied  authority 
thus  committed  to  them.59 

B»  Cf.  almost  any  of  the  older  municipal  charters,  the  general  municipal 
laws  of  Missouri,  Illinois,  or  Michigan,  the  revised  codes  or  compiled  ordi- 


305]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  109 

There  are  certain  matters  with  respect  to  which  the  exercise 
of  mayoral  authority  is  mandatory.  Thus  in  Evansville  and  In- 
dianapolis the  mayor  shall,  upon  three  days  notice,  hear  any 
complaint  against  a  person  to  whom  a  license  has  been  issued. 
In  Boston  the  mayor  is  obliged  to  issue  licenses  for  theaters  and 
public  halls  if  the  applicants  comply  with  the  prescriptions  laid 
down.  In  Minneapolis,  at  the  request  of  the  board  of  park  com- 
missioners the  mayor  must  appoint  park  police.  The  charter  of 
Kansas  City  requires  him  to  proclaim  to  the  inhabitants  any 
danger  from  malignant,  infectious,  or  contagious  disease  that  may 
threaten  to  become  prevalent  or  the  occurrence  of  public  calamity 
from  flood  or  other  disaster.  The  list  might  be  continued.  In- 
deed in  the  case  of  many  powers  previously  cited  such  as  the 
power  of  appointment,  the  power  to  call  meetings  of  heads  of 
departments,  etc.,  mandatory  provisions  are  to  be  found  in  some 
charters.  Thus  in  Baltimore  the  mayor  is  obliged  to  hold  an  an- 
nual conference  of  his  chief  subordinates,  and  in  appointing 
boards  and  commissions  he  must  recognize  a  minority  party.  In 
New  York  City  the  mayor  must  exercise  his  power  of  appointing 
officers  to  fill  vacant  offices.  The  usual  method  for  calling  these 
powers  into  operation  is  for  some  interested  citizen  to  sue  out  a 
writ  of  mandamus  in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  Another 
method  employed  to  bring  recalcitrant  mayors  to  time  is  that  of 
indicting  them  for  failure  to  fulfil  their  manifest  duty.  The 
former  offers  a  positive  means  of  reaching  the  incumbent,  the 
latter  merely  a  negative  one. 

The  exercise  of  the  foregoing  powers  does  not  by  any  means 
exhaust  the  duties  of  the  mayor.  There  are  numerous  clerical 
or  ministerial  duties  that  he  must  perform.  His  signature  must 
be  affixed  to  numerous  public  documents,  such  as  the  council 
journal  in  those  cities  in  which  he  presides  at  council  meetings, 
"council  enactments,  certificates  of  election  to  municipal  office, 
commissions,  licenses,  warrants,  drafts  or  other  evidences  of  ob- 
ligation," such  as  bonds  and  mortgages,  "leases,  deeds  and  all 
other  instruments  for  the  conveyance  of  real  estate  to  which  the 
corporation  is  a  party. ' ' 60  He  represents  the  municipality  in 

nances  of  any  of  the  following  cities:     St.  Louis,  Kansas  City,  Minneapolis, 
Indianapolis,  Evansville,  Ind.,  and  the  statutes  relating  to  Boston. 

so  Numerous  citations  might  be  given  to  indicate  the  extent  to  which 
the  mayor's  signature  is  required.  Mr.  Bayles  discusses  its  importance  espe- 


110  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [306 

projects  for  the  annexation  of  contiguous  territory,  especially 
suburban  cities,  and  in  the  settlement  of  controversies  between 
the  city  on  one  hand  and  private  individuals  or  corporations  or 
public  service  corporations  on  the  other.  He  receives  and  ap- 
proves claims  not  chargeable  to  any  department.  In  some  places 
he  must  give  his  entire  time  to  the  work  of  his  office,  in  others 
but  part  time  is  expected.  His  correspondence  is  enormous  in 
the  metropolitan  centers,  and  the  demands  upon  his  time,  ener- 
gies, and  wisdom  due  to  the  personal  calls  and  solicitations  of 
citizens  is  exhausting.61  His  social  duties  as  chief  executive 
threaten  to  become  oppressive.  He  is  expected  to  attend  local 
meetings  of  one  kind  or  another  and  to  support  movements  and 
enterprises  of  a  public  character  and  he  must  represent  the  city 
in  associations  of  municipal  officials  and  in  its  dealings  with  the 
state  and  nation. 

General  Estimate 

It  is  difficult  to  say  how  far  the  mayor  is  actually  held  responsi- 
ble for  the  character  and  efficiency  of  his  administration.  Many 
things  promote  confusion  of  responsibility.  The  lines  of  author- 
ity between  him  and  his  subordinates  vary  considerably  in  their 
directness  and  their  distinctness.  The  effectiveness  of  his  control 
depends  as  largely  upon  his  political  leadership  as  upon  his  legal 
authority.  In  many  cases  it  is  sadly  true  that  legislative,  council- 
manic,  or  machine  or  boss  interference  cut  roughly  across  the 
mayor's  authority,  and  materially  lessen  the  degree  to  which  he 
is  actually  responsible  for  the  administration.  It  is  true,  never- 
theless, even  in  cities  in  which  the  council  is  as  strong  as  it  is  in 
Chicago,  or  in  which  the  legislature  interferes  as  actively  as  it 
does  in  New  York,  or  in  which  the  rule  of  the  boss  is  as  well  es- 
tablished as  it  is  in  Philadelphia  or  Cincinnati,  that  the  electorate 

cially  as  affecting  the  validity  of  these  documents.  He  points  out  that  there 
is  a  broad  distinction  between  the  mayor 's  signature  and  his  approval ;  also 
that  in  the  case  of  ordinances,  the  omission  of  the  signature  may  not  in- 
validate the  ordinance  especially  where  the  omission  is  due  to  clerical  error, 
etc. 

61  Cf.  statement  by  Mayor  Mitchel  of  New  York  in  Proceedings  of  the 
American  Academy  of  Political  Science  in  the  City  of  New  York,  Vol.  V, 
No.  3  (April,  1915),  p.  14.  Among  other  things  Mr.  Mitchel  says: 
"There  are  a  thousand  things  that  consume  time  and  effort  and  there  is 
not  enough  time  left  for  the  mayor  to  supervise  the  work  of  the  departments 
and  to  be  actually  as  well  as  theoretically  responsible  for  it. ' ' 


307]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  111 

holds  the  mayor  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  administra- 
tion. Indeed  the  mayoralty,  even  where  it  is  weakest,  has  been 
marked  for  responsibility.  The  office  is  exposed  to  the  influences 
of  public  opinion  as  is  no  other  municipal  office.  It  is  unable  to 
escape  answering  for  its  use  of  power,  at  least  in  matters  upon 
which  the  public  has  made  up  its  mind.  To  this  scrutiny  the 
mayoralty  has  responded.  The  following  observations  on  the  ex- 
tent to  which  the  mayoralty  feels  its  responsibility  were  made 
more  than  a  decade  ago,  but  are  more  true  today  than  when  they 
were  uttered :  "In  every  city  in  which  the  mayor  has  been  given 
independent  powers  of  appointment  and  has  been  made  the  real 
head  of  the  administrative  organization  of  the  city,  the  sensitive- 
ness of  the  government  to  public  opinion  has  been  considerably 
increased.  When  rightly  viewed  the  change  (from  council  gov- 
ernment) involves  possibilities  of  popular  control  which  we  have 
hardly  begun  to  realize.  Almost  every  city  in  the  country  offers 
instances  in  which  the  mayor,  when  supported  by  popular  opin- 
ion, has  been  able  to  withstand  the  combined  influences  of  the 
council  and  any  machine  organization  that  attempted  to  direct 
his  action.  The  lessons  of  this  experience  have  left  their  impress 
upon  the  political  thinking  of  the  American  people  and  explain 
the  tendency  to  look  to  the  executive  rather  than  to  the  legisla- 
tive authority  for  the  solution  of  every  difficulty."  "To  an  in- 
creasing extent  the  American  people  are  looking  to  the  executive 
not  only  for  the  execution  but  also  for  the  planning  of  municipal 
improvements  .  .  ."  "The  vital  interest  of  the  citizen  in 
strengthening  the  administration. ' ' 62  The  record  of  the  past 
decade  has  not  tended  to  impair  this  estimate  of  the  responsible 
character  of  the  mayoralty.  The  appearance  of  many  able  and 
gifted  men  in  the  mayor 's  chair,  the  achievements  they  have  been 
able  to  realize  in  administrations  like  those  of  Rolph,  Hunt,  Mc- 
Cormick,  Head,  Baxter,  Johnson,  Whitlock,  and  Mitchel,  and 
above  all  the  gradual  augmentation  of  the  powers  entrusted  to 
the  mayoralty  —  all  these  bear  testimony  to  the  larger  degree  of 
responsiveness  which  the  mayoralty  begets  in  municipal  govern- 
ment when  its  leadership  and  authority  is  established  in  admin- 
istration.63 

62  See  address  by  L.  S.  Eowe  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  New  York  City 
Conference  on  Good  City  Government  (1905),  pp.  174-175. 

63  Rolph  of  San  Francisco,   Hunt  of   Cincinnati,  McCormick  of  Harris- 


112  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [308 

While  one  recognizes  the  foregoing  facts,  and  admits  the  decid- 
ed betterment  which  mayor  government  has  meant  to  municipal 
administration,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  this  betterment  has 
come  chiefly  with  respect  to  the  larger,  more  obvious,  or  more  im- 
portant features  of  municipal  administration.  There  is  still  very 
much  of  irresponsibility,  still  many  opportunities  to  dodge  or 
shift  liability  for  policies  and  promises  not  realized,  for  appoint- 
ments not  the  best,  for  petty  graft  not  eliminated,  and  for  oppor- 
tunities not  seized.  The  problem  of  administrative  responsibility 
is  not  adequately  solved  by  the  mayor  system,  even  where  its  pow- 
er is  most  nearly  complete.  The  strength  of  the  mayoralty  is  also 
its  weakness ;  it  is  a  political  office  and  may  be  won  by  the  popular 
as  well  as  by  the  worthy ;  the  people  must  ' '  trust  to  luck  to  get 
a  paragon"  of  virtue  as  well  as  of  ability.64  If  the  mayor  system 
has  done  much  to  lift  American  city  government  out  of  the 
"hodge-podge  of  responsibility,"  inefficiency,  and  extravagance, 
it  has  at  the  same  time  fallen  far  short  of  producing  and  assuring 
in  administration  that  liability  for  results,  that  skill  and  effi- 
ciency in  administration,  and  that  economy  in  operation  that 
should  normally  characterize  good  government.  The  mayor  sys- 
tem contains  no  guarantee  that  trained,  expert,  and  professional 
talent  will  always  be  in  charge  of  the  interests  and  services  of  the 
municipality. 

In  concluding  this  survey  of  the  mayor  and  administration  it 
should  be  noted  that  on  the  whole  the  power  of  the  mayor  has 
tended  to  increase  if  the  later  charters  which  have  adopted  the 
mayor  systems  may  be  taken  as  the  basis  for  judgment.  The 
power  of  appointment  and  removal  has  been  strengthened,  and 

burg,  Pa.,  Head  of  Nashville,  Tenn.,  Baxter  of  Portland,  Me.,  Johnson  of 
Cleveland,  Whitlock  of  Toledo,  Mitchel  of  New  York. 

s*  To  put  the  matter  concretely  the  election  of  administrators  cannot  fail 
to  open  the  question  of  whether  a  city  is  to  be  governed  by  a  political  ad- 
venturer like  Thompson  of  Chicago,  or  a  trained  administrator  like  Mitchel 
of  New  York.  The  opportunity  for  making  a  choice  between  these  two 
types  is  not  always  presented,  the  elector  sometimes  being  confronted  with 
the  job  of  selecting  the  lesser  of  the  evils  from  the  list  of  undesirable  can- 
didates. At  best,  the  elector  has  not  always  demonstrated  his  ability  to 
pick  able  and  competent  administrators,  tho  this  apparent  inability  can- 
not be  separated  from  the  necessity  under  which  he  now  labors  of  passing 
at  the  same  time  upon  questions  of  public  policy  for  which  the  respective 
candidates  stand. 


309]  THE  MAYOR  AND  ADMINISTRATION  113 

is  now  very  widely  recognized;  the  power  of  investigation  has 
now  been  effectively  developed  in  some  cities;  and  with  the  ex- 
ception of  his  judicial  authority  there  seems  to  be  little  deteri- 
oration, if  any,  in  the  other  administrative  authority  with  which 
he  has  been  clothed.  The  increase  which  is  thus  indicated  in  the 
mayor's  position,  does  not,  however,  reveal  the  true  extent  of  the 
development  which  has  taken  place.  The  latter  can  be  appreci- 
ated only  by  taking  into  account  the  growth  of  American  cities 
in  size  and  importance.  The  mayors  of  many  of  our  cities  are 
today  the  administrative  heads  of  corporations  that  include  larg- 
er populations  than  some  countries  and  many  states.  The  may- 
or of  New  York  City  guides  the  destinies  of  a  larger  population 
than  did  the  President  of  the  United  States  a  century  ago.  This 
element  of  size  and  growth  of  population  promises  to  continue  a 
more  or  less  constant  factor.  Another  development  that  will 
ultimately  affect  the  position  of  the  mayor  is  the  movement  for 
municipal  home  rule.  But  whatever  the  future  has  in  store  the 
directive  force  and  power  of  the  mayoralty  in  administration  is 
today  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  features  in  our  municipal  sys- 
tem. This  is  in  keeping  with  the  trend  in  state  and  nation,  es- 
pecially in  the  latter  where  the  dominance  of  the  executive  is 
largely  established.  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that 
American  cities  are  in  the  midst  of  a  season  of  almost  feverish 
activity  in  experimentation  with  municipal  forms  and  adminis- 
tration reconstruction.  Approximately  five  hundred  municipali- 
ties have  altered  their  charters  in  the  past  fifteen  years,  and  in 
the  larger  proportion  of  these  alterations  the  mayor  as  the  author- 
itative head  of  the  administration  has  passed  away.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  the  mayor  system  in  administration  is  not  only  on 
trial,  but  has  before  it  a  struggle  for  existence. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION 

The  development  of  the  mayor's  influence  and  power  in  munic- 
ipal legislation  has  kept  pace  with  the  expansion  of  his  authority 
over  administration.  The  English  doctrine  has  been  that  the 
mayor  as  an  integral  part  of  the  municipal  corporation  must  be 
present  at  council  meetings  if  the  latter  are  to  be  considered 
valid.  Altho  this  rule  does  not  obtain  in  the  United  States,  ex- 
cept where  specifically  provided  for,  yet  the  actual  position  of 
the  American  mayor  is  relatively  much  more  important  in  respect 
to  legislation  than  it  is  in  England,  or  than  it  has  ever  been  here- 
tofore in  this  country.1  Not  only  does  the  mayor  enjoy  the  grow- 
ing authority  which  he  exercises  in  the  work  of  the  city  council, 
but  he  has,  in  some  places,  acquired  important  influence  in  the 
enactment  of  state  legislation  affecting  municipalities.  In  cer- 
tain cities  he  also  has  clearly  defined  powers  with  respect  to  the 
ordinance  making  function  of  boards  and  commissions  which 
have  tended  to  supplant  the  council.  In  this  chapter  the  rela- 
tions of  the  mayor  to  legislation,  both  in  the  legal  and  the  politi- 
cal aspects  will  be  considered.  Attention  will  be  directed  in  turn 
to  his  relations  with  the  city  council,  with  the  municipal  boards 
or  similar  agencies  of  local  government,  and  with  the  state  legis- 
lature. 

THE  MAYOR  AND  THE  COUNCIL 

First  in  importance  and  interest  is  the  relation  of  the  mayor 
to  the  city  council,  the  representative  body  of  the  municipal  cor- 
poration. This  relationship  may  be  viewed  from  three  different 
angles:  (1)  the  general  status  of  the  mayor  as  a  factor  in  munic- 
ipal legislation;  (2)  the  powers  of  the  mayor  with  regard  to 

i  The  word  legislation  is  employed  here  to  cover  all  enactments  that  have 
the  force  of  law  in  municipal  government,  whether  they  emanate  from  the 
state  legislature,  the  city  council,  or  other  bodies  vested  with  ordinance 
making  power. 

114 


311]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  115 

council  procedure  and  action;  and  (3)  the  extra  legal  influence 
exerted  by  him  as  party  leader  or  administrative  chief. 

General  Status 

The  general  status  of  the  mayor  in  legislation  approaches  uni- 
formity in  its  fundamental  characteristics.  As  has  been  pointed 
out  the  English  doctrine  which  would  make  him  an  integral  part 
of  the  municipal  legislature  is  not  recognized  in  this  country. 
This  is  due  to  the  general  theoretical  acceptance  of  the  principle 
of  the  separation  of  powers.  Yet  in  practice  American  city  gov- 
ernments of  the  mayor  and  council  types  nearly  agree  the  mayor 
shall  exert  large  influence  upon  legislation.  The  measure  of  his 
influence  depends  upon  a  variety  of  considerations.  Among 
them  are  the  following:  (1)  his  charter  powers  and  preroga- 
tives; (2)  his  personality  and  party  standing;  (3)  his  posi- 
tion as  contrasted  with  that  of  the  council  and  other  municipal 
authorities 2  in  the  general  scheme  of  organization ;  (4)  his  legal 
relation  to  the  council  as  a  part  of  the  legislative  mechanism. 
The  last  two  considerations  demand  our  further  attention  at  this 
point ;  the  treatment  of  the  first  two  constitutes  the  main  body 
of  the  chapter. 

The  position  of  the  executive  is  effectively  contrasted  with  that 
of  the  municipal  council  or  other  local  authorities  in  the  organi- 
zation of  city  government  by  indicating  his  relative  position  in 
the  more  important  organizations  which  embody  the  mayor  and 
council  form.  Thus  New  York,  Baltimore,  Chicago,  and  other 
cities  differ  greatly  in  the  relative  positions  assigned  to  the  dif- 
ferent organs  of  government.  In  New  York  City,  for  example, 
the  board  of  aldermen  is  relatively  less  important  than  is  the  city 
council  in  Chicago.  This  situation  is  produced  by  the  powerful 
mayoralty  which  the  New  York  charter  creates,  and  is  accentu- 
ated by  the  establishment  of  the  board  of  estimate  and  apportion- 
ment and  by  its  tendency  to  become  the  policy  making  body  of 
the  municipality.  The  result  is  that  even  the  legislative  func- 
tions of  the  council  are  limited  to  a  marked  degree.  In  New 
York  City  also  the  mayor's  relation  to  municipal  legislation  is 

2  Such  as  boards  of  estimate  and  apportionment,  borough  presidents,  and 
state  controlled  commissions  or  like  agencies  operating  in  the  field  of  local 
government.  In  New  York  City  the  first  two  of  these  are  especially  im- 
portant. 


116  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [312 

important,  not  only  because  of  the  weakening  of  the  council,  but 
by  reason  of  his  strong  position  on  the  board  of  estimate  and 
apportionment,  in  which  he  has  two  votes.  In  Chicago,  on  the 
other  hand,  despite  a  strong  mayoralty,  the  council  continues 
relatively  vigorous,  insomuch  that  in  municipal  campaigns  voters 
are  urged  to  pay  special  attention  to  the  election  of  councilmen 
rather  than  the  choice  of  mayors,  on  the  ground  that  a  weak  or 
vicious  mayor  can  do  comparatively  little  harm  if  the  council  is 
made  up  of  clean  and  able  men,  while  a  good  mayor  would  be 
more  or  less  helpless  if  confronted  by  a  council  dominated  by 
"gray  wolves."3 

The  mayor  of  Baltimore  is  less  powerful  in  legislation  than 
is  the  executive  in  either  Chicago  or  New  York.  The  charter  of 
Baltimore  provides  that  ' '  The  mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more shall  have  power  to  pass  all  ordinances,"  etc.,  phraseology 
which  recognizes  the  mayor  as  a  distinct  branch  of  the  municipal 
legislature  and  which  requires  the  coordinate  action  of  both 
mayor  and  council  to  validate  enactments.4  In  Seattle  the  legis- 
lative function  of  the  mayor  is  even  more  clearly  defined  in  the 
words,  "The  legislative  powers  of  the  City  of  Seattle  shall  be 
vested  in  a  mayor  and  city  council. "  5  A  similar  situation  exists 

s  This  was  especially  noticeable  in  the  campaign  of  1915  when  many  vot- 
ers felt  that  there  was  little  choice  between  the  candidates  for  mayor,  both 
being  something  less  than  desirable.  Those  who  were  concerned  for  the  char- 
acter of  Chicago's  government  centered  their  energies  on  the  aldermanic 
contests.  Their  foresight  has  amply  justified  its  exercise  in  the  determined 
opposition  which  the  council  has  offered  to  many  of  the  policies  of  the 
mayor,  especially  those  representing  a  distinctly  backward  step  such  as  the 
partisan  exploitation  of  the  civil  service.  The  controversy  between  the 
mayor  and  the  council  led  in  1916  to  one  of  the  most  bitter  aldermanic 
campaigns  in  municipal  history,  the  mayor  throwing  the  whole  force  of  his 
administration  into  the  struggle  in  order  to  defeat  certain  "rebel"  council- 
men.  The  result  was  the  vindication  of  the  council. 

*  See  the  charter  of  the  city  of  Baltimore,  Sec.  218.  Note  also  Sees.  1,  6, 
220,  and  221,  the  last  two  especially.  To  quote,  "The  style  of  all  ordi- 
nances shall  be:  'Be  it  ordained  by  the  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Balti- 
more,' "  and  "Every  legislative  act  of  the  mayor  and  the  City  Council  of 
Baltimore  shall  be  by  ordinance  or  resolution."  See,  however,  the  discus- 
sion of  the  veto  further  on  in  this  chapter. 

5  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  1.  This  statement  is  subject,  however,  to  the 
reservation  that  the  people  of  the  city  of  Seattle  may  legislate  through  the 
initiative  and  referendum. 


313]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  117 

in  the  cities  of  Milwaukee  and  Madison,  Wis.,  in  the  last  of  which 
the  mayor  and  aldermen  form  the  common  council,  while  in  Mil- 
waukee the  mayor  and  common  council  form  the  "Municipal 
Government. "  6  In  general  it  may  be  observed  it  weakens  the 
mayoralty  to  integrate  it  so  closely  with  the  legislative  mechan- 
ism. This  is  true  both  in  the  mayor's  legislative  and  administra- 
tive relations.  Comparative  independence  is  essential  to  strength 
in  his  legislative  activity,  while  administrative  interests  seldom 
fail  to  suffer  when  swept  into  the  legislative  vortex.  On  the  other 
hand  the  absence  of  close  association  of  the  mayor  with  the  coun- 
cil, as  in  the  recent  St.  Louis  charter,  does  not  necessarily  pro- 
duce relative  superiority  for  the  mayoralty.7 

There  have  been  many  efforts  to  set  up  municipal  governments 
that  would  comply  substantially  with  the  theory  of  the  separa- 
tion of  powers.  Two  conspicuous  examples  are  Philadelphia  and 
Pittsburgh.  The  bicameral  council  obtains  in  both  cities.  The 
mayor  occupies  a  much  less  favorable  position,  however,  than 
does  the  president  in  the  national  model.  The  council  is  strong 
in  both  cities;  in  Pittsburgh  the  city  council  possesses  all  legis- 
lative power  not  expressly  conferred  on  some  other  body  or  offi- 
cer.8 The  mayor  appears  to  somewhat  better  advantage  in  Phila- 
delphia, but  does  not  possess  the  means  or  the  authority  to  dic- 
tate and  control  municipal  legislation.9  Perhaps  the  most  strik- 
ing instance  of  the  incorporation  of  the  doctrine  of  Montesquieu 
in  a  city  charter  is  to  be  found  in  the  case  of  Quincy,  Mass.  It 
is  provided  that  ' '  The  executive  department  shall  never  exercise 
any  legislative  power,  and  the  legislative  department  shall  never 
exercise  any  executive  power. "  10  In  more  recent  charters,  how- 

« In  each  of  the  two  charters  consult  Art.  4,  Sec.  1. 

7  The  failure  to  create  a  powerful  mayoralty  was  one  of  the  criticisms 
urged  against  the  St.  Louis  charter.  The  charter,  on  the  other  hand,  ap- 
pears to  have  gone  as  far  in  this  direction  as  the  laws  of  the  state  would 
permit. 

s  Cf.  Pittsburgh,  Charter,  Sec.  1494.  In  Sec.  1492  it  is  affirmed  that  the 
council  possesses  "the  power  of  the  corporation." 

9  One  of  the  principal  defects  in  the  recent  Blankenburg  administration 
was  the  inability  of  the  mayor  to  get  results  from  the  council.     The  latter 
became  increasingly  hostile  and  contributed  not  a  little  to  the  defeat  of  the 
reform  administration.     The  powers  of  the  mayor  in  legislation  are  to  be 
found  in  the  charter,  Chap.  II,  Sees.  11-31. 

10  Charter,  Title  1,  Sec.  2.     With  a  minimum  of  exceptions  such  as  pro- 


118  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [314 

ever,  the  recognition  of  the  federal  analogy  has  been  accompanied 
by  modifications  that  have  tended  to  obliterate  the  formal  inde- 
pendence conferred  upon  the  legislative  and  executive  depart- 
ments. On  the  whole  the  executive  has  gained  as  a  result  of 
these  modifications.  The  charter  of  Cleveland  serves  as  an  exam- 
ple. The  council  and  the  mayoralty  are  distinct  and  in  the  or- 
ganization of  their  respective  fields  are  independent  of  each 
other.  In  the  conduct  of  their  work,  however,  they  are  closely 
related,  and  on  the  whole  the  advantage  in  the  cooperation  pro- 
vided for  is  decidedly  with  the  mayor.  While  losing  his  position 
as  presiding  officer  with  the  privilege  of  voting  in  the  case  of  a 
tie,  he  gains  for  himself  and  his  department  chiefs  the  right  to 
sit  in  council  meetings,  to  take  part  in  discussions,  and  to  intro- 
duce ordinances.  In  addition  the  preparation  of  the  budget  is 
given  to  the  mayor.  Charter  commissions  in  Los  Angeles,  De- 
troit, Baltimore,  Toledo,  Cincinnati,  Newark,  and  other  cities 
have  recognized  the  desirability  of  increasing  the  influence  of  the 
mayor,  generally  at  the  expense  of  the  council. 

Various  explanations  have  been  offered  for  the  decline  of  the 
municipal  council  as  an  organ  of  government  and  the  corre- 
sponding increase  in  the  position  of  the  mayor.  Quite  generally 
the  incapacity  and  corruption  of  the  council  is  proffered  as  the 
reason  for  the  rise  of  the  mayor.  The  query  inevitably  presents 
itself  —  why  are  the  councils  incompetent  ?  Inadequate  systems 
of  representation,  the  presence  of  corruption,  and  other  reasons 
given  hardly  suffice  to  explain  an  incompetency  that  is  thoroly 
established,  especially  in  those  cities  whose  problems  of  govern- 
ment have  changed  rapidly  and  have  acquired  increasing  com- 
plexity. The  explanation  may,  in  part,  be  found  in  the  nature 
of  the  council.  It  has  many  members,  and  numbers  constitute 
a  source  of  weakness  in  a  period  of  readjustment.  The  average 
mind  is  not  easily  adjustable  especially  at  the  age  when  men  be- 
come councilors ;  and  councils  are  composed  mostly  of  men  with 
average  minds.  There  may  be  some  men  in  a  council  who  are 
able  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  rapidly  shifting  exigencies  of 
modern  municipal  life  and  social  change,  but  they  are  compara- 
tively few  and  always  in  a  hopeless  minority.  The  majority  make 
its  adjustments  very  slowly,  sometimes  not  at  all.  The  stimuli 

viding  for  cooperation  in  laying  out  of  streets,  the  charter  adheres  to  this 
principle. 


315]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  119 

which  may  be  applied  to  assist  members  in  extending  their  vision 
and  readjusting  their  conceptions  lose  much  thru  being  diffused 
upon  many  minds.  There  is  a  far  better  chance  of  finding  one 
man  gifted  with  a  creative  mind,  one  whose  back  is  to  the  past, 
not  to  the  future,  and  who  is  not  wanting  in  moral  and  intellec- 
tual courage.  Not  nearly  all  mayors,  nor  even  any  large  propor- 
tion of  them  have  shown  marked  qualities  of  initiative  and  leader- 
ship. But  in  cases  where  these  qualities  are  not  wholly  wanting, 
stimuli  may  be  applied  with  some  degree  of  success.  The  average 
mayor  is  of  a  somewhat  higher  type  than  the  average  councilman. 
The  problem  of  readjustment  is  not  so  formidable.  The  pressure 
of  increased  responsibility,  the  demand  for  leadership,  and  the 
ease  with  which  public  opinion  may  concentrate  upon  him,  com- 
bine to  call  into  activity  whatever  imagination,  whatever  power 
of  constructive  thinking,  and  whatever  capacity  for  leadership 
the  mayor  may  possess.  The  expansion  of  the  field  of  municipal 
activity  and  the  consequent  growth  of  administration  have  of- 
fered a  fruitful  field  for  the  best  he  had  to  give.  Handicapped 
by  the  millstone  of  checks  and  balances  which  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury political  theory  bequeathed  to  municipal  organization  in 
this  country,  the  mayoralty  and  its  incumbents  have  nevertheless 
achieved  a  success  which,  when  compared  with  the  record  of  the 
councils,  largely  justifies  the  confidence  which  the  public  has 
come  to  repose  in  them. 

In  comparing  the  status  of  mayor  in  relation  to  legislation 
today  with  that  of  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  one  must  conclude 
that  there  has  been  a  distinct  advance  in  the  position  which  he 
occupies.  In  those  cities  in  which  the  most  noticeable  steps  have 
been  taken  to  increase  his  importance  there  is  evident  a  tendency 
to  establish  some  degree  of  responsible  relationship  between  the 
mayor  and  the  council,  with  the  mayor  as  the  acknowledged 
leader.  It  cannot  be  said,  however,  that  this  tendency  is  very 
far  developed,  and  in  no  case  does  the  mayor  appear  as  a  branch 
of  the  legislative  organ.  Finally,  the  continued  decline  of  the 
council  has  served  to  augment  somewhat  the  relative  importance 
of  the  mayor,  even  in  cities  where  no  legal  or  charter  alterations 
have  occurred. 

Legal  Powers 

The  legal  powers  of  the  mayor  in  respect  to  legislation  are 
those  which  relate  (1)  to  the  initiation  of  municipal  legislation, 


120  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [316 

(2)  to  the  enactment  of  municipal  legislation,  (3)  to  the  enact- 
ment of  state  legislation  affecting  municipalities. 

In  the  initiation  of  municipal  legislation  the  mayor  has  the 
authority  to  call  special  meetings  of  the  city  council,  the  power 
of  sending  messages  to  the  council  in  which  the  affairs  of  the 
municipality  are  presented  and  in  which  measures  may  be  recom- 
mended for  dealing  with  the  conditions  described,  the  right  to 
introduce  bills  for  the  consideration  of  the  council  and  the  power 
to  prepare  and  submit  the  annual  budget. 

The  power  of  the  mayor  to  call  special  meetings  of  the  council 
is  almost  universally  recognized.11  Its  exercise  lies,  practically, 
in  the  discretion  of  the  mayor.  In  Kentucky  a  general  law  pro- 
vides that  a  call  may  be  issued  "when  the  interests  of  the  city 
demand  it, "  or  "  for  special  reasons. ' ' 12  In  some  charters  oc- 
casions are  specified  when  this  power  must  be  exercised.  In  St. 
Louis  the  organization  of  a  new  administration  and  the  instal- 
lation of  officers-elect  constitute  such  an  occasion ;  in  Beardstown, 
Illinois,  after  an  election,  the  mayor  is  enjoined  to  call  a  special 
session  of  the  council  "to  ascertain  the  outcome  of  the  election." 
In  the  majority  of  cases,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  effort  to 
limit  or  prescribe  the  exercise  of  this  power.  It  is  very  common, 
however,  to  provide  that  the  reasons  for  the  calling  of  the  special 
meeting  shall  be  communicated  to  the  council  members  in  writ- 
ing.13 The  method  of  making  the  call  is  defined  in  a  number  of 
cities  and  includes  personal  service,  the  leaving  of  notices  at  the 
residences  of  councilmen,  or  publication  in  the  official  news  organ 
of  the  city.14  In  the  case  of  New  York  City  the  notice  may  also  be 

11  Los  Angeles'  charter  is  an  exception. 

12  Kentucky,  General  Charter  Law  for  Second  Class  Cities,  Sec.  56. 

is  This  is  true  in  New  York  (Charter,  Sec.  37),  Cleveland  (Charter,  Sec. 
31),  San  Francisco  (Charter,  Art.  4,  Chap.  I,  Sec.  5),  Detroit  (Charter,  Chap. 
7,  Sec.  12)  ;  but  assignment  of  reasons  is  not  specified  in  the  case  of  St. 
Louis,  Seattle,  Baltimore,  and  a  number  of  other  cities. 

i*  Cf.  New  York,  Cleveland,  and  Detroit  charters,  Sees.  37,  31,  and  148 
respectively.  The  New  York  provisions  are  typical  and  read :  ' '  Three  days 
before  any  special  meeting  of  the  Board  of  Aldermen  is  held,  notice  of  the 
time  of  the  intended  meeting  and  of  the  business  proposed  to  be  transacted, 
signed  by  the  mayor,  shall  be  published  in  the  City  Record,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  city  clerk  shall  cause  a  copy  of  such  notice  to  be  left  at  or  sent  by 
post  to  the  usual  place  of  abode  or  of  business  of  each  member  of  the  board 
of  aldermen,  but  want  of  service  of  a  notice  upon  any  member  shall  not 
affect  the  validity  of  a  meeting. ' ' 


317]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  121 

sent  to  the  alderman's  place  of  business,  or  may  be  sent  by  mail, 
tho  failure  to  notify  any  member  does  not  invalidate  the  meeting 
held.  The  latter  provision  does  not  appear  in  other  city  charters. 
In  addition  to  the  foregoing,  the  business  specified  in  the  call  for 
a  special  meeting  is  usually  the  only  business  that  may  be  con- 
sidered. There  are  exceptions  to  this  rule,  however,  as  in  the 
case  of  Kansas  City,  in  which  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  coun- 
cil, when  called  in  special  session  by  the  mayor,  "to  transact 
business  as  at  a  regular  meeting. "  15  In  calling  special  meetings, 
the  mayor  must  frequently  observe  certain  requirements  as  to 
the  time  that  must  expire  between  the  call  and  the  time  of  meet- 
ing. There  is  no  uniformity  in  this  particular.  Somerville, 
Mass.,  leaves  the  matter  to  the  mayor;  the  general  law  of  Wis- 
consin fixes  six  hours,  Cleveland  twelve  hours,  and  the  city  of 
New  York  three  days  as  the  time  which  must  elapse  between  the 
call  and  the  meeting.  In  many  cases,  of  course,  no  mention  is 
made  of  this  feature.  On  the  whole  there  seems  to  be  a  disposi- 
tion among  charter  makers  to  elaborate  the  clauses  which  bestow 
upon  the  mayor  the  authority  to  call  special  meetings,  tho  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  municipal  executives  have  exploited  the 
power  to  initiate  legislation  which  this  authority  places  within 
their  reach. 

The  mayoral  message  is  the  second  important  means  by  which 
the  municipal  executive  may  initiate  legislation.  The  message 
serves  two  purposes.  In  the  first  place  it  is  used  to  inform  the 
council  as  to  the  state  of  municipal  affairs  or  to  report  upon  local 
conditions.  This  use  of  it  appears  to  be  almost  universal  and  is 
frequently  enjoined  as  a  duty.18  The  employment  of  the  message 

is  Kansas  City,  Charter,  Art.  2,  Sec.  14.  An  interesting  call  for  a  special 
session  of  the  council  of  Kansas  City  was  sent  out  by  Mayor  Henry  Jost  on 
July  14,  1915,  in  which  he  convened  the  two  chambers  "to  remain  in  con- 
stant and  continued  session  until  the  council  shall  have  passed  requisite 
ordinances  appropriating  money  adequately  and  properly  to  care  for  the 
entire  business  of  the  municipality,"  appropriations  which  the  lower  house 
had  previously  refused. 

is  The  submission  of  such  reports  would  appear  to  be  mandatory  in  many 
cases,  even  the  time  for  the  submission  of  the  annual  report  or  message  be- 
ing specified.  Cf.  Seattle,  Charter,  Art.  5,  Sec.  7;  Baltimore,  Charter,  Sec. 
22;  Los  Angeles,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  41.  The  charter  of  Quiney,  Mass., 
omits  mention  of  such  a  duty,  though  as  in  the  case  of  Charleston,  S.  C., 
the  council  is  probably  able  to  impose  such  a  duty. 


122  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [318 

as  a  means  of  information  or  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  re- 
ports has  in  a  very  large  proportion  of  cases  become  more  or  less 
perfunctory,  and  in  the  hands  of  the  majority  of  municipal  exec- 
utives appears  to  have  developed  no  particular  importance.  A 
perusal  of  many  of  them  reveals  the  fact  that  the  majority  are 
dull  and  colorless.  They  amount  to  little  more  than  letters  of 
transmittal  accompanying  departmental  reports,  or  summarizing 
the  latter.  Many  are  made  the  means  for  comparing  the  work  of 
one  party  with  its  predecessor  in  power,  portraying  the  evil  con- 
dition in  which  the  administration  found  things  and  the  great 
progress  that  has  been  made  since  the  incumbent  assumed  the 
direction  of  affairs.  In  not  a  few  cases  these  reports  are  either 
misleading  or  uninforming.  On  the  other  hand  a  considerable 
and  respectable  proportion  of  these  reports  on  local  conditions 
are  worth  reading.  They  are  vigorous  and  illuminating,  and 
betray  a  grasp  of  local  conditions  that  is  comprehensive  and  at 
the  same  time  conscious  of  the  significant  features, —  as  viewed 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  public  interest.17 

IT  For  examples  of  messages  that  are  wanting  in  color  see  the  following: 
Message  of  Louis  P.  Fuhnnann,  mayor,  to  the  city  council  of  Buffalo,  Jan- 
uary 3,  1910;  message  of  Hon.  Win.  J.  Gaynor,  mayor,  to  the  board  of 
aldermen,  New  York  City,  January  23,  1912.  This  message  is  quite  typical 
of  a  large  group  of  mayoral  messages,  tho  it  should  be  said  that  not  all 
of  Mayor  Gaynor 's  were  of  this  type.  See  also  the  message  of  Wm.  Thum, 
mayor,  to  the  city  council  of  Pasadena,  Calif.,  May  5,  1913;  and  the  mes- 
sage of  John  Sehon,  mayor,  to  the  city  council  in  San  Diego,  Calif.,  April 
30,  1906,  and  May  6,  1907.  The  sixth  annual  message  of  Mayor  George  W. 
Tiedeman  of  Savannah,  Ga.,  on  January  22,  1913,  will  illustrate  the  ten- 
dency to  compare  the  achievements  of  an  administration  with  the  conditions 
which  had  existed  under  a  prior  regime.  Of  messages  that  are  uninforming 
that  of  Charles  F.  O'Neall,  mayor,  to  the  common  council  of  San  Diego, 
Calif.,  on  May  5,  1913,  is  a  good  example.  The  annual  message  of  Mayor 
John  F.  Miller  of  Seattle,  dated  January  4,  1909,  dealt  with  the  cost  of 
operating  the  departments  of  the  city  government  and  represents  a  good 
piece  of  work;  likewise  the  two  annual  reports  a'nd  messages  of  Mayor 
"George  F.  Cotterill  of  the  same  city,  dated  January,  1913  and  1914  re- 
spectively, are  worth  while  efforts.  On  the  other  hand  messages  often  rep- 
resent little  but  bombast.  Note  the  following  from  a  message  by  Mayor 
J.  G.  Utterback  of  Bangor,  Me.,  during  the  year  1913-1914:  "In  most 
convincing  tones  the  voice  of  the  people  has  been  heard  demanding  a  strict 
business  administration  of  their  affairs."  The  message  suggests  the  crea- 
tion of  the  office  of  city  auditor  and  then  near  the  close  is  to  be  found  this 
choice  specimen:  ".  .  .  consider  Bangor 's  interests  first.  Eat  Bangor 


319]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  123 

Of  greater  importance  is  the  second  purpose  which  the  mayoral 
message  serves,  that  of  being  a  vehicle  thru  which  the  mayor 
piay  make  recommendations  regarding  measures  which  he  deems 
to  be  expedient  for  the  welfare  of  the  city.  In  the  majority  of 
cities  the  submission  of  recommendations  is  laid  upon  the  mayor 

bread,  smoke  Bangor-made  cigars,  trade  with  Bangor  merchants. ' '  Even 
this  is  somewhat  more  definite  in  the  way  of  a  recommendation  than  the 
suggestion  of  Mayor  George  Alexander  of  Los  Angeles  to  the  city  council 
on  January  6,  1913.  He  was  discussing  municipal  markets  and  the  high 
cost  of  living  and  by  way  of  recommendation  said,  ' '  Why  not  return  to  the 
good  old-fashioned  way  of  carrying  baskets  to  the  market  —  only  make  it  a 
public  market  —  and  cut  down  the  high  cost  of  living. ' '  Some  messages, 
however,  carry  recommendations  that  give  evidence  of  constructive  thot 
and  a  program,  the  parts  of  which  are  clearly  related.  See  the  message  of 
Mayor  Kudolph  Blankenburg,  dated  September  19,  1912,  relative  to  the 
problem  of  increasing  the  current  revenues  and  the  borrowing  capacity  of 
Philadelphia.  It  was  well  worked  out  both  in  conception  and  presentation. 
Also  the  special  message  of  Mayor  George  F.  Cotterill  of  Seattle,  dated 
March  17,  1913,  relative  to  public  utility  regulation  and  administrative 
efficiency  and  economy  illustrates  the  importance  of  adequate  and  readable 
treatment  and  executive  vision.  There  are  many  examples  of  messages  that 
have  been  intended  for  other  audiences  than  the  city  council,  and  one  of 
the  most  striking  messages  of  this  character  was  the  annual  message  of 
Mayor  James  C.  Haynes  of  Minneapolis,  dated  June  14,  1912.  The  mes- 
sage was  a  plea  for  municipal  ownership  and  the  data  compiled  showed 
painstaking  effort.  Copies  of  the  message  were  mailed  together  with  a 
letter  of  explanation  and  a  return  post  card,  to  many  citizens.  The  letter 
was  signed  by  the  mayor  and  read  as  follows:  "Herewith  I  am  sending 
you  copy  of  the  mayor's  annual  message  for  the  current  year.  It  is  ad- 
dressed to  the  people  as  much  as  to  the  city  council  on  the  assumption  that 
each  citizen  is  as  much  interested  in  the  future  of  this  city  as  is  the  mayor 
or  any  other  public  official. 

"This  message  points  out  how  the  city  council  can  save  annually  over 
one  million  dollars  and  use  the  same  to  beautify  and  improve  the  city,  there- 
by making  Minneapolis  preeminent  among  American  cities  within  the  next 
decade;  and  it  contains  information  and  ideas  which  if  true  are  vitally  im- 
portant to  every  citizen,  and  if  wrong  should  be  corrected  at  once.  May  I 
therefore  request  you  to  give  it  early  and  careful  consideration  and  to  for- 
ward any  criticism  or  suggestion  you  may  have  to  offer  as  soon  as  con- 
venient. Also  to  fill  out  and  return  the  enclosed  card.  The  latter  requires 
no  signature." 

The  enclosed  card  provided  for  a  sort  of  straw  vote  on  the  question  of 
municipal  ownership.  Three  questions  were  asked,  upon  the  first  two  of 
which  the  person  filling  it  out  was  asked  to  answer  "yes"  or  "no."  They 
were,  (1)  Do  you  favor  municipal  ownership  and  operation  of  all  public 


124  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [320 

in  directory  language,  especially  in  connection  with  the  annual 
message.  For  example  the  Seattle  charter  provides  that  "It 
shall  be  the  duty  of  the  mayor  annually  ...  to  recommend 
the  adoption  of  such  measures  as  he  may  deem  expedient  and 
proper."  In  this  and  similar  cases,  however,  a  clause  is  added 
authorizing  the  sending  of  special  messages  ' '  from  time  to  time ' ' 
as  the  mayor  may  deem  useful  and  proper.  It  is  apparent  at 
once  that  in  the  opportunity  which  the  message  in  this  form 
offers  there  lie  large  possibilities.  In  effect,  it  has  "become  a 
right  to  initiate  measures"  in  the  council;  "for  a  message  from 
the  mayor  is  invariably  referred  to  the  appropriate  council  com- 
mittee for  report,  and  this  report  puts  the  matter  squarely  before 
the  council  for  action. ' ' 18  Moreover,  it  enables  the  mayor  to 

utilities  using  the  streets,  and  (2)  Do  you  favor  such  ownership  of  both 
of  the  plants  of  the  lighting  companies.  The  third  question  asked  the 
recipient  to  indicate  which  of  the  lighting  plants  he  preferred  for  municipal 
ownership  if  he  favored  the  ownership  of  but  one  on  the  part  of  the  city. 

Not  infrequently  the  mayors  use  their  message  power  in  the  way  just 
described,  but  a  development  of  this  power  is  to  be  found  in  the  disposition 
to  address  messages  to  the  "citizens"  of  the  municipality.  Occasionally 
mayors  publish  and  distribute  their  messages  at  their  own  expense. 

There  is  available  today  a  large  body  of  material  comprising  mayoral 
messages  and  the  reports  that  mayors  make  from  time  to  time.  Much  of  it 
is  fugitive  but  the  work  of  collecting  it  has  been  begun.  Within  a  few 
years  it  should  be  possible  to  make  some  intensive  studies  within  the  field 
which  this  material  covers.  Indeed  this  material,  together  with  much  other 
material  in  the  form  of  municipal  documents,  is  beginning  to  assume  for- 
midable proportions.  It  has  yet  to  be  thoroly  explored  and  so  retains 
something  of  the  character  of  a  "primeval  forest." 

is  Cf.  Munro,  The  Government  of  American  Cities,  pp.  222,  223.  Mr. 
Bayles  in  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the  United  States,  rather  takes  the  con- 
trary views  and  intimates  that  the  recommendations  made  by  mayors  in 
"conventional"  messages  are  buried  in  committees.  It  must  be  acknowl- 
edged that  the  force  of  the  mayor 's  communications  is  often  less  than  might 
be  desired.  The  mayors  of  Providence  have  for  half  a  century  urged  the 
acquisition  by  the  city  of  the  water  front,  but  the  matter  has  never  received 
serious  consideration  by  the  councils.  Even  when  the  mayor  presents  bills 
already  drawn,  and  places  the  administration  squarely  behind  them  the 
councils  often  fail  to  face  the  issue  presented  on  its  merits.  On  the  whole 
it  appears  that  Professor  Munro 's  statement  describes  the  prevailing  ten- 
dency accurately,  though  there  are  many  exceptions  to  this  tendency.  Some 
of  these  are  indicated  by  Dr.  Munro  in  the  paragraph  following  the  one 
from  which  the  quotation  is  taken.  It  seems,  too,  that  the  situation  is 
somewhat  modified  in  the  smaller  cities  where  the  council  retains  a  some- 


321]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  125 

select  the  policies  and  measures  about  which  his  friends  and  par- 
tisan supporters  in  the  council  may  rally,  a  situation  which  be- 
comes increasingly  significant  in  proportion  as  the  mayor  is  a 
party  leader,  or  as  his  proposals  coincide  with  or  antagonize  the 
views  of  the  majority  party  organization.19  Finally,  the  power 
of  making  recommendations  regarding  municipal  affairs  permits 
the  mayor  to  attract  public  attention  to  the  more  important  is- 
sues and  to  focus  public  opinion  upon  the  council  while  these 
issues  are  under  consideration.  Indeed,  by  means  of  special  mes- 
sages the  main  issues  may  be  taken  one  by  one  so  that  a  mayor 
gifted  with  political  insight  and  devoted  to  the  public  interest 
may  rally  to  his  assistance  such  citizen  support  as  is  available 
in  behalf  of  his  proposals.  Some  mayoral  messages  read  as  tho 
they  were  intended  for  another  audience  than  the  respective 
councils  to  which  they  were  addressed.20 

Not  only  may  the  mayor  call  special  meetings  of  the  municipal 
council,  and  deliver  reports,  send  communications,  and  make 
recommendations  by  means  of  the  mayoral  message,  but  he  is  in 
many  cities  authorized  to  introduce  measures.  The  presentation 
of  administration  measures  has,  indeed,  been  frequent  enough  in 
cities  where  the  mayor  lacked  express  authority  for  pursuing 
such  a  course.  Nevertheless,  it  is  significant  that  the  power  to 
offer  measures,  full  drawn,  and  with  the  stamp  of  administration 
upon  them,  is  now  being  expressly  conferred  upon  the  mayor  by 
municipal  charters.  The  charter  of  Cleveland,  for  example,  pro- 
vides that  "the  mayor  shall  have  the  right  to  introduce  ordi- 
nances. Practically  the  same  phraseology  is  to  be  found  in  the 
charters  of  Toledo  and  St.  Louis,  both  twentieth  century  char- 
ters. Whether  this  development  will  be  followed  by  other  cities, 

what  more  important  place  in  comparison  with  the  mayoralty  than  it  does  in 
larger  centers  where  the  development  of  administration  has  tended  to  over- 
shadow it.  For  the  reference  to  Bayles  see  the  work  cited,  pp.  35,  36. 

19  For  a  somewhat  fuller  discussion  of  this  point  see  Munro,  W.  B.,  The 
Government  of  American  Cities,  pp.  222,  223. 

20  See  reference  to  the  message  by  Mayor  Haynes  of  Minneapolis.     A 
direct  appeal  to  the  electors  was  made  by  Mr.  Blankenburg  in  "A  New 
Year's  Letter  to  the  Citizens  of  Philadelphia"  on  January  1,   1913.     It 
was  a  readable  account  of  the  work  of  the  administration  during  the  pre- 
ceding year.     A  perusal  of  some  of  the  messages  of  Josiah  Quincy  almost 
a  century  ago  reveals  the  fact  that  he  appreciated  keenly  the  value  of  writ- 
ing for  a  larger  audience  than  the  municipal  council. 


126  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [322 

in  the  amendment  and  revision  of  their  charters,  it  is  too  early 
to  say.  It  may  foreshadow  the  ultimate  establishment  of  some 
sort  of  responsible  government,  tho  the  path  of  its  evolution 
promises  to  be  materially  different,  from  that  followed  by  the 
English  parliamentary  type.  In  effective  leadership  the  Boston 
charter  of  1909  appears  to  be  far  in  advance  of  any  others  in 
this  country.  Indeed,  its  provisions  are  almost  revolutionary,  in 
that  the  mayor  may  force  the  early  considerations  of  measures 
which  he  proposes.  In  the  words  of  the  charter  (Section  2)  :  "The 
mayor  from  time  to  time  may  make  to  the  city  council  in  the 
form  of  an  ordinance  or  loan  order  filed  with  the  city  clerk  such 
recommendations  other  than  for  school  purposes  as  he  may  deem 
to  be  for  the  welfare  of  the  city.  The  city  council  shall  consider 
each  ordinance  or  loan  order  presented  by  the  mayor  and  shall 
either  adopt  or  reject  the  same  within  sixty  days  after  the  date 
when  it  is  filed  as  aforesaid.  If  the  said  ordinance  or  loan  order 
is  not  rejected  within  sixty  days  it  shall  ~be  in  force  as  if  adopted 
by  the  city  council  unless  previously  withdrawn  by  the  mayor. 
Nothing  herein  shall  prevent  the  mayor  from  again  presenting 
an  ordinance  or  loan  order  which  has  been  rejected  or  with- 
drawn." In  commenting  upon  the  operation  of  the  charter 
amendments  the  finance  commission  in  its  report  of  January, 
1914,  remarked:  "Only  those  provisions  which  were  intended 

to  restrain  the  abuse  of  power  have  been  fully  tested 

The  provisions  which  afford  an  opportunity  to  conduct  the  city's 
business  upon  a  high  plane  of  efficiency  and  morality  have  not 
been  properly  utilized."  With  respect  to  the  passage  of  loans, 
however,  there  was  noted  a  "marked  improvement."  One  need 
hardly  marvel  at  the  failure  of  the  ordinary  mayor  to  exploit  all 
the  powers  which  the  Boston  charter  bestows.  Indeed,  it  is  quite 
pardonable  in  the  municipal  executive  modestly  to  doubt  his 
sufficiency  for  all  the  opportunities  opened  up  to  him  by  those 
who  see  in  the  mayoralty  the  hope  of  city  government,  in  the  field 
of  legislation  as  well  as  administration.  The  Boston  charter, 
however,  presents  a  logical  development  of  mayor  government,  a 
development  which  makes  him  responsible  for  the  government  of 
the  city  and  clothes  him  with  powers  adequate  to  meet  his  respon- 
sibility. 

The  power  of  the  mayor  to  prepare  the  municipal  budget  is 
properly  classed  among  his  more  important  prerogatives  with  re- 


323]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  127 

spect  to  the  initiation  of  legislation.  There  has  been  a  decided 
tendency  toward  vesting  this  power  in  the  mayor,  tho  in  some 
cities  such  as  New  York  and  St.  Louis  the  authority  is  shared  by 
the  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment.21  But  in  Boston, 
Cleveland,  and  a  few  other  cities  the  mayor  prepares  and  pro- 
poses the  budget  to  the  council.  In  the  case  of  Boston  this  power 
becomes  very  important  because  the  council  may  neither  origi- 
nate a  budget,  nor  increase  any  item  in  the  one  proposed,  nor 
increase  the  total  of  the  mayoral  budget.22  It  has  power  only  to 
reduce  or  reject  the  proposals  made  to  it.  In  Cleveland  the 
charter  specifies  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  duty  which  this 
power  to  prepare  and  propose  the  budget  carries  with  it.23  The 
drafting  of  the  appropriation  ordinance  is  specifically  reserved 
to  the  council,  in  Cleveland  and  Toledo,  tho  in  Boston,  St.  Louis, 
and  some  other  cities  the  appropriation  bill  is  drafted  either  by 
the  mayor  or  by  the  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment.2*  In 
practice  also,  the  mayor,  even  in  cities  where  he  is  not  vested 

21  Cf.  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  16,  Sees.  1,  2,  3 ;  New  York,  Charter,  Sec. 
226.     The  situation  in  New  York  City  has  not  been  materially  altered  so  far 
as  the  mayor  and  the  board  of  aldermen  are  concerned  by  the  mayor's 
decision  to  present  an  executive  budget  to  the  board  of  estimate  and  ap- 
portionment. 

22  Boston,  Amended  Charter,  Sec.  3.     The  mayor  may  also  submit  sup- 
plementary budgets  any  time  prior  to  the  date  upon  which  the  annual  tax 
rate  is  determined. 

23  The  budget  is  expected  to  set  forth  the  following:      (1)  an  itemized 
estimate  of  the  expense  of  conducting  each  department;  (2)  comparisons  of 
such  estimates  with  the  corresponding  items  of  expenditure  for  the  last  two 
complete  fiscal  years  and  with  the  expenditures  of  the  current  fiscal  year 
plus  an  estimate  of  expenditures  necessary  to  complete  the  current  fiscal 
year;   (3)  reasons  for  proposed  increases  or  decreases  in  such  items  of  ex- 
penditure compared  with  the  current  fiscal  year;    (4)   a  separate  schedule 
for  each  department  showing  the  things  necessary  for  the  department  to  do 
during  the  year  and  which  of  any  desirable  things  it  ought  to  do  if  possible; 
(5)  items  of  payroll  increases  as  either  additional  pay  to  present  employees 
or  pay  for  more  employees;  (6)  a  statement  from  the  director  of  finance  of 
the  total  probable  income  of  the  city  from  taxes  for  the  period  covered  by 
the  mayor's  estimate;   (7)  an  itemization  of  all  anticipated  revenues  from 
sources  other  than  the  tax  levy;    (8)   the  amounts  required  for  interest  on 
the  city  debt  and  for  sinking  funds  as  required  by  law;  (9)  the  total  amount 
of  outstanding  city  debt  with  a  schedule  of  maturities  of  bond  issues;  (10) 
such  other  information  as  may  be  required  by  the  council. 

2*  Cf.  Cleveland,  Charter,  Sec.  42 ;  also  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  16,  Sec.  3. 
The  mayor  of  New  York  has  assumed  responsibility  for  the  preparation  of 


128  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [324 

with  budgetary  authority,  does  really  exercise  a  very  powerful 
influence.  The  Chicago  budget  of  1916  was  known  as  the  mayor's 
budget  and  was  adopted  by  the  council  after  an  exceptionally 
bitter  struggle.25  There  seems  to  be  general  agreement  among 
students  of  municipal  government  that  the  mayor  should  be 
largely  responsible  for  the  budget  in  preference  to  having  it  pre- 
pared by  the  council  itself.  As  yet,  however,  no  general  or  char- 
ter acceptance  of  this  principle  obtains  but  there  has  been  a  de- 
cided trend  toward  it  or  some  modification  of  it,  especially  in  the 
larger  centers. 

Enactment  of  Legislation 

In  the  enactment  of  municipal  legislation  the  mayor's  author- 
ity includes  the  following  powers:  (1)  to  preside  over  the  ses- 
sions of  the  council;  (2)  to  sit  in  council  meetings  and  take  part 
in  the  discussion  of  measures;  (3)  to  cast  the  deciding  vote  in 
case  of  a  tie;  (4)  to  approve  and  sign  ordinances;  (5)  to  veto 
acts  of  the  council.  The  first  four  of  these  are  positive  in  their 
nature;  the  last  and  most  important  is  negative. 

The  power  of  the  mayor  to  preside  over  meetings  of  the  council 
is  evidently  passing  away.  Writing  in  1895  Mr.  Bayles  said :  "It 
is  very  generally  today  an  express  duty  of  the  mayor  to  preside  at 
meetings  of  the  city  council.  The  exceptions  are  found  chiefly 
among  the  largest  cities  such  as  Boston,  New  York,  Brooklyn, 
Philadelphia,  Cincinnati,  Detroit,  and  Omaha,  and  where  the 
strictly  executive  powers  of  the  office  have  been  most  developed. ' ' 
In  1913  Professor  Munro  observes:  "It  is  true  that  in  a  few 
cities,  notably  in  Chicago,  the  mayor  is  the  council 's  presiding  offi- 
cer; but  this  is  a  practice  quite  out  of  accord  with  the  general 
rule,  for  in  by  far  the  larger  number  of  American  cities  the  coun- 
cil chooses  its  own  presiding  officer,  and  the  mayor  does  not  take 
any  part  in  its  sessions,  or  even  attend  them."  An  examination 
of  the  charters  of  a  representative  number  of  cities,  and  also  of 
general  state  laws,  indicates  that  the  number  of  large  cities  in 
which  the  mayor  presides  at  council  meetings  is  very  small,  Chi- 
cago and  San  Francisco  being  the  most  important.26  There  are, 

an  executive  budget  which  he  submits  to  the  board  of  estimate  and  appor- 
tionment. 

25  The  state  legislature  by  act  of  June  29,  1915,  authorized  the  council 
to  create  a  board  of  estimate,  but  the  act  had  not  yet  gone  into  effect. 

26  Chicago  operates  under  the  general  state  law  of  Illinois;  the  position 


325]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  129 

however,  many  cities  operating  under  general  state  law  in  which 
the  mayor  still  acts  as  the  presiding  officer.  In  the  states  of 
North  Dakota,  Wisconsin,  Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Idaho,  for  exam- 
ple, the  mayor  presides  over  the  council  meetings.27  It  should 
be  observed,  however,  that,  despite  the  number  of  cities  which 
come  under  the  general  law  cited  and  others  similar  to  them,  it 
can  no  longer  be  said  that  it  is  "very  generally"  "an  express 
duty"  of  the  mayor  to  preside.  But  the  survival  of  this  power 
serves  in  many  places  to  bring  the  mayor  into  an  important  rela- 
tion with  regard  to  the  enactment  of  legislation.  On  the  other 
hand  it  is  highly  improbable  that  this  power  or  duty  materially 
strengthens  the  mayor's  position.  Indeed  if  one  compares  the 
real  authority  of  the  mayor  in  cities  where  the  mayor  presides 
over  the  council  with  his  influence  in  legislation  in  cities  like  New 
York,  Boston,  Cleveland,  Seattle,  and  many  others  where  he  does 
not  preside,  one  is  led  to  conclude  that  the  power  to  preside  con- 
tributes no  strength  to  the  mayor's  position  in  legislation  except 
under  circumstances  where  the  council  possesses  substantially 
greater  authority  than  it  does  in  most  of  the  larger  cities.  More- 
over, this  authority  of  the  mayor  in  legislation  is  secured  at  the 
expense  of  his  independence  in  administrative  affairs  especially 
when  he  becomes  enmeshed  in  the  logrolling  methods  of  the  coun- 
cil.28 It  is  significant  that  in  none  of  the  more  important  modern 
charters  is  the  mayor  expected  to  function  as  the  presiding  officer 
of  the  council. 

of  the  mayor  in  San  Francisco  is  declared  in  the  charter,  Art.  4,  Chap.  I, 
Sec.  5.  In  New  York  and  San  Francisco  ex-mayors  may  sit  in  council  meet- 
ings but  have  no  vote. 

27  The  charter  law  in  North  Dakota  provides  that  the  mayor  shall  ' '  pre- 
side at  all  meetings"  of  the  city  council.     In  Wisconsin  he  presides  in  cities 
of  the  "second,  third  and  fourth  classes"  (General  Charter  Law,  Sec.  38) ; 
in  Indiana  he  presides  in  cities  of  the  "third,  fourth  and  fifth  classes"  (An 
Act  Concerning  Municipal  Corporations,  Sec.  49). 

28  In   his  dissertation   on    Tlie    Office   of  Mayor  in   the   United   States, 
published  in  1895,  Mr.  Bayles  favors  the  passing  of  the  mayor's  right  to 
preside  over  municipal  councils.     He  says:     "The  exemption  of  the  mayor 
from  this  tiresome  and  often  uncongenial  task  of  acting  as  presiding  officer 
will  surely  develop  many  advantages.     The  executive  and  legislative  depart- 
ments of  municipal  government  will  become  more  distinct,  and  their  influ- 
ence upon  each  other  will  broaden  and  deepen,  and  responsibility,  that  neces- 
sary balance  wheel  for  all  political  machinery,'  will  become  more  and  more 
a  factor  to  be  relied  upon. ' '    In  another  place  he  indicates  that  such  exemp- 
tion would  be  an  advance  in  administration  (pp.  36,  37). 


130  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [326 

While  the  mayor  has  thus  been  losing  the  right  to  preside  in 
council  meetings  he  has  in  many  cases  the  right  to  sit  in  these 
meetings,  and  to  discuss  the  measures  which  are  presented.  This 
practice  has  met  with  recognition  in  such  cities  as  Cleveland,  St. 
Louis,  and  others,  and  was  proposed  by  the  charter  commission 
of  Cincinnati  in  1914.29  In  Boston  the  mayor  is  privileged  to 
attend  council  meetings  to  address  that  body  "upon  such  sub- 
jects as  he  may  desire. ' ' 30  He  may  also  be  required  to  attend  for 
the  purpose  of  answering  inquiries  previously  submitted  in  writ- 
ing.31 The  right  of  attending  council  meetings  and  of  taking 
part  in  the  discussion  appears  to  offer  all  the  advantages  that 
may  flow  from  the  right  to  preside,  except  that  of  applying  the 
rules  and  of  voting  in  case  of  a  tie.  It  enables  the  mayor  to  re- 
tain his  administrative  independence  and  at  the  same  time  exert 
upon  the  council  directly  whatever  measure  of  personality,  in- 
fluence, and  argumentative  ability  he  may  possess.  The  separate 
organization  of  the  legislative  and  executive  departments  are 
more  clearly  maintained  and  yet  an  important  and  effective  re- 
lationship between  these  departments  is  established. 

The  power  of  the  mayor  to  vote  in  the  enactment  of  ordinances 
is  usually  vested  in  him  as  presiding  officer  and  is  restricted  to 
cases  in  which  the  council  has  balloted  to  a  tie.  Thus  in  Illinois 
cities,  including  Chicago,  the  general  law  of  the  state  provides 
that  the  mayor  "shall  not  vote  except  in  case  of  a  tie,  when  he 
shall  give  the  casting  vote. ' '  Provisions  that  are  similar  in  form 
or  substance  are  found  in  the  general  laws  of  other  states.32  In 

29  See  Cleveland,  Charter,  Sec.  75:  "  the  mayor  shall  have  the  right 
.  .  .  to  take  part  in  the  discussion  of  all  matters  coming  before  the 
council ; "  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  7,  Sec.  1 ;  the  charter  proposed  for  Cin- 
cinnati but  defeated  on  July  14,  1914,  Sec.  66;  Toledo,  Charter,  See.  70; 
Utica,  N.  Y.,  Sec.  32. 

so  Amended  Charter  of  1909,  See.  7.  The  mayor  may  be  represented  by 
the  head  of  a  department. 

si  Ibid.  This  development  is  interesting  inasmuch  as  it  recognizes  the 
principle  of  the  interpellation  as  employed  in  European  governments.  It 
has  not  been  copied  in  any  of  the  later  charters.  The  distinction  between 
it  and  the  council's  right  of  investigation  has,  perhaps,  not  been  clearly 
appreciated. 

32  Indiana,  An  Act  Concerning  Municipal  Corporations,  1905,  Sec.  49. 
This  is  true  of  the  cities  of  the  third,  fourth  and  fifth  classes  only.  North 
Dakota,  The  Municipal  Charter  Act,  Sec.  17.  See  also  Wisconsin,  General 
Charter  Law,  Chap.  VII,  Sec.  49.  Cities  of  the  first  class  are  not  included. 


327]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  131 

Charleston,  South  Carolina,  where  the  mayor  is  an  integral  part 
of  the  council,  his  voting  power  is  apparently  not  restricted,  tho 
he  does  not  have  a  veto.  A  number  of  cities  expressly  prohibit 
the  mayor  from  voting  in  meetings  of  the  council  and  where  ex- 
mayors  are  permitted  to  sit  in  the  council  the  right  to  vote  is  de- 
nied.33 Broadly  speaking  there  has  been  no  gain  in  the  impor- 
tance of  this  power  during  the  last  twenty  years.  Certainly  it  has 
no  place  except  where  the  mayor  continues  to  function  as  the 
presiding  officer,  or  where  the  council  shares  in  the  appointment 
of  administrative  officials.  It  does  not  contribute  to  the  mayor's 
position  and  strength  in  the  municipal  government  to  compensate 
for  the  confusion  of  legislative  and  administrative  functions  to 
which  it  leads  in  actual  operation.  In  common  with  the  power 
to  preside,  the  right  to  vote  is  rejected  by  more  modern  charters. 

Approval  and  Veto 

The  first  three  of  the  mayor's  powers  in  the  enactment  of 
council  measures,  viz.,  the  right  to  preside,  the  right  to  a  seat  and 
to  discuss,  and  the  right  to  give  the  casting  vote  may  be  de- 
scribed as  his  powers  of  immediate  or  active  participation.  There 
remain  two  other  powers  which  are  very  closely  bound  up  with 
each  other  inasmuch  as  a  refusal  to  exercise  the  one  is  in  a  few 
cases  tantamount  to  an  exercise  of  the  other ;  these  are  the  power 
of  approval  and  signature  and  the  power  of  veto  and  may  be 
described  as  powers  exercised  in  detachment  from  the  actual  pro- 
ceedings of  the  council. 

The  power  of  approval  and  signature  is  almost  universally 
recognized  by  municipal  charters  and  general  laws  as  a  feature 
of  the  mayoral  system.  In  some  cases  it  extends  to  every  act  of 
the  council  except  those  which  relate  to  its  own  organization,  or 
internal  affairs.  Thus  in  Somerville,  Mass.,  ''every  ordinance, 
order,  resolution  or  vote  of  the  board  of  aldermen ' '  with  the  ex- 
ception just  noted,  "shall  be  presented  to  the  mayor"  for  his 
approval.34  His  approval  is  indicated  by  his  signing  the  record 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  this  law  the  mayor  is  not  to  be  counted  in 
determining  whether  or  not  there  is  a  quorum.  Compare  with  Charleston, 
S.  C.,  where  the  mayor  and  a  proportion  of  the  aldermen  do  constitute  a 
quorum.  (Act  of  December  23,  1879.) 

ss  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  7,  Sec.  1 ;  Cleveland,  Charter,  Sec.  75. 

s*  Somerville,  Charter,  Title  3,  See.  16.  Cf.  also  the  charters  of  the  fol- 
lowing: Quincy,  Sec.  17;  Baltimore,  See.  23;  Covington,  Ky.,  Sec.  60; 


132  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [328 

of  the  council.  It  is  not  generally  agreed,  however,  that  all 
council  acts  other  than  those  relating  to  its  own  internal  affairs 
shall  be  submitted  to  the  mayor.  The  Kansas  City  charter  speci- 
fied the  submission  of  ordinances  only.35  The  charter  of  Detroit 
expressly  excepts  from  presentation  to  the  mayor,  "  resolutions 
making  appointments  to  or  removal  from  office"  and  "ordinances 
and  resolutions  for  the  fixing  of  the  annual  estimates  and  sal- 
aries, and  for  the  payment  of  debts  and  liabilities  previously 
and  lawfully  contracted. ' ' 36  The  question  of  what  constitutes 
' '  approval ' '  by  the  mayor  is  one  upon  which  the  courts  have  not 
been  entirely  agreed,  some  holding  that  the  mayor's  signature  was 
essential  to  indicate  his  approval.  The  specific  provisions  of  some 
charters  warrant  this  view.  The  New  York  charter,  for  example, 
provides  that  if  the  mayor  "approve  it  (an  ordinance  or  resolu- 
tion) ,  he  shall  sign  it. ' '  The  language  is  directory,  but  the  signa- 
ture is  the  evidence  of  the  executive's  approval.  In  some  states 
other  acts  such  as  an  affirmative  vote,  publication  as  having  been 
approved,  the  attestation  of  the  minutes,  etc.,  have  been  accepted 
as  indications  of  the  mayor's  approval  of  council  acts.37  The 
exercise  of  the  power  cannot,  however,  be  delegated  and  "in- 
volves in  the  highest  degree  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  of  the 
chief  executive. ' ' 

There  has  been  little  change  in  the  mayor 's  power  of  approval 
in  the  last  two  decades.  The  language  employed  in  conferring 
this  authority  is  very  much  the  same  in  the  later  charters  as  in 
those  of  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago.38  The  extension  of  the 
mayoral  veto  to  include  items  in  bills  or  ordinances  has,  of 

Lewiston,  Sec.  119;  Boston,  Amended  Charter  of  1909,  Sec.  4;  New  York 
City,  Sec.  40. 

ss  Charter,  Art.  3,  Sec.  5.  In  Rochester,  New  York,  and  Seattle,  all  legis- 
lative acts  must  be  by  ordinance  and  these  are  to  be  presented  to  the  mayor. 
Rochester,  Charter,  Sec.  122. 

se  Detroit,  Charter,  Chap.  VII,  See.  13. 

37  New  York,  Charter,  Sec.  40.  Bayles,  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the 
United  States,  pp.  40-44,  contains  a  summary  of  the  power  of  approval  from 
the  standpoint  of  administrative  law,  and  cites  numerous  decisions  affecting 
the  method  by  which  the  power  is  exercised  in  the  various  states. 

ss  Cf.  the  charter  of  Cleveland,  Sec.  40;  St.  Louis,  Art.  4,  Sec.  17;  pro- 
posed charter  of  Cincinnati,  Sec.  59.  The  phraseology  in  the  Boston  char- 
ter of  1909  is  similar  to  that  which  obtains  in  the  Quincy  charter  of  1888, 
except  that  the  latter  enumerates  as  additional  exceptions  the  following: 
measures  relating  to  council  ' '  officers  or  employees,  to  the  election  or  duties 


329]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  133 

course,  enlarged  the  power  of  approval  to  the  extent  that  it  may 
now  be  applied  to  parts  of  measures  and  denied  to  other  parts. 
The  actual  importance  of  the  power  is  difficult  to  determine.  In 
nearly  all  cases  want  of  approval  by  the  mayor  does  not  invali- 
date the  measures,  and,  indeed,  the  latter  usually  go  into  effect 
within  a  fixed  time,  unless  the  mayor  expresses  his  disapproval 
by  the  veto.  In  practice  it  may  be  said  that  the  power,  coupled 
with  that  of  the  veto,  assures  the  mayor  that  he  will  be  consulted 
in  municipal  legislation,  it  secures  an  opportunity  for  a  review 
and  consideration  of  enactments  aside  from  that  given  in  the 
council  chamber,  and  it  calls  forth  the  opinion  of  the  administra- 
tion with  regard  to  legislative  proposals  and  ordinances. 

The  time  which  has  been  granted  to  the  mayor  for  the  consid- 
eration of  council  enactments  is  usually  ten  days,39  but  there  is 
some  disposition  to  lengthen  this  period.  Thus  in  Boston  he  is 
given  fifteen  days,  and  in  St.  Louis  twenty  days.  With  the  in- 
creasing mass  of  legislation  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  approval 
becomes  largely  perfunctory  with  respect  to  much  of  it  unless 
the  executive  is  given  a  longer  period. 

The  power  of  approval  when  exercised  with  respect  to  items 
in  appropriation  bills  gives  to  these  items  the  full  force  of  an  or- 
dinance ' '  in  like  manner  as  a  bill  approved. ' ' 40  The  value  of 
this  power  is  apt  to  be  overlooked  in  contrast  with  the  more  ob- 
vious importance  of  the  power  to  veto  items  in  such  bills. 

Of  the  legal  powers  of  the  mayor  in  respect  to  legislation  none 
except  the  power  of  approval  is  more  widely  recognized  than 
is  the  veto  power.41  Copied  from  the  executive  veto  in  the  na- 
tional and  state  governments  it  has  been  applied  to  municipal 
government  wherever  the  mayor  and  council  type  of  organization 
has  undergone  serious  development.  Municipal  charter  makers 

of  the  auditor  of  accounts  or  comptroller,  to  the  removal  of  the  mayor,  or 
to  the  declaration  of  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor."  Charter,  See.  17. 

39  Ten  days  is  set  in  New  York,  Baltimore,  Cleveland,  Kansas  City,  Se- 
attle, San  Francisco,  and  Los  Angeles,  while  in  Illinois,  North  Dakota,  and 
Norfolk,  Va.,  the  period  is  but  five  days.  Many  other  cities  might  be  added 
to  this  list  but  enough  have  been  cited  to  show  that  the  ten  day  period  is 
by  far  the  most  common  one. 

*o  Cf.  St.  Louis,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  17. 

4i  Twenty  years  ago  as  well  as  today  the  only  important  exceptions  under 
the  mayor  and  council  plan  were  the  cities  of  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee. 
The  mayor  of  Charleston,  S.  C.,  does  not  have  the  veto  power. 


134  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [330 

have  experimented  with  it  in  many  forms,  from  that  which  re- 
quires but  a  majority  vote  to  overrule  it,  to  the  absolute  veto, 
with  the  pocket  veto,  the  selective  veto,  and  the  most  common 
qualified  veto  in  which  from  two-thirds  to  three-fourths  of  the 
council  is  necessary  to  overrule  it.  In  all  of  its  forms  it  ex- 
presses some  active  and  positive  disapproval  of  legislation  by  the 
executive  and  has  become  his  most  important  means  for  the  con- 
trol of  such  legislation. 

The  suspensive  veto,  or  that  which  requires  a  bare  majority 
vote  of  the  council  to  overrule  the  mayor's  negative,  exists  in 
some  cities  of  Texas.  The  veto  of  the  mayor  merely  operates  to 
delay  an  ordinance  from  going  into  force,  pending  repassage  by 
the  council.  At  best  it  is  a  check  upon  hasty  legislation  and 
gives  opportunity  for  a  determined  opposition  to  make  its  power 
and  influence  felt.  The  suspensive  veto  also  exists  in  the  selec- 
tive form,  applicable  to  ordinances  and  resolutions  making  ap- 
propriations. It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  creation  of  a 
strong  mayoral  control  and  responsibility  in  legislation  is  not  to 
be  effected  under  veto  provisions  of  this  sort.  The  suspensive 
veto,  except  for  its  selective  power,  is  the  earliest  form  in  which 
it  was  employed  in  American  cities  and  the  whole  history  of  its 
development  has  been  in  the  direction  of  requiring  a  larger  pro- 
portion of  the  council  than  a  mere  majority  to  overrule  it. 

The  pocket  veto  has  rarely  been  found  in  municipal  govern- 
ments though  it  has  not  been  unknown.  In  Kentucky,  for  ex- 
ample, the  general  law  for  second  class  cities  under  the  federal 
plan  provides  that ' '  should  the  mayor  fail  to  approve  a  proposed 
ordinance  or  resolution  within  twenty  days  after  presentation  to 
him,  he  shall  be  deemed  to  have  disapproved  the  same,  and  there- 
upon the  same  course  shall  be  pursued  in  the  council  with  refer- 
ence thereto,  as  if  he  had  in  fact  disapproved  the  same. ' ' 42  On  the 
other  hand  most  city  charters  expressly  deny  the  pocket  veto,  by 
providing  that  if  the  mayor  fails  to  approve  a  measure  or  to  re- 
turn it  with  his  objections  it  shall  "take  effect  as  if  he  had  ap- 

42  General  Charter  Law,  Sec.  60.  The  existence  of  the  pocket  veto  in  city 
government  has  usually  been  ignored  or  denied.  Cf.  Munro,  The  Govern- 
ment of  American  Cities,  p.  224.  There  are  now  no  cities  operating  under 
this  act,  since  1915  all  of  them  having  adopted  the  alternative  commission 
form. 


331]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  135 

proved  it."  43  The  pocket  veto  appears  to  be  without  justifica- 
tion either  in  experience  or  theory  as  far  as  the  field  of  municipal 
government  is  concerned.  It  has  existed  only  in  isolated  cases, 
and  has  failed  to  commend  itself  to  those  responsible  for  draft- 
ing the  charters  under  any  one  of  our  principal  municipal  sys- 
tems. It  may  properly  be  considered  ?0s  an  unusual  and  unprom- 
ising feature. 

The  most  generally  accepted  form  of  the  veto  is  that  which 
requires  a  vote  of  from  two-thirds  to  three-fourths  of  the  council 
to  overcome  the  negative  of  the  mayor.  The  proportion  varies 
considerably,  tho  the  large  majority  of  cities  operating  under 
individual  charters  and  many  general  laws  provide  that  two- 
thirds  of  all  the  members  elected  to  the  council  must  vote  to  set 
aside  the  veto.44  In  Baltimore  and  Rochester  and  under  the  gen- 
eral laws  of  Wisconsin  the  proportion  is  fixed  at  three-fourths  of 
the  entire  council.  In  San  Francisco  fourteen  out  of  eighteen 
supervisors  are  necessary  to  defeat  a  mayoral  veto.  But  whether 
the  proportion  is  two-thirds  or  higher  the  result  is  an  effective 
executive  veto.  It  is  difficult  to  overcome  and  in  the  hands  of 
a  determined  mayor  becomes  a  powerful  factor  in  the  relations 
between  the  municipal  legislature  and  the  executive.  Strength- 
ened as  it  usually  is  by  the  selective  feature  it  illustrates  very 
clearly  the  disposition  of  municipal  charter  makers  to  trust  to 
one  man  power  in  the  control  of  legislation  as  well  as  of  admin- 
istration. The  selective  veto  permits  the  mayor  to  veto  items  in 
appropriation  ordinances,45  an  authority  which  when  combined 
with  his  power  to  initiate  the  municipal  budget,  is  of  imposing 
proportions,  and  certainly  impairs  the  responsibility  of  the  coun- 
cil in  the  field  of  municipal  finance.  With  the  exception  of  some 
smaller  cities  and  a  few  general  state  laws  the  selective  veto  is 
today  an  established  feature  in  municipal  charters.  The  propor- 

*3  gan  Francisco,  Charter,  Art.  2,  Chap.  I,  Sec.  16.  This  provision  is 
typical  in  substance,  tho  the  phraseology  frequently  differs. 

4*  Cf.  the  charters  of  Los  Angeles,  Seattle,  Kansas  City,  Detroit,  St. 
Louis,  Cleveland,  Toledo,  Indianapolis,  and  the  general  charter  laws  of 
North  Dakota,  Illinois,  and  Indiana  for  the  requirement  that  a  vote  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  council  is  necessary  to  overcome  the  veto. 

45  See  the  Kansas  City  charter,  Art.  3,  Sec.  6,  for  examples  of  provisions 
conferring  the  selective  veto.  Also  the  St.  Louis  charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  17. 


136  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [332 

tion  of  council  votes  necessary  to  overcome  it  is  the  same  as  for 
the  ordinary  veto. 

An  absolute  veto  is  vested  in  the  mayor  in  the  cities  of  New 
York  and  Boston.  In  the  former  the  strength  of  the  veto  power 
varies  according  to  the  kind  of  measures  under  consideration. 
Ordinary  measures,  if  vetoed,  may  be  reenacted  by  a  vote  of  two- 
thirds  of  the  aldermen.  Financial  measures  give  to  the  mayor  a 
power  which  it  takes  three-fourths  of  the  members  of  the  board 
to  overcome.  In  the  case  of  franchise  measures  the  negative  of 
the  mayor  is  final.  Boston  has  gone  one  step  further.  In  the 
amended  charter  of  1909  it  is  provided  that  every  appropriation, 
ordinance,  order,  resolution,  and  vote  of  the  city  council  must  be 
presented  to  the  mayor,  and  if  returned  by  the  latter  within  fif- 
teen days  with  objections,  or  if  in  the  case  of  appropriation 
measures  he  objects  to  any  items  either  in  whole  or  in  part,  the 
actions  of  the  council  to  which  he  objects  "shall  be  void."  This 
is  the  absolute  veto.  Coupled  with  the  mayor's  control  over 
financial  legislation,46  the  veto  tends  to  make  the  mayor  the  dic- 
tator in  municipal  legislation. 

The  development  of  the  veto  in  the  American  municipal  system 
is  unique.  It  has  run  the  entire  gamut  from  the  weak  suspensive 
veto,  to  the  qualified,  selective,  and  finally  now  the  absolute  veto. 
Its  growth  in  importance  has  kept  pace  with  that  of  the  mayor's 
other  prerogatives,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  it  has  con- 
tributed very  largely  to  the  exaltation  of  the  executive  over  the 
council.  The  veto  power  was  originally  intended  to  be  the  means 
by  which  the  executive  might  protect  itself  from  the  encroach- 
ments of  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government.  The  power 
does  not  now  need  to  be  justified  on  this  ground  in  municipal 
government,  if  indeed  there  was  ever  such  warrant.  In  fact,  no 
one  imagines  that  it  was  meant  to  serve  that  purpose  in  present 
day  charters.  It  is  rather  intended  that  it  shall  be  used  to  check 
and  curb  municipal  legislation,  and  its  increased  use  in  this 
direction  has  been  followed  by  the  enlargement  and  further 
strengthening  of  the  power  itself. 

46  This  control  enables  him  to  initiate  ' '  all  appropriations ' '  either  in  the 
annual  or  supplementary  budgets  and  only  permits  the  council  to  "reduce 
or  reject  any  item,  but  without  the  approval  of  the  mayor"  not  to  "in- 
crease any  item  in,  nor  the  total  of  a  budget,  nor  add  any  item  thereto," 
nor  "originate  a  budget." 


333]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  137 

A  perusal  of  many  of  the  veto  messages  penned  during  the  past 
fifteen  years  by  mayors  of  a  dozen  representative  cities  reveals  no 
flagrant  abuses  of  the  power  entrusted  to  them.  Some  vetoes 
are  defended  on  broad  grounds  of  public  policy,  some  for  reasons 
of  economy,  some  because  of  non-compliance  with  charter  provi- 
sions or  state  law,  some  on  account  of  poor  drafting  and  the 
incorporation  of  vague  or  indefinite  provisions,  and  occasionally 
a  veto  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  some  other  organ  of  city 
government,  such  as  a  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment,  in 
its  functions.  A  study  of  these  vetoes  and  the  acts  which  gave 
rise  to  them  together  with  the  circumstances  surrounding  them 
in  so  far  as  they  could  be  ascertained  indicated  that  on  the  whole 
the  mayoral  power  had  been  wisely  exerted.  Mr.  D.  B.  Eaton 
in  his  The  Government  of  Municipalities  suggests  that  the 
veto  power  of  the  mayor  tends  to  secure  careful  deliberation  on 
the  part  of  the  council  and  large  majorities  for  measures  enacted. 
He  contends  also  that  its  possession  renders  the  mayoralty  more 
dignified  and  responsible  and  therefore  more  attractive  to  men 
of  high  character  and  honorable  ambition. 

It  is  apparent,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  executive  veto  as 
employed  in  actual  practice  is  not  to  be  understood  or  described 
merely  by  a  consideration  of  the  veto  messages  delivered,  nor  by 
the  observations  and  conclusions  offered  in  charter  conventions, 
nor  by  comparing  it  with  its  prototypes  in  federal  and  state  gov- 
ernment. The  veto  messages  show  the  power  at  work  under  the 
most  favorable  conditions,  charter  makers'  speeches  are  apt  to  be 
little  more  than  expressions  of  personal  opinions  based  on  theory, 
and  comparisons  are  likely  to  be  misleading.  The  mere  threat 
of  the  veto  may  be  as  effective  as  its  actual  use  and  may  render 
the  latter  entirely  unnecessary;  and  its  effectiveness  is  scarcely 
diminished  because  the  threat  is  directed  against  a  good  measure, 
or  is  employed  for  trading  purposes  to  gain  support  for  the 
executive,  or  is  used  to  befog  issues  and  shift  responsibility  to 
the  confusion  of  the  electorate.  Indeed,  the  real  significance  of 
the  veto  power  lies  not  so  much  in  its  exercise  as  in  its  existence 
and  the  possibility  of  its  being  exercised.  This  fact  has  led  Pro- 
fessor "W.  B.  Munro  to  question  whether  ''the  veto  has,  or  ever 
had,  any  proper  place  in  the  domain  of  local  government,"  a 
question  which  he  answers  by  denying  the  necessity  of  the  veto 
to  maintain  a  theoretical  balance  of  power  as  long  as  the  power 


138  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [334 

of  the  state  is  at  hand  to  effect  readjustments.  He  further 
indicts  the  abuses  of  the  power  in  actual  practice,  abuses  char- 
acterized by  the  bulldozing  and  browbeating  of  councils  "in 
cases  without  number,"  and  by  trading  and  "political  jug- 
glery." These  defects,  he  suggests,  warrant  the  relegation  of 
the  mayoral  veto  power  to  ' '  the  political  scrap-heap. ' ' 4T  Occa- 
sionally there  have  been  proposals  made  for  taking  the  veto 
power  from  the  mayor,  as  in  the  Chicago  charter  convention  of 
1906.  In  this  case  it  was  proposed  that  the  veto  be  lodged  with 
the  president  of  the  council,  but  the  proposal  received  little  con- 
sideration, and  in  fact  the  mayor's  veto  was  retained  without 
roll  call.48  On  the  contrary,  in  cities  having  the  mayor  system 
the  tendency  is  to  strengthen  the  veto  either  in  its  qualified  form 
or  by  the  adoption  of  the  absolute  veto.49 

47  The  Government  of  American  Cities,  pp.  224-226.     An  earlier  discus- 
sion of  the  veto  power  by  Mr.  Bayles  contributes  almost  nothing  to  settle- 
ment of  the  question  raised  by  Dr.  Munro,  being  content  with  viewing  it 
from  the  standpoint  of  administrative  law.     See  The  Office  of  Mayor  in  the 
United  States,  pp.  45,  46,  and  47. 

48  In  fact  there  was  no  discussion.    Following  a  motion  that  the  proposal 
to  transfer  the  veto  to  the  president  of  the  council  be  laid  on  the  table,  a 
proposal  that  the  veto  be  made  suspensive  in  character  and  subject  to  being 
overruled  by  a  majority  vote  was  rejected  without  discussion.    The  qualified 
veto  proposal  was  then  reached.     A  motion  to  adopt  it  prevailed  without 
argument.     Cf.  The  proceedings  of  the  Chicago  Charter  Convention,  1906, 
pp.  74,  93,  94. 

*»  The  Boston  Finance  Commission  in  its  recommendations  for  the  adop- 
tion of  the  absolute  veto  said: 

"If  there  is  to  be  but  one  elective  council,  there  should  be  a  check  upon 
its  action  more  effective  than  the  qualified  veto  power  now  possessed  by  the 
mayor.  Such  a  check  can  be  secured  by  enlarging  the  power  of  the  mayor 
over  appropriations,  loans,  franchises  and  ordinances.  The  commission  rec- 
ommends that  the  mayor  be  given  a  concurrent  vote  in  all  matters  passed 
on  by  the  city  council.  This  means  either  an  absolute  veto,  or  the  right  of 
initiative  on  his  part.  The  commission  recommends  a  combination  of  the 
two  plans.  The  annual  appropriation  bill  or  budget  should  originate  in 
legal  theory,  as  it  does  now  in  practice,  with  the  mayor ;  while  all  other  acts 
and  votes  of  the  city  council  should  be  subject  to  his  approval." 

"Appropriations  from  revenue  and  taxes  should  be  submitted  by  the 
mayor  to  the  city  council,  which  should  have  the  power  to  eliminate  or  de- 
crease items,  but  not  to  increase  or  add  items.  A  similar  provision,  but 
varying  in  details,  is  found  in  the  charters  of  New  York,  Baltimore  and 
Cleveland,  and  is  recommended  by  the  National  Municipal  League  for  gen- 
eral adoption  by  the  cities  of  the  country.  All  other  acts,  votes  and  reso- 


335]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  139 

In  concluding  this  survey  of  the  mayor's  actual  authority  to 
participate  in  municipal  legislation  one  is  forced  to  recognize 
that  the  positive  powers  which  he  possesses  are  with  few  excep- 
tions much  less  important,  either  singly  or  collectively,  than  is 
the  power  to  veto  the  acts  of  the  council.  In  a  few  cases  this 
power  has  been  one  of  the  important  means  by  which  the  charter 
makers  have  sought  to  establish  responsible  organs  of  legislation ; 
almost  everywhere  it  has  been  recognized  as  a  desirable  feature.50 
Despite  the  attacks  made  upon  it  the  veto  power  appears  to  be 
thoroly  intrenched  in  the  municipal  constitution  of  the  mayor 
type,  a  type  which  continues  to  seek  good  government  thru 
the  creation  of  executives  who  are  dominant  both  in  legislation 
and  in  administration. 

EXTRA-LEGAL   INFLUENCE 

The  legal  powers  which  are  bestowed  upon  the  mayor  in  regard 
to  municipal  legislation  are  by  no  means  the  sole  measure  of  his 
influence  in  this  field.  Indeed,  it  may  often  be  doubted  whether 
they  constitute  the  most  important  factor  in  determining  his 
position.  His  personal  influence,  his  standing  in  his  party,  the 
patronage  which  he  controls,  and  his  ability  to  direct  public 
attention  to  favored  measures  either  thru  the  press  or  thru 
pamphlets  and  addresses  are  sources  of  extra-legal  power  that 
are  not  only  difficult  to  define  but  are  incapable  of  accurate 
measurement  as  to  their  potency  in  operation.  Yet  it  is  well  rec- 
ognized that  the  power  and  influence  which  flow  from  these 
sources  not  only  determine  the  character  of  city  government  dur- 
ing any  given  mayoral  term,  but  frequently  override  entirely, 
now  for  good  and  now*  for  ill,  the  ordinary  legal  provisions  laid 
down  in  municipal  charter  and  state  law. 

lutions  and  orders  of  the  city  council  should  require  the  affirmative  approval 
of  the  mayor. ' '  Cf.  The  Finance  Commission  of  Boston,  Eeports  and  Com- 
munications, Vol.  II,  p.  244.  Dated  January  29,  1909. 

By  an  act  of  November  10,  1908,  the  mayor  of  Boston  is  also  given  a 
veto  power  over  all  appropriations  and  votes  of  the  board  of  aldermen, 
acting  as  county  commissioners. 

so  Except  in  commission  or  city  manager  governed  municipalities.  As  a 
rule  commission  charters  do  not  recognize  the  veto  power,  tho  there  are  a 
few  that  do.  The  absence  of  the  mayor's  veto  has  been  pronounced  "not 
the  least  among  the  merits  of  the  commission  plan"  by  Dr.  Munro.  Cf. 
The  Government  of  American  Cities,  p.  226. 


140  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [336 

The  personal  influence  of  the  mayor  in  legislation  rests  upon 
numerous  personal  qualities  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  chap- 
ter on  the  personality  of  the  municipal  executive.  It  is  perti- 
nent to  observe  at  this  point,  however,  that  to  exert  any  great 
personal  influence  in  a  council  a  mayor  must  command  the  re- 
spect of  his  politically  hostile  opponents  as  well  as  of  his  immedi- 
ate supporters  and  friends,  and  he  must  be  able  to  cooperate  with 
those  who  disagree  with  him,  and  to  compel  their  cooperation  in 
return.  Not  all  successful  mayors  are  men  who  have  exercised 
a  commanding  personal  influence,  but  for  those  who  are  able  to 
do  so,  men  like  Josiah  Quincy,  Carter  H.  Harrison,  Sr.,  and  a 
few  others,  the  bonds  of  legal  definition  offer  little  restraint. 

A  factor  that  is  by  no  means  negligible  is  the  standing  of  the 
mayor  in  the  party  to  which  he  belongs,  for  the  party  is  the 
agency  thru  which  the  people  determine  and  carry  out  the 
policies  of  government.  Recognized  leadership  in  party  affairs 
is  almost  indispensable  to  the  successful  mayor.  Past  loyalty  and 
service,  flavored  with  a  touch  of  independence  in  judgment  and 
action  make  a  strong  partisan  appeal  even  where  leadership  is 
not  undisputed  as  in  the  career  of  the  late  William  J.  Gaynor. 
Even  fusion  and  independent  mayors  seriously  endanger  their 
legislative  programs  when  they  ignore  the  parties  which  put 
them  into  office.  Indeed  the  success  of  many  mayors  has  been 
possible  because  of  their  dominating  position  in  their  respective 
parties  and  their  common  sense  recognition  of  the  value  of  party 
organization  and  support.51 

When  one  discusses  the  use  of  the  mayor's  patronage  to  control 
local  legislation  it  becomes  necessary  to  deal  with  the  more  or  less 
hidden,  tho  generally  acknowledged,  workings  of  the  machin- 
ery of  legislation.  The  temptation  to  which  the  mayor  yields  is 
strong  and  pressing.  Mayors  are,  as  a  rule,  elected  not  as  chief 
executives,  but  "because  of  advocacy  of  some  particular  legis- 
lative policy"  and  with  little  or  no  attention  to  their  capacity  as 
administrators.  To  secure  the  legislation  to  which  the  mayor  is 
pledged  becomes  imperative.  Small  wonder  that  the  interests  of 
sound  administration  are  sacrificed  to  achieve  that  end  and  that 
the  mayor  trades  patronage  for  the  votes  of  recalcitrant  council- 
men.  Nor  is  this  power  utilized  only  to  secure  legislation ;  it  is 

si  The  administrations  of  Mayor  Mitchel  and  Mayor  Blankenburg  fur- 
nish instructive  contrasts  in  this  particular. 


337]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  141 

also  employed  to  forestall  and  block  the  acts  and  plans  of  the 
council.  An  example  is  afforded  by  the  fate  of  a  proposed 
investigation  by  the  council  of  school  finances  in  Chicago  in  1916, 
an  investigation  to  which  the  mayor  was  opposed.  So  successful 
was  he  that  Alderman  Robert  M.  Buck  remarked:  "If  the 
mayor  can  throttle  or  buy  enough  councilmen  with  his  patronage 
the  investigation  of  school  finances  will  never  be  properly  made. 
We  found  out  just  which  Republican  and  Democratic  aldermen 
the  mayor  had  bought  with  patronage  or  hopes  of  patronage. ' ' 52 
The  mayor's  power  of  appeal  to  the  public  thru  the  press 
and  pamphlet  literature  as  well  as  by  speeches  is  often  employed 
to  influence  pending  legislation  or  to  bring  public  opinion  to  bear 
upon  members  of  the  municipal  council.  Thru  the  daily 
papers  the  mayor  is  able  to  speak  as  frequently  as  he  may  choose 
to  the  reading  public  of  the  city,  and  because  of  his  control  of 
many  news  sources  he  is  able  to  make  sure  that  his  views  and  the 
data  which  he  presents  will  receive  space  even  in  opposition  news- 
papers. Doubtless  there  are  exceptional  cases  in  which  the 
mayor  is  unable  to  command  a  hearing  or  is  subject  to  deliberate 
misrepresentation,  but  the  importance  of  his  power  and  influence 
over  the  news  service  usually  is  not  to  be  denied.53  The  use  of 
pamphlets  is  not  widespread,  yet  it  is  employed  on  frequent  occa- 
sions for  the  purpose  of  informing  the  citizens  about  work  actu- 
ally accomplished,  or  to  prepare  the  public  for  the  intelligent  re- 
ception of  policies  yet  to  be  worked  out.  One  of  the  most  inter- 
esting uses  of  the  pamphlet  was  that  employed  by  Mayor  Clifford 
B.  "Wilson  of  Bridgeport,  Conn.,  in  1912.  In  August  of  that  year 
he  sent  a  message  to  the  common  council  reciting  "a  number  of 
pressing  needs  and  improvements"  and  suggesting  a  special  elec- 
tion at  which  the  voters  should  be  permitted  to  determine  the 
fate  of  the  proposals  made.  The  carrying  out  of  the  plan  in- 

52  Cf.   Chicago   Sunday   Tribune  of  July  4,   1915.     American  municipal 
history  is  not  wanting  in  many  flagrant  cases  in  which  the  mayor's  patron- 
age was  made  to  serve  his  legislative  program. 

53  In   a  pamphlet  issued   on   May  10,   1909,   and   entitled   What  Should 
New  York's  next  Mayor  Do?  the  Bureau  of  Municipal  Research  specifies 
among  other  things  the  systematizing  of  the  city's  news  service  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  the  press  to  obtain  authentic  statements  of  facts  regarding 
important  proposals.    The  cases  in  which  the  mayor  is  misrepresented  delib- 
erately appear  to  be  more  frequent  than  those  in  which  he  is  denied  a  hear- 
ing.   The  news  value  of  his  acts  takes  care  of  abuses  of  the  latter  sort. 


142  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [338 

volved  in  some  cases  the  issuing  of  bonds  for  the  financing  of 
sewer  systems,  bridges,  and  parks  proposed,  and  the  alteration  of 
certain  administrative  features  thru  charter  amendments. 
The  election  was  duly  called  and  Mayor  Wilson  in  order  "to  set 
before  the  voter  a  few  facts  concerning  each  proposition"  in 
order  "that  he  may  vote  intelligently"  published  a  ten-page 
pamphlet  that  was  free  from  partisan  appeal  explaining  the  proj- 
ects and  charter  changes.  Its  author  characterized  it  as  "an 
experiment  to  get  an  intelligent  expression  from  the  people  them- 
selves, based  on  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  facts. " 5*  It  is  a 
fact,  however,  that  mayors  have  not,  as  a  rule,  employed  their 
opportunities  for  publicity  either  with  skill  or  effectiveness. 
They  are  prone  to  follow  rather  than  lead  and  create  public 
opinion,  or  such  publicity  as  is  sought  is  tainted  with  partisan  or 
personal  objectives  and  lacks  that  candid  and  full  presentation  of 
facts  that  alone  can  command  respect  and  support. 

The  reference  above  to  the  mayor's  interest  in  the  fate  of  char- 
ter amendments  brings  up  the  question  of  the  power  and  influ- 
ence of  the  municipal  executive  in  the  framing  and  enactment 
of  charters.  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  while  the  mayor  fre- 
quently takes  a  leading  part  in  the  initiation  of  charter  revisions 
his  influence  in  charter  conventions  is  not  conspicuous.55  There 
are  in  some  cases  opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  such  influence, 
as  in  the  case  of  Chicago,  where  the  commissions  that  have  con- 
sidered charter  revision  have  been  appointed  by  the  mayor.56 
Occasionally,  as  in  New  York,  the  mayor  has  interested  himself 
in  promoting  the  amendment  of  the  municipal  charter  by  legis- 
lative action.57  Likewise  mayors  not  infrequently  advocate  or 
endorse  proposed  changes  which  they  believe  will  serve  the  public 
welfare.58  But  it  can  hardly  be  maintained  that  the  mayoralty 

5*  Cf.  Proposed  Charter  Amendments  and  Bond  Issues,  What  They  are 
and  What  They  are  For,  by  Clifford  B.  Wilson,  Mayor.  The  pamphlet  con- 
tained two  maps  in  addition  to  the  reading  matter. 

55  Cf.  Mayor  Fitzgerald 's  part  in  the  initiation  of  charter  revision  in 
Boston  prior  to  the  creation  of  the  Finance  Commission.  His  first  propo- 
sals along  this  line  failed  to  get  support  in  the  city  council. 

ss  Both  of  the  Chicago  charter  commissions  since  1900  have  been  appoint- 
ed, the  second  one  being  named  in  the  closing  year  of  the  Harrison  regime. 

57  The  most  notorious  instance  is  that  of  the  ' '  Tammany-Gaynor  char- 
ter."     See  National  Municipal  Review. 

58  Endorsements  and  suggestions  are  frequently  found  in  mayoral  mes- 


339]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  143 

has  had  undue  influence  on  the  formulation  of  the  charters  draft- 
ed by  commissions  and  conventions  organized  for  that  purpose. 
The  same  conclusions  may  be  reached  in  regard  to  the  mayor 's 
influence  in  the  work  of  those  boards  and  commissions  that  have 
been  given  authority  to  determine  public  policy  along  certain 
lines  of  municipal  activity.  The  boards  of  education  are  con- 
spicuous among  those  which  enjoy  large  powers  of  a  legislative 
character.  In  some  cities,  notably  in  New  York  and  Chicago, 
the  board  of  education  is  appointed  by  the  mayor.59  In  Detroit 
the  mayor  is  ex  officio  a  member  of  the  board  and  has  a  veto  upon 
its  proceedings.  Two-thirds  of  the  members  elected  to  the  board 
must  support  a  measure  to  carry  it  over  the  mayor's  veto.60  In 
other  cities,  however,  no  such  authority  appears  to  exist.  Tho 
members  of  the  board  of  education  in  New  York  are  specifically 
excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  removal  power  of  the 
mayor,61  the  latter  appears  to  be  able  to  influence  their  decisions 
thru  the  selection  of  members  known  to  be  in  accord  with  his 
views,62  and  thru  his  influence  as  a  member  of  the  board  of 
estimate  and  apportionment,  which  is  charged  with  the  authority 
to  receive  the  school  budget  and  to  act  upon  the  same  prior  to  its 
submission  to  the  aldermen.  The  board  must  also  submit  certain 
reports  to  the  mayor,  including  an  annual  report.  With  these 
exceptions  and  others  of  less  importance  the  mayor  may  be  said 

59  Cf.  New  York,  Charter,  See.  1061.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  this  power 
of  appointment  enables  the  mayor  to  exercise  an  important  influence  upon 
the  educational  policy  of  a  great  city,  even  tho  no  subsequent  interference 
by  the  mayor  be  recognized. 

eo  Detroit,  Charter,  Sec.  617.  No  pocket  veto  is  recognized.  The  Detroit 
board  of  education  is  elective. 

ei  New  York,  Charter,  Sees.  95,  1096.  The  latter  section  permits  the 
mayor  to  remove  upon  proof  of  official  misconduct  etc.,  the  removal  to  be 
preceded  by  notice  to  the  incumbent  and  a  hearing  upon  the  charges  pre- 
ferred. In  Chicago  the  authority  of  the  mayor  to  interfere  thru  the  exer- 
cise of  his  power  of  removal  is  recognized.  Thus  Mayor  Harrison  inter- 
fered in  1914  in  behalf  of  Mrs.  Young,  the  superintendent  of  schools  and 
prevented  her  being  dismissed  by  the  board. 

62  Mayor  Mitchel  is  credited  with  having  ' '  assumed  the  right  to  counsel 
with  the  members  of  the  board  of  education  respecting  policies  initiated  by 
them."  He  assisted  in  an  investigation  which  resulted  in  notable  develop- 
ments in  school  policy,  particularly  in  vocational  education  and  the  trial  of 
the  so-called  Gary  plan.  See,  Mayor  Mitchel's  Administration  of  the  City 
of  New  York,  by  Henry  Bruere  in  the  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol.  V, 
pp.  24-37,  especially  pp.  32-34. 


144  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [340 

to  have  little  immediate  power  over  education,  owing  to  the  pre- 
vailing American  practice  of  separating  this  function  from  other 
municipal  activities. 

In  municipal  finance  a  new  body  has  appeared  to  absorb  power 
from  the  city  council  and  to  augment  the  power  of  the  mayor, 
viz.,  the  board  of  estimate  and  apportionment.  In  New  York  ' '  it 
in  very  large  measure  makes  the  policy  of  the  city. "  63  In  some- 
what less  power  it  has  appeared  in  many  other  cities — "a  new 
organism  imposed  upon  the  old. ' ' 64  The  mayor  invariably  re- 
tains a  place  upon  it  and  may  thus  be  expected  to  influence  very 
largely  its  decisions.  TJhat  it  will  become  a  permanent  feature 
of  municipal  organization  does  not,  however,  appear  to  be  prob- 
able, except  in  some  large  municipalities  retaining  the  mayor 
system.  In  Boston,  indeed,  the  mayor  appears  to  have  absorbed 
the  functions  which  the  boards  of  estimate  and  apportionment 
perform  in  cities  other  than  New  York. 

STATE  LEGISLATION 

The  relation  of  the  mayor  to  state  legislation  affecting  cities 
has  found  legal  definition  in  but  one  state,  viz.,  New  York,  and 
in  this  case  it  is  negative  in  character,  consisting  of  a  suspensive 
veto  upon  special  city  laws.  But  in  all  the  states  in  which  there 

6»  See  article  by  Mr.  Mitchel  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Academy  of  Polit- 
ical Science,  etc.  on  "The  Office  of  Mayor."  Vol.  V,  p.  4.  Mr.  Mitchel 
explains  as  follows:  "By  that  I  mean  that  it  determines  such  broad  ques- 
tions as  the  construction  of  our  rapid  transit  system,  and  the  terms  and 
conditions  on  which  that  system  should  be  constructed  and  operated.  It  de- 
termines the  plan  upon  which  our  port  is  to  be  developed.  It  authorizes  the 
institution  of  the  various  portions  of  that  plan.  It  determines  the  financial 
policy  of  the  city,  as  it  did  recently  when  by  resolution  it  declared  the  insti- 
tution of  a  new  plan  for  financing  permanent  public  improvements  of  a 
non-revenue-producing  class,  and  said  improvements  of  that  kind  should 
hereafter  be  financed  in  increasing  proportions  out  of  the  tax  budget  of  the 
city  of  New  York,  instead  of  thru  the  issue  of  fifty  year  bonds.  All  these 
duties  that  board  performs,  and  I  can  assure  you  that  it  is  about  as  busy 
a  deliberative  body  as  sits  anywhere  in  this  country  or  elsewhere.  .  .  . 
In  a  great  many  instances  public  debate  is  had.  ...  In  addition  the 
Board  of  Estimate  has  created  under  this  administration  a  series  of  stand- 
ing committees  to  determine  questions  of  policy  and  the  preparations  of 
great  construction  plans." 

84  Cf.  Charters  of  Baltimore,  Rochester,  and  St.  Louis,  tho  in  none  of 
these  has  the  board  developed  such  powers  as  it  enjoys  in  New  York. 


341]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  145 

are  metropolitan  cities  the  mayor  must  assume  the  more  positive 
role  of  a  special  leader  in  behalf  of  the  interests  of  the  city 
which  he  represents.  In  this  capacity  he  heads  delegations  of 
city  officials  in  their  conferences  with  important  legislative  com- 
mittees, and  assists  in  the  organization  and  presentation  of  the 
city's  case.  The  effectiveness  of  his  endeavors  depends  upon  a 
great  many  elements  other  than  the  merits  of  the  case  which  he 
presents.  The  cooperation  of  the  city's  representatives  in  the 
legislature  is  not  always  forthcoming  owing  to  want  of  harmony 
on  the  legislative  program  within  the  city  itself.  Party  faction- 
alism and  jealousy  between  the  rural  and  urban  constituencies 
are  important  factors.  But  on  the  whole  it  can  be  affirmed  that 
"many  vicious  and  unwise  bills"  affecting  cities  would  never  be 
enacted  and  "fewer  desirable  bills"  would  "fail"  if  all  available 
facts  and  data  were  ' '  adequately  presented. ' ' 65  The  obligation 
to  undertake  this  presentation  undoubtedly  rests  upon  the  may- 
ors of  many  large  cities  today.  It  has  been  expressly  insisted 
upon  in  mayoralty  campaigns  in  New  York  City  and  has  been 
prominent  among  the  tasks  which  candidates  for  the  office  have 
promised  to  perform  in  Chicago  and  other  centers. 

The  suspensive  veto  with  regard  to  special  city  laws  is  con- 
ferred upon  the  mayor  by  the  constitution  of  New  York  state.68 
It  is  provided  that  following  its  passage  by  both  houses  of  the 
legislature  a  special  city  law  shall  be  transmitted  by  the  house 
in  which  it  originated  to  the  mayor  of  the  city  or  cities  affected. 
The  mayor  shall  within  fifteen  days  return  the  bill  to  the  house 
from  which  it  was  sent,  or  to  the  governor,  with  a  certificate 
stating  whether  or  not  the  bill  has  been  accepted  by  the  city.67 

os  Cf.  pamphlet  issued  by  New  York  Bureau  of  Municipal  Beseareh, 
under  date  of  May  10,  1909,  entitled  What  Should  New  York's  next  Mayor 
Dot  p.  7,  par.  No.  18  under  what  are  specified  as  "Some  of  the  Things 
New  York's  Next  Mayor  Must  Do."  It  should  be  said  the  record  of  the 
Mitchel  administration  supports  the  contention  set  forth  in  this  paragraph. 

66  See  Constitution  of  New  York,  Art.  12,  See.  2.     This  provision  was 
retained  in  the  constitution  drafted  and  submitted  in  1915,  but  the  term 
"special  city  law"  was  more  narrowly  defined.     Cf.  "The  New  York  Con- 
stitutional Convention"  by  Charles  A.  Beard  in  the  National  Municipal  'Re- 
view, Vol.  IV,  p.  644  (October,  1915). 

67  The  mayor  alone  acts  for  the  city  in  cities  of  the  first  class,  in  others 
the  council  or  a  majority  of  it  must  concur  with  him.    The  state  legislature 
may  require  the  concurrence  of  the  council  in  cities  of  the  first  class  also. 


146  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [342 

In  1900  the  state  legislature,  in  pursuance  of  the  directory  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution,  passed  a  law  providing  for  a  public 
hearing  on  such  ' '  special  city  laws, ' '  one  to  be  held  in  each  city 
affected  by  a  bill.  In  cities  of  the  first  class  the  hearings  are 
held  before  the  mayor,  in  other  cities  before  the  mayor  and  the 
legislative  body  of  the  city.  Provision  is  made  for  public  notice 
of  the  hearing  being  given  thru  the  press  in  all  cases,  and  in 
cities  of  the  third  class  the  mayor  is  instructed  to  serve  copies 
of  the  notice  upon  each  council  member  either  personally  or  by 
mail.  The  mayor  is  authorized  to  append  to  the  notice  ' '  any  ex- 
planatory statement ' '  that  he  ' '  shall  deem  advisable. "  It  is  sig- 
nificant that  if  the  bill  is  returned  without  having  been  accepted, 
or  is  not  returned  within  fifteen  days,  it  may  be  repassed  by  the 
assembly  by  a  majority  vote.  In  any  case,  whether  accepted  or 
vetoed  and  then  repassed,  the  bill  is  subject  to  the  action  of  the 
governor.  In  its  final  form  the  act  of  the  legislature  must  show 
in  its  title  whether  or  not  it  has  been  accepted  by  the  city.  All 
expenses  incurred  in  connection  with  hearings  must  be  borne  by 
the  city  or  cities  in  which  hearings  are  held. 

The  retention  of  the  mayoral  veto  on  "specified  city  laws"  in 
the  proposed  New  York  constitution  of  1915  indicates  that  the 
cities  consider  it  of  some  value  in  their  struggle  against  legisla- 
tion of  this  type.  There  are  many  evidences,  however,  that  the 
veto  is  not  so  effective  as  the  cities  might  wish  it  to  be.  The  hear- 
ings provided  for  have  tended  to  be  perfunctory  in  character  and 
productive  of  little  information  that  would  guide  the  mayor  or 
the  mayor  and  municipal  legislature  in  making  a  decision.  The 
New  York  campaign  of  1909  brot  out  a  demand  for  a  more  ef- 
fective use  of  the  power  by  the  mayor,  together  with  a  presenta- 
tion of  the  facts  which  justified  a  veto  or  an  approval  as  the  case 
might  be.  It  was  contended  that  proper  marshaling  of  the  facts 
would  "largely  determine  later  action  by  legislature  and  gov- 
ernor, ' ' 68  tho  in  the  past  the  mayoral  veto  had  been  overriden  by 
the  legislature  so  frequently  as  to  discourage  its  vigorous  use. 

See  Constitution,  Art.  12,  Sec.  2  and  also  Act  of  1900,  "The  General  City 
Law  "Art.  2,  Sec.  33,  cited  in  Ash,  The  Greater  New  York  Charter,  etc., 
with  Notes,  etc.,  together  with  Appendices,  etc.  (Third  Edition),  Appendix 
1,  pp.  1062,  1063. 

es  What  Should  New  York's  next  Mayor  Dot  For  Mr.  Seth  Low's 
opinion  of  the  value  of  the  mayor's  veto  on  special  city  laws  see  Bryce, 
American  Commonwealth,  Vol.  I,  p.  660,  (3rd  edition  revised).  Mr.  How- 


343]  THE   MAYOR  AND  LEGISLATION  147 

As  a  method  for  protecting  the  city  against  special  legislation 
and  yet  permitting  needed  action,  the  veto  has  but  one  rival,  the 
provisions  found  in  the  constitutions  of  Illinois  and  Michigan  in 
which  municipalities  are  permitted  by  popular  vote  to  accept  or 
reject  special  legislation.69  At  best  the  part  the  mayor  can  play 
is  exceedingly  limited. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  the  mayor  may  influence  the  fate 
of  state  legislation  thru  appeals  to  the  governor  to  exercise  his 
veto  power.  Instances  of  appeals  of  this  sort  are,  indeed,  quite 
frequent  and  they  offer  an  excellent  opportunity  for  a  summary 
of  the  position  of  the  city  with  respect  to  pending  legislation, 
particularly  special  bills  affecting  municipal  interests.  The  ef- 
fectiveness of  such  appeals  is  not  such  as  to  warrant  any  reliance 
upon  them  as  a  means  of  protecting  the  interests  of  the  munici- 
pality.70 

ard  Lee  McBain  praises  the  veto  as  well  worth  while  and  thinks  it  superior 
to  the  Illinois  and  Ohio  practice. 

e»  In  Illinois  this  protection  is  applied  to  Chicago  only,  for  other  cities 
are  protected  by  a  constitutional  restriction  on  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  enact  such  laws  except  for  Chicago.  The  Michigan  constitution  of  1908 
contains  a  general  provision  for  a  local  referendum  on  special  legislation. 

70  See  a  letter  from  Mayor  Mitchel  to  Governor  Whitman  of  New  York, 
dated  May  9,  1916,  appealing  for  a  veto  of  fourteen  million  dollars  in  the 
appropriation  bills  before  him  on  the  ground  that  taxable  property  in  the 
city  of  New  York  bears  as  great  a  burden  as  it  can  sustain  without  disaster 
to  the  owners.  The  following  excerpts  from  the  appeal  show  how  well  the 
opportunity  for  presenting  the  city's  case  was  utilized  in  this  instance: 

"Unless  you  veto  at  least  $14,000,000  from  the  state  appropriations  now 
awaiting  your  signature,  it  is  evident  that  within  a  year  it  will  be  necessary 
for  the  State  to  impose  another  direct  tax.  This  direct  tax  will  create  an 
additional  burden,  which,  added  to  the  other  taxes  which  New  York  City 
must  carry,  may  very  easily  produce  a  general  collapse  of  real  estate  values 
in  New  York  City. 

"The  City  of  New  York  itself  has  done  everything  humanly  possible  to 
reduce  its  own  expenditures  to  an  irreducible  minimum.  The  appropria- 
tions for  the  administrative  expenses  of  the  City  Government  are  $2,125,000 
less  than  the  corresponding  appropriations  for  1914.  The  city  now  asks 
that  the  State  Government  be  as  economical  as  the  city  itself  has  been. 
When  last  year's  appropriations  were  before  you  I  made  the  same  appeal 
for  the  vigorous  use  of  your  veto  power  that  I  am  now  making  in  regard  to 
this  year's  appropriation.  At  that  time  you  were  unable  to  agree  with  my 
conclusions,  but  I  am  emboldened  to  make  the  appeal  again  because,  with  a 
wider  experience,  I  feel  sure  that  you  have  come  to  realize  the  justice  of  the 
city's  position  last  year." 


148  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [344 

A  summary  view  of  the  mayor  and  legislation  reveals  a  dispo- 
sition to  continue  the  process  of  withdrawing  the  mayor  from 
membership  in  the  council  or  immediate  participation  in  its  work. 
His  relative  activity  in  the  work  of  legislation  appears  to  be  in- 
creasing, however,  owing  to  the  development  of  his  power  to 
recommend  measures,  to  attend  council  meetings,  to  introduce 
administration  measures,  and  to  veto  nearly  all  council  acts.  The 
tendency  to  make  him  the  responsible  organ  of  city  government 
in  the  field  of  finance  has  enabled  him  to  gain  in  power  and  pres- 
tige at  the  expense  of  the  council.  In  legislation  as  well  as  in 
administration  the  mayor  is  approximating  the  importance  of  the 
old  English  mayor  who  was  described  as  ' '  the  lord  of  the  city. ' ' 
Of  his  various  powers,  that  of  veto  appears  to  be  exercised  most 
effectively  for  the  accomplishment  of  his  purposes;  but  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  this  power  has  been  seriously  challenged  as 
unnecessary  and  undesirable  and  is  rarely  retained  in  any  but 
mayor  and  council  plan  charters.  The  relation  of  the  mayor  to 
state  legislation  can  hardly  be  pronounced  an  effective  one  and 
no  expansion  of  his  legal  powers  is  noticeable  along  this  line. 
The  net  results  of  developments  in  recent  years  warrant  the 
conclusion  that  the  mayoralty  is  both  relatively  and  absolutely 
more  powerful  in  the  field  of  legislation  than  ever  before. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS 

Intense  partisan  activity  and  strong  party  organizations  have 
been  outstanding  features  of  American  political  life.  Especially 
has  importance  been  attached  to  the  position  and  strength  of  the 
national  party  organizations.  State  and  local  issues  and  inter- 
ests have  been  subordinated  in  order  to  assure  the  success  of  the 
national  organizations  and  to  provide  the  means  for  their  effec- 
tive maintenance  and  support  during  the  intervals  between  cam- 
paigns. In  this  process  the  municipalities  have  suffered  tre- 
mendously. Whatever  of  honor,  reward,  and  opportunity  their 
offices  have  held  forth  for  their  citizens  has  been  seized  by  the 
great  national  and  state  organizations  for  the  promotion  of  the 
interests  and  purposes  of  the  latter.  The  mayoralty,  with  its 
power  and  influence,  has  been  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Times 
without  number  it  has  been  sacrificed  upon  the  altar  of  national 
party  loyalty. 

This  tendency  to  exalt  general  at  the  expense  of  local  political 
interests  is  accentuated  by  the  existence  of  a  professional  poli- 
tician class  that  has  consciously  emphasized  the  importance  of 
success  for  the  national  and  state  organizations.  The  members 
of  this  class  look  to  their  political  activities  to  furnish  them  a 
livelihood.  They  are  in  politics  ' '  for  what  there  is  in  it. ' '  The 
opportunity  offered  them  by  the  modern  city  and  its  government 
has  been  unparalleled  in  former  generations.  It  is  a  field  that 
can  be  most  successfully  exploited  when  the  interest  of  the  mu- 
nicipal citizens  is  centered  upon  other  than  municipal  problems. 
The  absence  of  tradition  in  local  politics,  the  transient  character 
of  much  of  the  urban  population,  the  indifference  of  large  por- 
tions of  the  population  due  to  preoccupation  in  industrial  and 
commercial  enterprises,  all  supplement  the  efforts  of  the  pro- 
fessional politician  to  magnify  other  than  local  programs  and 

149 


150  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [346 

issues,  or  to  exhaust  political  energies  in  vain  and  unprofitable 
sham  battles. 

Even  when  the  urban  electorates  have  been  aroused  to  the  im- 
portance of  municipal  politics  and  have  undertaken  to  discrimi- 
nate between  local  and  general  issues  and  to  analyze  the  former 
with  a  view  to  the  adoption  of  intelligent  policy  and  the  intro- 
duction of  efficient  administration  their  efforts  have  been  largely 
neutralized.  The  municipality  has  not  been  free  to  defend  itself 
from  state  interference.  The  state  has  often  been  only  too  will- 
ing to  assume  an  active  hand  in  local  affairs,  even  to  the  extent 
of  ripper  legislation.  The  necessity  of  having  local  patronage 
with  which  to  reward  branches  of  state  and  national  political 
organizations  has  led  both  to  flagrant  negation  of  the  expressed 
will  of  municipal  electorates,  and  to  the  imposition  upon  them 
of  burdens  which  serve  no  local  good.  The  city  has  been  the 
victim  of  unrefined  political  conditions  and  of  a  political  phi- 
losophy that  defines  success  only  in  terms  of  victory  at  the  polls, 
the  assumption  of  the  chief  offices  of  government,  and  the  seizure 
of  the  major  portion  of  the  positions  in  the  civil  service.  Failure 
on  the  part  of  local  party  organizations  to  retain  their  hold  on 
municipal  governments  not  infrequently  resulted  in  state  author- 
ity being  invoked  to  thwart  the  will  of  the  local  electorate. 

The  worst  conditions  have  arisen  when  powerful  private  inter- 
ests have  sought  to  intrench  themselves  in  richly  productive  pub- 
lic utilities,  an  end  that  could  most  easily  be  achieved  thru  an 
alliance  with  local  political  organizations.  The  result  has  usually 
been  the  establishment  of  a  bipartisan  regime,  in  which  profes- 
sional politicians  of  all  parties  and  predatory  privilege  leagued 
to  promote  their  respective  interests  irrespective  of  the  public 
welfare.  It  is  quite  obvious  that  under  such  conditions  the  con- 
trol of  the  municipal  executive  was  an  objective  of  primary  im- 
portance. 

The  mayoralty  has  reflected  the  political  conditions  in  which 
it  has  developed.  The  mayors  of  important  urban  centers  have 
usually  been  party  men,  at  least  in  the  sense  that  they  have  been 
affiliated  with  a  local  branch  of  some  national  party  organization. 
They  have  been  elected  by  party  men,  who  cast  their  votes  ' '  for 
a  mayor,  who  if  he  were  elected  President  would  do  this  thing 
or  that  thing  with  reference  to  national  expansion  or  the  cur- 


347]  THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS  151 

rency  question  or  something  of  that  sort ;  .  .  . "  It  remained 
possible  for  him  to  develop  a  local  party  leadership  that  would 
be  sensible  of  its  responsibilities  to  the  community  it  served  and 
possessed  of  sufficient  influence  and  power  to  prevent  the  whole- 
sale and  wanton  subordination  of  municipal  interests  to  partisan 
or  private  self-seeking.  It  was  much  easier,  however,  for  him  to 
become  the  pliant  tool  of  those  aggressive  forces  that  are  in  poli- 
tics for  mercenary  purposes.  Probably  no  program  of  local 
policy  had  been  projected  in  the  campaign  for  his  election.  He 
had  cautiously  refused  to  commit  himself  to  definite  lines  of  ac- 
tion on  local  issues.  Having  been  chosen  out  of  concern  for  some 
national  or  state  policy  to  the  realization  of  which  he  could  con- 
tribute little  or  nothing  he  remained  largely  free  to  give  "the 
street  car  company  or  the  gas  company  a  new  franchise."  In 
this  fashion  the  loyal  party  voter  who  supported  him  ' '  has  fool- 
ishly bartered  away  his  own  rights,  and  his  neighbor's  rights 
and  his  children's  rights  for  half  a  century.  He  thought,  per- 
haps, he  was  voting  for  Lincoln  or  Jefferson,  but  in  reality  he 
was  voting  for  some  contractor  or  for  some  political  boss  or  for 
some  public  service  corporation." 

There  is  generally  a  certain  point,  however,  beyond  which  the 
national  and  state  political  organizations  may  not  safely  disre- 
gard the  interests  of  local  communities.  Parties  and  politicians 
desire  above  all  else  to  retain  their  lease  on  office  and  power  and 
are  therefore  to  some  degree,  more  or  less  vaguely  defined,  re- 
sponsible to  the  manifest  will  of  the  local  electorate.  The  mayor- 
alty because  of  its  conspicuous  position  in  the  scheme  of  local 
government  is  among  the  first  of  the  organs  of  the  municipality 
to  feel  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  and  because  of  its  central- 
ized authority  is  the  least  likely  among  those  organs  to  offer  a 
successful  resistance.  It  has  been  frequently  true  that  mayors 
who  have  been  chosen  as  machine  candidates  and  for  given  par- 
tisan purposes  have  broken  with  their  backers  when  confronted 
with  a  wave  of  public  sentiment  that  was  determined  in  charac- 
ter. The  action  of  Mayor  John  Weaver  of  Philadelphia,  in 
breaking  with  the  Republican  organization  by  dismissing  from 
office  two  of  his  directors  and  opposing  the  proposed  gas  steal, 
is  a  conspicuous  illustration  of  the  fact  that  the  mayor  is  so 
positioned  that  he  is  inevitably  sensitive  to  public  thot  and 


152  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [348 

feeling.2  Like  independence  and  responsiveness  were  exhibited 
by  Mayor  McClellan  in  insisting  upon  non-partisan  appoint- 
ments to  membership  on  the  New  York  City  water  supply  board, 
even  when  the  state  assembly  at  the  behest  of  party  interest  had 
made  partisan  nominations  possible;  by  Mayor  James  N.  Adam 
of  the  city  of  Buffalo  who  kept  in  touch  with  his  party,  yet  was 
so  largely  independent  of  it  as  to  make  possible  an  honest,  eco- 
nomical, clean,  and  efficient  administration.  The  number  of  illus- 
trations might  be  multiplied  many  times  from  the  records  that 
are  accessible  and  doubtless  there  are  very  many  examples  that 
have  never  had  more  than  local  publicity. 

The  determination  of  political  parties  to  control  municipal 
politics  has  led  to  many  notable  struggles.  In  the  present  cen- 
tury the  most  flagrant  example  of  the  methods  to  which  parties 
will  resort  to  accomplish  this  end  was  the  abolition  of  the  mayor- 
alty in  Pennsylvania  cities  in  1901.  The  party  in  control  of  the 
state  had  lost  many  local  elections,  the  mayoral  campaign  among 
them.  The  office  of  mayor  was  forthwith  abolished  by  the  noto- 
rious ripper  legislation  of  that  year,  and  the  controller  made  chief 
executive  in  the  municipalities.  Another  and  more  recent  at- 
tempt to  set  up  a  mayoralty  which  would  be  responsive  to  the 
desires  of  the  party  in  control  of  the  state  was  embodied  in  the 
Tammany-Graynor  charter  proposed  for  New  York  in  1911.  The 
charter  conferred  great  power  upon  the  mayor,  probably  with 
the  view  of  serving  temporary  ends.  Among  other  things  it 
would  have  given  the  mayor  a  substantial  and  somewhat  irre- 
sponsible control  over  the  city's  budget.  The  proposal  was  de- 
feated by  the  fortunate  circumstance  that  the  city  had  within  it 
public  spirited  organizations  that  were  able  to  voice  their  pro- 
tests quickly,  persistently,  and  to  stir  up  behind  them  a  wave  of 
public  protest.3 

In  pursuit  of  their  objectives  party  organizations  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  "knife"  independent  or  doubtful  candidates  of  their 
own.  The  defeat  of  Mayor  Fagan  in  Jersey  City  in  1907  was  the 
result  of  party  treachery  rather  than  a  popular  repudiation  of 
his  efforts  and  independence  during  his  administration.  The 
more  recent  careers  of  Mayor  Hunt  in  Cincinnati  and  Mayor 

2  See  address  by  Mr.  White,  "The  Eevolution  in  Philadelphia"  in  At- 
lantic City  Conference  for  Good  Government,  Proceedings,  p.  136. 

3  Cf.  account  in  the  National  Municipal  Review,  I,  p.  67. 


349]  THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS  153 

Blankenburg  in  Philadelphia  testify  to  the  tendency  of  even  the 
so-called  reform  parties  and  fusion  organizations  to  turn  and 
rend  those  who  will  not  serve  them.4  A  mayor  in  his  constructive 
work  must  watch  the  wiles  of  those  who  because  of  his  indepen- 
dence will  stop  at  nothing  to  discredit  his  efforts,  to  bring  him 
into  conflict  with  other  state  or  local  authorities  under  their  con- 
trol, or  to  "put  him  in  a  hole"  in  the  execution  of  his  own  pro- 
gram. In  the  case  of  Mayor  Dempsey  of  Cincinnati,  in  1906, 
the  ingenuity  of  local  politicians  and  antagonists  was  exhausted 
in  the  conflict,  and  the  controversy  with  the  governor  of  the 
state  further  imperiled  municipal  reform.  A  striking  example 
of  a  mayor  being  compelled  to  veto  a  portion  of  his  own  election 
promises  is  that  of  Mayor  Blankenburg  of  Philadelphia,  who 
was  forced  into  the  position  of  vetoing  eighty  cent  gas,  a  thing 
he  had  expressly  pledged  himself  to  secure.  An  opposition  coun- 
cil had  outmaneuvered  him  and  had  rendered  possible  the  cheap- 
er rate  but  on  conditions  which  he  could  not  approve. 

There  are  few  instances  on  record  in  which  mayors  have 
successfully  defied  their  party  and  been  reflected.  Sometimes, 
however,  this  failure  to  secure  a  second  term  has  been  due  pri- 
marily to  other  causes  than  party  defection.  A  conspicuous  ex- 
ample is  found  in  the  career  of  Mayor  Timanus  of  Baltimore,  who 
established  a  gratifying  record  for  independence.  He  refused 
to  countenance  spoils,  yet  won  the  respect  and  support  of  his  own 
party,  and  was  renominated.  His  opponent,  however,  was  a  man 
of  good  character  able  to  command  the  normal  majority  of  the 
opposition  party  and  won  the  election.  There  was  no  evidence 
of  considerable  defection  within  the  ranks  of  Mr.  Timanus'  for- 
mer supporters. 

Among  other  causes  none,  perhaps,  has  been  more  potent  than 
the  principle  of  rotation  in  office.  As  Professor  A.  B.  Hart  ob- 
serves, ' '  Cities  seldom  permit  anyone  to  serve  more  than  .  .  . 
four  years  ...  in  the  mayoralty.  Rotation  in  office  pushes 
a  man  out  just  as  he  is  becoming  a  real  force. ' ' 5  To  this  there 
are,  of  course,  many  exceptions,  but  the  mere  inspection  of  the 
lists  of  "former  mayors"  and  other  municipal  officials  which 

*  See  the  Providence  Conference  on  Good  City  Government,  Proceedings, 
p.  107  (1907)  for  the  mention  of  the  defeat  of  Mayor  Fagan. 

s  Address  at  the  Providence  Conference  of  Good  City  Government,  Pro- 
ceedings, p.  70  (1907). 


154  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [350 

some  cities  publish  in  connection  with  their  manuals  or  reports 
confirms  the  statement.  It  should  be  observed,  of  course,  that 
municipal  executives  in  this  country  have  been  drawn  from  the 
ranks  of  a  busy  citizenship  and  that  quite  often  men  feel  impelled 
to  give  up  their  public  duties  after  a  few  years  in  office  in  order 
to  attend  to  their  own  business  interests.  In  some  cities,  too, 
mayors  may  not  succeed  themselves  and  this  of  course  augments 
the  number  of  changes.  In  other  cases  men  tire  of  the  struggle 
which  the  mayoralty  involves  and  return  to  private  life  at  the 
first  opportunity. 

In  their  efforts  to  gain  control  of  the  mayoralty  with  its  ap- 
pointive power,  parties  and  candidates  do  not  hesitate  to  use  the 
most  deceptive  slogans  as  campaign  bait.  National  party  loyalty 
is  appealed  to,  not  only  in  large  cities  like  Philadelphia  and  Chi- 
cago, but  in  very  many  of  the  smaller  municipalities.6  Opposi- 
tion candidates  are  usually  dubbed  ' '  socialistic ' '  if  they  have  ex- 
hibited the  slightest  disposition  to  question  the  demands  which 
vested  interests  have  made  upon  them,  and  the  description  is 
one  that  has  been  peculiarly  effective  with  conservative  Ameri- 
can electorates.  On  the  other  hand  known  conservatism  invites 
the  charge  of  being  ' '  capitalistic, ' '  and  the  consequent  suspicion 
of  the  labor  and  radical  groups  of  the  voters.  Frequently  such 
aggressive  slogans  as  "Get  Busy,"  "A  Business  Administra- 
tion," "Home  Rule,"  and  "Prosperity"  are  employed  to  rally 
support  and  conceal  from  the  elector  the  true  purpose  of  the 
spoilsman.  A  "Get  Busy"  campaign  waged  in  Philadelphia  in 
1907  seems  to  have  had  particular  reference  to  the  task  of  cir- 
cumventing the  civil  service  law  of  1906  and  of  providing  places 
for  those  "martyrs"  who  had  lost  out  in  the  upheaval  of  1905. 
The  Busse  campaign  in  Chicago  in  1907  was  typical  of  one  con- 
ducted on  a  "Business  Platform. ' '  Mr.  Busse  frankly  recognized 
the  evil  constituents  of  his  party,  saying,  "No  man  can  win  in 
politics  with  the  help  of  the  good  alone.  All  elements  are  neces- 
sary to  success."  In  the  Chicago  mayoralty  contest  of  1915 
there  were  many  issues,  but  it  was  declared  while  the  campaign 
was  on  that  it  was  to  be  a  division  on  national  party  lines  and 
that  the  Wilson  administration  was  on  trial.  The  election  at- 

6  National  politics  and  partisanship  played  a  notoriously  large  part  in  the 
Philadelphia  election  of  1915.  The  ' '  tariff ' '  was  one  of  the  chief  issues  in 
the  campaign. 


351]  THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS  155 

tracted  much  attention  and  the  attitude  of  the  mayor  elect  was 
evidenced  in  the  following  statement  concerning  his  victory: 
"Chicago  has  spoken  to  the  nation  in  this  overwhelming  vote 
given  the  Republican  candidates  today.  It  means  that  Illinois 
and  the  middle  west  will  swing  into  the  Republican  column.  The 
country  can  get  ready  for  a  return  of  prosperity."  The  pros- 
perity appears  to  have  fallen  chiefly  to  the  lot  of  the  party  hench- 
men who  labored  for  the  new  mayor.  The  demoralization  of  the 
municipal  civil  service  stands  out  as  one  of  the  most  striking 
undertakings  of  the  victors. 

When  measures  such  as  the  foregoing  do  not  suffice  the  cam- 
paign tends  to  degenerate  into  vilification.  Candor  and  fair 
play  are  supplanted  by  malice  and  vituperation.  "Mud-sling- 
ing and  muckraking  take  the  place  of  arguments  over  programs 
of  municipal  advance.  Abuse,  slander,  and  falsehoods  are  at  a 
premium  and  eleventh  hour  misrepresentations  are  circulated 
with  cool  and  calculated  effectiveness. ' ' 7  Sham  candidacies  to 
split  the  independent  vote  are  not  uncommon,  and  seldom  fail  to 
lead  astray  some  of  the  unsophisticated.  In  short,  all  the  devices 
known  to  the  political  game  are  so  frequently  called  into  use  in 
struggles  for  the  mayoralty  that  cases  of  gross  and  flagrant  cor- 
ruption stain  the  election  annals  of  every  important  American 
city.  Frequently,  the  worst  offenders  are  either  organized  under 
the  banners  of  a  national  political  party  or  are  closely  affiliated 
with  one. 

With  the  mayoralty  looked  upon  as  a  legitimate  and  desirable 
prize  in  the  warfare  between  the  two  great  political  parties  of 
the  nation,  and  the  consequent  tendency  to  reduce  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  municipal  executive  by  making  him  subservient  to 
party  interests,  it  is  small  wonder  that  mayors  frequently  put 
forth  strenuous  efforts  to  dominate  the  life  and  organization  of 
political  parties.  Occasionally  a  mayor  with  strong  and  vigorous 
personality  and  gifted  with  political  sagacity  will  succeed  in  con- 
trolling not  only  local  party  activities  and  interests  but  in  wield- 
ing a  powerful  influence  in  the  party  life  of  the  state.  There  are, 

7  Striking  examples  of  such  methods  are  found  in  some  of  the  campaigns 
of  Carter  H.  Harrison,  Sr.,  of  Chicago,  Tom  L.  Johnson  of  Cleveland,  and 
"Golden  Eule"  Jones  of  Toledo.  See  Abbot,  W.  J.,  Carter  Henry  Harri- 
son, A  Memoir,  pp.  124-126;  Lorenz,  Carl,  Tom  L.  Johnson,  Mayor  of  Cleve- 
land, p.  24 ;  Whitlock,  Brand,  Forty  Years  of  It,  pp.  130,  131. 


156  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [352 

of  course,  many  more  who  fail  than  there  are  those  who  succeed. 
It  is,  indeed,  an  undertaking  in  which  municipal  executives  rarely 
succeed.  But  it  is  also  one  which  is  inevitably  forced  upon  spirit- 
ed and  ambitious  mayors,  both  in  the  interest  of  the  community 
they  have  been  elected  to  serve  and  for  the  preservation  of  their 
own  independence  of  action.  Such  a  course  is  necessary  also  for 
the  man  who  aspires  to  state  or  national  political  honors.  The 
struggle  for  partisan  advantage  is  so  keen  that  it  becomes  a  ques- 
tion of  the  mayor  controlling  the  party  or  the  party  controlling 
the  mayor.  This  condition  is  likely  to  be  aggravated  in  states  in 
proportion  as  home  rule  is  not  recognized. 

Municipal  history  has  produced  many  mayors  who  have  suc- 
ceeded in  achieving  control  of  the  local  party  organization,  but 
fewer  have  been  able  to  exercise  effective  leadership  in  state  poli- 
tics. Men  like  Carter  H.  Harrison,  Sr.,  of  Chicago,  Mayor  James 
Dahlman  of  Omaha,  and  Tom  L.  Johnson  of  Cleveland,  have  not 
hesitated  to  push  the  organization  of  their  own  party  control, 
even  a  reformer  like  Mr.  Johnson  not  hesitating  to  go  to  question- 
able limits  in  order  to  assure  himself  that  his  policies  and  deci- 
sions would  be  registered  in  law.8  Both  Mayor  Dahlman  and 
Mayor  Johnson  played  an  active  part  in  state  politics  and  sought 
at  one  time  or  another  to  dominate  them.  The  close  relation  be- 
tween the  city  of  Chicago  and  the  political  activities  of  Illinois 
has  always  tended  to  draw  the  mayor  of  the  former  into  the  arena 
of  state  politics.  Mayors  Dunne,  Busse,  Harrison,  Jr.,  and 
Thompson  have  all  figured  with  prominence  in  the  direction  of 
their  respective  parties  in  the  state.  The  temptation  to  build  up 
personal  machines  in  order  to  render  this  party  control  stable 
and  effective  has  been  one  of  the  curses  of  municipal  government. 
It  tends  to  debauch  the  administration  by  giving  more  or  less  free 
rein  to  spoils  appointments;  it  paralyzes  municipal  councils  as 
organs  for  the  discussion  of  public  policies  and  often  reduces 
them  to  the  position  of  mere  vehicles  for  recording  the  executive 
will;9  even  in  the  case  of  well  meaning  men  it  eventually  pro- 
duces astigmatism  of  the  executive  vision,  as  they  confuse  per- 
sonal success  with  the  public  good;  it  invariably  subordinates 

s  Cf.  the  Eeport  of  the  Municipal  Association  of  Cleveland,  a  non-partisan 
organization.  Citation  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Providence  Conference  on 
Good  City  Government  (1907),  pp.  113,  114. 

9  Ibid.     Cf.  also,  Lorenz,  Tom  L.  Johnson,  pp.  89-112. 


353]  THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS  157 

local  policies  and  issues  to  the  considerations  of  expediency  pre- 
sented by  the  political  situation  at  large;  and  in  actual  cam- 
paigns it  tends  to  submerge  the  importance  of  selecting  good 
councilmen  in  the  tide  of  popular  interest  and  absorption  in  the 
selection  of  the  mayor.10 

On  the  other  hand  the  mayor  of  the  average  American  city 
cannot  leave  the  political  situation  either  local  or  general  out  of 
consideration  in  any  of  his  more  important  undertakings.  Doubt- 
less this  is  due  in  part  to  the  political  character  of  the  mayoralty 
and  the  necessity  of  obtaining  support  thru  political  parties. 
Opponents  of  the  mayor  system  and  advocates  of  the  controlled 
executive  plan  have  been  quick  to  seize  upon  the  mayor's  neces- 
sary participation  in  political  life  as  the  chief  menace  to  admin- 
istrative efficiency.  Undeniably  this  is  the  weakest  point  in  the 
mayor  plan.  Political  expediency  demands  and  receives  con- 
sideration at  the  expense  of  quality  in  service  rendered.  But 
the  weakness  is  not  without  its  compensating  advantage,  and  the 
vast  influence  which  a  popularly  chosen  mayor,  the  acknowledged 
leader  of  the  political  life  of  a  community,  may  have  upon  pub- 
lic policy  is  not  to  be  lightly  cast  aside  for  the  divided  counsels 
of  a  municipal  legislature  selected  by  crude  methods  of  securing 
representation  and  commanding  a  somewhat  colorless  expert  ser- 
vice in  administration.  Indeed,  the  emancipation  of  the  city 
from  the  domination  of  state  and  national  political  parties  and 
issues  has  probably  been  hastened  by  the  leadership  of  strong 
mayors.11  Few  believe  that  the  mayor  plan  even  where  most 
perfectly  developed  and  most  satisfactorily  operated  represents 
the  last  word  in  municipal  organization.  But  it  has  represented 
a  distinct  advance,  it  has  contributed  richly  to  the  improvement 
of  American  city  government,  and  it  has  cultivated  that  inde- 

10  The  records  of  the  Municipal  Voter  'a  League  of  Chicago  indicate  how 
much  more  successful  is  the  effort  to  secure  good  councilmen  in  years  when 
there  is  not  also  a  campaign  on  for  the  election  of  mayor.     The  editorials 
and  cartoons  of  the  Chicago  press  during  the  1915  campaign  were  contin- 
ually seeking  to  remind  the  elector  that  the  councilmanic  election  must  not 
be  lost  sight  of  in  the  attention  paid  to  the  struggle  for  the  mayoralty. 

11  Cf.  the  address  of  William  Dudley  Foulke,  retiring  president  of  the 
National  Municipal  League,  delivered  at  Dayton,  Ohio,  November  17,  1915, 
and  published  in  the  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol.  V,  p.  12,  under  the 
title  "Coming  of  Age.     Municipal  Progress  in  Twenty-one  Years,"  espe- 
cially p.  15. 


158  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [354 

pendence  in  the  electorate  which  will  enable  the  achievement  of 
higher  standards  in  administration  and  hasten  the  reduction  of 
partisan  and  political  considerations  to  the  minimum. 

Evidence  of  the  independence  of  the  electorate  with  regard  to 
the  mayoralty  has  been  steadily  accumulating.  Some  very  strik- 
ing examples  are  at  hand.  Mr.  James  Dempsey  was  elected 
mayor  of  Cincinnati  in  1905  in  a  campaign  noteworthy  for  the 
independent  stand  of  Mr.  W.  H.  Taft  against  the  partisan  ma- 
chine dominated  by  Boss  Cox.  Independent  appointments  fol- 
lowed and  the  education  of  the  electorate  began.  The  fact  that 
reform  in  administration  had  a  comparatively  poor  chance  owing 
to  the  hostility  of  the  council  did  not  prevent  the  utilization  of 
the  meager  opportunity  that  was  presented.  The  leadership  of 
Mr.  Taft  came  while  he  was  a  member  of  the  national  adminis- 
tration during  Mr.  Koosevelt's  second  administration.  Doubt- 
less it  encouraged  to  the  point  of  action  many  voters  who  were 
thinking  along  independent  lines.  The  reform  administration  of 
Mayor  Hunt  was  possible  only  because  of  these  earlier  influences 
which  tended  to  ' '  free ' '  the  elector  in  Cincinnati.  Brand  Whit- 
lock 's  career  in  Toledo  followed  close  upon  that  of  "Golden 
Eule"  Jones,  and  produced  an  intelligent  response  that  resulted 
in  a  sympathetic  council.  Tom  L.  Johnson's  repeated  success  in 
Cleveland  was  due  not  only  to  his  political  skill  within  his  own 
party  but  to  the  cultivated  independence  of  voters  in  the  opposite 
party  who  approved  his  conduct  and  policies  in  local  affairs. 

At  one  time  it  was  remarked  that  it  had  become  almost  a  cus- 
tom in  Providence  to  choose  a  mayor  from  the  opposite  party 
than  that  to  which  the  council  belonged,  a  condition  which  did 
not  contribute  greatly  to  harmony  in  the  city  government,  but 
which  justified  itself  under  the  enlightened  leadership  of  Mayor 
McCarthy.  Mr.  McCarthy  sought  the  counsel  of  groups  of  able 
and  prominent  citizens  in  making  up  his  nominations  for  ap- 
pointment and  his  suggestions  to  the  city  council,  thus  throwing 
a  burden  of  proof  upon  that  body  which  they  could  not  lightly 
escape  when  they  refused  to  confirm  his  nominees  or  adopt  his 
proposals.  It  was  easier  to  get  a  Blankenburg  administration 
in  Philadelphia  because  of  the  "revolution"  of  the  first  decade 
of  the  century.  The  Mitchel  regime  in  New  York  is  the  product 
of  an  independence  in  spirit  and  action  that  has  been  fostered 
appreciably  by  so-called  Tammany  mayors  as  well  as  by  fusion 


355]  THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS  159 

and  independent  incumbents  of  the  office.  The  independence  of 
Mayor  Gaynor  was  frequently  the  occasion  of  comment,  tho  he 
was  himself  a  member  of  the  Tammany  society  and  was  elected 
on  a  party  ticket.  Of  course  this  independence  was  not  always 
in  evidence,  but  "the  recent  Tammany  mayors  of  New  York,  Mc- 
Clellan  and  Gaynor,  were  very  much  better  men  than  the  earlier 
ones  such  as  Van  Wyck  or  Grant. ' ' 

Nor  are  these  examples  furnished  by  larger  communities  alone ; 
they  are  becoming  increasingly  common  in  the  smaller  cities. 
The  case  of  the  city  of  Lapeer,  Michigan,  is  rather  unusual,  but 
indicates  the  trend  in  many  small  communities.  The  majority 
of  the  electors  in  Lapeer  are  Protestants,  yet  in  1912  they  elected 
a  Roman  Catholic  priest,  Father  Dunnigan,  as  mayor,  owing  to 
his  attitude  toward  the  liquor  problem  and  despite  the  fact  that 
he  thereby  became  a  member  ex  officio  of  the  school  board.  In 
almost  every  case  the  mayors  are  found  in  the  lead,  even  under 
circumstances  in  which  they  owe  their  election  to  the  very  lack 
of  independence  which  was  formerly  so  common  in  municipal 
politics. 

Altho  undoubted  gains  have  been  made  in  the  character  and 
independence  of  municipal  politics,  stability  is  far  from  assured. 
The  independence  of  the  elector  is  fitful,  originating  sometimes 
in  temporary  disgust,  a  desire  to  chasten,  or  in  reliance  upon  the 
promises  of  the  reform  leaders.  At  times  the  old  fealty  re- 
asserts itself,  or  the  reform  movement  has  struck  closer  home 
than  was  anticipated,  or  has  failed  to  do  all  that  it  promised  to 
do  —  at  any  rate  periods  of  reaction  are  frequent  and  make  up 
many  chapters  even  in  recent  municipal  history.  Often  it  ap- 
pears that  independence  and  struggle  have  been  futile  and  that 
no  results  are  evidenced  by  the  shift  to  the  candidate  of  the  op- 
position. In  other  cases  it  is  much  easier  to  push  forward  the 
tide  of  reform  than  it  is  to  maintain  it.  Political  habits  are  not 
easily  changed.  Yet  in  the  reactions  which  follow  strong  mayors 
and  reform  administrations,  and  despite  many  pyrrhic  victories 
of  independent  movements,  the  city  rarely  slips  back  into  condi- 
tions as  bad  as  they  were  before,  nor  the  elector  into  the  smug 
complacency  or  preoccupation  which  characterized  him  before 
once  being  aroused.  At  times  there  may  be  little  choice  among 
the  candidates  set  before  the  voter  and  the  election  returns  may 
hide  the  record  of  a  brave  tho  unavailing  struggle,  or  a  dignified 


160  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL.   EXECUTIVE  [356 

and  considered  refusal  to  choose.12  Over  a  period  of  years,  how- 
ever, the  evidences  of  progress  are  unmistakable.  To  this  result 
independent  mayors  have  not  failed  to  contribute. 

The  opportunities  which  are  opened  up  in  the  field  of  political 
activity  by  the  increasing  position  of  the  mayor  in  American 
cities  are  vast  and  numerous.  The  clash  of  economic  and  social 
interests,  the  battles  of  industrial  warfare,  and  the  rising  con- 
sciousness of  community  interest  in  the  outcome  of  these  strug- 
gles all  tend  to  elevate  the  mayoralty  in  authority  and  influence. 
Frequently,  it  is  true,  municipal  executives  fail  to  realize  their 
opportunity  to  deal  with  situations  that  are  ominous  and  threat- 
ening, or  more  often  merely  annoying  and  unsatisfactory.  But 
the  number  of  mayors  who  will  interfere  to  settle  a  threatened 
tie-up  of  local  transportation  due  to  the  strike  of  the  employees 
or  the  bulldozing  attitude  of  magnates  in  a  traction  controversy, 
or  who  will  attack  the  problems  of  unemployment,  poor  housing, 
public  extravagance,  and  petty  graft,  is  already  large  and  grow- 
ing. State  associations  of  mayors  are  studying  these  and  other 
municipal  problems ;  a  national  gathering  of  mayors  has  consid- 
ered the  questions  presented  by  public  utilities ;  while  many  chief 
executives  have  seized  upon  chances  to  champion  measures  that 
will  promote  sound  social  organization  and  insure  efficiency. 
Whether  politics  be  considered  as  the  process  of  getting  into  and 
retaining  public  office,  or  be  viewed  in  the  larger  sense  of  devel- 
oping, establishing,  and  maintaining  a  just  and  responsible  or- 
ganization of  society,  such  action  is  more  and  more  recognized 
as  good  politics.  Mayor  Mitchel's  efforts  to  cope  with  unem- 
ployment in  New  York  City  in  1915;  Mayor  Thompson's  settle- 
ment of  the  traction  strike  in  Chicago  in  the  same  year ;  and  De- 
troit's  prompt  organization  of  motor  bus  facilities  for  transpor- 
tation in  reply  to  the  traction  companies  who  threatened  to  cease 
operation  unless  their  demands  for  franchise  privileges  were 
acceded  to;  the  action  of  Mayor  Henry  T.  Hunt  of  Cincinnati 
in  forcing  the  traction  interests  of  that  city  to  arbitrate  the  dif- 
ference with  their  employees  or  to  face  an  action  for  a  receiver- 
ship on  the  ground  that  the  company's  public  duty  was  not  being 

12  Such  was  the  case  in  the  Chicago  election  of  1915.  The  Independents 
failed  to  place  a  candidate  in  the  primary  race  when  Thompson  defeated 
Judge  Olson.  Thousands  felt  there  was  little  to  choose  between  Thompson 
and  his  opponent,  Mr.  Sweitzer. 


357]  THE  MAYOR  AND  POLITICS  161 

performed ;  and  many  other  similar  instances  illustrate  the  pos- 
sibilities of  mayoral  leadership.  The  continued  growth  of  the 
mayoralty  will  be  due  no  less  to  the  influence  and  authority  of 
the  incumbent  in  the  "good  politics"  just  mentioned  than  to  the 
ordinary  and  more  obvious  political  leadership  which  the  office 
has  called  forth. 

The  responsibility  which  attaches  to  the  mayors  of  our  cities 
for  overcoming  the  disturbances  in  municipal  government  due 
to  the  play  of  national  politics  or  to  the  pettiness  of  local  differ- 
ences of  opinion  has  hardly  been  recognized  by  them.  This  re- 
sponsibility belongs  primarily  to  the  mayor  as  a  leader  of  the 
majority  party,  a  leader  whose  business  it  is  to  carry  out  the 
party  program  with  the  least  disturbance  to  the  interests  and 
welfare  of  the  municipality.  But  it  also  inheres  in  the  office  it- 
self. The  mayor  is  something  more  than  a  party  leader.  He  is 
the  official  head  of  the  municipality;  he  is  the  mayor  over  all 
its  inhabitants.  It  is  his  duty  to  study  the  things  that  make  for 
cooperation  and  for  the  suppression  of  irrelevant  or  inconse- 
quential differences.  In  speaking  of  the  failure  of  Mayor  Baker, 
one  of  Cleveland's  most  enlightened  leaders,  to  contribute  mate- 
rially to  the  solution  of  this  pressing  problem,  Professor  C.  C. 
Arbuthnot  says:  "It  behooves  the  majority  in  municipalities 
without  surrendering  the  power  that  the  electors  have  placed  in 
their  hands,  to  put  the  minority  members  into  active  service, 
load  them  with  some  share  of  responsibility  for  the  public  work, 
entangle  them  indeed  in  the  execution  of  the  administration's 
policies  and  by  sheer  force  of  working  together  put  the  minority 
in  a  positive  relation  to  the  city  government.  The  policy  of  iso- 
lating the  group  in  comparative  ineffectiveness  draws  the  parti- 
san line  sharper,  turns  energy  that  should  be  constructive  into 
obstructive  tactics,  sours  the  milk  of  common  interest  and  sacri- 
fices matters  of  local  concern  to  an  over  emphasized  national 
distinction.  The  cities  will  never  begin  to  free  themselves  from 
this  incubus  unless  they  commence  in  substance  as  well  as  in 
form.13  An  enlightened  majority  must  start  the  unloading  proc- 
ess." 

is  The  changes  in  form  referred  to  are  those  which  relate  to  the  altera- 
tion of  the  election  machinery,  especially  those  which  seek  to  eliminate  con- 
tests by  national  parties  on  other  than  local  issues.  Mr.  Baker's  failure  to 
further  the  development  of  this  reform  is  "all  the  more  keenly  felt  because 


162  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [358 

In  concluding  this  review  of  the  relation  of  the  mayor  to  the 
party  and  political  life  of  the  time  it  is  well  to  call  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  large  number  of  municipal  executives  who  have 
served  as  local  political  leaders  have  contributed  a  relatively 
small  proportion  of  the  men  who  have  achieved  recognition  in 
the  political  life  of  the  state  and  nation.  There  are  some  striking 
exceptions,  especially  in  states  like  New  York  and  Illinois  which 
include  great  urban  populations.14  But  too  often  the  exigencies 
of  practical  politics  tend  to  render  the  stronger  man  unaccept- 
able for  the  municipal  service.  When  this  influence  is  supple- 
mented by  the  retirement  of  valuable  public  servants  either 
voluntarily  or  thru  the  tendency  to  pass  offices  around,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  perceive  why  the  cities  do  not  furnish  from  among 
thfeir  executives  a  larger  percentage  of  those  prominent  in  the 
larger  units  of  government.  It  would  seem  to  be  altogether 
desirable  that  men  who  have  experienced  as  valuable  training  as 
the  chief  magistracy  of  modern  cities  affords  should  not  be  lost 
to  a  people  whose  higher  forms  of  government  have  need  of  the 
most  skilled  and  trained  ability.  Fortunately  there  is  encourage- 
ment in  the  number  of  mayors  who  have  won  recognition  from 
state  and  nation  within  the  past  decade. 


Mayor  Baker  has  taught  many  a  republican  in  this  eity  to  forget  national 
party  affiliations  when  voting  for  himself  as  eity  solicitor  or  as  mayor." 
National  Municipal  Review,  Vol.  V,  pp.  235,  236. 

i*  Grover  Cleveland  served  as  mayor  of  Buffalo,  governor  of  New  York 
state,  and  President  of  the  United  States.  Governor  Dunne  of  Illinois  had 
already  served  as  mayor  of  Chicago;  Secretary  of  War  Baker  served  two 
terms  as  mayor  of  Cleveland;  David  R.  Francis,  ambassador  to  Russia, 
served  as  mayor  of  St.  Louis;  Brand  Whitlock,  minister  to  Belgium,  had 
been  mayor  of  Toledo;  and  there  have  doubtless  been  a  number  of  others. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  PERSONALITY  OF  THE  MAYOR 

Ten  years  ago  a  prominent  student  of  municipal  government 
made  the  statement  that  "tho  there  have  been  plenty  of  notable 
governors  there  is  hardly  a  man  in  the  country  who  has  made  a 
national,  or  even  a  state  reputation  as  a  highly  successful  mayor 
of  a  city."  1  In  the  intervening  years  there  have  been  a  number 
of  men  who  have  been  known  within  their  respective  states  for 
their  success  in  the  mayor's  office  and  some  who  have  been  known 
thruout  the  nation  for  the  same  reason.  The  majority,  however, 
may  never  hope  to  achieve  fame  of  more  than  local  scope,  not 
because  their  work  might  not  merit  broader  recognition,  but  be- 
cause of  other  conditions  over  which  they  have  no  control.  The 
facilities  for  extending  a  mayor's  reputation  were  not  so  well 
organized  ten  years  ago  as  they  are  now.  The  formation  of  state 
and  national  mayors'  associations,  of  municipal  leagues,  the  pub- 
lication of  many  journals  devoted  to  the  municipal  field  either 
local,  state,  or  national,  or  to  some  particular  phase  of  municipal 
government,  the  rising  interest  in  municipal  affairs  and  systems 
of  organization,  and  the  striking  advance  in  the  betterment  of 
administration  have  served  to  give  successful  mayors  an  oppor- 
tunity to  achieve  more  than  local  recognition.  Moreover,  there 
has  been  created  during  the  past  quarter  of  a  century  a  constit- 
uency which  is  primarily  interested  in  learning  of  successes  which 
are  worthy,  and  which  keeps  abreast  of  municipal  affairs  in  the 
more  important  cities  and  states,  if  not  in  the  nation  as  a  whole. 
It  must  be  remembered  also  that  many  able  mayors  have  not 
been  men  with  political  ambitions  that  would  lead  them  to  seek 
the  advertisement  and  public  acclaim  essential  to  the  establish- 
ment of  a  so-called  reputation.  Municipal  executives  have  not 
infrequently  been  men  called  from  private  life  for  a  few  years 

1  Address  before  the  Providence  Conference  on  Good  City  Government; 
see  Proceedings,  p.  69  (1907). 

163 


164  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [360 

of  public  service;  then  quietly  reabsorbed  into  the  body  politic 
as  one  of  the  mass.  The  means  by  which  many  of  our  well-known 
public  men  have  come  to  the  front  and  the  rewards  which  suc- 
cess achieved  in  this  way  offers  have  not  attracted  the  attention 
of  individuals  whose  ambition  lies  in  other  channels.  Equally 
true,  too,  is  the  fact  that  the  importance  of  the  mayoralty  as  a 
position  in  the  public  employ  and  as  a  channel  thru  which  to 
serve  the  public  has  been  quite  generally  underrated  when  com- 
pared with  state  and  federal  positions.  The  short  term  which 
formerly  obtained  generally  gave  only  a  few  men  a  tenure  suffi- 
cient to  attain  more  than  local  prominence.  Others  accounted 
it  a  source  of  quick  relief  from  a  very  arduous  and  quite  thank- 
less responsibility.  On  the  other  hand  popular  election  fre- 
quently cut  short  promising  careers  in  the  mayoral  office.  Want 
of  popular  sympathy  with  municipal  programs  and  broad  gauge 
planning  usually  gave  statesmen  small  opportunity  for  leader- 
ship, especially  where  the  council  continued  to  retain  and  exer- 
cise considerable  power  in  administration.  Many  mayors  de- 
spaired because  of  the  mire  of  intrigue,  petty  politics,  ward  and 
district  squabbles  that  must  be  faced  and  mastered  before  con- 
structive movements  could  begin.  These  conditions  have  not  been 
abolished  today,  but  very  marked  improvements  have  taken  place 
and  the  mayoralty  is  tending  to  attract  a  distinctly  abler  class 
of  individuals  into  the  public  service.  This  tendency  will  in- 
crease in  proportion  as  the  conditions  in  municipal  government 
improve  and  as  the  mayor  plan  feels  the  impact  of  other  types  of 
executive  organization. 

No  history  and  description  of  the  mayor's  office  is  adequate 
that  overlooks  the  personality  of  the  incumbent.  There  have 
been  mayors  who  like  some  accomplished  actors  "take  a  small 
part  and  make  of  it  a  great  one. ' '  The  opportunity  to  play  the 
part  with  distinction  comes  to  almost  every  mayor;  it  may  be 
offered  in  the  chance  to  clean  up  corrupt  and  vicious  practices 
in  city  government,  it  may  come  in  a  conflict  with  outside  forces 
that  seek  to  dominate  the  city's  life  and  welfare,  it  may  come  in 
struggles  to  define  and  direct  municipal  programs  of  action,  or 
it  may  appear  in  the  ever  present  problem  of  interpreting  the 
ordinary  powers  and  duties  of  the  office.  The  mayoralty  has 
felt  the  personality  of  great  men  in  every  one  of  these  lines,  and 
in  others.  "Whatever  other  factors  may  contribute  to  the  impor- 


361]  THE   PERSONALITY   OP  THE    MAYOR  165 

tance  of  the  office  in  the  municipal  field  it  owes  much  to  those 
individuals  who  have  left  the  impress  of  their  own  personality 
upon  its  development.  To  portray  that  obligation  fully  would 
require  too  extended  a  treatment,  but  a  survey  of  the  more  im- 
portant personalities  of  the  past  two  decades  will  indicate  its 
extent.  In  earlier  years  one  may  mention  such  remarkable  may- 
ors as  Josiah  Quincy  of  Boston,  in  many  respects  the  most  force- 
ful character  in  the  history  of  the  office,  Mr.  Abram  S.  Hewitt 
in  New  York,  and  Mr.  Carter  Harrison,  Sr.,  of  Chicago,  who  not 
only  made  a  name  for  himself  but  cast  such  a  spell  over  the 
electors  in  his  city  that  a  less  forceful  son  has  been  able  to  exer- 
cise a  predominate  influence  in  Chicago  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  present  century,  he  himself  being  mayor  for  twelve  years.2 
The  record  of  the  mayoralty  in  the  twentieth  century  inspires 
new  hope  and  establishes  hopes  already  aroused  with  regard  to 
the  future  of  city  government  in  the  United  States.  No  index 
to  this  record  is  more  significant  than  the  personalities  of  the 
men  who  have  held  the  office  during  these  years.  It  is  true  there 
have  been  men  of  the  type  of  Eugene  Schmitz  of  San  Francisco 
and  "Doc"  Ames  of  Minneapolis,  men  whose  administrations 
were  malodorous  with  corruption  and  inefficiency,3  and  who  have 
faced  trials  for  misconduct  or  who  have  become  fugitives  from 
justice.  One  can  also  turn  to  the  careers  of  the  great  majority 
to  find  their  work  fairly  honest,  tho  often  characterized  by  medi- 
ocrity, want  of  notable  force  and  vision,  and  subject  to  the  con- 
ventional methods  and  demands  of  practical  politics.  The  record 
of  Carter  Harrison,  Jr.,  of  Chicago  is  typical,  except  in  length 

2  For  an  account  of  the  life  of  .the  elder  Harrison  see  a  work  by  Willis 
John  Abbot,  Carter  Henry  Harrison,  A  Memoir,  New  York,  1895.  Accounts 
of  the  municipal  activities  of  Mr.  Quincy  will  be  found  in  his  Municipal 
History,  etc.,  Boston,  1852,  and  in  the  Memorial  History  of  Boston,  Vol.  III. 
The  nature  of  his  public  service  is  indicated  in  his  closing  address  to  the 
two  houses  of  the  council  sitting  in  convention  at  the  end  of  which  he 
uttered  this  challenge:  "I  inquire,  as  I  have  a  right  to  inquire  .  .  . 
Have  you  found  in  me  anything  selfish,  anything  personal,  anything  mer- 
cenary? In  the  simple  language  of  the  ancient  seer,  I  say:  'Behold  here 
I  am;  witness  against  me.  Whom  have  I  defrauded?  Whom  have  I  op- 
pressed? At  whose  hands  have  I  received  any  bribe?'  " 

s  The  Don  Eoberts  case  in  1915  indicates  that  the  worst  type  of  munic- 
ipal chief  executive  is  not  yet  extinct. 


166  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [362 

of  service.  John  F.  Fitzgerald  of  Boston  and  George  B.  McClel- 
lan  of  New  York  also  belong  to  this  group.  Occasionally  too, 
there  appears  a  mayor  who  is  wanting  in  the  qualities  which 
would  bring  enduring  recognition,  but  who  possesses  a  pictur- 
esqueness  in  personality  and  a  semi-independence  in  action  that 
win  for  him  more  than  local  recognition.  Before  his  election  it 
was  prophesied  of  William  J.  Gaynor  that  with  him  as  mayor, 
"New  York  would  not  know  one  dull  and  uninteresting  day." 
"His  picturesque  and  inscrutable  character  supplied  the  basis 
for  much  genuine  curiosity."  "But  at  least  his  policies  were 
all  his  own.  Citizens  opposed  to  him  were  glad  to  feel  that  their 
chief  executive  was  incapable  of  submitting  to  crude  dictation, 
that  he  had  reasons  or  motives  for  every  official  act  —  in  short, 
that  he  was  mayor  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name."  "His  strong 
and  unusual  personality  will  doubtless  be  remembered  by  New 
Yorkers  for  a  longer  time  and  more  vividly  than  will  any  partic- 
ular acts  and  policies  of  his  administration."  More  frequently 
the  office  attracts  the  type  of  man  quite  commonly  described  as 
a  war  horse  of  reform. 

Recent  years  appear  to  be  evolving  a  new  type  of  mayor,  a 
type  skilled  and  practiced  in  the  art  of  municipal  administration 
and  devoted  to  the  application  of  sound  principles  and  methods 
and  the  development  of  sound  traditions.  It  is  being  justified 
by  its  substantial  achievements.4 

One  of  the  most  unique  personalities  that  has  occupied  the 
mayoral  post  in  this  country  was  Samuel  M.  Jones,  more  famil* 
iarly  known  as  "Golden  Rule  Jones,"  of  Toledo.  Mr.  Jones  was 
considered  eccentric.  In  public  and  in  private  life  he  became 
a  national  and  an  international  figure.  He  tried  to  practice  the 
golden  rule,  not  in  a  limited  sense  but  so  completely  that  "every 
act  of  his  life,  no  matter  how  trifling  and  insignificant  it  may 
have  seemed,  suddenly  took  on  a  vast  and  vital  significance." 
When  the  golden  rule  "seemed  not  to  'work',  he  would  truly  say 
it  was  only  because  he  didn't  know  how  to  work  it."5  In  the 

*  Mitchel  as  mayor  of  New  York  serves  to  illustrate  this  later  type ;  also 
Newton  D.  Baker,  recently  mayor  of  Cleveland,  a  city  declared  by  non- 
resident students  of  city  government  to  be  the  best  governed  city  in  the 
United  States,  a  reputation  for  which  there  was  considerable  basis,  at  least 
up  until  the  close  of  his  administration. 

s  For  a  sympathetic,  yet  searching  portrayal  of  the  career  of  Mayor 


363]  THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE   MAYOR  167 

field  of  municipal  government,  Mr.  Jones,  as  mayor  of  Toledo, 
is  credited  with  two  great  contributions.  In  stating  these,  Mr. 
Brand  Whitlock,  a  later  mayor  of  the  same  city  and  minister  to 
Belgium  during  the  first  years  of  the  Great  War,  says  :6 

"I  regard  it  as  Jones'  supreme  contribution  to  the  thought  of 
his  time  that,  by  the  mere  force  of  his  own  original  character  and 
personality,  he  compelled  a  discussion  of  fundamental  principles 
of  government.  Toledo  today  is  a  community  which  has  a  wider 
acquaintance  with  all  the  abstract  principles  of  social  relations 
than  any  other  city  in  the  land.  .  . 

"Jones'  other  great  contribution  to  the  science  of  municipal 
government  was  that  of  non-partisanship  in  local  affairs.  That 
is  the  way  he  used  to  express  it;  what  he  meant  was  that  the 
issues  of  national  politics  must  not  be  permitted  to  intrude  them- 
selves into  municipal  campaigns,  and  that  what  divisions  there 
are  should  be  confined  to  local  issues. ' ' 

Mayor  Jones'  achievements  as  mayor  differed  from  those  of 
the  ordinary  office  holder.  ' '  There  is  not  a  public  building  which 
he  erected,  no  reminder  of  him  which  the  eye  can  see  or  the  hands 
touch."  Lincoln  Steffens  remarked  of  him,  "Why,  that  man's 
program  will  take  a  thousand  years. ' '  Nevertheless,  his  attitude 
toward  public  service  franchises,  toward  the  right  of  society  to 
inflict  punishment,  toward  machine  controlled  politics,  and  the 
rights  of  property  made  a  distinct  impression  upon  his  city. 
With  regard  to  the  problem  of  the  enforcement  of  law  in  cities, 
Jones  must  be  hailed  as  a  major  prophet.  For  the  policeman's 
club,  or  the  rigors  of  the  law  as  a  means  of  "making  people 
good"  he  had  no  use.7  He  believed  that  only  hatred,  not  love, 
could  appear  in  the  processes  of  force,  and  therefore  he  shunned 
them.  His  leniency  was  the  despair  of  conventional,  orthodox,  or 
reforming  folk,  who  opposed  him  bitterly.  Being  an  independ- 
ent in  politics,  he  was  relentlessly  opposed  by  the  organized  polit- 

Jones  see  Brand  Whitlock 's  Forty  Years  of  It,  pp.  112-150.  A  collection  of 
his  letters  have  also  been  published  by  the  Bobbs-Merrill  Co.  of  Indian- 
apolis. 

e  Forty  Years  of  It,  pp.  137,  138. 

7  His  position  on  this  subject  is  probably  most  lucidly  expressed  by  his 
fellow  worker,  and  disciple,  Mr.  Whitlock,  in  his  "Open  Letter"  addressed 
to  certain  "Representatives  of  the  Federation  of  Churches,  Toledo,"  pub- 
lished in  booklet  form,  Indianapolis,  1913.  The  letter  was  written  in  1910. 


168  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [364 

ical  forces  of  the  community,  especially  the  Republican  party  or- 
ganization. Aided  by  fellow  partisans  who  controlled  the  Ohio 
state  legislature  a  special  act  was  secured  which  deprived  the 
mayor  of  Toledo  of  control  over  the  police  force  and  gave  it  to 
the  governor  of  the  state  operating  thru  an  appointive  com- 
mission. Jones'  determined  resistance  to  this  statute  resulted  in 
the  reversal  by  the  courts  of  doctrines  and  precedents  long  estab- 
lished and  the  overthrow  of  "the  whole  fabric  of  municipal  legis- 
lation in  the  state,"  opened  up  the  entire  question  of  the  status 
of  municipalities  in  relation  to  the  state,  and  gave  the  oppor- 
tunity for  the  agitation  which  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  a  lib- 
eral measure  of  home  rule  by  the  constitutional  amendments  of 
1912.  Says  Mr.  Whitlock,  "the  decision  had  ultimate  far-reach- 
ing effects  in  improving  the  conditions  in  Ohio  cities,  and  was  the 
beginning  of  a  conflict  that  did  not  end  until  they  were  free  and 
autonomous. ' ' 8 

Few  men  have  left  a  more  permanent  mark  upon  municipal 
life  and  thot  in  this  country  than  Tom  L.  Johnson  of  Cleve- 
land. He  was  among  the  first  to  give  a  practical  demonstration 
of  what  was  meant  by  clean  administration  at  a  time  when  the 
movement  to  purify  municipal  politics  and  government  was 
acquiring  popularity  and  momentum.9  Under  him  Cleveland 
became  one  of  the  best  and  most  honestly  governed  cities  in 
America.10  "To  the  last  Mayor  Johnson  and  his  administration 
marched  abreast  with  the  times  assimilating  and  putting  into 
practice  the  most  advanced  theories  on  the  governing  of  a  modern 
city. ' '  "  Cleveland  became  a  source  of  inspiration  for  the  advo- 
cates and  friends  of  clean  and  honest  administration  everywhere. 
Representatives  of  other  cities  came  to  see  and  to  study.  John- 
son's  methods  were  often  new  and  original,  for  Cleveland  was  a 
sort  of  laboratory  or  experiment  station  as  well  as  a  live,  going 
concern. 

Even  more  important  than  the  foregoing  was  Mr.  Johnson's 
struggle  for  municipal  freedom;  freedom  from  the  domination 

s  Forty  Years  of  It,  p.  137. 

9  Cf.  Carl  Lorenz,  Tom  L.  Johnson,  Mayor  of  Cleveland,  p.  85. 

10  Lincoln  Steff ens  called  Johnson  ' '  the  best  mayor  of  the  best  governed 
city  in  the  United  States."     Cf.  McClure's  Magazine,  July,  1905.     Also, 
Lorenz,  Tom  L.  Johnson,  p.  48,  expressed  the  same  opinion. 

n  Lorenz,  Tom  L.  Johnson,  pp.  49,  50. 


365]  THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE    MAYOR  169 

of  privileged  interests  and  from  the  restrictions  imposed  by  state 
law.  To  do  this  it  was  necessary  to  awaken  and  educate  the 
Cleveland  electorate  on  the  vital  problems  of  the  municipality. 
He  succeeded  so  well  "that  they  overthrew  him,  when  they  be- 
lieved that  his  usefulness  had  come  to  an  end.  Today  the  people 
of  Cleveland  are  perhaps  better  versed  in  public  affairs  than  the 
citizens  of  any  other  city  of  the  United  States. ' ' 12  One  observer 
concludes,  ' '  he  did  perhaps  more  than  any  other  man  in  America 
to  make  possible  the  coming  of  the  free  city  in  this  land. ' ' 13 
Another  believes  that  "his  struggle  for  three-cent  railway  fares 
in  Cleveland,  which  was  but  a  roundabout  method  of  securing 
municipal  ownership  in  a  state  where  the  legislature  in  those 
days  would  not  permit  cities  to  own  their  public  utilities,  was 
his  great  work. ' ' 14 

Whether  one  accepts  the  judgment  of  his  friends  and  sup- 
porters or  the  more  moderate  views  of  detached  observers  one  is 
impressed  with  the  strong  personality  of  Mr.  Johnson  and  the 
extent  to  which  it  pervaded  every  branch  of  the  administration 
of  which  he  was  the  head.  Mr.  Whitlock  pictures  it  as  follows : 
"I  used  to  like  to  go  over  to  Cleveland  and  meet  that  charming 
group  Johnson  had  gathered  about  him.  There  was  in  them  a 
spirit  I  never  saw  in  such  fullness  elsewhere ;  they  were  all  work- 
ing for  the  city,  they  thought  only  of  the  success  of  the  whole. 
They  had  the  city  sense,  a  love  of  their  town  like  that  love  which 
undergraduates  have  for  their  university,  the  esprit  de  corps  of 
the  crack  regiment."  Tho  a  man  with  a  vision  of  Cleveland 
as  "  a  city  set  on  a  hill, ' '  he  was  essentially  a  man  of  action.  Mr. 
Johnson  was  aggressive,  resourceful,  and  dissatisfied  with  aught 
less  than  domination  in  any  undertaking  in  which  he  was  in- 
volved. The  latter  characteristic  he  once  clearly  expressed  in 
reply  to  a  proposal  from  Mark  Hanna  for  a  partnership  and  the 
consolidation  of  their  interests.  Mr.  Johnson  refused  on  the 
ground  that  he  and  Hanna  were  too  much  alike ;  that  ' '  as  associ- 
ates it  would  be  a  question  of  time,  and  a  short  time  only  until 
one  of  us  would  '  crowd  the  other  clear  off  the  bench. '  " 15  His 

12  Lorenz,  Tom  L.  Johnson,  p.  65. 
is  Whitlock,  Forty  Tears  of  It,  p.  174. 
i*  Ibid. 

is  Tom  L.  Johnson,  My  Story,  New  York,  1913,  p.  25.  This  autobiog- 
raphy is  not  the  least  among  Mr.  Johnson's  contributions  to  municipal  gov- 


170  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [366 

love  for  power  and  political  ambition  was  mingled  with  admitted 
sincerity  of  purpose  and  desire  to  serve  the  public  interest. 
Selfishness  and  personal  hatred  undoubtedly  asserted  themselves 
at  times  during  his  career  but  they  were  the  errors  of  a  well 
meaning,  determined  leader.  There  were  other  apparent  contra- 
dictions in  this  great  mayor  who  "liked  a  straight  course  and 
went  a  crooked  way"  —  at  times.  In  the  end  the  very  training 
and  traits  of  character  that  made  him  a  valuable  and  indis- 
pensable leader  in  the  terrific  struggle  his  city  was  making  for 
the  privilege  of  working  out  its  own  salvation  proved  to  be  his 
undoing,  once  victory  had  been  won.18 

There  can  be  no  question  of  the  added  significance  which  Mr. 
Johnson  gave  the  mayoralty  as  a  result  of  his  incumbency.  ' '  The 
secret  of  a  good  executive,"  he  writes  in  his  autobiography,  "is 
this  —  one  who  always  acts  quickly  and  is  sometimes  right. ' ' 17 
He  was  possessed  with  what  he  calls  a  "civic  consciousness"  in 
addition  to  superior  ability  and  a  reputation  as  a  successful  busi- 
ness man.  He  had  no  use  for  boodlers  nor  for  many  of  the  ways 
of  practical  politics,  though  his  skill  in  political  strife  was  usually 
of  a  high  order.  But  above  all  else  he  set  a  new  standard  for 
constant  and  persevering  labor  in  behalf  of  the  public  interest, 
for  fearless  and  tenacious  struggle  in  its  behalf,  and  developed 
and  exhaustively  exploited  the  powers  of  the  office.  The  mayor- 
alty had  a  different  meaning  in  Cleveland  when  he  left  it  than  it 
had  when  he  entered  upon  its  duties,  and  the  value  and  impor- 
tance of  this  change  has  not  been  lost  upon  other  municipal 
executives. 

Two  of  the  remarkable  figures  that  have  held  the  mayoralty 
since  the  opening  of  the  present  century  are  Henry  T.  Hunt  of 
Cincinnati  and  Rudolph  Blankenburg  of  Philadelphia.  Both 
men  were  essentially  "reform"  mayors.  The  political  conditions 
in  the  respective  cities  were  somewhat  different,  but  there  was 
little  to  choose  between  them  as  regards  the  depth  of  their  degra- 

ernment  in  this  country.  It  should  have  a  wide  reading  among  municipal 
officials,  many  of  whom  have  doubtless  profited  from  its  perusal  since  it  was 
first  published  in  1911. 

i« Mr.  Lorenz's  chapter  entitled  "A  Pyrrhic  Victory"  illuminates  this 
statement.  Cf.  also  Mr.  Whitlock,  Forty  Tears  of  It,  p.  174. 

n  My  Story,  pp.  121,  122.  Mr.  Johnson  admits  many  mistakes  in  his 
early  appointments,  for  example,  cf.  pp.  121,  167. 


367]  THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE   MAYOR  171 

dation.  Hunt  had  his  council  with  him,  Blankenburg  did  not. 
Both  men  refused  to  compromise  with  their  supporters'  demands 
for  the  spoils  of  victory  and  thus  alienated  many.18  The  failure 
to  take  account  of  "politics"  betrayed  idealistic  tendencies  which 
the  municipal  electorate  was  not  educated  to  appreciate  and  left 
their  reform  programs  without  that  cohesive  and  substantial 
support  which  is  still  usually  necessary  for  victory  at  the  polls. 
Both  were  opposed  by  machine  organizations  that  had  been  long 
organized  and  that  were  implacable.  By  their  impartial  execu- 
tion of  law  both  men  alienated  some  of  those  who  had  been 
friendly  to  them.  Hunt  was  charged  with  having  exploited  the 
powers  of  the  office  unduly ;  Blankenburg  with  failure  to  exhaust 
them  in  the  fulfilment  of  some  of  his  pledges.19  Their  person- 
alities were  different  in  many  respects.  Hunt  was  young,  and 
had  served  in  the  state  legislature  and  as  prosecuting  attorney  of 
the  county.  He  was  "single-minded,  brave,  outspoken,  able."20 
The  leading  press  of  the  country  joined  in  praise  of  his  charac- 
ter, ability,  faithfulness,  judgment,  loyalty  to  public  interest, 
and  his  progressive  attitude  toward  social  betterment.21  Mr. 
Blankenburg,  on  the  other  hand,  had  long  been  associated  with 
the  movement  for  reform  in  Philadelphia  and  at  the  time  of  its 
culmination  was  looked  to  as  "the  one  man  qualified  for  the 
task"  which  the  reformers  had  undertaken.22  He  was  a  typical 
"war  horse"  in  agitation,  picturesque  and  severe  in  his  denun- 
ciations. He  was  courageous,  enthusiastic,  even  vehement  in  his 

!8  In  both  cities  the  campaigns  had  been  waged  on  the  promise  that  no 
wholesale  displacement  of  office  holders  should  take  place.  The  keeping  of 
that  promise  proved  costly  in  each  case.  Cf.  National  Municipal  Review, 
Vol.  Ill,  pp.  519,  520,  for  a  discussion  of  the  procedure  followed  by  Mr. 
Hunt,  and  Vol.  V,  pp.  213  and  223,  for  the  discussions  of  the  course  taken 
by  Mr.  Blankenburg. 

19  Ibid.,  pp.  522,  523  in  Vol.  Ill,  and  218-220  in  Vol.  V. 

20  Cf.  "Mayor  Hunt's  Administration  in  Cincinnati,"  by  A.  Julius  Frei- 
berg in  the  National  Municipal  Review,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  518. 

21  See  Harpers'  Weekly,  October  11,  1913;  Boston  Transcript,  September 
24,  1913;  New  York  Evening  Post,  September  20,  1913;  Chicago  Tribune, 
October  13,  1913.     Extracts  from  these  and  other  editorial  opinions  that 
appeared  during  the  campaign  for  reelection  were  published  as  a  part  of  a 
pamphlet  entitled  "An  Account  of  the  Administration  of  Henry  T.  Hunt 
and  His  Associates. ' ' 

22  Editorial  in  the  Philadelphia  North  American  for  January  3,   1916, 
reproduced  in  the  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol.  V,  pp.  217-222. 


172  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [368 

temperament,  qualities  which  found  motive  power  in  his  ' '  innate 
abhorrence  of  venality,  chicanery  and  oppressive  abuses."  He 
was^experienced,  however,  in  public  administration.  One  observ- 
er judges  his  work  as  follows :  "Very  few  men  with  such  a  tem- 
perament possess  also  in  large  degree  the  virtues  which  enter  into 
the  making  of  a  successful  administrator  in  an  extensive  public 
office  elected  by  the  people  and  involved  in  active  politics.  Pa- 
tience, reticence,  a  shrewd  knowledge  of  human  nature,  practical 
concentration  of  purpose,  a  keen  perception  of  public  opinion  in 
all  its  fluctuations  and  eccentricities,  the  faculty  for  ready  co- 
operation with  all  sorts  of  men  who  represent  the  varied  life  of 
the  community,  and  the  cool  judgment  or  insight  by  which  the 
useful  man  discerns  the  things  which  can  be  done  and  avoids 
those  which  can 't  be  done  are  among  the  qualities  which  are  to  be 
found  in  the  mayoralty  or  any  kindred  office  when  it  is  well  and 
satisfactorily  administered.  In  these  respects  Mr.  Blankenburg 
has  not  been  strong.  But  in  honesty,  in  sincerity,  in  a  sense  of 
fidelity  to  conception  of  the  mayoralty  as  a  trust,  in  a  pure  love 
of  the  city  and  in  eagerness  to  serve  it  to  the  very  best  of  his 
ability,  there  is  no  man  among  us  to  whom  he  stands  second. ' ' 2S 
Both  Mr.  Hunt  and  Mr.  Blankenburg  appear  to  have  had  the 
faculty  of  being  able  to  select  able  subordinates;  and  to  retain 
their  devotion  and  respect.  Of  the  two  Mr.  Hunt  appears  to 
have  been  the  more  practical  in  his  turn  of  mind,  Mr.  Blanken- 
burg the  more  visionary.24  Hunt  was  defeated  for  reelection; 
Blankenburg  was  ineligible  to  succeed  himself  and  his  protege 
was  defeated.  Nevertheless  each  man  contributed  to  the  concep- 
tion of  what  a  mayor  should  be,  and  this  contribution  was  a 
general  one.  Their  administrations  attracted  wide  attention  in 
other  cities  and  their  achievements  made  impossible  a  complete 

23  Cf.  article  by  William  Perrine  in  the  Philadelphia  Evening  Bulletin, 
December  30,  1915,  and  published  in  the  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol. 
V,  pp.  223,  225. 

24  "  It  is  in  the  understanding  of  the  underlying  principles,  and  sympathy 
with  the  problems  of  the  people,  that  the  mayor   (Blankenburg)    and  his 
assistants  have  done  their  best."    One  recalls  also  the  "courses"  which  the 
mayor  and  members  of  his  staff  took  in  the  University  of  Wisconsin.     The 
value  of  Mr.  Blankenburg 's  vision  of  municipal  problems  should  not  be 
underestimated.     The  calling  of  the  conference  of  American  mayors  to  con- 
sider "Public  Policies  as  to  Municipal  Utilities"  may  prove  to  be  one  of 
the  principal  achievements  of  his  administration. 


369]  .        THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE   MAYOR  173 

return  to  former  conditions  in  their  respective  cities.  Mr.  Blank- 
enburg,  by  calling  the  first  "Conference  of  American  Mayors" 
to  meet  in  Philadelphia,  November  12-14,  1914,  made  a  distinct 
contribution  to  the  development  of  a  spirit  of  professional  service 
in  the  ranks  of  municipal  executives  (a  development  which  it 
must  be  recognized  is  yet  in  the  embryonic  stage)  and  gave  new 
meaning  to  the  halting  progress  which  has  often  attended  the 
efforts  to  organize  effective  associations  of  municipal  executives, 
or  to  the  work  which  those  already  in  existence  were  accomplish- 
ing in  the  various  states.  Nor  did  it  fail  to  call  the  attention  of 
the  cities  to  the  fact  that  fundamentally  their  public  utility  prob- 
lems are  very  much  alike.  Mr.  Hunt  continues  to  be  an  active 
contributor  to  the  understanding  and  solution  of  municipal  prob- 
lems in  general  and  in  such  effort  his  practical  experience  and 
observations  are  invaluable  factors. 

Two  mayoralties  in  recent  years  constitute  developments  that 
are  little  short  of  epochal,  viz.,  the  Baker  administrations  in 
Cleveland  and  the  Mitchel  regime  in  New  York.  Both  Newton 
D.  Baker  and  John  Purroy  Mitchel  were  experienced  and  trained 
public  servants  before  they  were  elected  mayors.  Mr.  Baker  had 
been  city  solicitor  while  Tom  L.  Johnson  was  in  power  and  had 
made  a  splendid  record  for  efficient  service  in  that  capacity. 
Upon  him  fell  the  mantle  of  his  chief  when  Cleveland  denied  to 
Mr.  Johnson  continued  support.25 

Mr.  Baker  was  a  ' '  scholar  in  the  mayor 's  office, ' '  a  man  unlike- 
ly to  renew  the  " storm  and  stress"  of  the  Johnson  period,  yet 
imbued  with  devotion  to  the  public  interests  and  equally  deter- 
mined that  they  should  find  expression  and  protection.  He  faced 
the  ' '  wearing  task  of  constructive  and  conciliatory  upbuilding  of 
the  city's  interests.  The  mayor's  aptitude  for  positive  achieve- 
ment fitted  him  well  for  the  need  of  the  time.  He  showed  a 
power  of  adjustment  and  an  ability  for  negotiation  that  reduced 
strained  relationships,  and  sought  the  equitable  way  out  of  con- 
flicts between  public  and  private  interests.  .  .  To  draw  a 
parallel  between  his  career  and  that  of  the  general  run  of  mayors 
in  this  country  would  be  provocative  of  adulation  distasteful  to 
a  man  of  his  fine  fiber.  .  .  That  he  will  rank  in  history  as 

25  There  was  an  interval  of  two  years  between  their  periods  of  service, 
this  being  the  period  of  Mayor  Baehr's  term. 


174  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [370 

one  of  the  few  great  mayors  of  American  cities  is  certain. ' ' 26 
The  personal  qualities  which  contributed  to  his  success  as  mayor 
were  "a  splendid  intelligence  influenced  by  a  wholesome  sym- 
pathy," a  personality  that  was  "radio-active,  graciousness,  a 
cultivated  taste,  and  a  wide  intellectual  outlook,  united  with  a 
catholicity  in  judgment. ' ' 27  Coupled  with  his  political  idealism 
there  was  an  insight  into  the  practical  which  gave  him  the  ap- 
pearance, at  times,  of  being  an  opportunist,  especially  in  his  rela- 
tion to  party  politics.28  The  contribution  of  Mayor  Baker  to  the 
mayoralty  lies  not  merely  in  the  failures  or  successes  of  his 
administration,  striving  as  it  did  to  consummate  a  worthy  munic- 
ipal program,  but  is  rather  to  be  found  in  his  expression  and 
cherishing  of  ' '  a  civic  spirit  of  extraordinary  vitality. ' ' 29  He 
imparted  to  it  elevation,  assisted  it  to  consciousness  of  its  powers 
and  possibilities,  and  gave  to  it  leadership  and  opportunity. 
Such  achievements  are  rare  among  statesmen  in  American  democ- 
racy and  that  they  should  have  been  recorded  in  municipal 
administration  is  most  significant.  Cleveland's  example  and 
influence  will  long  encourage  recognition  and  stimulate  the  devel- 
opment of  like  leadership  in  other  cities.  As  for  Mr.  Baker,  it 
is  noteworthy  that  he  found  large  range  for  his  ability  in  the 
office  of  secretary  of  war.  Indeed  it  is  indicative  of  the  altered 
character  of  American  municipal  administration  that  the  national 
government  is  drawing  many  of  its  servants  from  the  ranks  of 
those  who  have  served  their  respective  cities  well. 

While  still  a  young  man  when  chosen  mayor  of  New  York  City 
in  1913,  Mr.  Mitchel  brought  to  the  office  previous  training  in 
the  city's  service.  Under  Mayor  McClellan  he  had  been  commis- 
sioner of  accounts,  and  for  the  four  years  prior  to  his  election 
as  mayor  he  had  been  president  of  the  board  of  aldermen,  a  posi- 

2«  Cf.  article  by  Prof.  C.  C.  Arbuthnot  on  ' '  Mayor  Baker 's  Administra- 
tion in  Cleveland,"  National  Municipal  Review,  Vol.  V,  pp.  226  ff.  The 
above  quotation  is  found  on  pp.  240,  241.  This  survey  of  the  Baker  admin- 
istration is  appreciative,  yet  free  from  partisan  exaggeration;  critical  yet 
without  taint  of  antagonism.  It  is  a  refreshing  portrayal  of  the  subject 
dealt  with.  Mayor  Baker's  failures  and  unfinished  tasks  are  indicated  as 
well  as  his  successes. 

27  Hid.,  p.  240. 

28  Ibid.,  p.  235. 

29  Ibid.,  pp.  239,  240.     Mr.  Baker  not  only  helped  to  draft  the  Cleveland 
charter  but  enjoyed  during  his  two  terms  as  mayor  the  opportunity  of  in- 
terpreting it. 


371]  THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE   MAYOR  175 

tion  which  also  made  him  a  member  of  the  board  of  estimate  and 
apportionment  and  enabled  him  to  exercise  a  powerful  influence 
in  the  determination  of  municipal  policy  under  Mayor  Gaynor. 
For  a  short  time  he  had  served  the  national  government  as  col- 
lector of  the  port  of  New  York.  Altogether  he  brought  an  un- 
usual fund  of  experience  to  the  office  of  mayor,  a  fact  that  was 
the  more  significant  inasmuch  as  he  had  shown  himself  loyal  to 
principles  of  sound  administration,  viz.,  economy,  efficiency,  and 
fidelity  to  the  public  interest.  In  speaking  of  the  general  contri- 
bution which  Mr.  Mitch  el's  administration  has  made  to  munic- 
ipal government  Mr.  Henry  Bruere  says: 

' '  It  has  given  the  city  a  government  of  a  non-partisan  charac- 
ter. It  has  emphasized  the  professional  character  of  municipal 
administration  by  seeking  qualified  experts  for  administrative 
positions.  It  has  brought  to  the  forefront  the  social  welfare 
aspects  of  government  activity,  and  given  emphatic  and  continu- 
ing emphasis  to  economy  and  efficiency. 

"The  administration  has  not  had  presented  to  it,  nor  has  it 
created  an  opportunity  for  general  popular  appeal.  It  has  kept 
itself  in  the  position  of  recognizing  from  week  to  week  and  month 
to  month  the  obligation  it  assumed  on  entering  office  to  conduct 
the  affairs  of  the  city  government  with  efficiency  and  to  devote 
the  resources  of  the  city  exclusively  to  public  welfare. ' ' 30 

The  personal  qualities  which  enabled  Mr.  Mitchel  to  make  a 
distinct  success  as  mayor  of  the  country's  metropolis  were  in 
keeping  with  the  solid  and  substantial  character  of  his  public 
service.  He  was  a  man  of  clear  perceptions,  broad  vision,  and 
courage.  His  insight  was  demonstrated  in  the  establishment  of 
an  executive  budget  by  the  exercise  of  powers  which  the  mayor 
already  possessed.  He  was  skilled  in  the  art  of  securing  effective 
cooperation,  both  on  the  part  of  subordinates  and  from  those  not 
in  the  public  service.  Says  Mr.  Bruere,  "the  mayor  [Mr. 
Mitchel]  has  not  stood  alone  in  the  traditional  isolation  of  New 
York's  chief  executive.  He  has  had  the  sympathetic  and  effective 
cooperation  of  his  fellow  members  of  the  board  of  estimate  and 
apportionment.  .  . 

so  Ibid.,  Vol.  V,  p.  24.  The  article  by  Mr.  Bruere  from  which  the  quota- 
tion is  taken  is  an  illuminating  discussion  of  the  subject,  "Mayor  Mitchel 's 
Administration  of  the  City  of  New  York. ' '  It  covers  the  first  two  years  of 
his  term. 


176  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [372 

"I  do  not  recall  in  any  previous  administration  an  equal  use 
of  cooperating  citizen  committees.  Committees  not  only  repre- 
senting all  classes  of  citizens  and  types  of  interests  have  been 
summoned  to  assist  in  the  consideration  of  problems  of  emergent 
or  continuing  character,  but,  what  is  of  greater  consequence, 
practical  results  have  been  obtained  from  this  cooperation.  Not 
only  have  there  been  committees  appointed  by  the  mayor  on  such 
questions  as  unemployment,  markets,  ports,  terminals  and  taxes, 
but  various  department  heads  have  affiliated  with  their  activities 
interested  groups  of  citizens  to  assist  them  either  in  developing 
public  interest  or  providing  special  experts  to  help  in  solving 
technical  questions. ' ' 31  Mr.  Mitchel  impressed  the  public 
with  his  sincerity  as  well  as  his  ability,  and  the  want  of  ' '  politi- 
cal pharisaism"  did  not  fail  to  evoke  an  enthusiastic  response 
from  the  public. 

It  is  important,  also,  that  Mr.  Mitchel  retained  the  point 
of  view  of  a  true  representative  of  municipal  democracy.  He 
said,  "Everybody  wants  to  see  the  mayor  and  see  him  person- 
ally ...  no  matter  how  trivial  the  business  .  .  .  they 
feel  they  must  see  the  mayor.  He  is  called  upon  to  keep  the  door 
of  his  office  open  to  the  public,  and  after  all  it  is  proper  that  he 
should,  because  the  public  ought  to  have  direct  contact  with  the 
mayor ;  people  ought  to  have  access  to  him,  and  he  must  reserve 
enough  time  to  see  the  people  who  come  to  the  office  and  want  to 
see  him."  This  view  contrasts  strongly  with  that  of  Tom  L. 
Johnson,  who  advised  Mr.  Brand  Whitlock  as  follows :  ' '  Don 't 
spend  too  much  time  in  your  office.  A  quarter  of  an  hour  each 
day  is  generally  too  long,  unless  there  are  a  whole  lot  of  letters. 
Of  course,"  he  went  on  reflectively,  "you  can  get  clerks  who  can 
sign  your  name  better  than  you  can. ' '  Patience,  tact,  and  execu- 
tive ability  of  a  high  order,  especially  his  powers  of  selection  and 
decision,  and  undoubted  promptness  and  forcefulness  in  action, 
have  all  aided  in  making  conspicuous  Mr.  Mitchel 's  ' '  exceptional 
success  in  doing  the  right  thing  in  the  right  way  both  at  the  out- 
set of  his  administration  and  as  each  successive  emergency  has 
arisen. ' ' 32 

si  Ibid.,  pp.  24,  25.  Mr.  Bruere  contrasts  his  political  sincerity  with  the 
customary  ' '  political  pharisaism ' '  in  the  city 's  administration  and  describes 
the  city's  enthusiastic  response. 

32  Mr.  Johnson  is  also  reported  as  defining  executive  ability  as  follows: 


373]  THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE   MAYOR  177 

Moreover,  one  finds  in  Mr.  Mitchel's  record  evidences  of  the 
qualities  of  initiative  and  thoroness,  both  being  abundantly 
demonstrated  in  his  labors  in  behalf  of  the  city  during  the  ses- 
sions of  the  New  York  state  legislature.  Indeed  his  thoroness 
in  the  formulation  and  presentation  of  the  city's  interests  made 
it  difficult  for  "vicious  and  unwise  measures"  to  be  passed,  and 
easier  for  necessary  and  desirable  measures  to  secure  support. 
This  was  especially  noticeable  in  the  legislative  session  of  1916, 
tho  his  efforts  fell  short  of  being  crowned  with  complete  suc- 
cess, particularly  his  efforts  to  curb  appropriations  that  would 
necessitate  an  increase  of  taxation  in  New  York  City. 

It  is  altogether  too  early  to  define  in  detail  Mr.  Mitchel's  con- 
tribution to  the  mayoralty  except  as  related  to  New  York  City. 
Of  one  thing,  however,  those  interested  in  the  future  of  municipal 
administration  may  well  feel  assured,  viz.,  that  a  new  standard 
has  been  set  for  the  office  in  the  principal  city  of  the  land,  and 
that  this  standard  cannot  fail  to  be  felt  elsewhere.  Mr.  Bruere 
prophesied  as  follows:  "New  York's  present  administration 
promises  to  be  the  climax  of  a  period  of  progressive,  hard-won 
transition  and  the  beginning  of  a  period  of  revolutionary  change 
in  the  government  of  the  city. ' ' 33  There  can  be  no  question  but 
what  the  character  and  position  of  the  office  has  been  strength- 
ened, a  result  which  can  hardly  fail  to  be  felt  in  mftny  other 
cities.  It  is  rather  significant,  also,  that  the  mayor  system  has 
evolved  two  administrations  headed  by  men  who  can  satisfy  the 
demand  for  skilled  and  trained  executives  just  at  the  moment 
when  the  city  manager  plan  appears  to  lay  special  emphasis  upon 
the  necessity  for  public  servants  of  that  type. 

The  roll  of  those  who  have  left  their  impress  upon  the  mayor- 
alty has  by  no  means  been  exhausted.  One  likes  to  think  of  the 
constructive  leadership  of  Mr.  Vance  McCormick  of  Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania,  a  leadership  conspicuous  for  pluck,  determination, 
and  earnest  spirit,  and  notable  results.34  The  initiative  and  devo- 

"  It 's  the  simplest  thing  in  the  world ;  decide  every  question  quickly  and  be 
right  half  the  time  and  get  somebody  who  can  do  the  work.  That's  all  there 
ia  to  executive  ability."  Brand  Whitlock  in  Forty  Years  of  It,  p.  207. 
See  also  the  National  Municipal  Eeview  for  the  estimate  of  the  success  of 
Mr.  Mitchel's  administration,  Vol.  V,  p.  24. 

33  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol.  V,  p.  24. 

s* Cf.  article  on  "The  Harrisburg  Plan:   Celebration  of  a  Dozen  Years 


178  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [374 

tion  of  the  Hon.  James  M.  Head  as  mayor  of  Nashville,  Ten- 
nessee, placed  that  municipality  under  lasting  obligation  to  him 
for  the  modern  character  of  its  franchise  grants  and  other  for- 
ward looking  steps.35  Portland,  Maine,  recognizes  in  the  mayoral 
service  of  James  P.  Baxter  the  loyalty  and  public  spirit  of  "a 
citizen,  who,  more  than  any  other  man  in  his  generation,  has 
devoted  himself  in  many  ways  to  her  [Portland's]  welfare, "  hav- 
ing held  the  office  for  six  terms.36  Toledo  shares  with  Belgium 
the  fortune  of  having  known  the  ability  and  sympathy  of  Mr. 
Brand  Whitlock,  one  who  has  done  much  to  place  the  "police 
problem"  and  the  problem  of  law  enforcement  in  their  proper 
settings  and  so  to  hasten  their  ultimate  solution,  a  consummation 
of  immediate  importance  to  every  municipality.  It  was  his  priv- 
ilege also  to  have  no  unimportant  part  in  the  campaign  which  won 
for  constitutional  home  rule  the  approval  of  the  Ohio  electorate, 
a  fitting  climax  to  eight  years  of  earnest  effort  in  the  mayor's 
chair.37  Space  permits  but  the  mention  of  the  late  Seth  Low 
of  New  York,  of  Messrs.  David  I.  Jones  of  Minneapolis,  William 
B.  Thompson  of  Detroit,  George  F.  Cotterill  of  Seattle,  James 
Rolph  of  San  Francisco,  and  James  N.  Adam  of  Buffalo,  to  say 
nothing  of  executives  in  smaller  cities  and  with  less  opportunity 
to  gain  wide  repute,  many  of  whom  have  done  service  in  the 
development  and  maintenance  of  the  rising  standards  and  tradi- 
tions of  the  mayoralty.38  It  should  be  observed  also  that  men 

of  Municipal  Betterment,"  by  J.  Horace  McFarland  in  the  National  Muni- 
cipal Review,  Vol.  V,  pp.  71  ff.  It  should  be  noted  that  Mr.  MeFarland 
himself  had  the  honor  to  be  singled  out  as  the  "one  man  above  others  who 
stands  out  preeminently  as  a  patriot  in  all  these  years  of  improvement 
campaigns  .  .  ." 

ss  Atlantic    City    Conference   for    Good    City    Government   Proceedings, 
1905,  p.  296  et  seq. 

36  See  Proceedings  of  the  Atlantic  City  Conference  on  Good  City  Govern- 
ment, pp.  170-180.     This  conference  was  held  in  1906.     See  also  the  Pro- 
ceedings of  the  Providence  Conference,  1907,  p.  27. 

37  Few  men  have  given  us  a  clearer  picture  of  some  of  the  problems  of 
the  mayoralty  than  has  Mr.  Whitloek  in  his  book,  Forty  Tears  of  It.     For 
the  account  of  his  own  struggles  and  labor  in  that  position  see  especially  pp. 
205  ff.     See  also  his  open  letter  "On  the  Enforcement  of  Law  in  Cities," 
published  in  booklet  form,  1913. 

as  For  further  information   concerning  Mayor  Jones,   see  statement  by 
Stiles  P.  Jones,  Proceedings  of  the  New  YorTc  City  Conference  on  Good  City 


375]  THE   PERSONALITY   OF  THE   MAYOR  179 

who  have  not  become  mayors  have  made  their  contribution  to  the 
development  of  higher  standards  in  becoming  candidates  at  the 
times  when  the  public  interest  demanded  an  effective  protest,  and 
often  to  no  small  sacrifice  to  themselves.  There  are  probably 
very  few  cities  that  could  not  furnish  similar  examples  of  public 
spirited  citizens  who  have  aided  the  cause  of  good  government 
in  this  fashion,  even  when  without  well  based  hope  of  immediate 
success. 

In  this  brief  review  of  the  men  who  have  been  successful 
mayors  during  recent  years  it  is  noticeable  that  only  men  who 
possess  executive  ability  to  an  extraordinary  degree  can  credit- 
ably fill  the  office.  Mr.  Tom  L.  Johnson  defined  executive  ability 
as  follows :  ' '  It 's  the  simplest  thing  in  the  world ;  decide  every 
question  quickly  and  be  right  half  the  time.  And  get  somebody 
who  can  do  the  work.  That's  all  there  is  to  executive  ability." 
But  Mr.  Johnson's  definition  is  incomplete.  It  overlooks  the 
imponderables.  Mr.  Whitlock,  with  finer  insight,  puts  it  thus: 
"Executive  ability  is  a  mysterious  quality  inhering  in  personal- 
ity, and  partaking  of  its  mysteries. ' ' 39  This  statement  does  not 
imply  that  personality,  though  possessed  and  cultivated,  is  a 
mark  of  executive  ability.  It  rather  summarizes  the  observations 
and  facts  which  have  been  noted  in  this  chapter.  The  municipal 
executives  who  have  contributed  to  the  significance  and  growth 
of  the  mayoralty  have  been  men  of  strong  and  vigorous  person- 
ality. Their  work  becomes  most  intelligible  only  when  the  men 
themselves  are  known;  tho,  on  the  other  hand,  they  may  fre- 
quently be  known  in  their  works.  It  is  not  intended  here  to 
attempt  any  definition  or  analysis  of  the  mysteries  of  personal- 
ity.40 The  truth  of  Mr.  Whitlock 's  statement  is  obvious.  The 
debt  of  the  American  mayoralty  to  men  of  personality  consti- 
tutes an  obligation  that  had  assumed  large  proportions  by  the 
close  of  Josiah  Quincy's  six  years  service  as  chief  magistrate  in 

Government,  1905,  pp.  120-132.  For  the  record  of  Mayor  Thompson  see 
notations  in  Providence  Conference  Proceedings,  1907,  p.  119,  and  in  the 
National  Municipal  Review,  Vol.  I,  p.  726.  Mr.  Thompson  won  special 
recognition  for  his  probe  of  graft  in  the  city  council,  an  investigation  which 
was  privately  financed  and  which  involved  eighteen  aldermen,  a  number  of 
whom  confessed. 

39  Forty  Tears  of  It,  p.  205. 

40  Cf.  The  Eiddle  of  Personality,  by  H.  Addington  Bruce. 


180 


THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE 


[376 


Boston,  that  continued  to  increase  during  the  years  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  and  that  has  been  tremendously  augmented  dur- 
ing the  opening  years  of  the  present  era  of  municipal  renais- 
sance. For  at  best  its  powers  and  possibilities  sink  to  the  level 
of  the  commonplace  when  disassociated  from  the  personal  qual- 
ities of  its  incumbents.  Municipalities  can  ill  afford  to  neglect 
the  personality  of  those  who  would  administer  their  affairs  and 
represent  them  before  the  state  and  nation. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER1 

The  movement  for  concentration  of  power  and  responsibility 
in  municipal  government  received  a  tremendous  impetus  from 
the  success  of  the  commission  plan  in  Galveston  and  later  in 
Houston.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  this  plan  the  movement 
had  found  expression  chiefly  in  the  growth  of  the  mayoralty. 
FBOHI  the  time  of  the  tidal  wave  of  1901  it  has  been  expressed 
in  a  variety  of  forms,  notably  the  commissionership  and  the  man- 
agership in  addition  to  the  mayoralty.  Beginning  with  Galves- 
ton a  mayor-president  and  a  group  of  four  commissioners  —  the 
latter  a  term  that  is  primarily  administrative  in  meaning  —  were 
entrusted  with  all  the  legislative  and  executive  functions  of  the 
municipality.  Since  that  time  approximately  four  hundred 
cities  have  adopted  the  essential  principles  of  the  commission 
plan.2  Most  of  them,  however,  add  features  which  aim  at  very 
complete  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  commissioners  to  the 
electorate  and  which  make  it  possible  for  the  latter  to  act  directly 
in  the  expression  of  its  will.  In  all  cases,  however,  the  concen- 
tration of  executive  power  remains  intact. 

While  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  consider  the  chief 
executive  office  under  the  commission  system  it  is  essential  to  call 
attention  at  the  beginning  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the  "predom- 
inating" features  of  the  plan  is  a  much  greater  concentration  of 
power  than  the  mayoralty  had  ever  known.  It  is  in  this  larger 
measure  of  power  that  the  chief  executive  under  the  commission 
plan  shares  and  in  the  exercise  of  which  he  has  a  prominent  and 

1  This  term  is  a  combination  of  the  official  titles  ' '  mayor ' '  and  ' '  com- 
missioner,"  the  chief  executive  serving  in  both  capacities  under  the  com- 
mission plan. 

2  In  reality  all  but  two  of  the  cities  participating  in  this  movement  toward 
commission  government  have  joined  it  since  1907,  a  fact  that  emphasizes  the 
rapidity  with  which  it  has  spread. 

JL81 


182  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [378 

influential  part.  While  in  many  cases  he  retains  some  of  the 
powers  which  he  formerly  enjoyed  under  the  mayor  and  council 
form,  his  relative  position  as  chief  executive  is  very  much  weaker 
than  is  that  of  the  mayor,  for  there  are  other  executives  with  im- 
portant powers.  Nevertheless  it  is  altogether  too  early  to  affirm 
that  the  relative  weakness  of  the  mayor-commissioner  in  the  com- 
mission plan  will  continue.  The  Royal  Commission  on  Municipal 
Government  of  the  Province  of  British  Columbia  reported  in 
1912  that  "the  tendency  ...  is  strongly  toward  one-man 
government."3  Others  have  observed  that  there  is  the  oppor- 
tunity for  the  mayor-commissioner  to  acquire  a  ' '  dominating  in- 
fluence." Certainly  the  chief  executive  under  the  commission 
form  is  in  a  more  favorable  position  than  was  the  mayor  of  a 
century  ago. 

By  way  of  general  description  it  may  be  said  that  the  mayor- 
commissioner,  mayor-president,  or  whatever  title  he  may  be 
given,  is  the  principal  member  of  the  small  group  of  from  three 
to  seven  commissioners  to  whom,  under  the  commission  plan,  is 
entrusted  the  determination  of  public  policy  and  the  adminis- 
tration of  public  affairs  in  a  city.  He  is  usually  the  head  of  a 
department  over  which  he  exercises  immediate  supervision.  As 
a  rule,  also,  he  enjoys  a  general  supervisory  authority  over  the 
other  departments,  headed  by  his  fellow  commissioners.  He  is 
the  ceremonial  head  of  the  corporation  in  matters  of  a  social  or 
legal  nature.  In  municipal  legislation  he  is  an  active  partici- 
pant, being  the  presiding  officer  of  the  commission,  having  a  vote 
upon  all  matters,  and  enjoying  certain  other  powers  of  varying 
degrees  of  importance.  Apart  from  the  commission  plan  of  gov- 
ernment viewed  as  a  whole  the  office  of  mayor-commissioner  has 
received  little  or  no  study,  yet  both  because  it  is  differentiated 
from  the  rest  of  the  commission  and  because  of  its  inherent  pos- 
sibilities it  is  worthy  of  attention  and  study. 

I.     CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONERSHIP 

The  title  of  mayor  is  generally  employed  to  distinguish  the 
chief  member  of  the  commission  from  the  other  members  who  are 
known  as  commissioners  or  councilors.  The  early  Galveston 
charter  retained  the  title  and  combined  it  with  that  of  the  presi- 

sEeport,  published  at  Victoria,  B.  C.,  1913,  p.  16. 


379]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  183 

dent  of  the  board  of  commissioners,  and  the  recent  Buffalo  char- 
ter provides  that  one  of  the  five  members  of  the  council  shall  be 
styled  the  mayor.  There  have  been  a  number  of  cases,  however, 
in  which  the  title  has  been  dropped.  In  some  Ohio  cities,  in  Mar- 
shall, Texas,  and  in  the  North  Dakota  statute  of  1907  the  title  of 
chairman  or  president  is  substituted  for  that  of  mayor.  The  title 
is  occasionally  applied  to  one  holding  an  office  who  is  compara- 
tively distinct  from  the  commission  proper,  as  in  St.  Paul,  Min- 
nesota. 

Qualifications 

The  qualifications  which  obtain  for  the  office  of  mayor  under 
the  commission  plan  are  usually  the  same  as  those  laid  down  for 
members  of  the  commission.4  A  number  of  charters  require  can- 
didates to  be  citizens  either  of  the  state  or  of  the  United  States  or 
of  both.  In  some  of  the  cities  of  Alabama  the  charter  specifies 
citizenship  in  the  city.  The  requirement  of  residence  is  quite 
general  but  the  length  of  it  varies  greatly.  In  Chattanooga, 
Tennessee,  it  is  one  year;  in  New  Jersey  and  in  some  cities  of 
Oklahoma,  two  years ;  in  Portland,  Oregon,  three  years ;  in  Oak- 
land, California,  four  years,  and  in  Houston,  Texas,  five  years. 
In  a  majority  of  cases  the  mayor  must  have  been  a  qualified 
elector.  While  Denver  was  under  commission  government  the 
mayor  had  to  qualify  as  a  tax  payer.  In  Chattanooga  he  must 
be  a  freeholder  at  the  time  of  his  election  and  in  Kentucky  and 
Nebraska  it  is  merely  provided  that  he  shall  be  of  "good  char- 
acter." The  age  qualification  ranges  from  twenty-one  years,  a 
figure  that  is  usually  determined  by  the  provision  that  the  candi- 
date shall  be  an  elector,  to  twenty-five  years  in  Oklahoma  City 
and  some  of  the  cities  of  Alabama,  and  to  thirty  years  in  Chatta- 
nooga. In  the  latter  city  the  age  requirement  for  the  mayoralty 
is  five  years  higher  than  that  fixed  for  the  office  of  commissioner. 

In  addition  to  the  legal  qualifications  which  are  imposed  upon 
candidates  for  the  office  of  mayor-commissioner  there  are  certain 
conditions  which  operate  to  disqualify  individuals  from  holding 
the  office  and  which  in  effect  tend  to  become  qualifications  that 

*  In  a  number  of  important  cases  no  qualifications  are  mentioned  in  the 
city  charter.  Cf.  charters  of  Buffalo,  New  Orleans,  and  Pasadena,  Calif. 
Inasmuch  as  considerations  of  availability  are  really  of  much  greater  im- 
portance than  are  the  legal  qualifications,  this  would  seem  to  be  a  step  in 
the  right  direction. 


184  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [380 

those  who  seek  the  office  must  satisfy.  Frequently  the  incumbent 
must  be  able  to  devote  his  whole  time  to  the  work  of  the  office. 
He  is  often  forbidden  to  hold  any  other  public  position.5  In 
many  cases  he  may  not  be  interested  in  contracts  or  franchises, 
nor  be  an  employee  of  any  holder  of  a  contract  or  franchise.  A 
few  charters  provide  that  he  may  not  be  indebted  to  the  state, 
city,  or  county  for  taxes,  nor  have  been  convicted  of  malfeasance 
in  office,  bribery,  or  other  corrupt  practice.  In  Dallas,  Texas, 
he  is  excluded  from  being  a  member  of  any  political  party  or 
serving  on  any  party  committee. 

How  Chosen 

The  process  of  choosing  the  mayor  under  the  commission  plan 
presents  many  variations.  Three  methods  of  nomination  are  in 
vogue,  the  convention  method,  the  direct  primary,  and  nomina- 
tion by  petition.6  Of  these  the  direct  primary  enjoys  the  most 
favor,  the  petition  method  being  a  poor  second  and  the  conven- 
tion method  being  rarely  employed.  Under  the  direct  primary 
method  petitions  in  the  form  of  statements  of  candidacies  are 
sometimes  employed,  and,  in  the  absence  of  any  system  of  prefer- 
ential voting,  the  primary  election  becomes  a  qualifying  election 
to  determine  which  candidates  shall  be  nominated  to  the  office. 
This  procedure  is  both  costly  and  cumbersome.  Owing  to  the 
embarras  des  richesses  in  the  number  of  candidates  who  "are 
willing  to  govern  ...  at  from  $3,000  to  $6,000  a  year" 
some  means  for  weeding  out  candidacies  appears  to  be  impera- 
tive.7 The  primary  election  serves  this  purpose  in  a  crude  way, 
e.g.,  "the  two  candidates  receiving  the  highest  number  of  votes 
for  mayor  shall  be  the  candidates  and  the  only  candidates  whose 

s  Exceptions  are  usually  made  to  permit  him  to  be  a  notary  public  and  to 
hold  a  place  in  the  militia. 

« For  the  convention  method  see  the  charter  of  Huntington,  Va.  The 
Illinois  general  law  relating  to  the  commission  form  incorporates  the  direct 
primary  method.  See  also  the  general  acts  of  Nebraska  and  Pennsylvania 
and  the  charters  of  Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  Wilmington,  Del., 
and  others.  The  charter  of  Portland,  Ore.,  and  the  late  charter  of  Denver, 
Colo.,  provide  for  nomination  by  petition.  The  charter  of  Dallas,  Tex., 
permits  nominations  by  "written  requests,"  petitions,  primaries,  the  pro- 
visions governing  these  methods  being  found  in  Art.  3,  Sees.  2-5. 

7  In  the  first  election  of  Spokane  ninety-two  candidates  appeared  for  the 
office  of  commissioner,  there  being  five  places  to  be  filled. 


381]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  185 

names  shall  be  placed  upon  the  ballot  for  mayor"  at  the  regular 
election.  In  Dallas  any  candidate  for  the  office  of  mayor  who 
receives  a  majority  of  votes  at  the  first  election  is  declared  elect- 
ed, but  failing  a  majority  on  the  part  of  any  one  of  the  candi- 
dates a  second  election  is  held.  Nomination  by  petition  together 
with  a  system  of  preferential  voting  as  worked  out  in  a  few  cities 
appears  to  be  preferable. 

The  election  of  the  mayor  is  brot  about  in  one  of  three 
different  ways.  In  some  cities  he  is  a  candidate  for  the  office  of 
mayor  and  is  elected  to  this  office  by  popular  vote.8  In  others 
any  candidate  for  the  office  of  commissioner  who  receives  the 
highest  number  of  votes  cast  for  commissioners  thereby  becomes 
the  head  of  the  commission  and  receives  the  title  of  mayor.9  In 
still  other  instances  the  voters  elect  commissioners  only  and  the 
latter  elect  one  of  their  number  to  act  as  mayor.10  It  will  be 
readily  perceived  that  the  position  of  the  mayor  is  much  stronger 
when  he  is  chosen  by  the  first  method,  while  under  the  third  his 
responsibility  to  the  commission  and  dependence  upon  it  appears 
fairly  complete.  Of  course,  the  full  significance  of  election  by 
the  commission  as  contrasted  with  election  by  the  voters  can  be 
developed  only  as  it  obtains  over  a  longer  period  of  time  than 
has  elapsed  since  its  introduction.  It  is  significant  that  two  cities 
which  approved  of  election  by  the  commission  have  returned  to 
popular  election,  Denver  by  the  abolition  of  commission  govern- 
ment and  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  by  charter  amendment. 

The  proportion  of  votes  necessary  to  elect  under  popular  elec- 
tion ranges  from  a  plurality,  or  a  " preponderance,"  in  Galves- 
ton,  New  Orleans,  and  in  some  other  cities,  to  a  clear  majority, 
the  rule  in  most  places.  The  majority  result  is  possible  usually 
because  of  the  action  of  the  direct  primary  election  in  eliminating 

s  Cf.  the  charter  of  Dallas,  Tex.,  Art.  3,  See.  2 :  "  Candidates  for  mayor 
and  for  places  on  said  board  of  commissioners  shall  be  voted  for  separate- 
ly." Also  the  charter  of  Oakland,  Art.  5,  See.  14,  and  Art.  4;  the  charter 
of  Portland,  Sees.  18a,  18b,  22,  and  35.  The  charters  of  Buffalo,  New  Or- 
leans, and  many  other  cities  and  the  general  laws  of  Illinois,  Iowa,  Alabama, 
Pennsylvania,  and  some  other  states  provide  for  popular  election. 

9  See  the  general  act  of  W.  Va.,  Art.  5,  Sec.  20.     Also  the  charter  of 
Wilmington,  N.  C.,  amended  in  1913  to  provide  for  popular  election. 

10  This  practice  was  introduced  in  New  Jersey  in  1911.     Laws,  Chap. 
GCCLXVI,  Sec.  3.     Cf.  also  charters  of  Spokane,  Art.  3,  Sec.  9,  and  Pen- 
sacola,  See.  9. 


186  THE  AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [382 

all  but  two  candidates  for  the  office.  In  a  number  of  cities,  Grand 
Junction,  Colorado,  being  an  example,  the  majority  result  is  se- 
cured by  the  adoption  of  a  form  of  preferential  voting.  Of  the 
three  methods  of  making  the  count,  the  plurality  system  has  the 
least  to  recommend  it,  while  the  preferential  system  contains 
sufficient  promise  to  gain  for  it  increasing  recognition  and  adop- 
tion among  cities  operating  under  this  form.11 

Removal  from  Office 

The  determination  of  municipal  electorates  to  find  effective 
means  by  which  they  may  get  rid  of  undesirable  public  servants 
is  abundantly  manifest  by  the  provisions  to  be  found  in  commis- 
sion government  charters.  Of  these  provisions  the  most  common 
is  the  recall.  It  is  present  in  the  general  acts  of  many  of  the 
states  and  in  numerous  special  charters.12  It  is  applicable  to  the 
mayor  as  well  as  to  the  other  commissioners.  The  next  most  im- 
portant method  of  removal  is  by  a  vote  of  the  commission,  a  pro- 
cess which  usually  obtains  where  the  commission  elects  the  mayor 
and  sometimes  in  other  cases  also.13  Mayors  may  also  be  removed 
by  judicial  proceedings  as  well  as  by  the  recall  or  other  process. 
In  Huntington,  West  Virginia,  there  is  created  a  Citizen's  Board, 
popularly  chosen,  and  competent  to  remove  municipal  officials 
for  certain  causes  specified  in  the  state  constitution.  In  New 
York  the  governor  may  remove  the  mayor  as  in  the  case  of  cities 
operating  under  the  mayor  and  council  plan.  Impeachment  as 
well  as  the  recall  are  available  in  Houston  and  Corpus  Christi, 
Texas.  In  Louisiana  the  constitution  provides  for  removal  by 

11  The  preferential  system  has  been  adopted  since  1909  in  more  than  a 
score  of  the  cities  under  commission  government.     For  list  of  them,  see 
Equity,  Vol.  XVII,  p.  51  (January,  1916).     For  explanation  of  the  prefer- 
ential system  see  article  on  "Preferential  Voting,"  by  Robert  Tyson  in 
Beard's  Digest  of  Short  Ballot  Charters,  p.  21501. 

12  Bradford,  Commission  Government  in  American  Cities,  p.  276.     To  the 
list  given  by  Mr.  Bradford  should  be  added  the  states  of  Georgia,  Florida, 
Missouri,   Nebraska,   Wisconsin,    and   perhaps   some   others.     The   recall   is 
usually  found  in  special  charters. 

is  In  Battle  Creek,  Mich.,  by  a  vote  of  four-fifths  of  the  commission ;  in 
Bluefield,  W.  Va.,  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  commission.  In  Kentucky 
the  vote  must  be  unanimous  on  the  part  of  the  other  members.  Cf.  Act  of 
1910.  In  Denver  the  mayor  was  not  only  chosen  by  the  commission  but 
was  "removable  at  will"  by  it  under  the  charter  discarded  in  1916. 


383]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  187 

the  district  court  upon  suit  instituted  at  the  written  request  of 
twenty-five  resident  tax  payers. 

Term  of  Office 

The  term  of  office  of  the  mayor-commissioner  is  usually  the 
same  as  that  of  his  fellow  commissioners  and  varies  from  one  to 
six  years.  In  some  cases,  however,  the  mayor  serves  for  a  shorter 
term.  Thus  in  Pensacola,  Florida,  the  mayor  is  elected  by  the 
commission  and  serves  for  but  one  year,  a  situation  which  is 
doubtless  related  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the  three  commissioners 
is  elected  each  year,  making  the  body  a  continuing  one.  The 
shorter  term  for  the  mayor  is  also  found  in  certain  cities  in  Okla- 
homa and  California.  In  the  Kentucky  general  act,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  term  of  the  mayor  is  four  years,  that  of  the  commis- 
sioners but  two.  Practice  is  far  from  uniform  as  to  the  time  at 
which  the  mayor  shall  be  chosen,  even  in  those  cities  and  states 
in  which  the  length  of  the  mayor's  term  is  the  same  as  that  of 
the  commissioners.  In  many  cases  the  mayor  and  the  other  com- 
missioners are  all  elected  at  the  same  time ;  in  others  the  mayor 
and  part  of  the  commission  are  chosen  at  one  election,  the  remain- 
ing commissioners  at  another.1*  As  a  rule,  however,  this  varia- 
tion does  not  appear  to  affect  the  length  of  the  term  for  which  the 
mayor  is  elected. 

The  Filling  of  Vacancies 

In  the  filling  of  vacancies  in  the  mayoralty  the  commission 
plan  is  far  from  achieving  uniformity  of  method  in  the  cities 
which  have  adopted  it.  Four  principal  methods  are  employed; 
of  these  two  are  much  more  important  than  are  the  others.  The 
first  in  importance  is  that  of  the  temporary  appointment  or  elec- 
tion by  the  commission  "  of  an  eligible  person ' '  to  fill  the  vacancy 
until  the  next  general  municipal  election,  at  which  time  "the 
vacancy  shall  be  filled  by  election  for  the  unexpired  term. ' '  This 
method  obtains  in  Buffalo,  Portland  (Oregon),  Oakland  and 
Pasadena  (California),  Chattanooga  (Tennessee),  Spokane,  Okla- 
homa City,  Pensacola  (Florida),  the  third  class  cities  of  Utah, 

i*  For  further  discussion  of  the  length  of  the  term  and  the  practice  of 
alternating  elections,  see  Bradford,  pp.  157-160.  The  author  points  out  (p. 
160)  that  the  average  term  of  the  mayor  is  somewhat  shorter  than  the  aver- 
age term  of  the  commissioners,  a  fact  which  may  indicate  some  recognition 
of  his  greater  authority  and  the  need  for  proportionately  greater  control. 


188  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [384 

and  many  other  places.  Of  like  importance  are  the  provisions 
found  in  the  general  laws  of  Illinois,  New  Jersey,  Nebraska,  and 
in  the  charters  of  St.  Paul,  Birmingham,  Wilmington  (North 
Carolina),  and  other  cities  granting  to  the  commission  the  power 
to  fill  such  a  vacancy  "during  the  balance  of  the  unexpired 
term."  In  both  of  these  methods  the  task  which  the  council 
performs  is  important,  but  in  the  second  method  the  failure  to 
resort  to  popular  election  is  worth  noting,  especially  as  this  fea- 
ture has  been  made  the  object  of  attack  by  those  who  have  opposed 
the  adoption  of  the  commission  plan  in  cities  proposing  to  come 
under  it.  Of  the  other  two  methods  in  vogue  that  of  calling  a  spe- 
cial election  to  fill  the  vacancy  appears  to  be  the  most  important. 
It  is  found  in  the  charters  of  Lowell  and  Lynn  (Massachusetts), 
Houston  (Texas),  the  general  act  for  second  class  cities  in  Ken- 
tucky, and  some  other  cases.15  The  last  important  method  of 
filling  vacancies  is  that  provided  for  in  cities  between  twenty-five 
and  fifty  thousand  inhabitants  in  Alabama,  in  which  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  state  makes  the  appointment  for  the  remainder  of  the 
unexpired  term.16 

Vacancies  are  defined  in  terms  very  similar  to  those  employed 
under  the  mayor  system.  Death,  resignation,  removal,  absence 
from  the  city  for  a  specified  period,  usually  six  months,  incom- 
petency,  judicially  declared,  failure  to  qualify,  continued  disa- 
bility, or  conviction  for  felony  constitute  the  causes  which  are 
declared  to  effect  a  vacancy.17  In  the  case  of  Portland,  Oregon, 
and  a  few  other  cities  the  voluntary  acquisition  of  an  interest 
in  public  service  enterprises  or  public  contracts  operates  to  va- 
cate the  office  ' '  at  once. ' ' 18 

is  Lowell,  Charter,  See.  56.  If  the  vacancy  occurs  within  four  months 
prior  to  the  annual  city  election  the  council  is  authorized  to  fill  the  vacancy. 
The  same  is  true  in  Lynn.  See  Charter,  Sec.  60 ;  but  no  such  exceptions  are 
made  in  the  other  eases  cited.  C/.  Kentucky,  Act  of  1910  as  amended  in 
1912,  See.  22;  and  Houston,  Charter,  Art.  9,  Sec.  17a,  an  amendment  of 
1913. 

i«  See  Act  of  1911  as  adopted  by  Montgomery,  See.  14.  The  fact  that 
the  act  was  intended  to  apply  primarily  to  the  capital  of  the  state  may  be 
significant  in  this  case.  In  Pensacola  the  governor  appoints  temporarily 
under  certain  circumstances. 

17  Cf.  the  charter  of  Spokane,  Art.  2,  Sec.  8 ;  also  the  general  act  for 
cities  of  the  second  class  in  Kentucky,  Sec.  22. 

is  Charter,  Sec.  18f.     "If  he  shall  become  so  interested  otherwise  than 


385]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  189 

As  under  the  mayor  system,  the  commission  plan  knows  an 
"acting  mayor"  or  "mayor  pro  tern,"  who  is  usually  selected 
by  the  commission  or  council  from  among  its  own  number,  tho 
in  cities  in  which  there  is  a  president  of  the  council  in  addition 
to  the  mayor,  the  president  becomes  the  acting  mayor.19  The 
acting  mayor  enjoys  the  powers  of  the  mayor  and  performs  his 
duties  during  the  temporary  absence  or  disability  of  the  mayor, 
subject  to  the  restriction  that  in  matters  admitting  of  delay  he 
shall  await  the  return  of  the  mayor.20  In  Houston,  Texas,  the 
mayor  pro  tern  acts  during  the  interim  between  the  occurrence 
of  a  vacancy  and  the  holding  of  the  special  election  and  enjoys 
' '  all  the  rights  and  powers  of  the  Mayor,  and  performs  all  of  his 
duties. ' '  In  some  cases,  as  in  Buffalo,  the  office  of  acting  mayor 
is  not  provided  for,  the  council  merely  being  authorized  to 
choose  another  presiding  officer  temporarily  but  nothing  more. 

Salaries 

The  mayor-commissioner  is  usually  paid  a  larger  salary  than 
his  fellow  commissioners.  There  is  no  agreement  in  the  practice 
of  the  various  states  and  cities  in  this  regard,  however,  and  the 
difference  in  the  amounts  paid  to  the  mayor  and  to  a  commis- 
sioner ranges  from  little  or  nothing  at  all  to  several  times  the 
salary  of  the  commissioner.21  Both  of  these  extremes  are  excep- 

voluntarily  he  shall  within  ninety  days  divest  himself  of  such  interest,  and 
failing  to  do  so  his  office  shall  become  vacant  upon  the  expiration  of  the 
said  period  of  ninety  days."  This  provision  supplements  that  part  of  the 
section  cited  above. 

19  As  in  the  city  of  Portland,  Ore.     See  Charter,  Sec.  19.     Cf.  also  Lynn, 
Mass.,  Charter,  Sec.  60.     The  method  of  selecting  the  mayor  pro  tern  shows 
some  variations.     In  Houston,  the  mayor  nominates  him  from  among  the 
aldermen  at  the  first  regular  meeting  of  the  council.     He  receives  no  addi- 
tional salary.     See  Charter,  Art.  4,  See.  2.     In  other  cases  the  president  of 
the  council  is  elected  by  the  council,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  Illinois  the  com- 
missioner of  accounts  and  finance  is  by  state  law  made  vice  president  of  the 
council  and  becomes  acting  mayor.     See  Act  of  1910,  Sec.  32. 

20  Cf.  Houston,  Charter,  Art.  6,  Sec.  3 ;  also  Lynn,  Sec.  61.     The  restric- 
tions in  Houston  have  to  do  more  particularly  with  the  exercise  of  the  ap- 
pointive power.     In  Kentucky  cities  the  acting  mayor  appears  to  be  without 
limitations  except  those  operating  in  case  of  the  mayor  also.     Some  char- 
ters omit  the  "rights  and  powers"  but  impose  the  "duties"  upon  the  tem- 
porary incumbent. 

21  Waco,  Tex.,  pays  its  commissioners  one  thousand  dollars  and  its  mayor 


190  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [386 

tions  to  the  usual  custom  which  gives  the  mayor  anywhere  from 
one-seventh  to  four-fifths  more  than  the  commissioners  receive.22 
There  are  a  few  cities,  however,  which  make  no  distinction  be- 
tween the  mayor  and  the  other  members  of  the  commission  in 
this  particular.  With  but  few  exceptions  the  mayor-commis- 
sioner is  better  paid  than  was  the  mayor  under  the  old  form  of 
government.  The  salaries  to  be  paid  are,  as  a  rule,  specified  by 
the  charter  or  by  the  law  of  the  state,  but  in  Wilmington,  North 
Carolina,  the  council  is  permitted  to  exercise  its  discretion  within 
a  prescribed  maximum  of  three  thousand  and  minimum  of  eight- 
een hundred,  the  mayor  having  no  vote  on  this  question. 

Miscellaneous  Features 

There  are  comparatively  few  miscellaneous  features  found  in 
connection  with  the  constitution  of  the  mayor-commissionership, 
and  none  of  them  may  be  called  characteristic  of  the  office  as 
differentiated  from  the  other  places  on  the  commission.  The 
prescription  of  the  oath  of  office,  the  process  of  induction  into 
the  position,  etc.,  are  similar  to  like  features  described  under  the 
mayor  system.  The  incumbent  must  give  bonds,  the  amount  of 
which  is  often  quite  large.  Provision  is  sometimes  made  for  sec- 
retarial and  other  assistance.  In  none  of  these  respects,  how- 
ever, has  the  mayoralty  under  the  commission  system  developed 
any  marked  departures  from  that  which  obtains  under  the  mayor 
plan. 

A  comparative  survey  of  the  chief  magistracy  as  it  is  consti- 
tuted in  the  mayor  and  commission  plans  respectively  shows 
many  interesting  and  a  few  important  lines  of  differentiation  in 
the  commission  plan.  In  the  first  place  there  is  some  tendency 
to  substitute  a  new  title  for  that  of  mayor,  a  development  that 
does  not  appear  to  be  making  great  headway.  The  efforts  put 
forth  to  free  the  mayor  from  professional  political  affiliations 

twenty-four  hundred  dollars.  Marshall,  Tex.,  is  even  more  abnormal,  pay- 
ing its  mayor  eighteen  hundred  dollars  and  the  commissioners  three  hun- 
dred. 

22  Buffalo  pays  the  mayor  eight  thousand,  the  commissioners  seven  thou- 
sand; Portland  pays  the  mayor  six  thousand,  the  commissioners  five  thou- 
sand; St.  Paul  pays  the  mayor  five  thousand,  the  commissioners  four  thou- 
sand five  hundred;  New  Orleans  pays  the  mayor  ten  thousand,  the  commis- 
sion councilmen  six  thousand. 


387]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  191 

have  been  of  little  value.  The  retention  of  popular  election  as 
the  method  of  choosing  him  appears  to  be  permanent.  Prefer- 
ential voting  has  increased  the  political  effectiveness  of  the  elector 
with  respect  to  this  office.  The  desirability  of  longer  terms  seems 
to  have  gained  some  recognition  under  the  commission  system.  The 
filling  of  vacancies  thru  election  by  the  commission  is  an  innova- 
tion that  has  worked  no  ill,  but  it  is  debatable  in  principle  and 
of  doubtful  value.  The  requirement  of  full  time  service  and  reg- 
ular office  hours  together  with  a  disposition  to  increase  salaries 
constitutes  a  step  in  the  direction  of  efficient  and  professional 
service.23  The  essential  differences  between  the  mayor-commis- 
sionership  and  the  mayoralty  are  not  indicated,  however,  by  their 
respective  constitutions,  but  rather  in  their  relations  to  municipal 
administration  and  legislation. 

II.    THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  AND  ADMINISTRATION 

The  relation  of  the  mayor-commissioner  to  municipal  admin- 
istration is  determined,  in  general,  by  two  well  defined  concep- 
tions of  his  position  and  authority.  According  to  the  first  view 
the  office  occupies  a  place  very  similar  to  that  found  in  connection 
with  the  federal  plan.  It  is  the  chief  executive  office  of  the  cor- 
poration. Its  incumbent  should  have  authority  of  a  greater  or 
less  degree  over  all  the  administrative  services  of  the  city.  The 
second  view  recognizes  the  mayor-commissioner  as  merely  the 
first  among  equals, 'the  commission  itself  being  responsible  for 
the  administration.  No  special  powers  attach  to  the  mayoralty, 
and  its  incumbent  enjoys  only  the  added  dignity  which  his  func- 
tion as  presiding  officer  may  bestow,  together  with  that  which 
may  be  involved  in  the  performance  of  his  social  and  ceremonial 
duties  as  titular  head  of  the  city  government.  In  both  of  these 
conceptions  and  the  practices  in  which  they  are  embodied  the 
position  of  the  mayor  as  one  of  the  commissioners,  and  as  such 
the  head  of  a  department,  is  much  the  same. 

The  Strong  Mayor  Type 

The  charters  of  many  cities  and  the  statutes  of  some  states 
have  embodied  the  conception  of  the  mayor-commissioner  as  the 
head  of  the  administration.24  This  embodiment  is,  however,  by 

23  For  an  example  of  a  provision  relating  to  office  hours,  etc.,  see  Okla- 
homa City,  Charter,  Art.  2,  See.  13. 

2*  Cf.  the  charters  of  Buffalo,  Portland,  Ore.,  New  Orleans,   St.  Paul, 


192  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [388 

no  means  uniform  either  in  expression  or  in  purpose.  The  pro- 
visions which  bestow  special  authority  upon  the  mayor  may 
carry  with  them  little  more  than  powers  of  general  supervision. 
Thus  in  the  city  of  Buffalo  the  mayor  is  required  ''to  acquaint 
himself  with  the  conduct  of  each  of  the  other  city  departments" 
and  is  authorized  to  recommend  changes  or  innovations  that  will 
promote  their  efficiency  and  economical  operation.25  In  the  com- 
mission government  act  of  Kentucky  the  mayor  is  authorized  to 
exercise  "a  general  advisory  supervision  over  the  affairs  of  all 
the  departments."  The  Nebraska  act  imposes  a  similar  duty 
upon  the  mayor  in  the  following  terms:  "the  Mayor  shall,  in 
a  general  way,  constantly  investigate  all  public  affairs  concern- 
ing the  city's  interest  and  investigate  and  ascertain,  in  a  general 
way,  the  efficiency  and  manner  in  which  all  departments  of  the 
city  government  are  being  conducted."  He  is  also  empowered 
to  make  recommendations  with  respect  to  matters  of  administra- 
tion. 

There  are  many  cities,  however,  which  go  much  further  than 
the  group  just  described  and  which  give  to  the  mayor-commis- 
sioner power  and  opportunity  for  the  active  direction  of  admin- 
istration. The  power  of  appointment  subject  to  the  confirmation 
of  the  council,  is  vested  in  the  mayor  of  Houston,  Texas.  In 
Portland,  Oregon,  in  St.  Paul  and  a  number  of  other  cities  the 
mayor  assigns  the  commissioners  to  their  respective  departments 
and  in  some  cases  he  may  reassign  them  ' '  at  his  discretion. ' ' 26 
The  mayor  of  Dallas,  Texas,  "nominates"  all  appointive  officers 
of  the  city  except  the  auditor,  the  confirmation  of  the  council 
being  required  and^the  mayor  being  denied  a  vote  in  this  mat- 
ter.27 The  removal  power  is  found  in  Houston  and  St.  Paul,28 

Houston,  Dallas,  Oakland,  and  Wilmington,  and  the  statutes  of  Nebraska, 
Kentucky,  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  Massachusetts. 

25  Charter,  See.  42. 

28  Portland,  Charter,  See.  20a.  The  order  making  the  assignment  has  the 
force  of  an  ordinance  and  is  preserved  and  filed  as  such.  Cf.  also  See.  20a. 
For  St.  Paul,  see  Charter,  See.  57,  58.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  mayor 
of  St.  Paul  has  but  one  such  opportunity,  viz.,  the  first  Monday  in  Decem- 
ber following  his  entrance  upon  the  duties  of  his  office,  while  the  mayor  of 
Portland  may  make  reassignments  ' '  whenever  it  appears  that  the  public  ser- 
vice will  be  benefited  thereby." 

27  Charter,  Art.  3,  See.  6. 

28  Houston,  Charter,  Art.  5,  Sec.  2.     The  council  also  possesses  the  power 


389]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  193 

and  the  power  of  suspension  pending  an  investigation  in  Port- 
land and  in  Wilmington,  North  Carolina.  The  power  to  conduct 
investigations  into  official  conduct  carries  with  it  the  right  and 
authority  to  compel  attendance  and  testimony,  administer  oaths, 
and  examine  witnesses. 

A  number  of  other  cities  which  do  not  vest  the  powers  of  ap- 
pointment in  the  mayor  assure  his  active  participation  in  the 
conduct  of  the  administration  by  other  means.  Thus  in  New 
Orleans  the  mayor  is  ex  officio  a  member  of  each  board,  com- 
mission, or  body  created  or  authorized  either  by  the  charter  or 
by  any  subsequent  ordinance.  In  addition  he  is  charged  with  the 
general  oversight  of  the  administration,  and  with  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  state  laws  and  municipal  charter  and  ordinances. 
In  Dallas  it  is  made  his  special  duty  to  see  that  the  provisions  of 
franchises  and  contracts  are  complied  with,  and  in  Oakland  he 
is  particularly  charged  with  the  supervision  of  public  utilities, 
contracts,  and  the  enforcement  of  law.  In  Wilmington,  North 
Carolina,  the  mayor  is  ex  officio  chairman  of  all  departments  of 
the  city. 

The  "Strong"  Mayor  vs.  the  Ordinary  Mayor 

The  foregoing  indicates  what  is  meant  by  the  strong  mayor- 
alty under  the  commission  plan.  Except  in  a  few  cases,  among 
which  Houston  is  the  most  prominent,  the  "strong  mayor"  exer- 
cises very  much  less  authority  than  does  a  mayor  under  the  fed- 
eral plan.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tendency  to  retain  the  mayor- 
alty with  many  of  its  powers  unimpaired  is  most  evident  in  the 

to  remove.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  mayor 's  power  extends  to  "  all  offi- 
cers or  employees"  in  the  city  service.  The  provision  "for  cause"  is  so 
broad  as  to  leave  the  action  in  the  discretion  of  the  mayor.  He  may,  how- 
ever, be  required  to  file  a  statement  of  the  reasons  in  the  public  archives 
of  the  municipality.  For  St.  Paul  provisions  see  Charter,  Sees.  59  and  60  of 
Art.  5.  It  will  be  observed  that  he  may  start  proceedings  for  the  removal 
of  any  councilman  either  as  councilman  or  as  the  head  of  an  administrative 
department.  The  mayor's  action  in  the  case  of  non-elective  officials  and 
employees  must  be  preceded  by  notification  of  the  officer  or  body  having 
the  power  to  appoint  and  requesting  removal.  If  the  request  is  not  complied 
with  the  mayor  may  then  "in  his  discretion"  make  the  removal,  but  must, 
on  demand,  file  a  bill  of  particulars  with  the  city  clerk.  The  mayor  of  St. 
Paul  is  also  restrained  from  removing  the  appointees  of  the  controller,  an 
official  who,  in  practice,  has  proven  to  be  of  much  more  consequence  than 
any  other  elective  officer. 


194  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [390 

larger  cities  that  have  adopted  the  commission  plan.  While  it 
is  undoubtedly  true  that  in  the  great  majority  of  commission 
governed  cities  the  mayoralty  has  been  " merged  in  the  board," 
the  mayor  apparently  being  little  more  than  presiding  officer,  yet 
it  is  pertinent  to  note  that  in  those  centers  of  population  where 
the  plan  is  likely  to  be  put  to  the  greatest  strain,  the  office  main- 
tains something  of  its  individuality.  The  ' '  tendency  to  one  man 
government"  noted  by  the  Royal  Commission  of  British  Colum- 
bia in  its  investigation  of  commission  government  in  the  United 
States  can  under  ordinary  circumstances  have  but  one  direction, 
viz.,  toward  the  development  in  the  commission  plan  of  a  power- 
ful mayoralty.  Such  a  development  may  not  obtain  legal  recog- 
nition until  some  time  after  it  has  actually  assumed  importance 
in  the  affairs  of  government.  Such  an  evolution  would  gratify 
many  critics  and  opponents  of  the  commission  plan  who  have 
contended  that  the  absence  of  a  central  dominating  mind  em- 
powered to  coordinate  and  control  administration  constitutes  a 
serious  defect  in  the  plan.29 

As  Commissioner 

The  mayor-commissioner  is  generally  the  head  of  a  depart- 
ment, tho  this  function  was  not  imposed  upon  him  in  the  origi- 
nal commission  plan  as  developed  in  Galveston,  and  has  not  been 
a  feature  of  the  office  in  some  other  cities.30  The  department  of 
which  he  is  the  head  is  usually  specified  in  the  charter,  but  there 
are  frequent  exceptions  to  this  rule.31  The  most  favored  depart- 
mental assignment  for  the  mayor  is  that  of  public  affairs.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  some  commission  cities  the  departments  of  public 
safety,  of  finance  and  public  affairs  of  administration,  of  accounts 
and  finances,  of  public  affairs  and  public  education,  and  of 
water  and  waterworks,  are  respectively  designated  as  the  posts 

29  For  brief  reviews  of  the  mayoralty  under  the  commission  plan,  see 
Woodruff,  C.  R,  City  Government  by  Commission,  pp.  121,  123;  Bruere, 
Henry,  The  New  City  Government,  pp.  63-68,  and  Bradford,  Commission 
Government  in  American  Cities,  pp.  204-207.  Mr.  Bruere 's  work  contains 
an  enumeration  of  the  mayor's  powers  in  selected  cities. 

so  For  example  Houston  and  St.  Paul  and  Haverhill,  Mass. 

si  In  Portland,  Ore.,  the  mayor  appears  to  be  free  to  select  the  depart- 
ment of  which  he  becomes  the  head.  The  same  is  true  in  Huntington, 
W.  Va.  In  many  cities  the  council  or  commission  may  designate  the  de- 
partment to  which  each  member  shall  devote  his  attention. 


391]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  195 

to  be  filled  by  the  mayors.32  With  very  few  exceptions  the  may- 
or, as  commissioner,  enjoys  all  the  rights  and  privileges  accorded 
to  the  other  members  of  the  commission.  He  shares  in  the  general 
executive  and  administrative  authority  vested  in  the  commission 
as  a  whole,  and  frequently  exercises  great  influence  in  its  con- 
duct of  the  affairs  of  the  city.  As  commissioner  he  is  responsible 
for  the  conduct  of  his  department,  and  often  enjoys  considerable 
power  of  appointment  and  removal  within  the  department. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  description  of  the  position  of  the 
mayor-commissioner  in  administration,  it  should  be  noted  that  he 
often  enjoys  considerable  reserve  and  emergency  powers  con- 
ferred under  the  general  laws  of  the  state,  a  factor  that  contrib- 
utes something  to  his  standing  and  dignity.38  He  may  also  be 
charged  with  certain  ministerial  duties  similar  to  those  imposed 
upon  the  mayor  under  the  federal  plan.3*  In  a  few  cases  he 
retains  judicial  powers  of  some  consequence.85 

III.    THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  AND  LEGISLATION 

In  accordance  with  the  principle  of  commission  government 
which  seeks  to  concentrate  the  administrative,  legislative,  and 
other  authority  of  the  municipality  in  the  hands  of  the  commis- 
sion and  then  distribute  a  share  of  each  of  these  branches  of 
power  among  the  various  commissioners,  the  mayor-commissioner 
exercises  important  powers  in  legislation.  These  may  be  divided 
into  the  powers  which  he  enjoys  by  virtue  of  his  position  as 
mayor  and  those  which  are  his  by  reason  of  his  membership  on 
the  commission. 

As  mayor,  president,  or  chairman  of  the  board  or  commission, 

32  Cf.  the  charters  of  Salem,  Mass.,  Lawrence,  Mass.,  the  Massachusetts 
statute  of  1915,  Plan  "C,"  the  charters  of  Gardner,  Me.,  Cartersville,  Ga., 
the  Louisiana  statute  of  1910,  the  charters  of  Colorado  Springs  and  a  num- 
ber of  other  cities  for  examples  of  different  commissionerships  that  may  be 
filled  by  the  mayor.     The  commission  government  acts  of  Illinois,  Arkansas, 
and  Pennsylvania  and  the  charters  of  many  cities  will  give  the  provisions 
specifying  the  department  of  public  affairs. 

33  See,  for  example,  Oklahoma  City,  Charter,  Art.  2,  Sec.  4. 

s*  The  first  part  of  section  4  in  the  charter  of  New  Orleans  enumerates 
some  of  these  duties,  such  as  the  custody  of  the  seal  of  the  city,  the  signing 
of  all  contracts,  bonds,  and  other  instruments,  etc. 

ss  Cf.  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  of  1911,  State  of  Texas,  for  the 
provisions  relating  to  the  issuing  of  warrants,  the  keeping  of  dockets,  etc., 
by  the  mayors  of  cities  in  that  state. 


196  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [392 

the  chief  executive  may  call  special  meetings,36  presides  over  all 
sessions  at  which  he  is  present,37  and  is  entitled  to  submit  pro- 
posals, recommendations,38  and  in  some  cases  to  prepare  and  lay 
before  the  council  the  annual  budget.39  In  a  number  of  cities  he 
retains  the  veto,  either  in  its  suspensive  or  its  qualified  form,40 
and  in  one  case  he  has  the  selective  veto  with  respect  to  items  in 
appropriation  measures.41  His  signature  is  often  required  to  be 
affixed  to  ordinances  and  other  records  of  the  council.  It  is  ap- 
parent, however,  that  his  powers  of  coercion  in  matters  of  policy 
determination  are  largely  curtailed ;  the  influence  of  the  powers 
of  appointment,  removal,  and  veto  being  quite  generally  denied 
to  him.42  On  the  other  hand,  his  position  as  commissioner  in 

36  See,  for  example,  the  charter  of  Lowell,  Mass.,  Sec.  23.  This  power  is 
also  entrusted  in  this  case  to  the  president  of  the  council  and  to  any  two 
members  of  it.  The  usual  provisions  for  notice  of  time  and  place  obtain. 
Many  charters  omit  any  mention  of  this  power. 

37  There  are  a  few  exceptions  as  in  San  Diego,  Calif.,  but  even  in  cities 
like  Lowell  and  Portland,  Ore.,  which  has  a  president  of  the  council  in  addi- 
tion to  the  mayor,  the  latter  presides  ' '  if  present. ' '  Ordinarily  the  charters 
specify  that  the  mayor  shall  be  the  presiding  officer.  Cf.  Oklahoma  City, 
Charter,  Art.  4,  S  Sec.  See  message  of  mayor  of  Lincoln,  Nebr.,  July  17, 
1916. 

38  See  St.  Paul,  Charter,  Chap.  V,  Sec.  1 ;  Dallas,  Charter,  Art.  3,  See. 
15;  and  the  general  act  of  New  Jersey,  Sec.  5,  and  of  Illinois,  Sec.  32. 

39  The  budget  is  prepared  and  submitted  by  the  mayor  in  Houston,  Dal- 
las, and  some  other  cities  in  Texas;  in  Pennsylvania  he  is  expected  to  keep 
the  board  informed  as  to  the  financial  needs  of  the  city. 

40  Cf.  charters  of  High  Point,  N.  C.,  St.  Paul,  and  Chattanooga,  and 
Houston,  Greenville,  Dallas,  Beaumont,  Denison,  Corpus  Christi,  Marshall,  all 
in  Texas,  Tulsa,  Ardmore,  and  Salpulpa  in  Okahoma,  Colorado  Springs,  (se- 
lective), San  Diego,  Calif.,  and  Lewiston,  Idaho.     In  Houston  and  Dallas, 
Tex.,  and  Tulsa,  Okla.,  the  mayor  has  a  vote  on  the  question  of  sustaining 
his  veto,  a  power  that  is  clearly  due  to  his  being  a  commissioner  as  well  as 
a  mayor. 

41  Colorado  Springs,  Charter,  Art.  4,  Sec.  24.     The  vote  of  four  members 
of  the  council  of  five  is  necessary  to  override  this  vote.     Inasmuch  as  the 
mayor  is  the  fifth  member,  it  means  that  the  rest  of  the  council  must  be  a 
unit  against  his  act. 

42  The  special  committee  of  the  National  Municipal  League  on  City  Gov- 
ernment by  Commission  says  in  its  report,  See.  9 :     "  It  is  doubtful  whether 
the  mayor  should  have  a  veto  over  his  confreres  or  in  fact  any  added  powers 
lest  he  overshadow  the   other  commissioners  and   attract  the   limelight   at 
their  expense,  leaving  them  in  obscurity  where  the  people  cannot  intelli- 
gently and  justly  criticise  them."  National  Municipal  Eeview,  Vol.  I,  p.  42. 


393]  THE  MAYOR-COMMISSIONER  197 

some  measure  compensates  for  the  powers  which  he  has  lost  as 
mayor. 

In  the  capacity  of  commissioner  the  mayor  may  participate 
and  vote  on  practically  all  matters  coming  before  the  council. 
Inasmuch  as  the  commissioners  are  rarely  more  than  five  in  num- 
ber, and  in  smaller  cities  often  only  three,  it  is  apparent  that  his 
voting  power  is  greatly  augmented  above  that  which  the  mayor 
under  the  federal  plan,  with  his  casting  vote,  enjoys.  Coupled 
with  whatever  other  legislative  authority  he  may  possess  and  with 
his  general  and  administrative  powers  the  mayor-commissioner 
often  exercises  an  influence  in  municipal  affairs  that  would  com- 
pare favorably  with  that  of  many  mayors  under  the  federal  plan. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  relatively  great  powers  enjoyed  by  the 
other  commissioners,  especially  in  matters  of  public  policy,  ren- 
ders it  less  likely  that  the  mayor  will  dominate  except  by  the 
force  of  his  personality  and  the  processes  of  moral  suasion.  The 
pressure  of  political  forces,  so  common  under  the  mayor  system, 
is  usually  greatly  minimized  under  the  commission  plan,  a  fac- 
tor which  does  not,  however,  necessarily  weaken  the  position  of 
the  mayor-commissioner. 

A  few  observations  based  upon  the  foregoing  survey  of  the 
office  of  chief  executive  under  the  commission  plan  can  be  made 
in  conclusion.  Altho  mayoralty  has  undergone  great  modifica- 
tions in  its  adaptation  to  the  commission  plan,  it  has  usually  sur- 
vived as  an  office  of  some  importance,  and  in  significant  instances 
it  has  retained  much  of  its  former  power  and  prestige.  Gener- 
ally, however,  there  has  been  little  disposition  to  magnify  it  and 
it  has  seemed  to  merge  in  the  executive  authority  vested  in  the 
commission  as  a  whole. 

In  the  second  place  it  should  be  noted  that  in  actual  practice 
the  mayor-commissioner  is  often  much  more  powerful  than  the 
provisions  of  charters  and  statutes  indicate.  This  is  the  result 
of  an  undoubted  tendency  to  create  a  powerful  chief  executive 
under  this  scheme  of  organization  as  well  as  in  other  fields  of 
American  government.  It  is  a  tendency  that  may  be  expected 
to  become  better  defined  as  the  plan  is  adapted  to  large  cities 
where  the  exigencies  of  government  will  demand  the  guiding 
hand  of  some  one  man  to  unify  policy  and  coordinate  administra- 
tion, and  also  as  the  legal  provisions  which  now  constitute  the 


198  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [394 

office  become  modified  by  amendment  so  as  to  conform  with  cus- 
tom. One  can  predict  the  development  of  this  tendency  with 
some  assurance.  The  impact  of  the  manager  plan  upon  the  com- 
mission form  has  been  felt  most  keenly  at  the  point  of  executive 
organization  and  in  the  field  of  administration.  It  is  also  signifi- 
cant that  Denver,  which  tried  to  snuff  out  the  mayoralty  under 
two  years  of  pure  commission  government,  has  returned  to  the 
mayor  system,  and  that  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  has  sub- 
stituted a  strong  mayor-commissionership  for  a  weak  one. 

Finally,  the  sweep  of  the  commission  plan  and  its  remarkable 
and  consistent  record  of  success  have  been  a  continuing  challenge 
to  the  old  mayoralty.  The  result  has  been  the  revival  of  the 
latter  into  new  life  and  vigor,  a  condition  which  cannot  fail  to 
react  upon  the  commission  form.  Such  reaction  will  manifest 
itself,  in  part,  in  the  strengthening  of  the  mayor-commissioner. 


CHAPTER  IX 
THE  CITY  MANAGER 

Nothing  is  more  significant  of  the  trend  in  municipal  govern- 
ment than  the  country-wide  interest  which  is  manifested  in  the 
development  of  the  city  manager  plan.  The  readiness  with  which 
it  has  been  adopted  in  scores  of  cities,  its  recognition  in  the  gen- 
eral municipal  statutes  of  a  number  of  the  states,  and  its  advo- 
cacy by  the  National  Municipal  League  in  the  model  charter 
recommended  by  that  organization  in  1915  combine  to  promise 
for  it  increasing  consideration  and  acceptance  by  municipal  char-, 
ter  commissions  and  electorates.  The  feature  of  the  plan  with 
which  this  work  is  concerned  is  the  introduction  of  an  expert 
chief  executive  called  the  city  manager  who  is  responsible  to  a 
powerful  representative  legislative  body,  the  council  or  commis- 
sion. The  mayoralty  barely  continues  a  perfunctory  existence. 
Its  incumbent  is  reduced  to  the  position  of  a  figurehead  in  admin- 
istration, tho  as  councilman  or  commissioner  he  may  be  active 
and  influential  in  the  determination  of  public  policy.  The  city 
manager  becomes  the  chief  executive.1 

The  Mayoralty 

The  condition  of  the  mayoralty  under  the  manager  plan  con- 
stitutes a  fitting  introduction  to  a  consideration  of  the  place  and 
functions  of  its  successor.  As  in  the  commission  plan  the  mayor 

i  There  are  exceptions  as  in  the  case  of  Phoenix,  Ariz.,  in  the  charter  of 
which  the  mayor  is  made  the  "chief  executive  of  the  city"  with  authority 
that  gives  considerable  substance  to  the  title.  See  Charter,  Chap.  V.  In 
the  charter  proposed  for  Douglas,  Ariz.,  the  disposition  to  retain  a  powerful 
mayoralty  was  quite  apparent.  The  mayor  was  not  only  to  enjoy  the  usual 
authority  given  him  under  the  manager  plan  but  was  charged  with  ' '  the  gen- 
eral oversight  of  all  departments,  boards  and  commissions  of  the  city"  and 
was  the  sole  party  thru  whom  the  regulations,  directions,  and  orders  of 
the  municipal  commission  were  to  be  transmitted  to  the  city  superintendent 
(manager)  and  to  such  other  city  employees  as  might  be  necessary.  It 

199 


200  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE  [396 

is  a  member  of  the  legislative  body.  He  is  first  a  councilor  or 
commissioner,  then  a  mayor  with  whatever  limited  prerogatives 
the  latter  office  may  carry  with  it.  The  qualifications  for  the 
place  are  the  same  as  those  that  obtain  for  councilor.2  The 
methods  by  which  the  incumbent  may  be  chosen  are  three  in 
number :  first,  by  direct  popular  vote ;  second,  by  receiving  the 
highest  number  of  votes  cast  for  any  member  of  the  commission ; 
and  third,  by  election  at  the  hands  of  the  commission.3  In 
Springfield,  Ohio,  the  failure  of  the  commission  to  choose  a  pres- 
ident (mayor)  brings  into  operation  a  fourth  method,  viz.,  the 
lot.*  The  mayor  may  be  removed  by  the  recall,  by  judicial  or 
statutory  process,  and  in  New  York  and  Ohio  by  the  governor 
of  the  state.5  In  some  charters  the  mayor  is  given  a  term  shorter 
than  that  which  he  enjoys  as  a  member  of  the  commission,  a 
practice  which  is  necessitated  by  the  election  of  part  of  the  com- 
mission every  second  year,  thus  making  it  a  continuing  body.8 

should  be  noted  that  the  title  of  mayor  sometimes  gives  way  to  that  of 
president  or  chairman  as  in  the  commission  form.  Cf.  charters  of  Spring- 
field, Ohio,  and  La  Grande,  Ore. 

2  Cf.  the  provisions  of  the  charters  of  Dayton  (See.  6),  Springfield  (See. 
3),  and  St.  Augustine,  Fla.  (See.  11). 

s  Direct  popular  vote  on  the  mayoralty  obtains  in  Hickory,  N.  C. ;  Phoe- 
nix, Ariz.;  Jackson,  Cadillac,  and  Manistee,  Mich.,  and  in  Amarillo  and 
Sherman,  Tex.  It  also  obtains  in  a  number  of  other  cities  and  is  provided 
for  in  the  general  laws  of  New  York  state.  The  candidate  for  commis- 
sioner who  receives  the  highest  number  of  popular  votes  becomes  mayor  in 
Dayton,  and  in  cities  adopting  the  manager  form  as  provided  for  in  the 
general  charter  act  of  Massachusetts.  This  method  was  also  a  feature  of 
the  original  Lockport  proposals.  Election  of  the  mayor  by  the  commis- 
sion is  the  most  common  method  and  tends  to  place  the  mayoralty  in  the 
same  relative  position  with  respect  to  legislation  that  it  usually  occupies 
under  the  commission  plan.  Cf.  the  charters  of  Springfield  and  Sandusky, 
Ohio;  Sherman,  Tex.;  Collinsville,  Okla. ;  Montrose,  Colo.,  and  San  Jose  and 
Bakersfield,  Calif.,  and  the  general  acts  of  Iowa  and  Virginia. 

*  Springfield,  Charter,  Sec.  6.  The  lot  is  to  be  conducted  by  the  city 
solicitor. 

s  The  recall  is  not  provided  for  in  Massachusetts  and  New  York  and  in  a 
number  of  cities  with  special  charters  but  it  is  the  most  widely  used  of  the 
methods  noted. 

s  See  the  charters  of  Springfield  and  Sandusky,  Ohio,  and  Jackson,  Mich. 
In  these  cases  the  mayor  is  chosen  for  two  years,  while  his  term  for  com- 
missioner is  four  years.  A  new  mayor  is  possible  following  each  election  of 
commissioners. 


397]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  201 

Otherwise  his  term  as  commissioner  and  mayor  is  usually  the 
same.  The  salary  of  the  mayor  generally  is  no  more  than  that 
of  any  other  commissioner,  but  in  some  cities  he  receives  a  some- 
what larger  remuneration.  In  the  original  Lockport  plan  it  was 
proposed  that  he  should  be  paid  double  the  amount  paid  to  other 
members  of  the  council;  in  Dayton,  Ohio,  the  mayor  is  paid 
eighteen  hundred  dollars  and  the  commissioners  twelve  hundred 
dollars  per  year.7  In  no  case  is  the  remuneration  large  enough 
to  make  the  office  specially  attractive  from  the  standpoint  of 
salary  alone.  Vacancies  in  the  mayoralty  are  in  almost  all  cases 
filled  by  the  council.  In  some  cases  it  elects  the  mayor  pro  tem- 
pore  at  the  same  time  that  it  chooses  the  mayor,  in  others  at  the 
time  when  the  vacancy  occurs. 

The  powers  of  the  mayor  under  the  manager  form  of  govern- 
ment are  exceedingly  limited.  He  is  the  presiding  officer  of  the 
commission  or  council,8  and  enjoys  a  voice  and  a  vote  in  its  delib- 
erations.9 With  but  one  exception  he  has  been  denied  the  veto 
power.10  The  duty  of  furnishing  the  council  with  information 
thru  messages  and  reports,  and  the  privilege  of  submitting  execu- 
tive proposals  and  recommendations  appear  to  have  fallen  into 
abeyance  or  to  have  been  transferred  to  the  city  manager.11  In  a 
number  of  proposed  charters  his  power  to  appoint  the  committees 

7  The  amount  to  be  paid  is  usually  specified  as  a  fixed  sum  ($2,  $5,  or 
$10)  per  meeting  or  per  month.  In  some  eases  the  monthly  rate  is  twenty- 
five  or  fifty  dollars.  In  Cadillac  and  Manistee,  Mich.,  no  salary  is  provided. 
In  Jackson  the  mayor  receives  seven  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  in  Ashta- 
bula,  Ohio,  one  hundred  and  fifty. 

s  The  terms  ' '  council ' '  and  ' '  commission ' '  are  employed  synonymously 
in  treating  of  the  legislative  organ  under  the  manager  form.  Both  terms 
are  found  in  the  charters  that  are  classified  in  this  group.  The  model  char- 
ter of  the  National  Municipal  League  uses  the  term  ' '  council. ' '  This  term 
is  to  be  preferred,  tho  a  majority  of  the  cities  that  have  adopted  the 
manager  system  probably  use  the  other  title. 

9  In  the  charters  proposed  for  Lockport,  N.  Y.,  and  for  Youngstown,  Ohio, 
the  mayor  was  given  two  votes  if  necessary  to  break  a  tie  in  the  commission, 
a  situation  that  might  arise  during  the  absence  of  a  member  or  when  one 
of  the  commissionerships  was  vacant.  Cf.  Youngstown,  Proposed  Charter, 
Sec.  44. 

!<>  In  Elizabeth  City,  N.  C.,  the  charter  enables  the  mayor  to  veto  or- 
dinances, contracts,  and  franchises. 

"  An  exception  is  found  in  the  city  of  Phoenix,  Ariz. 


202  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [398 

of  the  council  has  been  affirmed  and  the  practice  is  established  in 
Manistee,  Michigan.12 

The  administrative  authority  and  duties  of  the  mayor  (or 
president)  under  the  manager  form  are  usually  of  minor  impor- 
tance. He  is  the  official  head  of  the  municipality  for  ceremonial 
purposes  and  is  the  officer  to  be  recognized  by  the  courts  for  the 
service  of  civil  process  and  by  the  governor  for  military  pur- 
poses.13 A  charter  provision  that  occurs  frequently  requires 
him  to  perform  such  duties  as  may  be  prescribed  by  law  and  or- 
dinance, while  other  charters  give  him  such  powers  and  duties 
as  are  prescribed  in  the  charters  ' '  and  no  others. " 14  In  Spring- 
field, Ohio,  and  a  few  other  cities  the  charter  expressly  declares 
that  the  use  of  the  title  of  mayor  shall  not  confer  upon  the  holder 
"the  administrative  or  judicial  functions  of  a  mayor  under  the 
general  laws  of  the  state. ' ' 15 

On  the  other  hand  the  mayor  is  sometimes  invested  with  emer- 
gency power  of  no  small  moment.  Thus  in  Dayton,  Springfield, 
and  Manistee,  and  under  the  general  law  of  New  York,  the  mayor 
in  times  of  public  danger  or  emergency  may  assume  control  of 
the  police  and  govern  the  city  by  proclamation,  and  in  some 
cases  is  made  the  judge  of  when  such  conditions  exist.16  In  the 
model  charter  of  the  National  Municipal  League  it  is  proposed 
that  emergency  power  of  this  character  be  given  to  the  mayor 
subject  to  the  restriction  that  it  be  exercised  "with  the  consent 
of  the  council. " 17  In  addition  to  this  occasional  emergency 
authority  the  mayor  sometimes  has  other  duties  of  importance. 

12  See  the  charters  proposed  for  Youngstown,  Ohio,  and  for  Douglas, 
Ariz.  Also  that  of  Manistee,  Art.  4,  Sec.  14. 

is  Cf.  the  charters  of  Hickory,  N.  C. ;  Dayton,  Ohio ;  Wheeling,  W.  Va. ; 
Manistee,  Mich.;  Amarillo,  Tex.,  and  Phoenix,  Ariz.  Provisions  to  these 
ends  appeared  in  the  original  Lockport  proposals. 

i*  For  example,  Dayton  and  Springfield  use  the  first  method  of  determin- 
ing the  mayor's  range  of  power  and  action,  while  Hickory  and  Manistee 
limit  the  mayor  to  the  sphere  outlined  in  the  charter  itself.  There  is  doubt- 
less a  fear  that  the  former  mayoralty  may  reappear  under  the  new  form  of 
government. 

is  See  Springfield,  Ohio,  Charter,  See.  6.  In  the  case  of  Cadillac,  Mich., 
no  definition  of  the  place  and  functions  of  the  mayor  is  incorporated  in  the 
charter. 

i«  For  example,  see  charter  of  Springfield,  Sec.  6.  The  New  York  provi- 
sions are  incorporated  in  what  is  known  as  "plan  0." 

IT  "A  Model  Charter,"  etc.,  Sec.  6. 


399]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  203 

In  Sherman,  Texas,  he  is  charged  with  the  task  of  making  an 
audit  of  the  city  accounts  annually ; 18  in  Jackson,  Michigan,  he 
is  clothed  with  the  power  of  a  sheriff;19  in  Phoenix,  Arizona,  he 
is  authorized  to  enforce  the  law ; 20  and  in  Hickory,  North  Caro- 
lina, he  may  administer  oaths.21  On  the  whole,  however,  the 
magisterial  powers  which  were  retained  in  the  Lockport  pro- 
posals have  not  found  favor  with  the  framers  of  city  manager 
charters.22  The  judicial  powers  of  the  mayor  are  either  expressly 
abolished  as  in  Springfield  or  are  ignored  by  the  charter  makers.23 
In  Douglas,  Arizona,  it  was  proposed  to  retain  in  the  mayoralty 
the  power  to  remit  fines,  costs,  forfeitures,  and  penalties  im- 
posed for  violation  of  municipal  ordinances,  but  this  charter  was 
not  adopted.24  In  some  cases  the  mayor  retains  certain  minis- 
terial functions  such  as  the  signing  of  ordinances,  resolutions, 
and  legal  documents  and  in  New  York  state  he  is  charged  with 
the  custody  of  the  seal  of  the  city  over  which  he  presides.25 

It  is  apparent  from  the  foregoing  description  that  the  mayor- 
alty has  little  opportunity  for  renewed  development  under  the 
city  manager  plan.  Indeed,  there  is  no  prospect  that  such  devel- 
opment will  occur.  The  office  is  reduced  to  a  position  lower  than 
that  which  obtained  under  the  council  regime  of  the  early  nine- 
teenth century  and  certainly  much  less  prominent  than  that  at- 
tained in  the  Baltimore  charter  of  1796.  However  influential 
the  mayor  may  become  in  legislation  due  to  personal  strength 
and  force  of  character,  the  compactness  of  the  council,  the  lat- 
ter 's  collective  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  municipal  affairs, 
and  the  appearance  of  the  expert  executive  as  the  dominating 
factor  in  political  execution,  all  seem  to  preclude  any  marked 
or  permanent  expansion  of  mayoral  authority  and  influence. 
It  is  to  the  office  of  city  manager  that  one  must  turn  in  order  to 
describe  the  chief  executive  position  in  cities  under  this  form  of 
government. 

is  See  Beard,  C.  A.,  Digest  of  Short  Ballot  Charters,  p.  36031. 

19  Ibid.,  p.  35015. 

20  Charter,  Chap.  V,  Sec.  1. 

21  Charter,  Art.  5,  Sec.  2. 

22  See  Lockport  proposals,  Art.  6,  Sec.  46. 

23  Charter,  Sec.  6. 

24  Proposed  Charter,  Art.  6,  Sec.  2,  Par.    (a). 

25  Cf.  Beard,  Digest  of  Short  Ballot  Charters,  p.  32001. 


204  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [400 

The  City  Managership 

The  genesis  of  the  city  managership  in  this  country  is  a  matter 
of  comparatively  recent  history.  The  idea  of  a  municipal  exec- 
utive chosen  by  a  representative  council  on  the  basis  of  his  fit- 
ness and  ability  to  administer  the  affairs  of  the  corporation  long 
appealed  to  Americans  who  had  observed  and  studied  the  work- 
ings of  municipal  government  abroad,  especially  in  Germany. 
The  idea  has,  indeed,  found  expression  on  numerous  occasions 
and  frequently  in  such  opportune  places  as  before  charter  com- 
missions.26 It  is  not  altogether  unexpected,  therefore,  during  a 
period  of  rapid  development  in  municipal  government  as  evi- 
denced by  the  perfecting  of  the  mayor  system  and  by  the  spread 
and  development  of  the  commission  plan  to  find  the  conception 
of  an  expert  executive  finding  favor  in  some  one  of  the  many 
centers  of  activity.  Tho  it  failed  in  the  effort,  Loekport,  New 
York,  was  the  first  community  to  seek  to  realize  the  conception 
now  embodied  in  the  city  managership.  Staunton,  Virginia,  suc- 
ceeded in  grafting  the  idea  on  to  the  old  stem  of  mayor  and 
council  government.  Sumter,  South  Carolina,  grasped  the  oppor- 
tunity offered  it  by  the  legislature  of  the  state  to  adopt  the  city 
manager  idea  root  and  branch,  a  step  which  was  heralded  to  the 
world  on  October  20, 1913,  by  the  appearance  of  an  advertisement 
for  a  city  manager.  Since  that  date  the  plan  has  been  adopted, 
either  in  a  complete  or  modified  form,  in  scores  of  cities  represent- 
ing all  sections  of  the  country.27 

A  survey  and  analysis  of  the  provisions  creating  the  city  man- 
agership discloses  many  interesting  points  with  regard  to  the  use 
of  the  title,  the  constitution  of  the  office,  and  the  powers  vested  in 
it.  The  contrast  with  the  mayoralty  and  the  mayor-commission- 
ership  is  usually  quite  striking.  The  chief  executive  under  the 
manager  form  is  in  most  cases  styled  the  city  manager,  but  this 

26  For  example,  Messrs.  C.  E.  Merriam,  Walter  L.  Fisher,  and  Alderman 
Frank  I.  Bennett  advocated  the  election  of  the  municipal  executive  by  the 
council   before   the    Chicago    charter   convention    of   1905.     Cf.    article    by 
George  C.  Sikes  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Providence  Conference  for  Good 
City  Government  (1907),  pp.  191,  192. 

27  There  are  many  discussions  of  the  city  manager  plan  in  both  magazine 
and  newspaper  files.     The  best  work  on  the  subject  up  to  date  is  found  in 
the    National   Municipal    League    Series,    The    City    Manager,    by    H.    A. 
Toulmin,  Jr.     The  volume  reveals  special  familiarity  with  the  operation  of 
the  plan  in  Dayton,  Ohio. 


401]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  205 

title  is  varied.  It  is  the  "general  manager"  in  Cadillac,  Michi- 
gan, and  La  Grande,  Oregon;  the  "business  manager"  in  Col- 
linsville,  Oklahoma ;  and  in  Texas  it  has  been  proposed  to  apply 
the  title  of  "mayor"  to  the  incumbent  of  the  office.28  It  now 
seems  well  assured  that  the  title  of  city  manager  will  be  generally 
accepted,  especially  as  it  has  been  incorporated  in  the  model  char- 
ter recently  recommended  by  the  National  Municipal  League  and 
is  already  employed  in  such  a  predominate  number  of  the  cities 
having  this  form  of  government. 

The  constitution  of  the  managership  is  relatively  simple  as 
compared  with  that  of  the  mayoralty.  The  qualifications  for  the 
office  are  determined  by  the  legislative  organ  of  the  municipal 
government.  The  charters  very  often  specify  that  residence  in 
the  city  is  not  necessary,  and  in  practice  there  seems  to  be  little 
disposition  to  discriminate  in  favor  of  residents.29  Provision  is 
usually  made  for  the  selection  of  the  manager  without  regard  to 
his  political  beliefs,  a  policy  which  is  also  frequently  evident  in 
the  parts  of  the  charter  that  deal  with  the  nomination  and  elec- 
tion of  the  council.30  In  a  number  of  instances  cities  have  under- 

28  Cadillac,    Charter,   Chap.   XI,    Sec.    1.     See   also   the   charters   of   La 
Grande  and  Collinsville.     The  Texas  proposal  was  made  by  H.  G.  James, 
first  in  his  ' '  Model  Charter  for  Texas  Cities ' '  and  later  was  incorporated  in 
his  Applied  City  Government,  p.  72. 

29  For  example  for  this  change  in  attitude  see  the  following  charters : 
Amarillo,  Tex.,  Sec.  20;  St.  Augustine,  Fla.,  Sec.  30;  also  see  the  charters 
of  Dayton,  Springfield,  and  Sandusky,  Ohio,  and  the  general  acts  of  Massa- 
chusetts and  Iowa.     Of  course  there  are  exceptions.     In  Jackson,  Mich.,  the 
charter  reads,  "The  city  manager     .     .     .     may  or  may  not  be  a  resident 
or  elector  of  the  city  at  the  time  of  his  appointment,  but  other  things  being 
equal,  preference  shall  be  given  to  a  citizen  of  Jackson."     Sec.  55.     In  its 
advertisement  for  a  city  manager  in  1912,  Sumter,  S.  C.,  stated  that  "a 
knowledge  of  local  conditions  and  traditions  will,  of  course,  be  taken  into 
consideration,"  but  the  choice  fell  upon  a  non-resident.     In  the  charter 
proposed  for  Youngstown,  Ohio,  there  was  a  notable  departure  from  the 
usual  custom.     Five  years  residence  as  an  elector  was  required  of  the  ' '  Gen- 
eral Director."     (Sec.  65.)     This  charter  was  not  adopted.     In  Ashtabula, 
Ohio,  the  council  acted  "contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  charter"  and  under- 
took to  select  one  of  its  own  number  to  act  as  city  manager,  and  failing  in 
this  it  chose  a  local  resident  without  technical  or  other  special  qualifications 
for  the  place.     These  exceptions  are,  however,  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
usual  elimination  of  the  residence  feature. 

so  Cf.  charters  of  St.  Augustine,  Fla.,  Sec.  30,  and  of  Sandusky,  Ohio, 
Sec.  31. 


206  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [402 

taken  in  a  broad  way  to  fix  the  standards  by  which  the  manager 
shall  be  chosen.  Thus  the  St.  Augustine  charter  reads  ' '  He  shall 
be  chosen  solely  on  the  basis  of  his  executive  and  administrative 
qualifications ; ' '  the  Massachusetts  statute  authorizes  his  selection 
' '  for  merit  only ; ' '  and  the  Iowa  general  act  permits  the  council 
to  consider  "the  qualifications  or  fitness  only"  of  the  candidates 
who  apply.  In  Jackson,  Michigan,  the  qualifications  are  defined 
as  those  of  "a  man  of  good  business  and  executive  ability,  and, 
if  practicable,  a  civil  or  mechanical  engineer. ' '  The  first  Sumter 
advertisement  announced  that  the  applicant  should  be  competent 
to  oversee  public  works,  that  an  engineer  of  standing  and  ability 
would  be  preferred,  and  that  applicants  should  state  their  pre- 
vious experience  in  municipal  work.31  In  practice  the  applicants 
who  have  had  technical  training,  especially  in  the  field  of  en- 
gineering, seem  to  have  commanded  the  attention  of  councils 
and  a  majority  of  the  city  managers  may  properly  be  called 
experts.32  In  addition  to  the  technical  qualifications  indicated, 
the  charters  of  Hickory,  North  Carolina,  and  of  Cadillac  and 
Manistee,  Michigan,  and  some  other  cities  require  the  manager 
to  furnish  bonds  and  to  take  the  oath  of  office.  Still  other  cities 
provide  for  the  disqualification  of  managers  who  are  interested 
in  the  profits  of  contracts,  supplies,  or  service  for  the  city.  Cad- 
illac prohibits  its  manager  from  holding  any  other  public  office, 
a  feature  which  was  also  incorporated  in  the  Youngstown  pro- 
posals. 

The  manager  is  always  chosen  by  the  council  or  commission. 
The  latter  is  usually  free  to  adopt  whatever  measures  it  sees  fit 
to  enable  it  to  perform  its  duty,  and  the  methods  which  are  fam- 
iliar in  private  business  when  an  important  post  is  to  be  filled 
are  frequently  employed.  Applications  are  secured  from  candi- 
dates by  means  of  advertising,  by  personal  solicitation,  and  by 
invitation  to  successful  managers  in  other  cities.  In  Taylor,  Tex- 
as, it  is  provided  that  the  manager  shall  be  chosen  ' '  from  among 

si  See  the  advertisement  as  reproduced  in  Sumter  City  Manager  Plan  of 
Municipal  Government,  published  by  the  Sumter  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
February  and  April,  1913. 

32  An  examination  of  over  a  score  of  city  managers  indicates  that  more 
than  half  of  them  have  had  some  engineering  training.  It  should  be  ob- 
served, also,  that  a  number  of  universities  have  undertaken  to  give  training 
to  men  who  aspire  to  places  in  municipal  service. 


403]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  207 

all  the  candidates  who  apply  to  public  advertisements. "  33  In  the 
case  of  Sumter  the  local  chamber  of  commerce  cooperated  with 
the  council  in  its  first  attempt  to  find  a  manager. 

The  removal  of  a  manager  from  office  may  be  brot  about  in 
the  following  ways:  (1)  by  the  action  of  the  council;  (2)  by 
the  recall;  (3)  by  the  expiration  of  a  fixed  term.  Of  these 
methods  the  first  is  everywhere  possible  and  is  the  feature  of  the 
plan  which  makes  the  council  fully  responsible  for  the  kind  of 
management  secured.  In  the  majority  of  cases  the  council's 
power  of  removal  is  unrestricted,  the  charters  providing  for  its 
exercise  "at  will"  or  "at  pleasure."34  In  Phoenix,  Arizona, 
there  is  no  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  removal, 
but  the  manager  is  protected  against  attempts  to  oust  him  by 
indirect  means  by  a  provision  that  removal  may  be  effected  only 
by  a  majority  of  the  commissioners  "voting  affirmatively  there- 
for." There  is,  moreover,  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  some  char- 
ter makers  to  limit  this  power.  Thus,  in  Tyler  and  in  Taylor, 
Texas,  the  removal  power  may  be  exercised  without  restriction 
only  during  the  first  three  months  of  a  manager's  service;  at 
any  time  after  that  date  the  manager  may  demand  the  filing  of 
written  charges  and  the  holding  of  a  public  hearing  before  the 
commission  prior  to  the  order  of  removal  going  into  effect.  St. 
Augustine  gives  the  council  six  months  in  which  to  act  without 
restriction,  and  the  model  charter  of  the  National  Municipal 
League  fixes  the  same  period,  both  providing  for  written  charges 
and  a  public  hearing  after  the  expiration  of  that  length  of  time. 
The  council,  in  the  meantime,  may  suspend  the  manager  until 
after  the  hearing  is  held  and  its  decision  reached.  The  purpose 
of  the  hearing  is  merely  to  throw  the  restraint  of  publicity  about 
the  action  of  the  council,  and  apparently  the  latter 's  ability  to 
take  whatever  course  of  action  it  may  determine  upon  is  not  im- 
paired. 

The  recall  may  be  used  against  the  city  manager  only  in  Day- 
ton, and  the  conditions  under  which  it  operates  are  the  same  for 
the  executive  as  for  the  members  of  the  commission.  The  peti- 

33  Taylor,  Charter,  Art.  7,  Sec.  2. 

s*C/.  the  charters  of  Springfield,  Ohio,  Sec.  15;  Sandusky,  Sec.  31; 
Dayton,  Sec.  47 ;  Amarillo,  Tex.,  Sec.  20 ;  Hickory,  N.  C.,  Art.  6,  Sec.  3,  and 
many  others.  In  La  Grande,  Ore.,  the  charter  permits  the  council  to  remove 
the  manager  "with  or  without  cause."  (Chap.  VIII,  Sec.  4.) 


208  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [404 

tion  for  the  recall  election  must  be  signed  by  at  least  twenty-five 
per  centum  of  the  total  number  of  voters  registered  in  the  munic- 
ipality. Precautions  to  assure  the  genuineness  of  the  signatures 
and  the  form  of  the  petition  are  provided  for  in  the  charter,  and 
the  details  regarding  the  filing  of  the  petition  with  the  clerk  of 
the  commission,  the  notification  of  the  manager,  and  the  calling 
and  conduct  of  the  election  are  specified.  In  the  event  of  a  man- 
ager being  recalled  no  successor  is  elected,  but  the  place  is  to  be 
filled  by  the  commission.  A  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  the  recall 
election  determine  the  result.  If  the  vote  be  for  removal,  the 
manager  "regardless  of  any  technical  defects  in  the  recall  peti- 
tion," shall  be  deemed  removed  from  office.  There  is  a  provision, 
however,  which  makes  it  impossible  to  file  a  recall  petition  within 
six  months  of  a  manager's  appointment  or  six  months  of  a  pre- 
vious recall  election.35 

The  application  of  the  recall  to  the  manager  has  been  one  of 
the  most  severely  criticised  features  of  the  Dayton  charter.  It 
forces  upon  the  manager  the  duty  of  considering  his  standing 
before  the  people  in  the  performance  of  work  which  the  commis- 
sion has  ordered.  It  enables  the  electorate  to  override  the  com- 
mission instead  of  making  it  representative  of  the  public  will. 
Its  presence  in  the  Dayton  plan  is  defensible  only  on  the  ground 
that  its  incorporation  was  a  concession  necessary  to  assure  the 
adoption  of  the  plan  as  a  whole.  It  is  significant  that  it  has  not 
been  made  a  part  of  any  of  the  city  manager  charters  adopted 
since  that  of  Dayton. 

The  removal  of  the  city  manager  by  the  expedient  of  giving 
him  a  fixed  term  and  thus  reopening  frequently  the  question  of 
his  retention  obtains  only  in  Tyler,  Texas.36  With  respect  to 
any  other  public  office  one  would  hardly  count  this  a  method  for 
removing  an  officer,  and  with  the  majority  of  American  munic- 
ipal executives  the  fixed  term  is  the  rule.  In  the  case  of  the 
manager  plan,  the  fixing  of  a  term  of  office  is  rare,  and  the  only 
reason  for  its  presence  is  to  enable  removal  of  a  manager  without 
resorting  to  the  "right  to  fire"  him.  Indeed,  the  city  manager 
is  in  almost  all  cases  chosen  for  an  indefinite  term.  As  long  as 
he  gives  satisfaction  and  chooses  to  remain  his  place  should  be 

SB  Dayton,  Charter,  Sees.  13-20  inclusive. 

36  In  Taylor  the  manager  is  chosen  for  a  fixed  period  of  two  years.  Cf. 
Beard,  Digest  of  Short  Ballot  Charters,  p.  36031. 


405]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  209 

secure.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  many  city  man- 
agers will  be  able  to  render  as  long  and  acceptable  service  as 
have  superintendents  of  schools  in  many  cities. 

In  almost  all  the  manager  governed  cities  the  salary  of  the 
chief  executive  is  left  to  the  determination  of  the  council.  This 
practice  has  not,  however,  met  with  universal  approval,  and  the 
charter  of  St.  Augustine  fixes  a  minimum  of  three  thousand  dol- 
lars. The  model  charter  of  the  National  Municipal  League  rec- 
ommends a  like  provision.  A  fixed  minimum  protects  the  city 
against  a  penny  wise  commission  and  guards  the  manager  against 
petty  attacks  by  a  council  that  might  hesitate  to  remove  him.  In 
Elizabeth  City,  North  Carolina,  Montrose,  Colorado,  and  La 
Grande,  Oregon,  the  charters  prescribe  that  the  salary  of  the 
manager  shall  not  exceed  a  given  maximum.  Tyler,  Texas,  fixes 
both  a  maximum  and  a  minimum  figure,  the  one  at  thirty-six 
hundred  dollars  and  the  other  at  eighteen  hundred.  Phoenix, 
Arizona,  permits  the  council  to  change,  increase,  or  modify  by 
ordinance  the  salary  of  the  city  manager  ' '  as  it  may  deem  proper 
and  necessary." 

Vacancies  in  the  managership  are  usually  filled  by  action  of 
the  commission.  This  is  always  true  of  permanent  vacancies,  but 
in  case  of  absence,  disability,  or  suspension,  and  vacancies  of  a 
temporary  character  there  are  different  methods  of  providing 
for  the  conduct  of  administration.  In  the  majority  of  cities  the 
council  is  authorized  to  "designate  some  properly  qualified  per- 
son to  execute  temporarily  the  functions  of  the  office  of  city  man- 
ager."  In  Taylor,  Texas,  the  commission  selects  one  of  its  own 
members  to  act  as  manager.  Jackson,  Michigan,  gives  to  the 
manager  the  power  to  name  one  of  his  subordinates  as  assistant 
manager.  The  latter  becomes  the  acting  manager  in  case  of  tem- 
porary vacancy  "unless  the  commission  provides  otherwise." 

Few  other  features  are  discernible  in  the  constitution  of  the 
manager's  office.  The  tendency  has  been  to  slough  off  many  of 
the  provisions  that  had  gathered  about  the  mayoralty  in  the 
course  of  its  development  and  to  simplify  the  structure  of  the 
executive  as  well  as  the  other  organs  of  municipal  government. 
The  results  in  the  mere  simplification  of  machinery  in  the  man- 
ager plan  constitute  no  small  part  of  its  claim  to  public  attention 
and  favor. 


210  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE 

The  Manager  and  Administration 

The  relation  of  the  city  manager  to  the  administration  of  the 
affairs  of  the  municipality  is  the  subject  of  careful  and  detailed 
definition  in  manager  charters.  In  a  general  way  the  manager 
is  the  executive  head  of  the  government,  is  responsible  for  the 
efficient  conduct  of  the  departments  and  divisions,  and  exercises 
control  over  them.37  This  relation  is  occasionally  modified  by 
provisions  which  make  possible  the  interference  and  direct  action 
of  the  council,88  but  in  some  cases  the  manager  is  expressly  pro- 
tected against  such  activity  on  the  part  of  the  council,  the  latter 
being  obliged  to  deal  with  matters  of  administration  thru 
him.39  The  organization  of  the  administration  is  usually  deter- 
mined in  the  charter  or  left  in  the  hands  of  the  commission,  but 
the  manager  is  still  in  a  position  to  influence  and  modify  the 
plans.  In  Dayton  the  commission  appoints  advisory  adminis- 
trative boards  "on  request  of  the  city  manager."  In  Spring- 
field, St.  Augustine,  and  Cadillac  the  manager  is  the  head  of  all 
departments  except  those  otherwise  provided  for  by  the  charter, 
while  in  Wheeling,  West  Virginia,  he  appoints  "such  officers 
.  .  .  as  are  necessary  or  proper"  to  make  the  authority  of 
the  city,  the  council,  or  the  manager  effective  and  grants  to  his 
appointees  the  power  necessary  to  perform  the  duties  assigned 
to  them.  His  appointive  power  is  usually  broad  and  extends  to 
all  municipal  employees  except  those  few  such  as  clerk,  treasurer, 
and  municipal  judge,  reserved  by  the  charter  to  the  commission.40 
This  practice  with  respect  to  appointments  is  modified  in  some 
cities.  Amarillo,  Tyler,  and  Taylor,  Texas,  and  Jackson,  Mich- 
igan, make  the  manager's  appointments  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  council.  Frequently  the  appointees  must  be  named  from 
an  eligible  list  prepared  by  a  civil  service  commission  as  in  Day- 
ton, San  Jose,  California,  and  for  certain  departments  in  Wheel- 
ing. On  the  other  hand  the  majority  of  manager  governed  cities 

37  See  charters  of  Dayton  (Sees.  47  and  48),  Springfield  (Sec.  16c),  Tay- 
lor (Art.  9,  See.  1),  Hickory  (Art.  6,  Sec.  1),  Manistee  (Art.  6,  See.  10), 
and  the  statutes  of  Massachusetts,  New  York,  Iowa,  and  Virginia. 

ss  Cadillac,  Charter,  Chap.  XI,  Sec.  1  and  4e. 

3»  St.  Augustine,  Charter,  Sec.  10. 

*o  Cf.  charters  of  Dayton,  Sandusky,  Montrose,  Phoenix,  and  others.  In 
La  Grande,  Ore.,  the  appointing  power  of  the  manager  is  ''absolute." 
Charter,  Chap.  VIII,  Sec.  4. 


407]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  211 

do  not  maintain  a  civil  service  commission,  tho  it  would  seem 
to  be  eminently  desirable  in  places  of  any  considerable  size  as  a 
means  for  assisting  the  manager  to  learn  of  the  qualifications  and 
fitness  of  applicants  for  positions.  In  contrast  with  those  cities 
that  require  confirmation  of  appointments  by  the  council  stands 
the  provision  in  the  St.  Augustine  charter  that  neither  the  com- 
mission nor  any  of  its  members  shall  "dictate  the  appointment 
of  any  person  to  office  or  employment  by  the  city  manager  or  in 
any  way  prevent  the  city  manager  from  exercising  his  own  judg- 
ment in  selecting  the  personnel  of  his  administration."  A  few 
charters,  notably  those  of  Amarillo  and  Montrose,  seek  to  guard 
against  nepotism,  the  former  by  prohibiting  the  city  manager 
from  appointing  any  person  "related  within  the  second  degree 
by  affinity  or  the  third  degree  by  consanguinity  to  either  of  the 
commissioners,  or  to  the  city  manager."  41 

Altho  the  power  of  appointment  is  usually  vested  in  the 
manager,  there  are  exceptions,  as  in  the  city  of  Hickory,  North 
Carolina,  where  the  council  appoints  or  elects  the  municipal  em- 
ployees for  a  term  of  one  year.  The  manager,  however,  is 
authorized  to  supply  the  council  with  lists  of  names  from  among 
which  the  council  may  choose.  In  case  one  list  does  not  satisfy 
the  council  may  call  for  as  many  other  lists  as  it  desires.42 

Along  with  the  power  to  appoint,  the  manager  is  frequently 
empowered  to  suspend,  remove,  or  dismiss,  and  otherwise  to  dis- 
cipline members  of  the  municipal  service.  The  exercise  of  these 
powers  is  carefully  supervised  either  by  the  council  or  by  the 
civil  service  commission.  Thus  in  Dayton,  the  manager  may 
remove  officers  appointed  by  him,  except  that  in  the  classified 
service  removals  are  subject  to  an  appeal  to  the  civil  service 
commission,  a  body  appointed  by  the  council.  The  power  of  sus- 
pension is  vested  in  the  city  manager  of  Dayton  exclusively  when 
exercised  with  respect  to  the  chief  of  police  and  the  fire  chief. 
In  Cadillac,  Michigan,  he  may  suspend  any  appointive  officer 
"for  any  just  and  reasonable  cause"  including  a  number  of 
specified  offenses  such  as  neglect  of  duty,  drunkenness,  and  the 

•*i  Amarillo,  Charter,  Sec.  30.  The  Montrose  provision  is  less  specific, 
providing  simply  that  the  manager  "shall  not  appoint  any  relative  of  hia 
own  to  any  office  of  trust."  Sec.  36. 

42  Charter,  Art.  6,  Sec.  12.  See  also  the  charter  of  Manistee,  Mich.,  and 
the  explanatory  note  in  Beard's  Digest,  p.  35017. 


212  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [408 

like.43  La  Grande,  Oregon,  gives  its  manager  "absolute  control 
and  supervision  over  all  ...  employees  of  the  City  except 
the  Commissioners  and  Municipal  Judge,"  including  the  power 
to  appoint  all  other  officers  prescribed  by  the  charter  and  to  em- 
ploy "such  additional  help  as  may  be  necessary"  and  "to  dis- 
charge, with  or  without  cause,  any  person  appointed  or  em- 
ployed by  him." 

The  manager's  powers  of  appointment  and  removal  are  un- 
questionably vital  features  of  the  plan.  In  a  recent  discussion 
of  the  professional  standards  which  should  characterize  member- 
ship in  the  City  Managers'  Association,  the  requirement  was  pro- 
posed that  members  must  come  from  cities  operating  under  ap- 
proved charters  and  one  of  the  things  for  which  an  approved 
charter  must  provide  was  the  manager's  appointive  power  with 
respect  to  all  city  departments.4*  That  it  may  be  necessary  "for 
some  years"  to  have  the  protection  which  the  civil  service  system 
offers  in  the  matter  of  appointments  is  admitted,  by  Manager 
"Waite  of  Dayton.  On  the  other  hand  the  power  to  dismiss  sub- 
ordinates absolutely  is  held  by  many  managers  to  be  essential 
to  efficiency.  "If  you  are  going  to  look  to  an  executive  for 
results,  he  must  and  should  have  the  power  of  dismissal."  On 
the  other  hand  anyone  familiar  with  municipal  conditions  in  the 
United  States  will  recognize  that  in  the  exercise  of  the  powers 
of  appointment  and  removal  the  manager  system  will  face  one  of 
its  gravest  tests.  The  disposition  of  councils  to  interfere  with 
the  appointments  made  by  managers  has  already  been  evidenced 
in  Sandusky,  Ohio,  and  some  other  cities.45  On  the  whole,  man- 

43  With  respect  to  officers  and  members  of  boards  and  commissions  that 
are  not  included  within  regular  departments  the  removal  power  of  the  man- 
ager of  Cadillac  is  absolute.     The  power  of  suspension  noted  above  is  ex- 
clusive with  respect  to  all  other  officers,  except  the  few  selected  by  the  com- 
mission.    Charter,  Chap.  XI,  Sees.  5  and  8. 

44  See  proposals  in  a  paper  by  Mr.  Richard  S.  Childs  on  ' '  Professional 
Standards  and  Professional  Ethics  in  the  New  Profession  of  City  Man- 
ager," National  Municipal  Review,  Vol.  V,  p.   197    (April,  1916).     This 
feature  was  not  approved. 

45  See  the  discussion  of  the  situation  in  Sandusky  in  National  Municipal 
Review,  Vol.  V,  p.  383.     The  commission  in  this  case  justified  its  action  in 
removing  some  of  the  manager 's  appointees  on  the  ground  that  he  had  fallen 
with  those  who  were  "out  of  sympathy  with  the  ideals  of  the  people"  and 
had  made  his  appointments  "without  consulting  the  commissioners."     Con- 
sequently it  becomes  ' '  the  imperative  duty  of  the  commission  to  supervise  his 


409]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  213 

agers  appear  to  look  with  favor  upon  such  assistance  as  the  civil 
service  can  render  in  securing  qualified  candidates  for  appoint- 
ment ;  opinion  is  divided  with  regard  to  activity  on  the  part  of 
the  council.  Some  believe  under  such  circumstances  a  manager 
should  retire ;  others  believe  that  if  a  community  is  not  ready  for 
"a  non-political  set  of  appointments"  a  manager  must  stay  his 
hand,  get  along  the  best  he  can,  and  bide  his  time.  He  is  the 
servant  of  the  municipality  as  represented  in  its  council  and 
should  make  non-political  appointments  only  when  he  can  make 
such  a  course  seem  worth  while  to  those  who  employ  him.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  however,  one  must  agree  with  the  view  that  com- 
munities which  cannot  vest  their  managers  with  broad  powers  of 
appointment  and  removal  ' '  are  not  ready  for  the  ideal ; ' '  doubt- 
less also  such  communities  should  proceed  cautiously  before 
adopting  a  form  of  government  as  simplified  and  advanced  as  is 
the  manager  plan ; 46  on  the  other  hand  the  establishment  of  im- 
proved conditions  in  administration  and  the  elimination  of  spoils 
politics  are  goals  to  be  won  only  by  degrees,  and  in  the  winning 
of  them  the  municipal  manager  will  assist  more  effectively  by 
the  patient  and  tactful  education  of  the  public  than  by  ultimata 
threatening  resignation  if  his  powers  of  appointment  and  re- 
moval are  not  recognized.  The  successes  which  the  manager 
plan  has  already  achieved  have  not  always  been  realized  under 
conditions  which  admitted  of  the  unrestricted  exercise  of  the 
powers  in  question,  but  this  fact  by  no  means  impairs  their  claim 
to  importance. 

The  manager's  powers  of  appointment  and  removal  are  some- 
times accompanied  by  the  right  to  fix  the  compensation  of  em- 
ployees, subject  to  the  approval  of  the  council.47  Limitations 
provide  that  the  rates  of  pay  shall  be  uniform  for  like  service  in 
each  grade  of  the  service.48  He  is  also  empowered  to  require  and 
to  fix  the  amount  of  bonds  of  appointees.49 

appointments,"  p.  384.  From  an  article  on  "Some  Eecent  Uses  of  the 
Recall,"  by  F.  S.  Fitzpatrick.  Phoenix,  Ariz.,  and  Niagara  Falls,  N.  Y., 
are  other  examples. 

46  See  report  of  a  discussion  by  Manager  Waite  of  Dayton  on  the  man- 
ager plan,  New  York  Times,  March  9,  1916. 

47  Cf.  the  charters  of  Wheeling   (Sec.  14),  Montrose   (Sees.  36,  Par.  1), 
and  Dayton   (Sec,  131). 

48  Dayton,  for  example,  Charter,  Sec.  161. 

49  Cf.  Wheeling,  Charter,  Sec.  14,  and  Dayton,  Charter,  Sec.  162. 


214  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [410 

Naturally,  the  city  manager  has  extensive  authority  to  investi- 
gate the  conduct  of  subordinate  officers  of  administration.  There 
are  but  rare  exceptions  to  the  bestowal  of  this  power  and  few 
limitations  upon  it.50  The  authority  is  usually  complete,  includ- 
ing the  right  to  investigate  without  notice,  to  conduct  examina- 
tions under  oath,  to  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  the 
production  of  evidence,  books,  accounts,  etc.,  to  punish  for  con- 
tempt, and  to  delegate  his  power  in  these  particulars  to  persons 
selected  by  him  to  conduct  such  investigations  for  him.51  In 
Dayton  the  city  accountant  is  required  to  make  for  the  manager 
an  examination  of  the  accounts  of  any  office  vacated  by  death, 
resignation,  removal,  or  the  expiration  of  the  incumbent's  term. 
In  Bakersfield,  California,  it  is  one  of  the  duties  of  the  manager 
to  investigate  all  complaints  in  regard  to  public  utility  services 
and  to  take  the  steps  necessary  to  correct  abuses.  The  power  of 
investigation  constitutes  one  of  the  most  essential  features  of  a 
managership  that  is  worthy  of  the  title  and  that  aspires  to  useful 
and  effective  service.  It  is  necessary  if  the  responsibility  of  the 
executive  is  to  be  thoroly  established. 

The  control  of  the  manager  further  extends  to  the  power  of 
requiring  information  and  reports,  either  orally  or  in  writing, 
from  his  subordinates  and  from  other  municipal  officers.  Such 
reports  are  expected  at  stated  intervals,  and  may  be  demanded  on 
such  other  occasions  as  the  manager  may  direct.  Where  the 
manager  is  not  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  all  the  depart- 
ments, such  as  the  department  of  law,  the  charters  sometimes 
specify  that  he  may  require  the  submission  of  opinions  or  other 
data.52 

One  of  the  most  important  duties  imposed  upon  the  city  man- 
ager is  the  exercise  of  his  power  of  approval.  Matters  from  the 
departments  come  before  him  continually,  the  extent  of  this 
power  in  actual  practice  depending,  of  course,  upon  the  disposi- 

so  In  Hickory,  N.  0.,  the  manager  is  not  authorized  to  investigate  the 
books  of  the  eity  treasurer. 

si  See  the  charters  of  Dayton  (See.  50),  Springfield  (Sec.  88),  St.  Augus- 
tine (Sec.  211),  Manistee  (Art.  6,  Sec.  16),  Cadillac  (Chap.  XI,  Sees.  8  and 
10). 

52  Cf.  the  charters  of  St.  Augustine  (Sees.  35  and  38)  and  Dayton  (Sec. 
58). 


411]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  215 

tion  of  the  particular  individual  who  is  manager.  There  are 
some  things,  however,  with  respect  to  which  the  charters  require 
the  approval  of  the  chief  executive.  For  example,  some  cities 
provide  that  he  must  countersign  all  vouchers  for  the  payment 
of  claims  against  the  city,  or  that  he  shall  countersign  and  ap- 
prove all  orders  for  the  purchase  or  sale  of  supplies.53  In  Spring- 
field, Ohio,  contracts  in  excess  of  a  given  sum,  usually  one  hun- 
dred, five  hundred,  or  one  thousand  dollars,  are  valid  only  upon 
the  approval  of  the  manager.  Any  modification  of  the  terms  of  a 
contract  may  be  effected  only  with  his  consent.  In  Taylor,  Texas, 
the  charter  provides  that  the  board  of  commissioners  shall  not 
act  on  any  matter  of  administration  without  first  asking  the  opin- 
ion in  writing  of  the  city  manager,  thus  making  the  matter  of  his 
approval  or  disapproval  a  consideration  of  primary  importance, 
even  tho  it  is  not  binding  upon  the  legislative  organ. 

Frequently  the  manager  is,  by  charter  enactment,  a  member  of 
important  municipal  boards  or  commissions  or  holds  certain  of- 
fices ex  officio.  He  is  one  of  the  three  members  of  the  board  of 
review  of  assessments  and  one  of  the  seven  trustees  of  the  sink- 
ing fund  in  Dayton.  The  manager  of  Springfield  is  also  platting 
commissioner  and  budget  commissioner  of  the  city.  St.  Augus- 
tine 's  charter  evidences  the  influence  of  the  Dayton  plan  in  that 
the  manager  is  made  a  member  of  the  equalizing  board,  and  as  in 
Springfield  he  is  also  superintendent  of  plats.  In  both  of  the 
latter  cities  he  is  made  the  purchasing  agent  of  the  city,  a  prac- 
tice that  obtains  also  in  Elizabeth  City,  North  Carolina,  and  in 
Montrose,  Colorado. 

In  some  of  the  departments  the  manager  has  special  powers 
and  responsibilities.  The  charter  laws  very  often  lay  upon  the 
manager  the  duty  of  seeing  that  the  laws  and  ordinances  are 
enforced.5*  Thus  special  emphasis  is  sometimes  laid  upon  his 

sa  See  the  charters  of  St.  Augustine  (Sec.  91),  Dayton  (Sees.  80  and 
85),  and  Amarillo  (Chap.  XXVI). 

s*  Cf.  Dayton,  Charter,  Sec.  48 (a)  ;  Springfield,  Charter,  Sec.  16(a)  ; 
Sandusky,  Charter,  Sec.  16 (a);  St.  Augustine,  Charter,  Sec.  33 (a).  In 
Bakersfield,  Calif.,  the  manager  must  see  that  the  laws  and  ordinances  are 
"faithfully  enforced  by  the  heads  of  the  departments."  Charter,  Sec.  36, 
Par.  1.  In  Phoenix,  Ariz.,  the  manager  shares  the  duty  of  enforcing  the 
ordinances  with  the  mayor.  Charter,  Chap.  VI,  Sec.  2. 


216  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [412 

control  of  the  department  of  public  safety  which  includes  the 
divisions  of  police  and  fire  protection.  In  Dayton  the  manager 
determines  the  composition  of  these  divisions  and  has  the  exclu- 
sive right  to  suspend  their  chiefs  pending  a  hearing  by  the  com- 
mission. Cadillac  gives  its  manager  exclusive  control  of  the  sta- 
tioning and  transfer  of  all  members  of  the  police  and  fire  forces, 
subject  only  to  such  rules  and  regulations  as  the  council  may  lay 
down.  Jackson  places  its  manager  in  "active  control"  of  the 
departments  of  police  and  fire.  The  effectiveness  of  the  man- 
ager's authority  to  enforce  the  laws  and  ordinances  is  increased 
in  Cadillac  and  Manistee  by  his  power  to  revoke  or  suspend 
licenses. 

The  relation  of  the  manager  to  the  department  of  finance  is, 
of  course,  intimate,  and  his  duties  in  this  connection  bring  him 
into  close  contact  with  every  part  of  the  administration.  The 
investigation  of  accounts,  the  approval  of  claims,  purchases, 
sales,  and  contracts,  the  revision  and  equalization  of  assessments, 
and  other  duties  have  already  been  mentioned.  In  reality,  how- 
ever, his  relation  to  municipal  finance  is  even  more  important 
than  the  foregoing  would  indicate.  He  must  make  frequent 
reports  to  the  commission  and  be  prepared  to  inform  it  regarding 
the  finances  and  the  future  needs  of  the  municipality.  These 
reports  are  made  weekly  in  some  places,  monthly  in  others,  or  at 
the  request  of  the  commission;  and  annual  reports  are  expected 
in  all  cases.  Of  greater  significance  is  the  work  of  preparing  and 
defending  the  annual  budget.55  This  task  involves  familiarity 
with  all  the  details  of  the  city 's  finances  and  an  intelligent  appre- 
ciation of  the  departmental  needs  and  services.  The  Dayton 
charter  provides  that  the  estimates  "shall  be  compiled  from 
detailed  information  obtained  from  the  several  departments  on 
uniform  blanks  to  be  furnished  by  the  city  manager. ' '  In  prac- 
tically all  cases  the  budget  is  presented  to  the  council,  but  in 
Bakersfield  it  is  submitted  to  the  auditor. 

The  miscellaneous  duties  which  the  manager  is  called  upon  to 
perform  are  almost  as  imposing  in  number  and  variety  as  those 
which  pertain  to  the  mayoralty.  Charters  frequently  provide 

ss  Cf.  Dayton,  Charter,  See.  156 ;  Springfield,  Charter,  Sec.  86 ;  also  the 
charters  of  Sandusky,  Ohio,  Manistee  and  Jackson,  Mich.,  Taylor,  Tex.,  and 
the  general  acts  of  New  York  and  Virginia. 


413]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  217 

that  in  addition  to  the  duties  and  functions  listed  within  their 
limits  the  manager  shall  perform  such  others  as  may  be  required 
by  ordinance  or  resolution  of  the  municipal  council.58  Many  are 
specified  in  the  charters  that  are  more  or  less  miscellaneous  in 
character  and  of  no  little  importance  and  interest.  In  Dayton 
and  St.  Augustine  the  manager  serves  notices  on  property  owners 
involved  in  commission  resolutions  regarding  the  repair  of  side- 
walks, curbings,  and  gutters,  the  vacating  of  streets,  and  con- 
demnation proceedings.  In  the  latter  city  he  distributes  the 
rebates  due  property  owners  from  the  unexpended  surplus  in 
special  assessment  funds.  He  is  required  to  prepare  and  display 
publicly  the  plans  of  proposed  improvements,  together  with  data 
and  information  relating  to  them.  Springfield,  Bakersfield,  and 
Montrose  expect  him  to  see  that  the  obligations  of  public  utility 
corporations  operating  under  franchise  grants  are  faithfully  ob- 
served. Montrose  places  in  his  hands  the  issuance  of  building 
permits,  the  care  of  city  tools  and  property,  and  the  work  of 
advertising  for  bids  on  supplies;  Phoenix  empowers  him  to  see 
to  the  performance  of  all  contracts;  Cadillac  entrusts  him  with 
the  management  of  all  charitable,  correctional,  and  reformatory 
institutions  and  agencies,  the  supervision  of  weights  and  meas- 
ures, the  keeping  of  a  "complete  and  accurate  system  of  vital 
statistics  and  the  enforcement  of  health,  sanitary,  and  quaran- 
tine regulations  of  every  kind. ' '  The  Iowa  general  act  and  the 
charters  of  Cadillac  and  Jackson  lay  special  emphasis  upon  his 
management  and  supervision  of  all  public  improvements  and  en- 
terprises. Clerical  and  ministerial  duties  such  as  the  signing  of 
all  public  documents,  licenses,  contracts,  etc.,  specified  by  the 
commission  are  enumerated  in  the  charters  of  Manistee  and  Cad- 
illac. La  Grande  expects  the  manager  to  see  that  the  business 
affairs  of  the  corporation  are  transacted  in  "a  modern  scientific 
and  businesslike  manner  and  the  services  performed  and  the 
records  kept"  to  be  "as  nearly  as  may  be  like  those  of  an  effi- 
cient and  successful  private  corporation."  In  Collinsville,  Okla- 
homa, he  is  vested  with  the  judicial  power  and  authority  of  the 
city,  and  in  Cadillac  and  some  other  cities  he  may  sign  warrants 
and  cause  arrests.  To  fill  the  cup  of  his  authority  he  is  occa- 

se  For  example  of  this  blanket  provision  see  Springfield,  Charter,  Sec 


218  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [414 

sionally  authorized  to  ' '  exercise  and  perform  all  other  executive 
and  administrative  functions  and  duties"  not  provided  for  by 
the  charter  or  by  the  commission.57 

The  justification  for  the  concentration  of  executive  and  admin- 
istrative authority  which  the  manager  enjoys  is  threefold:  the 
manager  is  immediately  and  continuously  responsible  to  the  rep- 
resentative council;  the  legislative  and  administrative  functions 
of  the  municipality  are  separated  from  each  other,  and  the  con- 
fusion resulting  from  a  system  of  checks  and  balances  is  elim- 
inated ; 58  and  the  introduction  of  trained  and  expert  department 
heads  and  of  capable  employees  in  subordinate  positions  is  en- 
couraged and  facilitated.  There  can  be  no  question  but  that  in 
communities  where  intelligent  cooperation,  sympathy,  and  sup- 
port are  accorded  this  type  of  administrative  organization  the 
results  achieved  tend  to  compare  very  favorably  with  the  best 
that  has  hitherto  been  achieved  under  either  the  mayor  or  the 
commission  plans.  On  the  other  hand  the  possibility  that  the 
manager  form  "might  prove  to  be  susceptible  to  perversion  in 
the  interest  of  a  boss  in  cities  with  an  undeveloped  and  inactive 
public  opinion ' '  has  led  the  friends  of  the  manager  plan  to  urge 
caution  in  its  adoption  and  the  National  Municipal  League  to 
insist  that  none  of  the  other  principal  features  of  the  plan  be 
omitted  if  the  administrative  provisions  are  adopted.59 

The  Manager  and  Legislation 

The  relation  of  the  city  manager  to  legislation  is  much  more 
simple  than  is  that  of  the  mayor  or  the  mayor-commissioner.  In 
the  manager  plan  the  council  is  at  once  the  organ  for  the  deter- 
mination of  public  policy  and  the  judge  and  critic  of  the  manager 
and  of  his  conduct  of  the  administration.  It  is  a  restored  and 
powerful  representative  body.  But  despite  this  renaissance  of 
the  council  the  manager  retains  an  influence  in  legislation  that 
is  far  from  inconspicuous.  Tho  he  enjoys  no  vote  as  does  the 
mayor-commissioner,  and  no  veto  as  in  the  case  of  the  mayor,  he 
finds  still  open  to  him  the  more  important  and  useful  avenues  of 
executive  participation  in  the  initiation  and  enactment  of  legis- 

57  Jackson,  Charter,  Sec.  33  (f) ;  Cadillac,  Charter,  Chap.  XI,  Sec.  4. 

58  Cf.  comment  by  Manager  H.  M.  Waite  of  Dayton,  quoted  in  the  New 
York  Times,  March  9,  1916. 

e»  A  Model  City  Charter,  etc.,  p.  29,  note  12. 


415]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  219 

lation.  His  power  to  initiate  legislation  is  threefold:  he  may 
call  meetings  of  the  council  or  commission ;  he  may  submit  rec- 
ommendations ;  and  he  prepares  and  submits  the  annual  budget. 
His  power  to  call  meetings  of  the  council  is  usually  expressed  in 
the  charter  and  is  shared  by  the  mayor  or  president  or  by  a  fixed 
number  of  commissioners.  The  method  of  making  the  call  effec- 
tive is  not  always  incorporated  in  the  charter  provisions,  but  in 
Dayton,  St.  Augustine,  and  some  other  cities,  the  members  of  the 
council  must  be  served  with  written  notice,  either  personally  or 
by  messenger  at  their  respective  residences  at  least  twelve  hours 
in  advance.  In  Amarillo,  on  the  other  hand,  the  manager  may 
call  the  meetings  "at  any  time  deemed  advisable."  The  model 
charter  of  the  National  Municipal  League  does  not  confer  this 
power  on  the  city  manager  but  leaves  the  matter  of  calling  special 
meetings  with  the  council  to  be  "prescribed  by  ordinance." 

The  manager's  power  to  make  recommendations  is  recognized 
in  the  great  majority  of  charters,  and  in  most  of  them  its  exercise 
is  couched  in  directory  language.  The  form  which  the  recom- 
mendations shall  take  is  rarely  specified,  but  in  Amarillo  they 
are  to  be  "in  writing."  The  value  of  this  provision  is  somewhat 
enhanced  by  the  requirement,  generally  made,  that  all  meetings 
shall  be  public  and  the  privilege  of  access  to  the  minutes  and 
records  of  the  council  vouchsafed  to  any  citizen.60  The  right  of 
the  manager  to  introduce  proposals  is  not  generally  provided  for 
in  express  terms,  but  it  is  frequently  the  practice  to  supplement 
recommendations  with  measures  already  drawn  and  ready  for 
consideration  and  action.  This  course  is  provided  for  in  the 
charter  of  Cadillac,  the  manager  being  authorized  to  "draw  up 
resolutions  and  ordinances  for  adoption  by  the  commission ' '  and 
to  "introduce"  them  before  the  commission.  Perhaps,  however, 
the  most  important  function  of  the  manager  in  connection  with 
the  initiation  of  legislation  is  that  of  submitting  the  annual 
budget.  This  does  not  involve  the  preparation  of  the  annual 
appropriation  bill,  but  it  does  include  the  recommendations  of 
the  manager  as  to  the  amounts  to  be  appropriated,  together 
"with  the  reasons  therefor."  The  estimates  as  prepared  and 
the  manager 's  recommendations  are  open  to  the  inspection  of  the 
public  and  following  the  preparation  of  the  appropriation  ordi- 

eo  For  example,  Dayton,  Charter,  Sec.  39. 


220  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [416 

nance  by  the  commission  and  prior  to  its  adoption,  the  ordinance 
is  published,  together  with  a  parallel  comparison  of  the  proposals 
made  by  the  manager.  In  some  cities  as  much  as  ten  days  must 
elapse  after  publication  before  the  ordinance  may  be  adopted, 
and  it  is  obvious  that  in  the  majority  of  cases  the  council  will 
hesitate  to  alter  the  manager's  estimates  materially,  unless  there 
be  sound  reasons  for  such  action. 

The  power  of  the  manager  to  participate  in  the  enactment  of 
legislation  is  limited  to  his  having  a  voice  in  discussions  on  mat- 
ters before  the  council  for  consideration.  The  vote  is  expressly 
denied  to  him  by  many  charters,  thus  differentiating  him  from 
most  other  municipal  executives  in  this  country.  The  right  to 
be  heard  is  of  the  utmost  importance  and  is  generally  bestowed.61 
Exception  to  the  manager's  presence  when  the  council  is  con- 
sidering his  removal  is  made  in  the  model  charter  proposed  by 
the  National  Municipal  League,  but  this  document  goes  further 
than  those  already  in  operation  in  that  it  provides  that  the  man- 
ager may  meet  with  all  sessions  of  council  committees  as  well  as 
with  the  council,  and  may  discuss  with  such  committees  matters 
under  consideration  by  them.  In  Taylor,  Texas,  the  board  of 
commissioners  may  not  act  on  measures  which  affect  administra- 
tion without  first  securing  the  written  opinion  of  the  manager. 
From  whatever  angle  one  may  view  this  power  of  making  his 
opinions  known,  whether  in  oral  discussion  or  in  written  state- 
ments, one  must  recognize  its  potency.  The  manager's  intimate 
knowledge  of  conditions,  his  grasp  of  the  effect  of  measures  and 
policies  upon  all  branches  of  the  public  service,  and  the  experi- 
ence which  he  will  in  time  have  acquired  in  the  organization  and 
presentation  of  his  material  cannot  fail  to  gain  for  his  opinions  a 
degree  of  recognition  and  a  measure  of  approval  which  will  rival 
the  success  of  even  the  strongest  mayors.  The  manager's  attend- 
ance upon  all  meetings  of  the  commission  is  almost  always  made 
one  of  his  duties.  His  presence  operates  to  make  him  an  active 
and  influential  factor  in  legislation,  especially  where  his  record 
in  the  service  of  the  municipality  has  won  for  him  the  respect 
and  loyalty  of  the  community.  His  judgment  will  rarely  be  con- 
sidered lightly. 

6i  Cf.  charters  of  Dayton,  Springfield,  Cadillac,  Jackson,  St.  Augustine, 
Montrose,  Amarillo,  for  examples  of  the  bestowal  of  the  right  of  discussion. 


417]  THE  CITY  MANAGER  221 

Conclusions 

There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the-  manager  plan  is  firmly  estab- 
lished in  this  country  as  one  of  the  three  main  types  of  city  gov- 
ernment. Of  course  it  is  altogether  too  early  to  judge  of  its 
ultimate  place  in  the  municipal  life  of  American  cities.  Under 
unfavorable  conditions  it  has  registered  a  record  of  success  and 
an  increase  in  efficiency  that  has  commanded  for  it  the  attention 
and  respect  of  all  who  are  interested  in  the  improvement  of  city 
government  and  politics.  Not  all  of  the  problems  that  are  called 
into  being  by  the  appearance  of  the  expert  executive  have  been 
solved.  His  relation  to  the  commission  has  been  easier  to  outline 
in  charter  law  than  to  establish  in  practice  and  will  ultimately  be 
defined  only  under  the  pressure  of  experience.  To  keep  the  man- 
ager in  the  background  and  out  of  politics  and  the  commission  in 
the  foreground  where  the  public  eye  may  follow  its  every  act  will 
be  a  most  difficult  and  persistent  undertaking.  The  development 
and  maintenance  of  the  active  and  intelligent  public  interest  in 
governmental  affairs  that  is  essential  to  the  success  of  the  man- 
ager plan  as  well  as  to  any  other  will  be  achieved  only  by  degrees. 
Yet  despite  these  and  other  difficulties  the  city  manager  plan  is 
undoubtedly  of  great  promise.  It  has  been  received  with  en- 
thusiasm by  students  of  political  theory  as  embracing  sound 
principles  of  government  organization.  Its  entry  into  the  field 
of  city  government  has  been  opportune.  It  has  the  endorsement 
of  the  National  Municipal  League  in  its  model  charter.  Already 
its  impact  has  been  felt  by  the  older  forms  of  organization.  The 
administrative  system  which  it  incorporates  seems  to  be  capable 
of  indefinite  development  and  expansion  and  therefore  qualified 
to  be  successfully  applied  in  the  large  cities,  thus  coming  into 
effective  competition  with  the  mayor  system  at  the  point  where 
the  commission  plan  has  made  the  least  impression. 

The  advocates  of  the  respective  executive  types  described  in 
this  work  are  not  wanting  either  in  arguments  or  in  enthusiasm. 
Especially  is  this  true  of  the  commission  and  the  manager  plans. 
It  is  hardly  to  be  expected,  however,  that  the  enthusiasm  for  a 
product  of  long  and  evolutionary  development,  such  as  the  mayor 
plan,  could  rival  that  displayed  in  behalf  of  plans  of  more  recent 
devising,  lacking  as  they  are  in  records  of  conspicuous  failure. 
On  the  one  hand  it  is  said  that  "there  should  be  no  mayor  of  the 


222  THE   AMERICAN    MUNICIPAL   EXECUTIVE  [418 

old-fashioned  sort, "  a  "  chief  official  having  both  deliberative  and 
executive  powers,  and  elected  at  the  polls"  —  "he  should  not 
exist. ' ' 62  On  the  other  it  is  said  that  under  commission  govern- 
ment there  ' '  would  often  be  found  one  man  who  would  dominate 
.  .  ."  and  that  the  "tendency,  therefore,  is  strongly  toward 
one-man  government, ' '  government  by  a  ' '  city  autocrat. ' ' 63 
From  another  work  one  learns  that  the  tendency  of  commission 
government  to  invest  the  elective  official ' '  with  active  managerial 
functions  is  an  unwise  inclination  toward  the  Jacksonian  doc- 
trine of  the  popular  election  of  administrative  officials. ' ' 6*  The 
principal  objections  to  the  manager  form  are  that  it  does  not 
admit  that  there  are  "good  men  in  every  locality  capable  of 
administering  the  government  of  the  city,"65  and  that  it  pre- 
sumes standards  of  public  life  and  citizen  activity  that  do  not 
obtain  in  the  average  city.  As  to  the  validity  of  these  views 
regarding  the  municipal  chief  executive  the  reader  is  left  to 
judge.  The  writer  views  with  favor  and  hopefulness  the  future 
spread  of  the  manager  type,  the  expert  executive  responsible  to 
a  representative  council.  Certain  it  is,  however,  that  no  revolu- 
tion is  impending  that  will  sweep  away  the  mayoralty  or  the 
mayor-commissionership.  In  the  evolution  of  municipal  democ- 
racy toward  higher  ideals  and  nobler  achievements  in  govern- 
ment, the  type  of  executive  organization  which  proves  fit  will 
survive  and  endure ;  and  in  a  world  which  bears  witness  to  the 
adaptability  and  permanence  of  differing  forms  of  governmental 
organization  it  would  be  idle  to  prophesy  the  ultimate  passing 
of  any  one  of  the  three  types  studied  in  the  preceding  pages. 
Bather,  one  may  reasonably  expect  that  each  of  them  will,  under 
varying  conditions,  and  with  divers  modifications,  develop  into 
agencies  adequate  for  the  tasks,  responsibilities,  and  purposes 
with  which  they  are  charged. 

62  ' '  The  City  Manager  Plan  with  Proportional  Representation,  otherwise 
called  The  Representative  Council  Plan,"  by  C.  G.  Hoag.  Found  in  Beard, 
Digest  of  Short  Ballot  Charters,  p.  21305. 

«s  Eeport  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Municipal  Government,  British 
Columbia,  1912,  published  at  Victoria,  1913,  p.  6. 

6*  Eyan,  Oswald,  Municipal  Freedom,  a  Study  of  the  Commission  Govern- 
ment (New  York,  1915),  p.  99. 

65  Toulmin,  H.  A.,  The  City  Manager,  A  New  Profession  (New  York. 
1915),  pp.  262,  263. 


INDEX 


Abbot,  W.  J.,  155,  165 

Abbott,    Edith,    51 

Accountant,  71,  203,  214 

Accounts,  commissioner  of,  97 

Adam,  Jamea  N.,  152,  178 

Age  qualification  of  mayor,  41,  44; 

of  mayor-commissioner,  183 
Alabama,  39,  183,   185,  188 
Alderman,  18,   19,  22,  53,  54,  64ff, 

67,  79,  92,  93,  115,  117,  120,  121, 

122,  127,  131,  136,  139,  141,  143; 

aa  mayor,  65 
Alexander,  George,  123 
Alternative  commission   government, 

134 
Amarillo,  Texas,  200,  202,  205,  207, 

210,  211,  215,  219,  220 
Ames,   "Doc,"  165 
Appointment 

Of  mayor-commissioner,  187;  of 
city  manager,  201,  205 

Power  of  mayor,  20,  30,  31,  77, 
79ff,  88ff,  92,  94,  102ff,  109, 
112 ;  of  mayor-commissioner, 
192,  193,  196;  of  city  man- 
ager, 201,  210ff;  of  commis- 
aions,  210;  of  council,  79ff,  103, 
192,  205,  211 

See   election,    removal,   vacancies 
Approval,    power    of    mayor,    lOOff, 

131ff;    of  council,   210ff;    of   city 

manager,  214 

Arbuthnot,  C.  C.,  161,  174ff 
Ardmore,  Okla.,  196 
Arkansas,   39,   195 
Ash,   146 

Ashtabula,  Ohio,  201,  205 
Aurora,  111.,   76 


Baehr,  173 


Baker,  Newton  D.,  162,  166,  167, 
173ff 

Bakersville,  Calif.,  200,  204,  215, 
216,  217 

Baltimore,  22ff,  38,  39,  41,  42,  61, 
64,  68,  74,  87,  89,  92,  95,  98,  100, 
102,  104,  106,  107,  109,  115,  116, 
118,  120,  121,  131,  133,  135,  138, 
144,  153,  203 

Bangor,  Me.,  122 

Battle  Creek,  Mich.,   186 

Baxter,  James  P.,  Ill,  178 

Bayles,  37,  41,  42,  45,  52,  53,  71, 
92,  106,  109,  124,  128,  129,  132, 
138 

Beard,  Charles  A.,  39,  48,  145,  186, 
203,  208,  211,  222 

Beardstown,  111.,  120 

Beaumont,  Texas,  196 

Bell,  mayor,  55 

Bennett,   Frank  I.,  204 

Bicameral  council,  79,  117 

Birmingham,   188 

Blankenburg,  Eudolph,  74,  78,  123, 
125,  140,  153,  158,  170ff 

Bluefield,  W.  Va.,   186 

Boards:  executive's  position  on,  98, 
99,  193,  194,  215;  education,  100, 
143;  of  estimate  and  apportion- 
ment, 99,  100,  105,  106,  115,  116, 
127,  143,  144;  also  see  96,  97,  100, 
105,  106 

Bonds,  101;  of  mayor,  69;  of  may- 
or-eommissione|r,  190;  of  city 
manager,  206 

Boroughs,   17,   20,   56,   115 

Boss  rule,  110 

Boston,  22,  25,  27,  38,  40,  .46,  47, 
48,  49,  50,  58,  59,  60ff,  61,  68,  70, 
79,  84,  85,  86,  88,  89,  92,  96,  97, 


223 


224 


THE  AMERICAN  MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE 


[420 


102,  104,  105,  109,  126,  127,  128, 
129,  130,  132,  133,  136,  138,  142, 
144.  See  Quiney,  Fitzgerald 

Bradford,  186,  187,  194 

Bridgeport,  Conn.,  141 

Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  128 

Bruce,  H.  Addington,   179 

Bryce,  146 

Bruere,  Henry,  175ff,  194 

Buck,  Eobert  M.,  141 

Budget,  99,  105,  118,  120,  126,  135, 
136,  196,  216,  219 

Buffalo,  152,  162,  178,  183,  184,  185, 
187,  189,  190,  191,  192 

Bureau  of  information  and  efficien- 
cy, 96 

Bureau  of  Municipal  Eeseareh,  141, 
145 

Busse,  mayor,  154,  156 

Butte,  Mont,  90 

Cabinet,  mayor's,  78 

Cadillac,  Mieh.,  200,  201,  202,  205, 

206,  210,  211,  212,  214,  216,  217, 

218,  219,  220 
California,   187 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  80 
Cartersville,  Ga.,  195 
Caucus,   44 
Centralization  of  power,  10,  34,  112, 

118,  197,  218 
Chadwiek,  E.  E.,  92 
Charleston,   S.    C.,   27,   41,   61,   121, 

131,  133 
Charters,   early   city,   17ff;    mayor's 

influence   in,    142;    of    Baltimore, 

24ff 
Chattanooga,   Tenn.,    183,   184,   187, 

196 
Chicago,  10,  12,  32,  49,  50,  61,  63, 

68,  82,  89,  102,  106,  107,  110,  115, 

116,  128,  130,  138,  142,  143,  145, 

147,  154,  156.     See  Harrison,  Wm. 

Hale  Thompson 
Childs,  Richard  S.,  212 
Cincinnati,    48,    85,    106,    110,    118, 


128,  130,  132,  152,  153,  158.     See 

Hunt 
Citizenship,    of    mayor,    39,    44;    of 

mayor-commissioner,     183 ;     states 

requiring,   39 
City  clerk,  as  mayor,  64 
City  manager,  10,  13,  14,  34,  99,  198 

Election,  44,  200,  205 

And  legislation,  218ff 

Powers,  201,  210ff 

Qualifications,  205 

Eemoval,  200,  207ff 

Salary,  201,  209 

Term,  200,  208 

Vacancies,  201,  209 
City  Managers'  Association,  212 
Civil  service,  79ff,  88,  94,  103,  112, 

211,  212,  213 
Claims,  101,  215 
Cleveland,  39,  42,  46,  48,  50,  51,  59, 

64,  66,  67,  69,  70,  71,  79,  80,  86,  92, 

96,  98,  99,  101,  102,  104,  105,  106, 

118,  120,  121,  125,  127,  129,  130, 

131,  132,  133,  135,  138,  156.     See 

Baker,  Johnson 
Cleveland,  Grover,  162 
Collinsville,    Okla.,    200,    205,   217 
Colonial  mayors,  20ff,  45 
Colorado  Springs,  195,  196 
Columbus,  Ohio,  48,  57,  61 
Commission  government,  10,   14,  34, 

50,  60,  99,   181ff;   primaries,  49; 

recall,  57ff,  186.     See  election 
Commissions,  and  council,  201;  and 

city  manager,  208 ;  and  mayor,  99 ; 

and  mayor-commissioner,   194;    of 

publicity  and   efficiency,   96.     See 

boards 

Conference,  99,  109 
Conference  of  American  Mayors,  173 
Constitution,  U.  S.,  45,  70 
Controller,  56,  70,  94,  101,  106,  152, 

193;  as  mayor,  64,  65 
Convention,  to  elect  mayor,  44ff,  47, 

49,  72;  to  elect  mayor-commission- 
er. 184 


421] 


INDEX 


225 


Corporation,  English,  17ff,  21ff;   of 

London,  18 
Corporations  Act,  19 
Corpus  Christi,  Texas,  186,  196 
Cotterill,  George  F.,  122,  123,  178 
Council,  city,  9ff,  29 
Bicameral,   79,   117 
And  mayor,  114ff;  and  city  man- 
ager, 218 

Powers  appointment,  79ff,  103, 
192,  205,  211;  approval,  210ff; 
budget,  117ff,  136;  election,  45, 
51;  removal,  52ff,  90,  93,  189ff, 
207;  vacancies,  64ff,  67,  201, 
209 
President  of,  56,  64,  65,  138,  189, 

196 
Presiding    officer,    64,    128,    129, 

196,  198,  201 
Eecommendations    to,    120ff,    123, 

196,  201 

Special  meetings,  120,  196 
Courts,   for   removal   of   mayor,   54, 
57;    of  mayor-commissioner,   186; 
of  city  manager,  200 
Covington,  Ky.,  131 
Cox,  Boss,   158 
Curley,  mayor,  88 

Dahlman,  James,  156 

Dallas,    Texas,    184,    185,    192,    193, 

196 
Dayton,  Ohio,  68,  200,  202,  204,  205, 

207,  208,  210,  211,  213,  214,  215, 

216,   217,   219,   220 
Delaware,  22 

Dempsey,  James,   153,  158 
Denison,  Texas,  96 
Denver,  38,  183,  184,  185,  186,  198 
Departments,   and  mayor,    74ff,   95; 

and      mayor-commissioner,     192ff, 

194;   and  city  manager,  214,  216. 

See  appointment 
Detroit,  38,  40,  42,  48,  90,  118,  120, 

128,  132,  135,  143,  160,  178 
Dilton,  John  F.,  52,  53,  56 
Direct  primary.     See  primary 


Discussion,    right   of    executive,    99, 

128,   130,  197,  215,  220 
Don  Roberts,  55,  165 
Douglas,  Ariz.,  199,  202,  203 
Dunne,   156,  162 
Duniiigan,  Father,  159 

Eaton,  D.  B.,  137 
Election 

Majority,  50,  51 

Of  mayor,  20,  28,  49ff;  of  mayor- 
commissioner,  184ff;  of  city 
manager,  200,  205ff;  by  lot, 
200;  by  commission,  185,  187, 
191,  200 

Non-partisan,   50,   51,    72 

Popular,  25ff,  28,  44,  49,  185,  188, 
191,  200 

Plurality,  49,  50,  51,  185,  200 

Primary,    184 

Qualifying,   184 

Eecall,  52ff,  61,  67,  72 

And  removal,  88ff,  92ff 

Special,   64,  188 

See  appointment,  primary 
Elizabeth  City,  N.  C.,  201,  209,  215 
Elizabeth,  N.  J.,  21 
Emergency,  power  of  city  manager, 

202 
English  mayor,    16ff,  47,   114,    115, 

126,  148 

Evansville,  Ind.,   68,   109 
Expert,  examiners,  95 

Fagan,  mayor,  152,  153 

Fairlie,  John  A.,  106 

Finance,  and  mayor,  31,  105ff ;  com- 
missions of,  97,  105 

Fire  department,  102ff,  105,  211, 
216 

Fisher,  Walter  L.,  204 

Fitzgerald,  John  F.,  60,  105,  142, 
166 

Fitzpatrick,  F.  S.,  213 

Florida,    186 

Foulke,  Wm.  Dudley,  82,  84,  157 

Francis,  David  B.,  162 


226 


THE  AMERICAN  MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE 


[422 


Freiberg,  A.  Julius,  171 
Fuhrmann,  Louis  P.,  122 
Fusion  ticket,  50 

Galveston,  Texas,  181,  185,  194 

Gardner,  Me.,  195 

Gaynor,  Wm.  J.,  102,  104,  122,  140, 

142,  152,  159,   166,  175ff 
Georgia,  186 
Gilbertson,  H.   S.,  46 

Governor,   45,   52,    55,    56ff,   82,   97, 

146,  147,  188,  196,  200 
Giand  Forks,  N.  D.,  50 
Grand  Junction,  Colo.,  186 
Grant,   159 
Greenlaw,  29,  32,  33 
Greenville,  Texas,  196 

Hanna,  Mark,  169 

Harrisburg,  Pa.,   177ff 

Harrison,    Carter   H.,   Jr.,    63,    142, 

143,  156,  165 

Harrison,    Carter   H.,    Sr.,   32,    140, 

155,  156,  165 
Hart,  A.  B.,  153 
Hartford,  Conn.,  50 
Haverhill,  Mass.,  194 
Haynes,  James  C.,  123,  125 
Head,  James  M.,  Ill,  178 
Health  department,  104ff 
Hewitt,  Abram  S.,  165 
Hickory,  N.  C.,  200,  202,  203,  206, 

207,  210,  211,  214 
High  Point,  N.  C.,  196 
Hoag,   C.   G.,  222 
Home  Eule,  113,  123,  178 
Houston,  Texas,  181,  186,  188,  189, 

191,  192,  193,   195,   196 
Hunt,  Henry  T.,  Ill,  152,  158,  160, 

170ff 
Huntington,   Va.,   184,   186,   194 

Idaho,  129 

Illinois,  30,  31,  38,  42,  51,  54,  60, 
62,  65,  68,  69,  70,  89,  94,  95,  100, 
103,  106,  107,  108,  128,  129,  130, 
133,  135,  147,  162,  184,  185,  188, 
189,  195,  196 


Impeachment,  of  mayor,  54ff,  67; 
of  mayor-commissioner,  186 

Indiana,  31,  39,  54,  55,  62,  63,  64, 
65,  71,  89,  92,  107,  129,  130,  135 

Indianapolis,  40,  54,  55,  64,  85,  92, 
109,  135 

Information,  bureau  of,  96 

Interpellation,  130 

Introduce  measures,  power  of  may- 
or, 125 

Investigation,  power  of  mayor,  94ff; 
of  council,  130;  of  mayor-commis- 
sioner, 192,  193;  of  city  manager, 
214 

Iowa,  185,  200,  205,  206,  210,  217 

Jackson,  Mich.,  200,  201,  203,  205, 
206,  209,  210,  216,  217,  218,  220 

Jacksonville,  HI.  30 

James,  H.  G.,  205 

Jersey  City,  N.  J.,  61,  152,  153 

Johnson,  Tom  L.,  104,  111,  155,  156, 
158,  168ff,  173,  176,  179 

Jones,  David  I.,  178 

Jones,  Samuel  M.,  "Golden  Rule," 
104,  155,  158,  166ff 

Jones,  Stiles  P.,  178 

Jost,  Henry,  121 

Judicial  power,  of  mayor,  31,  106ff ; 
of  mayor-commissioner,  195;  of 
city  manager,  203  5  proceedings  to 
remove  executive,  56,  186,  200 

Kansas,  39 

Kansas  City,  38,  39,  40,  41,  53,  69, 

70,  103,   104,  106,   107,   109,   121, 

132,  133,  135 
Keene,  Me.,  49 
Keller,  mayor,  57 
Kentucky,    90,    120,    134,    183,    186, 

187,  188,  189,  192 

La  Grande,  Ore.,  200,  205,  207,  209, 

210,  212,  217 
Lapeer,  Mich.,  159 
Lawrence,  Mass.,  195 
Legislation 


423] 


INDEX 


227 


And    mayor,    114ff;     and    mayor- 

commissioner,      195ff;      and     city 

manager,  218ff 

Kipper,   150 

Special,  146ff 
Lewiston,  Idaho,  132,  196 
Lincoln,  Neb.,  196 
Loans,  126 

Lockport  (N.  Y.),  plan,  200ff 
Lorenz,  Carl,  155,  156,  168ff 
Los  Angeles,  48,  49,  58,  59,  61,  65, 

69,    70,   79,    87,   89,    90,   93,    102, 

103,  104,  106,  118,  120,  121,  123, 

133,  135 
Lot,  51,  200 
Louisiana,  186,  195 
Louisville,   Ky.,   38 
Low,  Seth,  146,  178 
Lowell,  Mass.,  185,  196 
Lynn,  Mass.,   188,  189 

i 

Macomb,  111.,  30 
Madison,  Wis.,  64,  68,  107,  117 
Maine,   212 
Majority,    elections,    50ff,    60,    185, 

208.     See  elections,  vote 
Manager.     See  city  manager 
Manistee,  Mich.,  200,  201,  202,  206, 

210,  214,  216,  217 
Marriage,   by  mayor,   107 
Marshall,  Texas,  183,   190,  196 
Maryland,  22 

Mason,  Augustus  Lynch,  83 
Massachusetts,  82,  84,  192,  195,  200, 

205,  206,  210 

Massachusetts  Civil  Service  Commis- 
sion, 79 
Mayor 

Bond,  67 

As  city  manager,  199ff 

Development  of,  13ff;  history, 
16ff;  English,  16ff;  colonial, 
21ff 

Election,  49ff,   72 

Nomination,  44ff,   72 

Oath,  70 

Qualifications,  37ff,  72 


Eemoval,  52ff,  72 

Salary,   67ff,  72 

Successors,    67 

Term,   61ff,   72 

Vacancy,  63ff 

See  these  headings  * 

Mayor    and    administration,    powers 

of 

Appointment,  77,  78ff,  92,  94,  109, 
112 

Approval,  lOOff 

Approval  and  veto,  131ff,  144ff 

On  boards,  99ff 

Budget,  126,  129,  135,  136 

Financial,  105 

Introducing  bills,  125 

Investigation,  94ff,  112 

Judicial,   106ff,  113 

Legal,  29ff,  119ff 

Miscellaneous,  108ff 

Public  safety,  102ff 

Kemoval,  30ff,  87ff,  112 

Report  ami  conference,  98ff,  109 

Suspension,    92ff 

See  these  headings 
Mayor  and  legislation 

Approval  and  veto,  131ff,  144ff 

In  council,  114ff,  118 

Influence  upon,  115ff,  139,  142 

Introduce  bills,  125ff 

Message,  121 

Presiding  officer,  128ff 

Special  meetings,   120 

State  legislation,  144ff 
Mayor  and  party,  149ff 
Mayor-commissioner,  181ff 

In  legislation,  195ff 

Powers  of,  191ff,  195ff 

Pro  tern,  189 

Qualifications,  183ff 

Eemoval,  186 

Term,  187 

Vacancy,  187,  191 
Mayor-president.     See       mayor-com- 
missioner 

Mayors'  association,  35 
Mayor's  eye,  71,  96,  97 


228 


THE  AMERICAN  MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE 


[424 


McBain,  Howard  Lee,  146 

McCarthy,  mayor,   158 

McClellan,  George  B.,  152,  159,  166, 
174 

McCormick,  Vance,  111,  177ff 

McFarland,   Horace  J.,   178 

Meetings,  special,  of  council,  120, 
196,  219 

Memphis,  45 

Mendota,  111.,  68 

Merit  system,  81ff 

Merriam,  C.  E.,  48,  204 

Message,  of  mayor,  12 Iff;  of  city 
manager,  201 

Michigan,  39,  90,  94,  102,  108,  147 

Miller,  John  F.,  122 

Milwaukee,  90,  117 

Minneapolis,  48,  53,  65,  68,  90,  104, 
109,  165,  178 

Minnesota,  107 

Mississippi,  38 

Missouri,  39,  70,  107,  108,  186 

Mitchel,  John  Purroy,  74,  76,  82,  83, 
99,  100,  104,  110,  111,  112,  140, 
143,  144,  147,  158,  160,  166,  173ff 

Model  charter.  See  National  Mu- 
nicipal League 

Moderator,    23 

Montana,  41,  62 

Montesquieu,  117 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  188 

Montrose,  Colo.,  200,  209,  210,  211, 
213,  215,  217,  220 

Municipal  Corporations  Act,   19,  94 

Municipal  Voters  League,  157 

Munro,  W.  B.,  47,  48,  61,  85,  124, 
125,  128,  134,  137,  138,  139 

Nashville,   Tenn.,   45,   178 

National  Municipal  League,  (model 
charter),  15,  40,  56,  78,  82,  94,  95, 
138,  157,  196,  199,  201,  202,  205, 
207,  209,  218,  219,  220,  221 

Nebraska,  39,  62,  183,  184,  186,  188, 
192 

Newark,  N.  J.,  118 

New  Britain,  Conn.,  50 


New  Jersey,  22,  52,  183,  185,  188, 
196 

New  Orleans,  183,  185,  190,  191, 
193,  195 

Newport,  E.  I.,  92 

Newton,  Mass.,  90 

New  York,  22,  52,  56,  82,  107,  145, 
146,  162,  186,  192,  200,  202,  203, 
210,  216 

New  York  City,  12,  22,  27,  29,  32, 
38,  39,  42,  49,  50,  62,  65,  67,  68, 
70,  72,  74,  76,  79,  80,  82,  86,  87, 
92,  94,  96,  100,  102,  103,  104,  105, 
107,  109,  110,  113,  115,  116,  120, 
121,  127,  128,  129,  132,  133,  136, 
138,  142,  143,  144,  145,  147,  152, 
159,  165.  See  Gaynor,  Low,  Mc- 
Clellan,  Mitchel 

Niagara  Falls,  N.  Y.,  213 

Nieolls,  Colonel,  22 

Nomination,  of  mayor,  44ff,  59,  72; 
of  mayor-commissioner,  184ff ; 
English  system,  47 

Norfolk,  Va.,  55,  56,  65,  91,  133 

Norris,  George  W.,  78 

North  Carolina,  22,  106,   133 

North  Dakota,  129,  130,  133,  135, 
183 

Oakland,  Calif.,  183,  185,  187,  192^ 
193 

Oath,  203;  of  mayor,  70;  of  mayor- 
commissioner,  190;  of  city  man- 
ager, 206 

Office  holding,  of  mayor,  42 ;  of  may- 
or-commissioner, 184;  of  city 
manager,  206 

Office  hours,  of  mayor,  71;  of  may- 
or-commissioner, 191 

Ohio,  56,  106,  107,  147,  178,  183,  200 

Oklahoma,  183,  187 

Oklahoma  City,  183,  187,  191,  195, 
196 

Olson,  Judge,  160 

Omaha,   128,  156 

O'Neall,  Charles  F.,  122 

Oregon,  39 


425] 


INDEX 


229 


Pardon,  by  mayor,  107 

Party,  43,  46,  140;  primary,  44,  48. 

See  politics 

Pasadena,  Calif.,  183,  187 
Pawtucket,  R.  I.,  90 
Pennsylvania,    22,    42,    63,    65,    152, 

184,  185,  192,   195,  196 
Pensacola,  Fla.,  185,  187,  188 
Perrine,  Win.,  172 
Petition,    to   elect   mayor,   44ff,   51, 

72 ;     mayor-commissioner,     184ff ; 

to    recall    mayor,    56,    57ff;    city 

manager,  208 
Philadelphia,  12,  27,  38,  39,  41,  50, 

51,   61,  68,   70,  74,   78,  110,  117, 

128,  151,  153,  154.     See  Blanken- 

burg 
Phoenix,  Ariz.,   199,   200,   201,   202, 

203,  207,   209,  210,  213,  215,  217 
Pittsburgh,  30,  39,  41,  51,  117 
Plurality.     See  election 
Pocket  veto.     See  veto 
Police,  102ff,  178,  202,  211,  216 
Politics,  and  mayor,  149ff;  and  may- 
or-commissioner,    197;     and    city 

manager,  213.     See  party 
Popular   election.     See   election 
Portland,  Me.,  Ill,  170,  178 
Portland,  Ore.,  39,  40,  183,  184,  185, 

187,  188,  189,  190,  191,  192,  193, 

194,  196 

Powers.     See  mayor,  mayor-commis- 
sioner, city  manager,  council 
Preferential  voting,   50ff,   184,   186, 

191 

President.     See  city  manager 
President  of   council.     See  council 
Presiding    officer,    mayor,    64,    128; 

mayor-commissioner,      196 ;       city 

manager,  201 
Primary,  direct,  44,  45,  48ff ,  72,  184 ; 

party,  44,  48ff;  closed,  48;  open, 

49 
Property  qualification  of  mayor,  41; 

of  mayor-commissioner,  183 
Providence,  B.  I.,  90,  124,  153,  158 


Publicity  and  efficiency  commission, 

96 
Public  safety,  102ff 

Qualifications,  for  mayor,  37ff;  for 
mayor-commissioner,  183;  for  city 
manager,  205 

Qualified  voters,  49.     See  veto 

Qualifying   election,    184 

Quiney,  Josiah,  25ff,  73,  76,  95,  125, 
140,  165,  179 

Quiney,  Mass.,  117,  121,  131,  132 

Recall,  of  mayor,  52,  57ff ;  of  mayor- 
commissioner,  186;  of  city  mana- 
ger, 200,  207ff;  of  officers,  87, 
90.  See  election,  petition 

Recommendations  to  council.  See 
reports,  message 

Registration,   of  voters,  49,   208 

Reinsch,   94 

Removal,  of  mayor,  52ff,  67,  72;  of 
mayor-commissioner,  186;  of  city 
manager,  200,  207.  See  council, 
courts,  governor,  impeachment,  re- 
call, and  below 

Removal,  power  of  mayor,  30,  31, 
87ff,  112;  of  council,  53ff,  90,  93, 
189ff,  207;  of  mayor-commission- 
er, 192,  196 ;  of  city  manager,  211 ; 
of  governor,  52,  56ff 

Reports,  mayor,  98ff,  121;  of  may- 
or-commissioner, 196;  of  city 
manager,  201,  216,  219 

Residence,  of  mayor,  37ff,  44;  of 
mayor-commissioner,  183;  of  city 
manager,  205 

Responsibility,  of  voters,  46 ;  of  may- 
or, 32ff,  73ff 

Ripper  legislation,  150,  152 

Roberts,  Don,  55,  165 

Rochester,  38,  39,  42,  55,  64,  65,  95, 
100,  132,  144 

Rolph,  James,  Jr.,  55,  111,  178 

Roosevelt,  158 

Root,  Elihu,  73 


230 


THE  AMERICAN   MUNICIPAL  EXECUTIVE 


[426 


Eowe,  L.  S.,  Ill 

Eoyal  Commission  on  Municipal 
Government  of  Province  of  Brit- 
ish Columbia,  182,  194,  222 

Eyan,  Oswald,  222 

Safety,  public,  102ff 

Salary,  of  mayor,  67ff;  of  mayor- 
commissioner,  189ff;  of  city  man- 
ager, 201,  209 

Salem,  Mass.,  50,  195 

Salpulpa,  Okla.,  196 

San  Diego,  Calif.,  196 

Sandusky,  Ohio,  200,  205,  207,  210, 
212,  215,  216 

San  Francisco,  38,  41,  43,  49,  55, 
59,  65,  68,  71,  75,  76,  80,  88,  92, 
93,  99,  102,  103,  104,  120,  128, 
133,  135,  165.  See  Eolph 

San  Jose,  Calif.,  200,  210 

Schmitz,  Eugene,  165 

Scranton,  Pa.,  54,  80 

Seattle,  41,  48,  53,  54,  59,  64,  65, 
67,  72,  80,  102,  103,  106,  116,  120, 
121,  124,  129,  132,  133,  135.  See 
Cotterill 

Sehon,  John,  122 

Selective  veto.     See  veto 

Separation  of  powers,  28,  117 

Sheriff,  22,  102,  203 

Sherman,  Texas,  200,  203 

Signature,  to  petitions,  46,  208;  pow- 
er of,  109,  131ff,  196 

Sikes,  George  C.,  204 

Smith,  Wm.,  22 

Somerville,  Mass.,  121,  131 

South  Carolina,  22 

South  Dakota,  39 

Spokane,  184,  185,  187,  188 

Springfield,  Ohio,  200,  202,  203,  205, 
207,  210,  214,  215,  216,  217,  220 

St.  Augustine,  Fla.,  200,  205,  206, 
207,  209,  210,  211,  214,  215,  217, 
219,  220 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  38,  39,  40,  41,  42,  53, 
59,  61,  64,  65,  69,  70,  71,  80,  81, 
89,  93,  96,  98,  99,  100,  102,  104, 


105,  106,  107,  109,  117,  120,  125, 

127,  130,  131,  132,  133,  135,  144,  - 

162 
St.  Paul,  Minn.,  48,  50,  51,  183,  188, 

190,  191,  192,  193,  194,.  196 
Stanwood,    Edward,    45 
Staunton,  Va.,  204 
Steffens,  Lincoln,  167,  168 
Succession,    of    mayor,    42;    of    city 

manager,  208.     See  vacancy 
Suffrage,  40,  44 
Sumptuary  legislation,  107,  108 
Sumter,  S.  C.,  204,  205,  206,  207 
Superior,  Wis.,  87,  92,  98 
Suspension,  power  of,  92ff,  193,  207, 

211 

Suspensive  veto.     See  veto 
Sweitzer,  160 

Tacoma,  75,  95 

Taft,  W.  H.,  158 

Taylor,  Texas,  206,  207,  208,  209, 
210,  215,  216,  220 

Tennessee,  45,  52,  133 

Term,  of  mayor,  31,  61ff,  72;  of 
mayor-commissioner,  187,  191;  of 
city  manager,  200,  208 

Terre  Haute,  Indiana,  55,  91,  165 

Texas,  38,  39,  134,  195,  196,  205 

Thompson,  Wm.  B.,  178,  179 

Thompson,  Wm.  Hale,   82,   160 

Thum,  Wm.,  122 

Tie.     See  vote 

Tiedeman,  George  W.,  122 

Timanus,  mayor,  153 

Toledo,  Ohio,  32,  50,  51,  80,  87,  88, 
89,  96,  97,  99,  101,  102,  104,  105, 
118,  125,  127,  130,  135.  See  Sam- 
uel Jones,  Whitlock 

Toulmin,  H.   A.,  204,  222 

Tulsa,  Okla.,  196 

Tyler,  Texas,  207,  208,  209,  210 

Tyson,  Eobert,  186 

Utah,  45,  187 
Utica,  N.  Y.,  68,  130 
Utterback,  J.  G.,  122 


427] 


INDEX 


231 


Vacancy,  of  mayor,  63ff;  of  mayor- 
commissioner,  187ff,  191;   of  eity 
manager,  201,  209 
Van  Wyck,  62,  159 
Veto 

Absolute,  29,  136ff 
Of  city  manager,  201,  218 
Of  governor,   147 
Of  mayor,  24,  29,  32,  131ff,  144ff 
Of  mayor-commissioner,  196ff 
Pocket,  134ff,  143 
Qualified,  29,  134,  135ff,  196 
Selective,   29,  32,   134,   135,   196 
Suspensive,   134,   144ff,   196 
Threat  of,  137 

Virginia,  22,  55,  56,  200,  210,  216 
Vote 

Of  mayor,  130,  131;  of  mayor- 
commissioner,  185,  197;  of  city 
manager,  201,  218,  220;  of  com- 
missions, 186 

For  removal  of  mayor,  53;  of 
mayor-commissioner,  186 ;  of 
city  manager,  208;  of  officers, 
89ff,  93 

Tie,  51,  128,  130,  197,  201 
See  election,  removal 


Waco,  Texas,  189 

Waite,  H.  M.,  212,  213,  218 

Waltham,  Mass.,  90 

Water  department,  103ff 

Weaver,  John,  151 

West  Virginia,  52 

Wheeling,  W.  Va.,  202,  210,  213 

White,   152 

Whitlock,  Brand,  32,  102,  104,  111, 

155,  158,  162,  167ff,  176,  178,  179 
Whitman,    governor,    147 
Willis,  governor,  57 
Wilmington,  Del.,  184 
Wilmington,   N.    C.,    185,   188,    190, 

192,  193,  198 

Wilson,  Clifford  B.,  141,  142 
Wilson,   mayor    (Chicago),   154 
Wisconsin,  49,   53,  62,  64,  65,  121, 

129,  130,  135,  186 
Witnesses,  95ff,  193 
Woodruff,  C.  E.,  194 
Worcester,  Mass.,  90 

Young,  Mrs.,  143 

Youngstown,  Ohio,  201,  202,  205,  206 


"-'        y 


